Migration Studies: Eurasian Perspectives

Editors Merve Hazer Yiğit Uyar, Apak Kerem Altıntop, Yaşar Onay

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To Can and Deniz Kemal,
To Yaşar Apak,
And to our families...

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Preface

Notes on the Political Power of People on the Move and Data-Driven Policymaking

Emre Eren Korkmaz

It is clear that migrants have much less political power compared to citizens. The process of acquiring a new identity as a result of the migration, traumas experienced by some, problems in adapting to a new country, and in particular, the delay in acquiring citizenship rights and opportunities for democratic participation prevent the emergence of a grassroots movement. Moreover, issues such as widespread anti-immigrant and anti-refugee feeling in many destination countries, aided by current political developments; legitimization of racist and discriminatory policies when applied against foreigners; the denial, under the disguise of border security, of many of the rights granted by international law to refugees and asylum seekers; and anti-immigration platforms adopted by ruling and opposition parties in many countries weaken the position of migrants, refugees, and their advocates.

Large numbers of people, who have been employed in various industries for decades, who pay taxes, are consumers and carry out their obligations are however unable to fully participate in the political process because of limitations and requirements of citizenship policies. In some cases they are even barred from having a say in local administration. Representation and participation processes are however not limited to voting or being represented in the central or local administration. For instance, many Turkey-origin immigrants who are unable to vote in municipal elections can be elected as worker representatives of their workplace or the local branch and distinguish themselves as outstanding political figures, as they speak on behalf of all workers.

Capitalist economies, on the one hand, need migrant flows as a source of cheap labour and a reserve army of labour; on the other hand, they try to manage flows of migration. However, migrants refuse to play this passive role. The desire to live in better conditions, or at the very least to prepare better conditions for children and future generations, is the primary motivation. With the participation of migrants in the economic and social life in large numbers and in a continuous way, reciprocal effects and relationships start to be formed in daily life.

Immigrants may experience both countries (country of emigration and country of immigration) at the same time via networks, organizations and technology. These transnational social spaces enable immigrant communities to construct a unique identity. They do not simply adopt the dominant identity of the country of immigration or they are not simply an extension of the societies of country of emigration. They are also not a part of a dominant community of a certain nation-state. They construct an identity which is a product of their constant, mutual relations with two societies based on their transnational social networks. For instance, progress in transportation and information technologies allows Turkey-origin immigrants to combine their relation among "home country" and "country of work" within their daily lives. Two countries' geographies became just a few hours flight distance as a result of frequent economic charter flights. Internet, TV channels, newspapers, associations and certain economic activities allow Turkish immigrants to experience both countries at the same time in their daily lives and these all developments demonstrate the dynamism of the transnational social space. Transnational social space of Turkey-origin immigrants is not a passive and introverted space, rather provides a lively public sphere that also include sub-spheres such as Kurds, Alevis, some religious and political groupings etc.

The contemporary question for policy-makers is how to approach to people on the move. For this reason, the notion of data-driven decision making gained huge popularity in recent years. After the the pandemic, in particular, making political decisions in a data-driven manner has been a commonly made argument. In this approach, data is treated as constituting an objective, irrefutable piece of evidence, and whatever data analysis generates is taken to be the neutral, objective reality. This is also valid for academics as many scholars tend analyze datasets to understand the dynamics of migratory movements.

However, it is wrong to treat data as being objective in itself. This is not a rejection of data analysis, either; the amount of data generated by people and machines increases on a daily basis, and processing and analyzing these data via machine learning, thanks to technical advances, make it possible to investigate issues in more depth and detail. Data from social media, cell phones, satellites, and sensors allow understanding developments and changes in these fields in real time or almost real time. Analysis of these datasets can prove very valuable, but it should be kept in mind that these datasets can be biased, reproducing structural inequalities in society, and there are class, status, gender, and age differences among the people who generate these data, as well as between them and people who do not generate any data.

Moreover, if a study involves vulnerable groups or groups at risk, such as refugees, unregistered migrants, forcibly displaced people, or asylum seekers, it would be best to exercise extra caution. This is first because findings of big data studies can be used against refugees by governments that do not recognize their rights and freedoms, and can lead, as seen in the example of smart borders, in a larger death toll among refugees. Second, it should be kept in mind that there are deep inequalities both among refugees, many of whom have experienced traumas, legal problems, and fears, and do not have sufficient knowledge of the language, culture, and socio-economic structure of their host societies. Analysis of data collected from the cell phones or social media accounts of migrants and refugees would provide information about a smaller community compared to the host society.

Among the new data sources and methodologies employed in migration studies, data analysis provides important insights, but two caveats should be kept in mind. First, big data analysis should be supported and triangulated with qualitative research to produce robust studies. Face to face interviews, sociological and ethnographic research, and evaluation of the historical background remain valuable tools in understanding the sociological, psychological, and economic realities of communities at risk. The migration literature and international law have a lot to gain from these sorts of studies as well. The second issue is that data analysis should be conducted with an ethical approach that avoids doing harm to refugees. Migrants and refugees themselves should be at the center of the study, and care should be taken to avoid serving refugees' data to governments and thus supporting

their anti-refugee policies. This, in turn, requires undertaking mixed methods research with a multidisciplinary research team.

This important book brings together scholars discussing different aspects of migratory movements from economics to civil society and securitization and with a regional focus. The notes above about the economic prospectives and political representativeness together with the weaknesses of the dominant quantitative approach aim to support these valuable articles that provide a critical approach to migration studies.

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Dr. Emre Eren Korkmaz
University of Oxford

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Human Stock and Economy

1

Introduction to Migration Studies

Apak Kerem Altintop*, Merve Hazer Yiğit Uyar**

ABSTRACT

People change places and get affected by these actions. Millions of people have been relocating since the known periods of history, and displacement is not a new phenomenon. What has changed is the observable impact of globalization on the rate and impact of displacement. Whatever the reason (economic, political, social, war situation, climate change), migration movements have increased their speed in the current period compared to the previous periods. Mass migration movements can affect neighboring countries, regions, and the world, creating serious problems or being perceived as a problem. Demographic transformation is a structural change that needs to be prepared in this context. As a natural consequence of these migration movements, demographic transformations began to occur. It is certain that migration movements will change all data on the labour market, social system, and population.

