

Introduction: Turkey's International Migration in Transition

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Traditionally, Turkey has been known as a country of emigration. Starting from the early 1960s and well into the 1970s, large numbers of Turkish nationals migrated to western European countries, particularly West Germany. This emigration continued until recent times through family reunification schemes and applying for asylum the asylum track. However, more recently, Turkey has also become a country of transit for irregular migrants from Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan who are trying to reach the western world. Turkey is also becoming a destination country for EU professionals and retirees as well as regular and irregular migrants from former Soviet Bloc countries. Furthermore, a growing numbers of transit migrants are stranded in Turkey. Finally, Turkey is also a country of refuge for asylum seekers coming from neighbouring Middle East countries and beyond. The combination of Turkey's status as a 'transition country' as well as its efforts to become a member of the EU is creating pressures for an overhaul of Turkey's immigration policies.¹

¹ For an earlier and detailed discussion over the term "migration transition", see, for instance, Castles (1998, 2007) and Castles and Miller (1997).

EMIGRATION IN TRANSITION

The first half of the twentieth century was very much marked by state and nation building, generating large waves of forced migrations and “un-mixing” of peoples of Europe as well as of beyond Europe (Marcus, 1985).² Turkey’s case was not much different. In the final days of the Ottoman Empire and the first two decades of the Turkish Republic, the country’s non-Muslim minority populations experienced mass emigration. Pull and push factors culminated in the majority of the members of non-Muslim communities to migrate to various countries around the globe (Akgündüz, 1998; Loizos, 1999; İçduygu et. al., 2008). In turn Turkey saw the arrival of large numbers of Muslims belonging to a range of ethnic groups from the Balkans. As a result of the “un-mixing” that took place, the demographic composition of the population of the Republic was substantially different from that of the empire it replaced. As Keyder (1987: 79) notes, ‘...before the war, one out of every five persons living in present-day Turkey was non-Muslim, after the war, only one out of forty persons was non-Muslim’. While in the 1920s the population of non-Muslims in the country was close to three percent of the total, today it has dropped to less than two per 1,000 (İçduygu et al., 2008: 358) (see Table 1).

TABLE 1
Muslim and non-Muslim Population in Turkey, 1914-2005 (in thousands)

Year	1914	1927	1945	1965	1990	2005
Muslims	12,941	13,290	18,511	31,139	56,860	71,997
Greeks	1,549	110	104	76	8	3
Armenians	1,204	77	60	64	67	50
Jews	128	82	77	38	29	27
Others	176	71	38	74	50	45
Total	15,998	13,630	18,790	31,391	57,014	72,122
Percentage of non-Muslims	19,1	2,5	1,5	0,8	0,3	0,2

Sources: From 1914 to 1965, Ottoman and Turkish censuses and statistical abstracts; from 1990 to 2005, personal communication of the (opinion) leaders of non-Muslim communities to the authors.

2 For the notion of state formation provoking forced migrations, see Zolberg (1983).

Until the Second World War, emigration from Turkey by and large resulted from the out-mobility of its non-Muslim populations. They had a mostly urban as well as middle or upper class background. In the second half of the twentieth century, Turkey went through a massive economic and political transformation (Ahmad, 1993). This precipitated an ever growing proportion of Turkish rural population to move to urban centers beginning in the early 1950s.³ This was, within a decade, accompanied by large-scale Turkish labor emigration to Europe that started as a result of an Agreement signed by the Turkish and West German governments in 1961.⁴ The pact aimed to provide the booming German economy with temporary unskilled labor, while thinning the ranks of Turkey's unemployed. Turkey signed similar agreements with other European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, and Sweden. It was expected that these 'guest workers' would return to Turkey with new skills and help reorient the Turkish economy from an economy based on rural agriculture to industry. However, many of them tended to settle down and bring their families to join them. Furthermore, it was often skilled laborers that ended up emigrating rather than the unskilled ones. The economic downturn in Western Europe in the 1970s ended the recruitment of labor from Turkey. However Turkish emigration to Europe continued through family reunification and family formation (see **Table 2**). Today, the number of Turkish nationals migrating to Europe is put at less than 50,000 (the net figure is even less when the number of migrants returning to Turkey is deducted) (İçduygu, 2006b).

In the late 1960s, the Turkish government, under pressure from growing unemployment, quickly began a search for new markets to sustain the labor exporting process. Indeed, Turkish emigration to Australia as well as to Arab countries started under these circumstances (İçduygu, 1991) (see **Table 2**). The timing of the bilateral labor recruitment agreement with Australia in 1967 reflected the efforts of

3 For a detailed elaboration of the rural-urban migration flows in Turkey, see Baydar (1998).

4 For an extensive coverage of labor emigration see Abadan-Unat (2002).

TABLE 2
Turkish Labor Migration by Destination, 1961-2005

Host Countries	1961-1974		1975-1980		1981-1990		1991-1995		1996-2000		2001-2005		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Europe	790,017	97,5	13,426	12,8	2,612	0,6	96,47	2,8	10,465	9,3	16,561	9,1	842,728	42,4
Arab Countries	2,441	0,3	74,181	70,6	423,208	97,7	208,274	60,4	32,195	28,5	57,974	31,9	798,273	40,2
Australia	5,806	0,7	2,647	2,5	2,478	0,6	1,324	0,4	515	0,5	176	0,1	12,946	0,7
CIS Countries							115	0,0	65,321	58,0	89,623	49,3	155,259	7,8
Others	12,235	1,5	14,792	14,1	4,875	1,1	125,238	36,3	4,256	3,8	17,533	9,6	178,929	9,0
Total	810,499	100	105,046	100	433,173	100	344,598	100	112,952	100	181,867	100	1,988,135	100

Source: Compiled by İctiygu (2006), based on various official sources in Turkey.

the Turkish emigration strategy of “falling back on another country if one showed signs of saturation and diminished absorption ability” in another (Bahadır, 1979). There was, of course, a significant contrast between the migration policies of Turkey and Australia at that time. While Australian immigration policy was based upon the expectation of permanent settlement of immigrants, Turkish emigration policy was guestworker-oriented. The signing of a migration agreement with Australia was a new step undertaken to maintain the continuity of emigration.

Europe's recession in the mid-1970s coincided with an economic boom in the Middle East. This allowed the Turkish government to channel labor emigration to countries such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq as Turkish companies obtained major infrastructural construction projects (İçduygu and Sirkeci, 1998) (see **Table 2**). This emigration almost never involved family reunification. The Turkish presence in Iraq (and to a lesser extent, in other Arab countries) was reduced by the 1991 Gulf War. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union an increasing number of Turkish companies won construction and industrial contracts in the Russian Federation and other parts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This created employment opportunities for Turkish workers, engineers, and managers (see **Table 2**) and was accompanied by a growing number of small businesses, often in the form of bakeries and restaurants, set up by Turkish businessmen in these countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania.

Since the early 1980s, asylum seekers have been heading for Western Europe, fleeing from the consequences of the Turkish military intervention in civilian politics and the increase in the violence surrounding efforts to suppress the PKK⁵, a separatist Kurdish movement in south eastern Turkey. According to the United Nations High Commission of Refugees' (UNHCR) statistics, between 1981 and 2005

5 The abbreviation of PKK refers to “Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan” (Kurdistan Workers' Party).

over 664,000 Turkish citizens applied for asylum, mostly in various European countries (see Table 3). The refugee recognition rates varied from country to country but have been very low as there were many who tried to make fraudulent use of the asylum channel to emigrate. Since the worst of the conflict between the armed forces and the PKK wound down in the second half of the 1990s, and following the gradual introduction of political reforms, asylum applications have fallen. However, an unidentified number of Turkish nationals, often of Kurdish origin, continued to attempt to enter EU countries illegally in search of jobs.

Today, it is estimated that there are approximately 3.3 million Turkish nationals living abroad, of whom about 2.7 million are in European countries. This is a substantial increase from 770,000 in the mid 1970s cited by Abadan-Unat (2002: 48). There are also some 100,000 Turkish workers in the Arab countries, some 60,000 immigrants in Australia, and over 75,000 workers in the CIS countries (see Table 4). In addition to these, there exists also more than a quarter million Turkish migrants in Canada and the United States. Thus, the equivalent of some six percent of today's Turkish population is residing abroad. There are also another almost 800,000 Turkish nationals that have taken up the citizenship of their host countries between 1991 and 2005 (see Table 5). This makes the Turks in Europe the largest immigrant community and a target for anti-immigrant feelings and xenophobia. Against this background there are many in Europe who fear the arrival of further migration from Turkey if Turkey were to become a member of the EU. This fear is further aggravated by the social and cultural difficulties that Turkish immigrants encounter in integrating into the host societies. A significant proportion of second and third generation Turks abroad do poorly, especially in respect to education and employment. However there is a growing Turkish immigrant civil society in Europe which increasingly addresses the integration problems of the Turkish communities in major European countries.⁶

6 See for instance articles in the special issue of journal *Turkish Studies* by Erzan and Kirişçi (2006); see also Kaya and Kentel (2005).