In order to understand the migration studies and interdisciplinary approaches and perspectives, a detailed explanation needs to be made on the following concepts; international protection, subsidiary protection, temporary protection, regular and irregular migration, the current situation regarding migration. Analysing concepts and examples together with data provides a more holistic and meaningful picture. In this section, concepts, definitions, examples and data are analysed and interpreted together.

Keywords: International Migration, International Protection, Definition of Refugee, Migration Policy

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INTRODUCTION

Globalization and the transformation of technology for human mobility have had various consequences. These are the visibility of the mixed migration movement, the irregularity of migration movements, and the questioning of the gains of the process. Like the various consequences of migration, it can be categorized in many different ways and meanings. There were many concepts related to migration that needed to be defined, for example refugee, asylum seeker, protection status, temporary/indefinite migration, economic-political migration, registered/unregistered migration, regular/irregular migration. In addition to refugees fleeing war, famine or natural disasters, people may also have voluntary migrations. Some people leave their country because they want to work, study or join their families. Others feel they should leave because of poverty, political unrest, gang violence, natural disasters, or other serious conditions that are there.

It is valuable to understand the issue of migration to look at the types of migration and where they differ in detail. Migration is defined by some circles as a displacement that crosses or does not cross the border, sometimes being on the move (Council of Europe, 2022), changing place (Perruchoud & Redpath - Cross, 2009), process (Dictionary.com, 2022) or traveling (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). The common point in all definitions is that people are on the move. The reasons for this being in motion bring about the separation of migration into species. The popular distinction is voluntary migration when the reason for departure is based on non-essential reasons, and forced migration, when it is based on compulsory reasons. However, there are also distinctions made such as compulsory - unwilling - voluntary. Moreover, the concept of mixed migration has come to the fore again and is being discussed, with the claim that the processes of forced and voluntary migration have begun to interpenetrate.

The concept of forced migration is generally defined in the literature as a forced displacement caused by conflict and/or natural disaster. As mentioned before, in general, forced migration and voluntary/voluntary migration are compared and used as two basic poles. The concept of forced migration is expressed as "*the term used to describe the migration movement in which there is an element of coercion, including threats to life and welfare due to natural or man-made reasons.*" (Perruchoud & Redpath - Cross,

2009) The European Commission similarly defines it as "*the movements of a person subject to a migration movement where there is an element of coercion, including threats to life and livelihoods, whether for natural or man-made reasons*" (for example, refugees and internally displaced persons and persons displaced by natural or environmental disasters or chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects) (EC, 2022).

Another discussion of forced migration is that there is a continuity of representation that is tightly bound to conventions such as the 1951 Geneva Convention, in which forced migration is expressed rather than the voluntary/forced dichotomy, and this is due to the concern that for different reasons this could undermine or narrow the existing international protection regime for all migrants. This discussion leads us to the concept of mixed migration. There is an emphasis on people in motion in the conceptualization of mixed migration. Being on the move means going across borders and not staying within the borders of the country. According to the Center for Mixed Migration, mixed migration refers to "*cross-border movements of people, including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims of trafficking, and people seeking better lives and opportunities*" (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019)

The concept is based on the "*mixing of migrants' motivations and mixing in mobility*". (Oelgemöller, 2021, p. 251) The first one is "*focusing on the fact that people, whether forced or not, move together in space after having left and before arriving or being allocated a status based on some or other positive (legal) criteria*". (Oelgemöller, 2021, p. 255) This phrase describes the mixed motivations of migrants who travel the migration route for various reasons. The second is related to the "motivation to participate in mobility". Because "*most people who move do so because of a mix of being compelled and having the choice to move*". (Oelgemöller, 2021, p. 250) Inclusion of people with mixed motivations means that it includes "*refugees and asylum seekers fleeing war and persecution, and migrants seeking better lives and opportunities (…) but migrants who left their home countries voluntarily may also be fleeing situations of insecurity, while refugees are also seeking better lives and opportunities.*" (Horwood et al., 2018, p. 179) Today, those who migrate with different motivations using the same routes stand out. Someone who fled the war in Afghanistan, came from Pakistan to have better economic conditions and life, or fled Iran for their sexual

orientation uses the same routes but for different reasons. This situation may result in states that construct the scope of international protection and immigration policies on the basis of those fleeing for economic reasons and melt every subject in the same pot.

Migration can be voluntary or forced (even mixed), domestic or international. On the main line, which we divide into voluntary and forced migration based on the reasons for its formation, and seasonally and continuously according to its duration, migration is the geographical displacement of human communities as internal or external migration, including those related to religion, economy, politics and social issues. Reasons for forced migration: wars, conflicts, deportation, natural disasters, climate; access to basic water resources, security, cultural and ethnic pressures, displacement of people by roads and dams. Regardless of the typology, most voluntary migrations are searching for better economic opportunities or living. For people who migrate with different motivations from similar routes, concept of mixed migration is valuable to understand and analyse.

In the period when more than one type of migration takes place at the same time, irregular migration, including refugee migration, is considered a security issue, as there is increasing political belief that migration should be managed and controlled. Still, it is considered necessary to encourage regular migration, whose limits are decided by states. At a time when it is seen as a threat to immigrants and refugees, positive and negative developments are experienced at the same time. On the one hand, search and rescue efforts in Italy are being restricted by the Meloni government (Bonnel, 2023) while the UK government is discussing a new bill that will criminalize those trying to cross into the UK using the Channel, and making immigration a security issue (MacGregor, 2023), Germany is launching an accelerated visa application for those affected by the devastating earthquakes in Turkiye and Syria on February 6 (Bathke, 2023), Moldova requests support from the EU to serve better those coming from Ukraine. (InfoMigrants, 2023a)

On the other hand, Spain expanded the scope of the work visa it issued to work in the fields to include Senegal (InfoMigrants, 2023b). However, it is still remembered that at least 37 of the immigrants who tried to cross from Spain's North African lands to Melilla months ago died due to the harsh intervention of Moroccan and Spanish police. (Ramalho da Silva, 2022) The claim that the border authorities in Greece have stolen more than