TABLE 3
Turkish Asylum-seekers by Destination, 1981-2005

Destination	1981-1985		1986-1990		1991-1995		1996-2000		2001-2005		1981-2005	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Europe	45,620		185,797		175,557	98,6	141,226	97,9	107,534	97,2	655,734	98,7
Canada				0,4	755	0,4	1,919	1,3	2,451	2,2	5,125	0,8
Australia				0,4	780	0,4	928	0,6	332	0,3	2,040	0,3
USA				0,6	984	0,6	199	0,1	330	0,3	1,513	0,2
Total				100,0	178,076	100,0	144,272	100,0	110,647	100,0	664,412	100,0

Source: Figures are compiled by İcduygu (2006) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat.

TABLE 4
Turks Changing Citizenship in Europe by Country, 1991-2002

Country	1991-1993		1994-1996		1997-1999		2000-2002		1991-2002	
	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%
Germany	20,3	27,8	97,0	42,7	129,1	56,8	159,4	63,4	405,8	52,1
Austria	4,7	6,4	6,6	2,9	7,8	3,4	18,3	7,2	37,4	4,8
Belgium	7,2	9,9	13,0	5,7	17,5	7,7	31,7	12,6	69,4	8,9
Denmark	1,1	1,5	2,6	1,1	5,4	2,4	5,9	2,3	15,0	1,9
France	2,8	3,8	8,8	3,9	14,5	6,4	13,8	5,5	39,9	5,1
The Netherlands	29,5	40,4	87,6	38,5	39,9	17,6	10,2	4,1	167,2	21,5
The UK	0,2	0,3	0,5	0,2	2,0	0,9	2,5	1,0	5,2	0,7
Sweden	5,8	7,9	7,6	3,3	4,9	2,2	4,2	1,7	22,5	2,9
Switzerland	1,4	1,9	3,6	1,6	6,2	2,7	6,2	2,5	17,4	2,2
Total	73,0	100,0	227,3	100,0	227,3	100,0	252,5	100,0	779,8	100,0

Source: Figures are compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat.

TABLE 5
Turkish Migrant Stock Abroad in mid-1980s, mid-1990s and mid-2000s

	Mid-1980s		Mid-1990s		Mid-2000s	
	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%	# (x1000)	%
Austria	75,0	3,1	147,0	4,4	127,0	3,8
Belgium	72,5	3,1	79,5	2,4	45,9	1,4
France	146,1	6,2	198,9	6,0	208,0	6,3
Germany	1400,1	59,3	2049,9	62,0	1912,0	57,9
Netherlands	156,4	6,6	127,0	3,8	160,3	4,9
Scandinavian Countries	41,2	1,7	73,0	2,2	51,6	1,6
Switzerland	51,0	2,2	79,0	2,4	79,5	2,4
Other European Countries	42,0	1,8	87,0	2,6	130,0	3,9
Total Europe	1984,6	84,0	2841,3	85,9	2714,3	82,1
Arab Countries	200,0	8,5	127,0	3,8	105,0	3,2
Australia	35,0	1,5	45,0	1,4	60,0	1,8
CIS Countries	0,0	0,0	50,0	1,4	75,0	2,3
Other Countries	140,0	5,9	245,0	7,4	350,0	10,6
Total	2359,6	100,0	3308,3	100,0	3304,3	100,0

Source: Figures are compiled by İçduygu (2006) from various sources of OECD and Eurostat.

Furthermore, there is also a growing recognition that host societies need to make an effort to encourage integration. There are also economic studies suggesting that the number of Turkish nationals that might actually migrate to EU countries if membership with full freedom of movement were to occur is much less than what the general public fears (Erzan et. al., 2006). In addition, demographic studies show that by the year 2025, the economically active layer of the Turkish population (15-64 years of age) will start shrinking in proportion to the rest of the population (Behar, 2006). The mean age of this group will also be getting older. Hence, it is likely that in a growing Turkish economy it might become difficult to find large numbers of people prepared to migrate. Furthermore, those who will migrate will probably be the better educated. Finally, like in the case of Greece and Spain, it is possible that by then Turkey would have completed its 'migration transition' and become a net immigration country.