2 million euros of money and products from immigrants in the last 5 years is on the agenda (InfoMigrants, 2023c). At the end of February 2023, at least 28 children died in an accident off the southeast coast of Italy (ANSA, 2023), the disinformation, hate speech and acts of violence that only spread about the looting of immigrants and refugees during the earthquake in Turkiye show that the results of the securitization of migration can be radical. (Özoflu, 2019)

While these changes and developments occur, immigration continues to make its indisputable existence together with its different types. In an era where borders are built as a solution to control migration (Euronews, 2022) , millions of people are simultaneously forcibly displaced or voluntarily displaced within or across national borders every year for various reasons such as war, civil conflict, natural disasters, their identity or belonging; they migrate in order to have better living conditions and better conditions. On March 10, more than 1300 migrants arrived in Italy in one day (Info-Migrants, 2023d). The number of forcibly displaced people worldwide has exceeded 100 million for the first time in history. (UNHCR, 2022a) These developments and the increase in the number of forcibly displaced people reveal that migration will continue and remain on the agenda. The motivation to migrate seems to continue despite all the developments and changes. These data reiterate that the phenomenon of migration is not, as usual, a temporary phenomenon. As long as this phenomenon exists, debates, different perspectives, practices, and attitudes towards immigration will continue to exist. This indicates that a single concept or content cannot explain migration.

Many people do not meet the definition of legal refugees, but they may still be in danger if they return to their country of origin. It is important to understand that even if immigrants do not flee persecution, they have the right to have all human rights protected and respected, regardless of their status in the country of origin. The term asylum seeker is used for persons seeking international protection and awaiting the outcome of their application for refugee status, that is, those who have not yet been officially recognized by governments or UNHCR. Despite the fact that the refugee right is determined by law, the migrant is generally referred to as someone who leaves their residence and settles in a new place to live in better conditions. Although immigrants and refugees are defined as the same, there are differ-

ences between them. To explain more, concepts are evaluated in the second section. In the third section, data and current statistical situation regarding all types of migration are given before the fourth section which is about general assessment and discussion. Lastly, we have concluding remarks.

CONCEPTS OF MIGRATION

In this section, definitions of different concepts related to migration will be given. Refugee, conditional refugee, asylum seeker, temporary protection and secondary protection concepts are mentioned. However, not only a descriptive structure has been established, but also the legal ground on which it is based and how it changes regionally has also been examined. For example, there are differences based on historical realities between the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention and the definition proposed by the Cartagena Declaration. Including and discussing these definitions is also valuable for a book from the Eurasian perspective. In this context, firstly, the definition of refugee is given.

In the global context , "*either a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned before, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it*". (Refugees, 1951)

In the EU context, "*either a third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and to whom*" (DIRECTIVE 2011/95/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, 2011)

Refugee is the type of status with the broadest rights which is arising from international agreements. Asylum application can only be made indi-

vidual, evaluation will also be individual. However, members of family or children may apply and be evaluated with one member of the family. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:

> "*as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.*" (Refugees, 1951)

The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees restricted refugee status to those whose circumstances had come about "*as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951*", as well as giving states party to the convention the option of interpreting this as "events occurring in Europe" or "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere". The 1967 Protocol removed both the temporal and geographic restrictions. This was needed in the historical context of refugee flows resulting from decolonisation. Madagascar and Saint Kitts and Nevis are parties only to the convention, while Cape Verde, the United States of America and Venezuela are parties only to the protocol. (UN, 1967) The protocol gave those states which had previously ratified the 1951 Convention and chosen to use the definition restricted to Europe the option to retain that restriction. Only four states actually chose that restriction: the Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Monaco, and Turkiye. Congo and Monaco dropped the restriction upon ratifying the 1967 Protocol; Turkiye retained it, and Madagascar has not ratified the protocol. (UN, 1967)

While these conventions are the most universally accepted, other definitions of refugee exist. The first is the Declaration of Cartagena, signed in 1984 by the Latin American States. This declaration accepts the conditions of the 1951 Convention but enlarges the conditions of refugee. It means

"*persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.*" (The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 1984)

As a second, OAU (Organization of African Unity) Convention signed in 1969 and 1974 also accept conditions of 1951 Convention but enlarge. Refugee shall mean:

> "*Every person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. […] every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.*" (OAU, 1969)

For, Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries (1994), refugee means:

> "*Any person who is outside the country of his nationality or outside his habitual place of residence in case of not having a nationality and owing to well-grounded fear of being persecuted on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of or return to such country. Any person who unwillingly takes refuge in a country other than his country of origin or his habitual place of residence because of sustained aggression against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or because of the occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in major disruption of public order in the whole country or any part thereof.*"(Refugees, 1994)

These differences mean that although there is a refugee definition accepted by countries, countries expand the definition based on their own realities. Another difference arises from reservations. Turkiye has a reservation on 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.

For Turkiye for conditional refugee is:

> *"a person who as a result of events occurring outside European countries and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkiye temporarily until they are resettled to a third country"* (Presidency of Migration Management, 2023a)

Except for these statutes, asylum-seeker is a crucial term to understand and evaluate reality and policies regarding migration. An asylum seeker is a person who seeks protection from persecution or serious harm in a country other than their own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. (EMN, 2023) In the EU context, a third-country national or stateless person who has made an application for protection under the Geneva Refugee Convention and Protocol in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken. (Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005)

Another statute is the temporary protection which is not new as concept but new as implementation. Temporary Protection has no universal certain definition which is valid internationally. It is usually used in mass raids and provide emergency and temporary protection for the ones who needed. Those Under Temporary Protection generally have temporary rights granted by the initiative of the executive. This is not as broad as immigration or specific as refugee.

The most recent example of temporary protection is the Ukrainians in the EU. Although the EU's temporary protection directive dates back to 2001, its implementation is new. In the 1990s, the war in the former Yugoslavia forced thousands of Bosnians to flee, and countries such as Austria and Germany had problems with their asylum systems. (Wagner, 2022) This

directive is designed as a tool for the EU's mass influx. However, it was not used in the 2011 Arab Spring, 2015-16 refugee movements, or 2021 immigration from Afghanistan. (Wagner, 2022) One of the main reasons for this is that the approval process is complex. It is subject to the adoption of the proposal by a majority vote of the European Commission and the Council of Europe (if there are at least 15 member states representing 65% of the EU population). There is also no consensus on the definition of mass influx. (Özoflu, 2022) There is also an increase in the number of people coming to EU territories of general concern. (Wagner, 2022) While we were able to ignore this concern in 2011, 2015 and 2021, one of the reasons why they could not in 2022 is that Ukrainian refugees come from a country neighboring the EU. Since the Dublin Regulation does not apply to the temporary protection directive, it is possible for them to be taken under temporary protection not only by the country they originally came from, but also by any EU country. At the end of the process, Ukrainian citizens who were in Ukraine before February 24, 2022, third-country nationals under international protection in Ukraine or stateless persons and their family members, long-term residence permit holders were able to benefit from this status. (Fragomen, 2023)

As the migration mobility continued and the reasons for migration became different, states did not want to recognize the refugee status, which gives everyone wide rights, and wanted to meet the need for protection. In this context, secondary protection status has emerged. Secondary protection means:

> *"A foreigner or a stateless person, who neither could be qualified as a refugee nor as a conditional refugee, shall nevertheless be granted subsidiary protection upon the status determination because if returned to the country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence would*
>
> *a)be sentenced to death or face the execution of the death penalty;*
>
> *b)face torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;*
>
> *c)face serious threat to himself or herself by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or nationwide armed conflict;*
>
> *and therefore is unable or for the reason of such threat is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of his country of origin or country of [former] habitual residence."* (Presidency of Migration Management, 2023b)

Although definitions related to international protection are important, those who migrate legally and voluntarily also occupy an important place in the phenomenon of migration. In the global context, a person who is outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens and who has resided in a foreign country for more than one year irrespective of the causes, voluntary or involuntary, and the means, regular or irregular, used to migrate. (EMN, 2023) In the EU/EFTA context, a person who either:

> *"(i) establishes their usual residence in the territory of an EU/EFTA Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another EU/EFTA Member State or a third country; or*
>
> *(ii) having previously been usually resident in the territory of the EU EFTA Member State, ceases to have their usual residence in the EU/EFTA Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months. EU context: Derived by EMN from Eurostat's Concepts and Definitions Database and the UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration*
>
> *A person who left her country voluntarily and settled in another country with the knowledge and permission of the country's authorities."*(EC, 2023)

Concepts, the facts that concepts correspond to, and the conditions under which they were born tell us a lot, but data also tell us so much different and more. For this reason, thirdly, world data on migration is briefly explained in the next chapter.

DATA ON MIGRATION

After the invasion of Ukraine, the number of forcibly displaced persons exceeded 100 million for the first time in world history. It is currently thought to be about 103 million people. (UNHCR, 2022b) 32.5 million of them are refugees. (UNHCR, 2022b) Although the presence of refugees is perceived as a significant problem in the West due to the influence of the media and politicians, in fact 74% of them are hosted in low- and middle-income countries. (UNHCR, 2022b)

Figure 1.1[1] Percentage of Refugees: 6.3% of Displaced people are Refugee

Figure 1.2 Percentage of Low-and-middle income countries

Besides, "*69 per cent of refugees and other people in need of international protection lived in countries neighbouring their countries of origin.*" (UNHCR, 2022b) These data emphasise two important elements. The first of these is that people who have to flee their countries primarily seek refuge in border countries. Secondly, globally, most of the incidents in which people have to flee their countries occur in the regions where underdeveloped or developing countries are located.

Figure 1.3 Percentage of Refugees lived in neighbouring countries

When a global perspective is developed on the issue of migration, it is seen that the emergency areas are already in regions such as Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Rohingya, South Sudan, Venezuela and Nigeria. (Refugees, 2023a) Although each country does not favour a broad perspective on the issue of migration until it reaches its own borders, the invasion of Ukraine has brought the issue of forced migration back to the agenda in a different way, especially in Europe. On the other hand, host countries such as Turkiye, Uganda, Colombia and Pakistan continue to host large numbers of refugees (UNHCR, 2022b) amidst their own economic and social turmoil. Another dimension is the ratio of refugees to the population of host countries. It is known that this ratio is particularly high in Lebanon and Jordan. In Jordan, this ratio is around 25 per cent (Hamsici, 2019), while in Lebanon it is about 6 per cent. (Özkan, 2022)

The situation for internally displaced people is even worse. A significant portion of the forcibly displaced (53 million) are internally displaced

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1   Figures were designed and added by the authors.

persons. (UNHCR, 2022b) Especially the urgent humanitarian needs and poor conditions in Yemen mean that people who cannot leave their countries are trying to continue their lives in very difficult and inhumane conditions. While more than 4 million people are internally displaced in Yemen, more than 23 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. (Refugees, 2023b)

Figure 1.4 Percanteg of Internally Displaced People.

%51,4

Figure 1.5 Percentage of People in need of humanitarian assistance 69% of Yemen Population in need of humanitarian assistance

Irregular migrants are an important segment of migration. Although it is not known exactly how many irregular migrants there are in the world, regional perspectives can be important in terms of showing the general change. For example, illegal crossings recorded at EU borders, a 57% rise compared to 2020 and 38% rise compared to 2019. (ICMPD, 2022) In 2021, the US border patrol encountered 1.52 million irregular migrants on the U.S.-Mexico border; in 2020, that number was 491,000. (Migration Data Portal, 2022)

GENERAL ASSESSMENT AND DISCUSSION

As mentioned above, the phenomenon of migration is not a homogeneous phenomenon. Both the people it includes, the motivation and the routes it has also differ. This situation creates a complex structure, process and causal links. Written by non-Western writers with a Eurasian perspective, this book is also based on different concepts, fields, types and subjects of migration. Migration studies can vary from international mobility, immigration law, statistical techniques in migratory studies, discourses, comparative research on migrations, economy, social-psychology approaches, governance, diversity, discrimination, xenophobia, multiculturalism, geopolitics, labour Mar-

ket, employment policies, health to disadvantaged groups such as women, children, *LGBTQIA+.*

This book, titled 'Migration Studies: Eurasian Perspectives', was carried out as impartially as possible, with the rigor of a researcher. It aims to make a note in history by detecting the current situation. This book covers the gap on Eurasian perspectives on Migration. When the books on migration are examined, studies such as identity, belonging, border and populism come to the fore. These studies are valuable and make outstanding contributions to the field of migration. The book recommended here is to focus on different topics and themes without being limited to any theory or concept.