IMMIGRATION IN TRANSITION

The founding fathers of the Turkish Republic were very concerned about boosting the population of the country which in the 1920s stood at around 13 million, compared to 16 million in 1914 (Courbage and Fargues, 1998: 128). They were also concerned about creating a homogenous sense of national identity in an otherwise ethnically and culturally diverse country. This was very much driven by a deep-seated belief that the Ottoman Empire had collapsed because of its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural nature (Ahmad, 1993). Exclusive priority was therefore given to encouraging and accepting immigrants that were either Muslim Turkish speakers, or who were officially considered to belong to ethnic groups that would easily melt into a Turkish identity such as Bosnians, Circassians, Pomaks, and Tatars from the Balkans (Kirişçi, 1996; 2000). From the establishment of Turkey in 1923 to 1997, more than 1.6 million immigrants came and settled in Turkey (see Table 6). These immigrants were successfully assimilated.

TABLE 6
Number of People Who Migrated to Turkey; by Region Between 1923-1997

Country	1923-1939	1940-1945	1946-1997	Total
Bulgaria	198,688	15,744	603,726	818,158
Greece	384	-	25,889	84,431
Romania	117,095	4,201	1,266	122,562
Yugoslavia	115,427	1,671	188,6	428,26
Turkistan	-	-	2,878	2,878
Others	7,998	1,005	8,631	17,634
Total	823,208	22,621	830,99	=1,676,819

Source: Compiled from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI.

After the 1970s, immigration began to be discouraged on the grounds that Turkey's population had grown enough and that land to distribute to immigrants had become scarce. Nevertheless, immigration did continue. In fact, the last major wave of immigration occurred when

more than 300,000 Turks and Pomaks were expelled from Bulgaria in 1989. A third of these refugees returned soon after the regime change in Bulgaria in 1990 as the Cold War came to end, while the rest acquired Turkish citizenship. Since Bulgaria's recent accession to the EU, more and more of these immigrants as well as Turks of Bulgarian origin have been reclaiming Bulgarian citizenship in order to obtain the right to travel to Bulgaria and other EU countries without a visa.

Beginning in the early 1990s, Turkey has witnessed a new form of immigration involving nationals of neighboring countries, EU nationals, and transit illegal migrants (İçduygu, 2006b). Turkey allows nationals of Iran, the former Soviet Union as well as of Balkan countries to enter the country quite freely, either without visas or with visas that can easily be obtained at airports and other entry points (Kirişçi, 2005). In 2007 there were almost 7.2 million people from the Balkans and the ex-Soviet world that entered Turkey, in 1980 the figure was under 100,000 (see **Tables 7 and 8**). Some of these people overstay their visa in Turkey and become involved in prostitution or work illegally on construction sites as well as in households looking after the children or elderly parents of professionals in large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. In 2002 the government introduced new legislation that has made it a little easier for foreign nationals to work as household help and in the tourism industry.

It is very difficult to estimate the number of irregular immigrants in Turkey. However, figures ranging from 150,000 to 1,000,000 are often cited (İçduygu, 2006b). To these groups must be added trafficked persons, particularly women. In August 2002, the government introduced new articles to the Penal Code criminalizing human smuggling and trafficking. It instituted stricter controls at borders and ports. In the meantime a project was put into action in cooperation with an NGO to bring social assistance for victims of trafficking. Currently there are two shelters for victims of trafficking, one in Istanbul and another one in Ankara. In May 2005, the police in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

TABLE 7
Entry of Persons From the Soviet Union and Former Soviet Republics Between 1964 and 2005

	1964	1970	1980	1990	1996	2000	2005
Soviet Union	414	4,824	40,015	222,537	1,235,290	677,152	1,855,900
Russia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Central Asian Turkic States							
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	31,373	38,939	106,167
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	-	8,052	8,789	31,017
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	3,087	952	6,811
Turkmenistan	-	-	-	-	5,035	10,987	34,292
Subtotal	0	0	0	0	1,196,395	757,881	2,058,821
South Caucasus							
Armenia	-	-	-	-	5,345	17,549	36,633
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-	100,249	179,878	411,111
Georgia	-	-	-	-	116,709	179,563	367,148
Subtotal	-	-	-	-	222,303	376,990	814,892
Western Newly Independent States (NIS)							
Belarus	-	-	-	-	474	9,622	77,029
Moldova	-	-	-	-	8,290	62,687	89,849
Ukraine	-	-	-	-	93,794	173,551	367,103
Subtotal	-	-	-	-	102,558	245,860	533,981
Total	414	4,824	40,015	222,537	1,621,256	1,380,731	3,407,694
General Total	229,347	724,754	1,057,364	2,301,250	8,538,864	10,428,153	20,275,213

Source: Compiled from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI and State Statistical Institute Annual Reports.

TABLE 8
Entry of Persons From the Neighbouring Balkan and Middle Eastern Neighbouring States, 1964-2007

Middle East	1964	1970	1980	1990	1996	2000	2003	2005	2007
Iran	12,796	14,247	42,082	219,958	379,003	380,819	484,269	957,244	1,057,987
Iraq	3,919	6,518	14,046	13,372	14,137	20,776	29,94	107,972	180,208
Syria	9,996	13,184	26,384	113,959	92,033	122,417	154,108	287,343	331,368
Gulf States	-	-	-	43,088	40,029	19,537	43,503	62,648	76,603
Pakistan	1,961	7,383	4,8	7,347	12,41	7,908	12,336	11,698	21,084
Subtotal	28,672	41,332	87,312	397,724	537,612	551,457	724,156	1,426,905	1,667,250
Balkans									
Albania	-	-	-	1,924	20,971	29,748	32,682	50,513	56,955
Bosnia	-	-	-	-	12,115	28,631	35,119	44,716	50,376
Bulgaria	693	18,214	26,523	-	139,648	381,545	1,007,535	1,620,939	1,238,280
Greece	3,042	11,313	19,477	203,72	147,553	218,092	368,425	548,268	404,847
Macedonia	-	-	-	-	41,269	108,928	117,819	119,157	93,672
Romania	-	-	-	352,034	191,203	265,128	184,182	201,807	388,132
Serbia-Montenegro	-	-	-	-	44,6	128,383	186,423	175,294	140,237
Yugoslavia	5,661	28,352	13,817	296,843	-	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	9396	57,879	59,817	854,521	597,359	1,160,455	1,932,185	2,760,694	2,372,499
Total	38,068	99,211	147,129	1,252,245	1,134,971	1,711,912	2,656,341	4,187,599	4,039,749
General Total	229,347	724,754	1,057,364	2,301,250	8,538,864	10,428,153	13,461,420	20,275,213	22,249,775

Source: Compiled from data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI and State Statistical Institute Annual Reports.

launched an awareness campaign and opened a telephone hotline for victims of trafficking.

Another problem that has confronted Turkey has been illegal transit migration. It is very difficult to estimate the actual number of illegal migrants that are transiting through Turkey. Between 1995 and 2007, the Turkish authorities apprehended more than 336,000 nationals of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (see Table 9). The Turkish government has been under massive pressure

TABLE 9
Breakdown by Nationality of Illegal Immigrants Arrested by
Turkish Security Forces, 1995-2007

Country of origin	Number of people
Afghanistan	44,525
Bangladesh	20,683
Palestine	13,064
Iran	26,327
Iraq	123,508
Pakistan	57,7
Somali	15,901
Syria	9,527
Unknown Origin	24,991
Sub-total	336,226
North Africa*	12,45
Former Soviet Republics**	133,607
Central Asian Countries***	12,901
Albania	4,496
Bulgaria	11,446
Romania	23,335
Turkey	33,322
EU	57,766
Others	105,644
Total	696,412

(*) Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia

(**) Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus

(***) Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior (MOI).

from a number of EU member countries to curb transit migration. Furthermore, the European Commission has been trying hard to get Turkey to negotiate and conclude a readmission treaty. Such a treaty would make it possible for EU member countries to send back illegal migrants that have transited Turkey. In turn, the Turkish government is trying to sign similar agreements with the governments of countries from where most illegal transit migrants come from (Kirişçi, 2007).

Finally there is an increasing number of EU member-state nationals, professionals as well as retirees, who are settling in Turkey, particularly in Istanbul and some of the Mediterranean resorts.⁷ They too constitute a relatively new phenomenon in terms of immigration into Turkey, and their numbers are estimated to be around 100,000 to 120,000. In 2006, according to figures provided by the Directorate of General Security, there were over 187,000 foreigners who resided in Turkey with residence permits. While 18 percent of them were people with work permits and 13 percent were students, the remaining portion of foreigners with residence permits were mostly people who are the dependants of working and studying foreigners (İçduygu, 2007).