The book has both empirical and theoretical content. Focusing on different themes from politics to economy, from law to society, the book deals with the issue of migration from many various aspects. The countries that host 65% of the immigrant and refugee population are developing and underdeveloped countries. (UNHCR, 2022b) In this study, the fact that the authors are from Eurasia and have been raised in the dynamics of developing countries is essential in terms of revealing a voice raised in a different environment in the field of migration. This does not mean that the book focuses only on non-Western countries. On the contrary, there are western countries among the examples discussed, but the authors with the perspective presented are mostly Eurasian and non-Western.

The first part of this book, *Human Stock and Economy*, is devoted to examining the refugee issue within the scope of the human stock dimension and labor relations. In the first article of the first part, Altintop and Yigit Uyar briefly introduce the book, while presenting a study that touches on the concept of migration and its dimensions in their research titled An Introduction to Migration Studies. In the second chapter of the second part Fakhri discusses the precarity topic with his article titled We were born as labourers, and we will die as labourers": Afghan migrant precarity In Iran and Turkiye. In this article, the idea of "migrant precarity" is used as a lens to examine how states, immigration laws, and borders that are placed and acting in particular historical and political settings make migrants vulnerable. This research examines how, in the case of Afghan migrants in Iran and Turkiye, specific interactions between Iranian and Turkish migration governance, border control, and labor regimes—through which Afghans are

governed, circulated, and channeled into precarity—constitute "illegality" and informal labor for Afghans. It also draws on existing academic works (historical and empirical) and non-academic reports. In the third article Karadayı Usta scientifically discusses sustainability with her article titled Economic, Social and Environmental Triple Bottom Line of Sustainability Based Migration. To highlight the relationships between concepts with visual maps and clarify the causal relationships of the causes influencing the migration, this research examines how this triple bottom line of sustainability is treated in the literature via bibliometric analysis. Also, as a result of the migration, a guiding conceptual model is supplied for practitioners focusing on the industry; as a result, a useful contribution is also made. In the fourth article Algan introduces the concept of migration industry with her article titled the Rise of the Migration Industry: the Example of Border Management Systems in Turkiye. This chapter will cover how the migration industry's border management policies affect neighboring states, non-state actors, and migrants and how Turkiye's border management systems have altered since 2015 compared to earlier years. It will also cover how these systems are funded. The foundations of the migration sector will first be covered for this; second, using Turkiye as an example, one of the biggest areas of the migration industry will be discussed: border management; lastly, the dynamics of neoliberal globalization will be used to evaluate the migration business. In the fifth article Topsoy highlights the economic challenges with her article titled Economic Challenges of Syrians in Turkiye. In this section, Turkiye's economic structure and refugee policies will be discussed in relation to the financial assistance given to Syrians living in Turkiye, their involvement in the labor force there, and their means of subsistence. Also, the future prospects for Syrian refugees would be assessed, as well as the laws put in place by the Turkish government to encourage the economic integration of Syrians with temporary protected status.

The second part of this book, *Civil Society and Security*, is devoted to examining the layers of civil society relations and their historical processes. In the first chapter of the third part Ceceli Kose introduces the topic of group identity with her article titled How Group Identities Influence the Views About Assistance to New Immigrants? A Study on The Opinions of the Turkish Origins in Germany About the Assistance to Syrian Immigrants. The study looks at why Germans of Turkish descent, a non-dominant and

immigrant-origin community, support Syrian immigrants. The conceptual perspective of Social Identity Theory is used to study perspectives from people of Turkish descent on aiding or helping Syrian immigrants. According to their ethnic, religious, ideological, and migrant group identities, persons of Turkish ancestry differ and resemble one another. This study aims to examine the claim that "those who have shared group connection with Syrians help more." This study aims to clarify the attitudes and motivations of previous immigrants toward incoming immigrants. The second article of the fourth part is titled Securitization of Migration In The European Union: Frontex and Refugees from Ozdemir. The present migration policies of the EU will be discussed and studied in this chapter, and the security measures implemented as part of FRONTEX will be assessed. The operation of FRONTEX and the legitimization of discourses and behaviors will also be examined within the framework of the securitization theory. The premise of this chapter is that these discourses and practices are purposefully employed to make it easier to move immigration-related concerns to an emergency policy that is handled outside of the typical policy-making processes. It further contends that these utterances legitimate and put into effect the unprecedented policy measures that the EU can implement against global migration. In the third article Ozoflu examines the European identity with her chapter titled Discursive Divergences of the European Identity Construction between Hungary and Germany during the European Refugee Crisis of 2015.

With regard to the existence of "refugees" as the "Others of the European identity," this research examines discursive differences in identity construction between Hungarian and German ruling parties. It also aims to analyze the ways in which specific discursive practices exposed the cleavage within the in-group of European identity. In the fourth chapter Phutkaradze introduces ethnic conflict displacements with her article titled Ethnic Conflict and Internal Displacement: Georgia. Due to the turmoil and civil war brought on by the country's ethnic disputes in Georgia, residents now live in a constant state of terror, which is what is motivating migration patterns. Living in the area where the post-war separatist groups have taken control of has become a serious threat for Georgians. As a result, the residents who were worried about their safety because of the wars started looking for safer locations within the nation. This study aims to assess the reasons for and effects of internal displacement brought on by racial tensions in Georgia in

the 1990s. In the fifth chapter Gul discusses the topic of civil society organizations with her article titled Relations Between the State and Civil Society Organizations in Turkiye's Response to Syrian Refugees: Case of STL and IHH. This chapter integrates macro and meso-level analysis as it examines how macro-scale historical and political circumstances influence meso-level refugee reception in Turkiye. It is based on historical research and comparative case studies. Turkish civil society has a history of being dependent on governmental institutions, according to a historical study of the state-civil society relationship in Turkiye. CSOs may be favored or penalized according on whether or not their secular vs. religious orientation aligns with the desires of the applicable state authorities, including the military. This chapter demonstrates how secular CSOs in Turkiye had the chance to reverse the country's pervasive pattern of state dependence thanks to a significant rise in foreign financing for refugee support. In the sixth article Khanum discusses the challenges on migration and assimilation from a historical perspective with her study titled Migration and Assimilation Challenges: A Case Study of the Partition Refugees and Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. This paper provides insights into the 1947 and 1979 migrations to Pakistan by comparing and analyzing the context, statistics, and consequences of two different nations migrating to Pakistan. Pakistan witnessed many social, economic, and political problems due to Afghanistan's troubled socio-political situation and by hosting a large number of Afghan refugees for decades (Indian Muslims and Afghan Muslims).

The third part of this book is devoted to examining the refugee issue within the institutional and political dimension of *Migration Politics and Policies*. In the first chapter, Katliarou with his work titled International Migration In The World of Nation-States: Implications, Challenges, and Policy Responses analyzes how populace exchanges, mass deportations, and ethnic cleansing all contribute to the facilitation of forced migration through nationalism and nation-building, and also, the chapter discusses instances when persistent migratory patterns have changed the core tenets of nation-building in their destination countries. In the second article Ozekmekci and Cakmak examines the politicization with their article titled Politicization of Syrian Refugee Crisis by Far-Right Parties in Turkiye: Victory Party and Nationalist Movement Party. The study contends that in relation to the volume of duties imposed by institutional positions, the far-right parties'

discursive constructions of migrants, which frequently contain constructions of the Other and threat, tend to moderate. This method aids in understanding the variations in how far-right parties in power and those that aren't respond to the crisis. In the third article Caytas and Eyolcu Kafali highlights the disinformation on the issue with their article titled Anti-immigration Disinformation Campaigns in Turkiye: Actors and Their Purposes. The article seeks to identify the motivations of the anti-immigration disinformation operations. A framework for combating and preventing the disinformation that threatens democracy and the integration process may be provided by identifying the network of actors who run disinformation operations and learning about their objectives and purposes. In the fourth article Muderrisoglu and Okmen opens up a discussion in their article titled Is the EU a Normative Power? Criticism Of The Readmission Agreement Between Turkiye And The EU. This study aims to determine whether EU member states prioritize norms in their interactions with Turkiye, or if they put their interests first. Reaching the EU-Turkiye Statement on March 18, 2016, is criticized notwithstanding the unfavourable impression that Turkiye has painted of standards regarding Syrian people in Turkiye. In the fifth article Istif Inci puts a pin on the topic of naturalization with her article titled Naturalization Policies of Turkiye from the Historical Perspective. The examination of Turkiye's naturalization laws over time is covered in this chapter. The impact of migration waves in response to these changes is also investigated in this study. This study seeks to contribute to and clarify current conversations over the naturalization of Syrians as Turkish citizens by offering a historical perspective on Turkiye's naturalization and immigration policies. In the last article Artan discusses the concept of international protection with her article titled Reflection of International Protection and Temporary Protection Regimes on Turkish Law. In this study, the reflection of the concept of refugee, as it is defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention, to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and to Turkish Law is emphasized and the way of how both International Protection and Temporary Protection regimes are implemented in Turkiye has been mentioned. After the statutes and the rights related to the statutes in Turkish Law are introduced, the reflection of the new immigration wave caused by the Ukraine-Russia War on the immigration system in Turkiye has been mentioned and the statuses which war victims from Ukraine and peace supporters from Russia may obtain in Turkiye were examined.

CONCLUSION

There is an increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced people. In the coming years, displacement beyond national borders is expected to increase further due to the climate crisis. According to Brown, up to 200 million people may be displaced by climate change in 2050. (Brown, 2008) However, the number has already exceeded 100 million in 2023. These data reiterate that migration is not a temporary phenomenon. As long as this phenomenon exists, discussions on migration, different perspectives, different practices and attitudes will continue to exist.

We end our rethinking of migration with one final claim. Looking at migration from a global perspective deserve further attention. The issue of migration does not only affect western societies and developed countries as reported by the powerful press of powerful countries. This does not mean that these countries are not affected. However, it is necessary to realise that the empirical reality is different. Therefore, it is important to try to make sense of and explain the phenomenon of migration from different fields such as politics, economics, civil society and history.

Studies on migration have been carried out until today and will continue after. The phenomenon of migration will continue to exist even if its form changes, even if it is influenced by actors and affects them. This book and many others have been written to help understand and explain the phenomenon of migration in the light of the context in which it exists. We hope that this book will also be useful for many people interested in the field. We hope that the valuable contributions of the authors from non-Western societies and the different country cases discussed in the book will contribute to reflect the current situation in a broader and more detailed way.

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"We were Born as Labourers, and We will Die as Labourers": Afghan Migrant Precarity in Iran and Turkiye*

Abu Fakhri**

ABSTRACT

For decades, Afghan migrants in Iran have been deprived of any rights, living as second-class citizens, entrapped in uncertainty and immobility, and hyper-exploited doing menial jobs. Similarly, there is a considerable population of 'irregular' Afghan migrants in Turkiye who are illegalized, pushed to work in the informal sector with no basic rights, and exposed to exploitation and deportation. In this article, the concept of 'migrant precarity' is used to explore how migrants are made precarious by states, migration policies, and borders situated and operating in specific historical and political contexts. Taking the case of Afghan migrants in Iran and Turkiye, this research draws on existing academic works (historical and empirical) and non-academic reports investigating how for Afghans, 'illegality' and informal labour are constituted, reaffirmed, and heightened via specific *entanglements* of Iranian and Turkish migration governance, border control, and labour regimes. This article also draws on ethnographic vignettes from Afghan migrant labourers who have lived and worked in both countries. In their narratives, these Afghan migrant labourers point to how migration precarity and informal labour has worked in dispossessing and disposing of them in these countries. They emphasize three primary forms of 'currency' of dispossession and exploitation in their forced migration and informal labour: body, time (age), and de-qualification.

Keywords: Afghans, irregular migration, illegality, precarity, informal labour, neoliberalism, Iran, Turkiye (Turkey)

INTRODUCTION

For the last four decades, Afghans have been one of the major displaced populations in the world, and Iran has been one of their primary migration destinations. UNHCR estimates that Iran hosts more than two million Afghan refugees, official passport holders, and undocumented migrants (UNHCR, 2022).[1] Afghans in Iran live as second-class citizens, deprived of any rights, have limited access to public services and labour market, and are entrapped in social and spatial immobility (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007; Hyndman and Giles, 2017). Available data and academic research suggest that most Afghans in Iran are undocumented and engaged in precarious labour, mainly menial jobs with no rights and protection.