ASYLUM IN TRANSITION

Turkey is also a country of asylum, and is among the original signatories of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, Turkey, together with Monaco, Congo and Madagascar, is among the only remaining countries that maintain a 'geographical limitation'. Accordingly, Turkey does not grant refugee status to asylum seekers coming from outside Europe and maintains a two-tiered asylum policy. The first tier of this policy is centered on Europe and is deeply rooted in Turkey's role as a western ally neighboring the Soviet Union during the Cold War. During that period, in close co-operation with the UNHCR, Turkey received refugees from the Communist Bloc countries in Europe, including the Soviet Union. Such refugees, during

7 For a detailed elaboration of the retirement migration to the the Mediterranean resorts in Turkey, see for instances, Unutulmaz (2007), Kaiser and İçduygu (2005).

their stay in Turkey, enjoyed all the rights provided for in the Convention. However, only a very small number were allowed to stay in Turkey, and many who stayed did so as a result of marriages that took place with Turkish nationals. The rest were mostly resettled to the United States and Canada. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate statistics on their numbers, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) has indicated that some 13,500 asylum seekers benefited from the protection of the Convention between 1970 and the end of the Cold War. In addition, approximately 20,000 Bosnians were granted temporary asylum in Turkey during hostilities between 1992 and 1995 in the former Yugoslavia. Since the adoption of the Dayton Peace Plan, many of these refugees steadily returned to Bosnia. In 1998 and 1999, approximately 18,000 Kosovars fled to Turkey and enjoyed protection from the ethnic strife in their homeland. The majority have returned (Kirişci, 2001: 75-76).

The second tier of Turkey's asylum policy deals with people arriving from outside Europe. The new policy emerged after the Iranian Revolution in 1980 and subsequent to the growing instability in the Middle East, Africa, and south-east Asia in the late 1980s. This led to the composition of asylum seekers to change. For a long time, the government allowed the UNHCR considerable leeway to temporarily shelter these asylum seekers, with the tacit understanding that they would be resettled out of Turkey if the UNHCR recognized them as refugees. The understanding was also that those whose claims were rejected would be deported. However, the growth in the number of illegal entries into Turkey and in the number of rejected asylum seekers stranded in Turkey strained this practice. The situation was also aggravated by mass influxes of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq, in 1988 and 1991, which amounted to almost half a million. It was against such a background that the government introduced a decree, the *Asylum Regulation*, in November 1994. The regulation aimed to bring status determination under the control of the Turkish government. It was primarily drafted out of national security concerns and

hence introduced strict measures governing access to asylum procedures, with little regard for the rights of refugees.

However, the situation began to improve by the late 1990s, with the UNHCR and the Turkish government returning to the close cooperation that had characterized their relationship up until 1994. The government introduced amendments to the asylum regulation to prevent deportations in violation of the 1951 Convention. Most importantly, in 1997 the way to judicial appeal was opened against deportation orders. In addition, training programs were run for police officers and other officials dealing with asylum issues. Lastly, the officials increasingly began to work with NGOs.

Turkey has been under pressure to align its asylum system with that of the European Union. This would require Turkey to lift the geographical limitation and introduced a fully fledged national asylum system. At a time when Europe is tightening its own asylum system, Turkish authorities are concerned that Turkey could become a buffer zone. Accompanied with increasing refugee pressures from Iraq, Somalia and Sudan, Turkey too has been tightening its asylum policy.

According to Turkish government statistics, there were approximately 3,500 to 4,000 asylum applicants filed a year between 1995 and 2007. During this period a total of more than 50,000 asylum applications were received and about 25,000 of them were recognized as refugees (see **Table 10**). The overwhelming majority of the recognized refugees continue to be resettled out of Turkey. Those whose applications are rejected are supposed to be deported to their countries of origin, but many go underground and stay in Turkey or try to move on to European countries illegally.

THE VOLUME

This first book of MiReKoc Migration Research Series aims to address in greater detail some of the issues that arise as a result of Turkey becoming a “migration transition” country. It examines this develop-

TABLE 10
Applications Under the 1994 Asylum Regulation, 1995-2007

Country	Applications	Accepted cases	Rejected cases	Pending cases	Withdrawals and Secondary protection
Iraq	16,972	5,919	5,209	4,707	1,137
Iran	28,963	18,316	3,225	6,048	1,374
Afghanistan	1,48	312	280	860	28
Russia	80	15	43	15	7
Uzbekistan	231	70	76	73	12
Azerbaijan	36	3	24	1	8
Other Europe*	125	53	59	3	10
Other**	2,467	339	369	1,676	83
Total	50,364	25,027	9,285	13,393	2,659

(*) Includes Albania, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Switzerland, Ukraine and Yugoslavia

(**) Includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Birmania (Myanmar), Burma, Burundi, China, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Moritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United States of America, Yemen, Zaire

Source: Data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI.

ment and assesses some of its wider implications. These issues will be addressed by a new generation of promising Turkish researchers working on migration issues. The book is divided into two main parts, emigration from Turkey and immigration into Turkey.