Monsutti (2007, 2016) offers historical and empirical evidence that for Afghans, displacement does not mean a rupture in their livelihood or social ties. Instead, mobility and labour migration have been a structural feature of Afghan communities, a strategic act offering opportunities. However, one can argue that since the 2010s, their presence, mobilities, and labour have been highly securitized, restricted, and exploited in their host countries, mainly Iran and Pakistan, with the highest Afghan refugee population. Generally, Afghans experience shrinking condition in post-2016 Iran with its economic deterioration, high rate of unemployment, and political oppression. For the past decade, the Iranian government has solidified and extended its exclusionary migration policies, tightened its border control, and increased forced repatriation of Afghans. Similarly, Mielke and Etzold (2022) demonstrate how migration (options) has been significantly politicized and narrowed for Afghans in Pakistan. This restricted mobility—or immobility— in the last two decades is also embedded in the broader unwillingness of the international community and states in the Global North to admit and accommodate Afghan migrants. For many Afghans, there is a fear

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[1] UNHCR relies on the statistics communicated by the Islamic Republic government. According to the latest communicated data as of August 2022, 780,000 Afghan refugees, some 2.1 million undocumented Afghans and nearly 600,000 Afghan-passport holders live in Iran. 500,000-1,000,000 Afghans have newly fled to Iran since the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan in 2021. As the situation in Afghanistan remains volatile, UNHCR foresees that Afghans will continue to flee to Iran in the coming months. Based on UNHCR estimations, the government returns 65% of all new arrivals. Smaller percentages include those who will continue moving to Turkiye and the EU and those who chose to come to Iran for economic or family reasons before returning to Afghanistan voluntarily (UNHCR Afghanistan Situation Response in Iran, August 2022).

of easily becoming 'illegal' and ending up in 'kar-e siah' (menial job) that is situated in the contemporary refugee and labour regimes in these countries.[2] The majority of 'irregular' and precarious workers in Iran are Afghans only permitted to work in specific labour-intensive, menial jobs, namely the construction sector. The established position of Afghans in the Iranian labour regime has made *afghani* a synonym for undocumented, 'illegal,' and 'unskilled' labour force.

Similarly, while the global and academic imagining of refugees in Turkiye is mainly highlighted by 'waves of Syrian refugees,' there is a more established and growing population of Afghan asylum seekers and 'irregular' migrants to that country.[3] Turkiye has hosted Afghan migrants for years. However, the past decade, particularly after 2018, is marked by a significant increase in Afghans moving to or crossing Turkiye 'legally' or 'illegally.'[4] This increase in number corresponds with the abovementioned crisis in Afghanistan, especially the Taliban takeover, deteriorating conditions in Iran (and Pakistan), and EU-Turkiye migration policies. Afghans might seek to settle temporarily or permanently or continue their journeys to Europe and other places. This is where Afghan migrants in this research describe the repetition of a similar turn of events for Afghans in Turkiye after (Pakistan and) Iran, where they *eventually* or *once again* become 'illegal,' undocumented, ending up in menial jobs. Afghans comprise most of Turkiye's precarious labor force in cities like Istanbul and Ankara (Karadağ, 2020). After the Tal-

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2   Afghan refugees in Iran have been called in different ways. *Afghani* is an offensive term to address them. In her analysis of identity and class contention in Iran, Zuzanna Olszewska (2013) argues that *afghani* is not only a derogatory and xenophobic term (the darker side of Iranian nationalism); it has class and status implications where 'afghani' is presented it poor class and inferior status. Generally, refugees, asylum seekers, and 'irregular' immigrants are described and labelled differently in each context. Such labelling has political and legal implications impacting the lives of refugees and immigrants. Thus, one should be mindful of such linguistic, social, and political articulation of refugee figures in each context. See (Safri, 2011) for more on the transformation of the figure of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan.

3   UNHCR reports that 133,062 Afghan asylum seekers and 7,647 refugees reside now in Turkiye. As of October 2022, Turkiye's Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) indicates that 92,583 'irregular' migrants have been apprehended. In the first ten months of 2022, 55,502 Afghans have been deported (showing a 206% increase compared to 2021). Indeed, these numbers do not include the exact number of undocumented or unregistered migrants residing or those crossing 'illegally.'

4   The available data by DGMM indicate that since 2018, Afghan 'irregular' migration to Turkiye has increased annually, except for 2020, due to the COVID pandemic (falling from 201,437 in 2019 to 50,161 in 2020). Throughout the years, Afghans represent most of those who have applied for international protection (21,926 by the end of 2021) and 'irregular' migrants captured among all other groups.

iban takeover in 2021, similar to (or in line with) the Iranian government's approach, the Turkish government has increased its anti-Afghan rhetoric, close-border approach, and deportation policies targeting Afghan migrants (Amnesty International, 2022).

Nevertheless, Afghans' irregular' migration and labour are not just a property of Afghan communities emerging out of their choices. Nor is it *only* a product of the internal crisis in Afghanistan. In what follows, it is argued that Afghan' illegality' and precarious labour are constituted and constantly reaffirmed via specific *entanglements* of Iranian and Turkish migration governance, border control, and neoliberal labour regime(s). These entanglements entrap Afghans in precarious legal, social, and labour conditions that can permeate their life courses through generations. Suppose migration dynamics and experiences change over time. In that case, it is necessary to investigate what constitutes Afghan migration precarity and what new conditions, practices, stakes, and perceptions of mobility-labour have emerged in their host countries.