Part I considers both historical and contemporary migratory flows from Turkey. It covers cases ranging from early twentieth century emigration of “Karamanlis” from Anatolia to Greece as well as the brain drain of Turkish professionals to the United States and the so-called guestworker experience of Turks in Germany. Renk Özdemir in her chapter draws attention to the continuous re-definition of identity borders involving the Karamanlis. The Karamanlis were members of the Greek Orthodox community in Anatolia who spoke Turkish and were included among the people that were exchanged with the

Muslims of Greece as a result of the mandatory population exchange stipulated in the 1923 Lausanne Convention. In an attempt to account for the continuous shift in the borders of belongingness to the Karmanli community identity before and after the Exchange, the study first takes an historical approach. It examines the dialectical relationship of this community to the ideological undercurrents taking place in the Ottoman Centre. This relationship is traced to the circumstances culminating in the final governmental 'decision' to include Karamanlis in the Exchange. Secondly, Özdemir in an effort to follow the spatial and socio-political rupture that the Karamanlis experienced, employs an anthropological approach and treats the information gathered from in-depth interviews with fifty Karamanlis to trace the complex re-identification processes. In so doing, Özdemir introduces the Mandatory Population Exchange to the literature as a metaphorical rite of passage. This enables her to account for the multiplicity of shifts in the borders of belongingness caused by a shift in one's socio-political setting and space.

In Chapter 3, Şebnem Koser Akçapar, looks at the dynamics of 'brain drain' from Turkey to the United States. The US has traditionally been the key recipient of Turkish professionals, scientists, as well as graduate and post-graduate students, a significant number of which tend not to return to Turkey. Excessive 'brain drain' or emigration of highly skilled individuals is considered an important negative factor for the intellectual, academic, and labor productivity of any given country. This general observation is also pertinent in the case of Turkey, which is a net exporter of skilled migrants. This is a feature of Turkish emigration that is often overlooked. A particular strength of this chapter is that it relies on on-site observation and analysis in both the destination country and country of origin. The chapter focused on mainly three groups of highly skilled people from Turkey: the first are those who came in the 1950s-60s and who settled in the US; the second group are young professionals who come to the U.S. for further studies and decide to stay after finding work; and the third are Turkish

doctoral students who have come in the last few years. The chapter questions the idea that all export of skilled individuals is inherently negative. Instead, it tries to show that migration of the highly skilled can produce balance between 'brain drain' and 'brain gain'.

Berlin can be considered the host city of the longest-standing Turkish emigrant community abroad. In Chapter 4, Levent Soysal focuses on the way in which the changing meaning and constitution of public events in Berlin interacts with the identity of migrants. He argues that the modes of immigrant participation in Berlin's public events reveal the elaborate connections between the social and cultural spaces of host and home countries. For the Turkish immigrants, these public spectacles occupy a significant place in ordering their everyday experiences in the social spaces of Berlin. This implicates them in a constant and often virtual movement between Turkey and Germany. At the heart of this study are the Carnival of Cultures, the May Day Parade, and the Turkish Day Parade, all of which attract significant participation of Turkish immigrants as audiences and performers. By subjecting public spectacles to anthropological analysis, Soysal aims to delineate the limits of identity as a concept and praxis, as well as tries to understand the changes in cultural production and civic participation in a world now imagined as increasingly "transnational and global."

A comparison of migrants and non-migrants often makes a powerful case for a better understanding of the impact that migratory context has over individuals. It is with this in mind that Bilge Yağmurlu in Chapter 5 investigates the role of education in long-term socialization goals of Turkish mothers. Results indicate that all mothers endorse goals that enhance both autonomy and relatedness. However, as predicted, low-educated mothers emphasize the importance of relatedness and compliance more than high-educated mothers. High-educated mothers report that they value autonomy and self-enhancement, as well as emphasize these goals more highly than low-educated mothers. This chapter reveals similarities between socializa-

tion goals of the low-educated and high-educated Turkish mothers regardless of whether these mothers are migrants or non-migrants. Accordingly, both groups of mothers share similar concerns regarding love, decency and self-control related socialization goals. Overall, the comparative findings show the relative salience of constructs of autonomy and relatedness in the long-term socialization goals of low-educated and high-educated mothers both in the migratory and non-migratory context. This points to the fact that education is a potent source of within-culture variance in the attributes mothers want their children to attain. Results also provide support for Kağıtçıbaşı's Family Change Model that sheds light on the variations in family structure and familial relationship patterns in different socio-cultural-economic contexts.

Yadigar Coşkun, and A. Sinan Türkyılmaz try to demonstrate in Chapter 6 that it is possible to make indirect estimations on the size of international migration into Turkey by using the 2000 Census data. Starting with the 1975 Census, the following question was asked to every household head: "how many members of this household who are not in the house now are (a) in the country, or (b) abroad?" The chapter with this question in mind, and assuming that the people who were abroad on the day of the 2000 Census and were reported as part of the households, attempts to estimate the number of emigrants. Coşkun, and Türkyılmaz recognize and discuss the difficulties associated with such an estimation but argue that this kind of an estimation can still be of use. This chapter also presents figures on the migratory flows considering the differentiations between the traditional five regions of Demographic and Health Surveys and for all three NUTS (The Nomenclature Units for Territorial Statistics) levels constructed by the State Planning Organization and State Institute of Statistics as part of the efforts of statistical adaptations to the European Union.

Part II covers a range of different categories and examples of recent immigration flows into Turkey and focuses thematically on their growing importance over the past two decades. Specifically, the

case studies in this part also point to some specific features that help to explain the dynamics and mechanisms of immigration into Turkey. In Chapter 7, A. Didem Daniş, Cherie Taraghi and Jean-François Pérouse refer to the period in which Turkey has acquired a central position in the international irregular migrations systems in the last decades and thus has become a crossing point on a regional and international scale. They elaborate the 'unofficial integration' models of four specific migrant groups in Istanbul, namely Iraqi, Afghan, Maghrebi and Iranian migrants. It is argued that given the weakness of state assistance and non-governmental organizations providing services for regular or irregular migrants, social networks have primary importance for migrants' survival and socio-economic incorporation in Turkey. The authors show how the migrants as soon as they arrive in Turkey become involved with informal reception mechanisms. The segmented incorporation of migrants via social networks is very precarious and contingent on policies as well as on the official treatment of foreigners in the country. Thus, such an incorporation, even though it is highly important for the survival of undocumented migrants, condemns the migrants to stay 'in limbo', unless a regularization in the migrants' status occurs. This chapter concludes that *de facto integration* of non-European migrants in Turkey may shed light on the mechanisms of socio-economic incorporation and thus contribute to the new policy making processes as well as the academic discussions.

In Chapter 8, Brewer and Yüksekler present a survey of the African migrants and asylum seekers in Istanbul. They show their demographic characteristics, their reasons for migration, as well as their living conditions and problems. This chapter draws a number of conclusions. It observes that there is an increase in the numbers of Africans who arrive in Turkey as transit migrants and asylum seekers. These Africans in Istanbul should not be considered as a homogeneous group. There are instead migrants from all over the continent, and their motivations for migration are diverse, though often characterized by efforts to reach Western Europe. However, the difficulty of getting

into Europe prolongs their stay in Turkey, leading them to engage in a variety of survival strategies. These strategies range from trying the asylum track with the hope to resettling out of Turkey, to seeking employment illegally while looking for means and ways of getting into EU. Finally, the chapter highlights how all these strategies are developed against a background of poor living conditions and extremely limited social services.

In Chapter 9, Selmin Kaşka focuses on the gender dimension of migration. She explores the new trends in the globalisation of household work in the Turkish context by focusing on female Moldovan domestic workers. In the last decade, these women migrants have joined the migration movements to Turkey mainly due to Moldova's geographical proximity, Turkey's liberal visa regulations and an informal vibrant labor market. Ethnicity also plays its role in the choice of Turkey as a destination country as most of the Moldovan women migrants are *Gagauz Turks*. This chapter also makes a contribution to better understanding how, in an informal economy, supply and demand for domestic work operates.

Finally, the concluding chapter lays out the challenges that are awaiting Turkey as a migration transition country. It also introduces a series of questions that might help to guide future research agendas.

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