METHODOLOGY

This article takes Afghan migrants who have lived and worked in Iran and Turkiye as the case study. This research is based on a literature review drawing on historical and empirical academic works and non-academic reports on migrants and refugees, specifically Afghans in Iran and Turkiye. These works are selected on themes including migration patterns, policies, transformation in migration governance, asylum policy, migrants in the informal labour market, and securitization. It also engages with empirical works on the experience of uncertainty, insecurity, and 'illegality' in migration and labour in Iran and Turkiye. In selecting relevant works, the focus is on those works and reports that explain the late conditions of Afghan migrants in these countries after 2018 and the Taliban takeover. The vignettes in this research are taken from the author's current ethnographic research (participant observation and in-depth interviews) among Afghan migrants in Istanbul, Turkiye (May 2022 – January 2023). The participants are chosen from different migration statuses, including registered asylum seekers, undocumented migrant labourers, and transit migrants. The participants in this research are primarily single men, 18-47 years old, and all are from Hazara ethnicity. It is imperative to approach Afghan displacement in its

heterogeneity of ethnic and social lines, pre-established migratory routes, hubs, and transnational networks. In this regard, Hazaras experience institutionalized discrimination and violence in Afghanistan, affecting their life and migration trajectories and experiences. Hazaras might continue to be dispossessed and excluded during and after migration. For instance, the Hazaras in Iran experience 'double discrimination'; they are persecuted and displaced in Afghanistan based on their ethnicity, and at the same time, they are resented and treated as the main figure of *afghani* in Iran based on their facial features. This research zooms in on Hazara migrants to shed light on their multi-layered exclusion and precarity through their migration.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMING: MIGRATION PRECARITY

Generally, dominant discourses constitute refugees, particularly 'illegal' and 'irregular' migrants as a *mass* of bodies to be governed.[5] In the Iranian and Turkish contexts, Afghans are presented as substantially 'illegal' unskilled migrant labourers. These narratives tend to externalize or obscure the roots of their predicament and pervasiveness of 'irregular' migration and informal labour, making it appear that these states are just passively receiving waves of 'illegal,' 'irregular' and unskilled migrants—where the state and international organizations should effectively manage the migrant overload.[6] This research follows Afghan interlocutors distorting such narratives where they describe 'illegality' and precarious labour forced to them way before their border crossing and as an ongoing process within and between these countries.

Studies characterize such perilous migration conditions as "extended or indefinite exile," in which refugees lack permanent legal status and experience circumscribed livelihoods (Hyndman and Giles, 2017), where they

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5   In refugee and (forced) migration studies, the concepts of 'irregular,' 'illegal,' and 'unauthorized' cover a wide variety of migration that does not fall under regular, formal, and legal migration. These concepts describe the forms of entrance and residence (or stay) as opposed to formal and recognized migration. This includes visa and permit overstayers, failed refugee claimants and undocumented and unregistered immigrant labourers. This article follows the scholars in critical refugee studies who use 'irregularity' or 'illegality' not at face value as an objective status but as a status produced through migration, border security, and policing practices. These terms will be thus specified and used in single quotation marks.

6   This is manifested in the focuses and conventions in the research concerned with refugees and 'irregular' immigrants, particularly in the Iranian context, where research on Afghans is mainly concerned with security, impact on the labour market and economy and regularization, integration and assimilation.

are "entrapped" in spirals of risks (Vecchio and Gerard, 2018), their lives, journeys, and their existence is coloured by uncertainty (Horst and Grabska, 2015), are subject to "violence of uncertainty," and are pushed into poor labour conditions that be described by "voluntary servitude" (Eder, 2015). In particular, the term *precarity* has become popular across the fields of migration and refugee studies to explain multiple forms of insecurity, uncertainty and exclusion to which migrants and refugees are subject. However, 'irregular' migrants do not become precarious by their own hands, as scholars in these fields have urged that migrants and refugees are *made* precarious. There is a growing literature employing precarity in 'irregular' migration in different contexts and different meanings: legal production and institutionalization of migrant 'illegality' leading to precarity (Goldring et al., 2009), precarity as constructed, reified by the state in tandem and through other normative discourses like gender and sexuality (Hodge, 2019; Canefe, 2018), and refugee precarity in the Global South and non-European contexts (Schierup et al., 2015; Schierup and Jørgensen, 2016).[7]

In this line, there is an emerging literature in Turkiye that widely use precarity to describe the predicament of migrants, mainly Syrians. These works use the term to explain several dimensions of their vulnerabilities, lack of protection, insecurity, and the ways they navigate through it (Parla, 2019, Şenses, 2017; Canefe, 2016; Canefe, 2018; Baban et al., 2017; Oner et al., 2018; Ertorer, 2021). Alternatively, some works use the term 'hyper-precarity' to describe the multiple forms of precarity surrounding Syrian migrants in Turkiye (Ertorer, 2021). This research echoes Nazlı Şenses (2017), discussing the relevance of the concept of precarity in the Turkish context; a state transforming from one exporting migrant labour to Europe into a

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[7] In framing precarity, this article also engages with those scholars who use precarity to describe the legal precariousness of refugees, asylum seekers, and 'irregular' immigrants. For example, Goldring et al. (2009) develop and use the concept of "precarious migration status" to attend to the production of precariousness as a condition of less-than-full citizenship or legal status. "Precarious status" can consider varying forms of irregular status and 'illegality' (Goldring et al., 2009). The concept of precarious status provides an alternative to binary conceptions of migrant legality versus 'illegality,' documented versus undocumented, or regular versus 'irregular' (Goldring and Landolt 2011: p. 328). It can cover documented' but temporary workers, registered asylum seekers and refugees, as well as unauthorized forms of status, such as visa and permit overstayers, failed refugee claimants and undocumented and unregistered immigrant labourers. Precarious migration status marks the absence of permanent residence; lack of work authorization; dependence on a third party for residence or employment rights; restricted or no access to public services and protections available to permanent residents (healthcare, education, and workplace rights); 'detainability' and 'deportability' (Goldring et al., 2009).

migratory hub and destination for 'irregular' and regular migrant labour where they end up in situations that "not only lack Standing's (2011) seven forms of labour related security but they actually lack any kind of security" (113). Similarly, Nergis Canefe (2018) utilizes the term to investigate the connections between neoliberal labour regimes, Turkish asylum and immigration management, and the exploitation of migration flow based on the experiences of Syrian refugee women in Turkiye.

This article follows Canefe's (2016) suggestion for a more nuanced take on migration precarity in the Global South (and for a particular context like Turkiye). Bridget Anderson (2010) urges that with the popularity of the term—here in migration scholarship— there is "the risk of it becoming a catchall, meaning everything and nothing at the same time" (p. 303). In the delimitation of the term precarity, this work draws on Kathleen Millar's "Toward a critical politics of precarity" (2017) and Ayse Parla's *Precarious Hope* (2019). Different lines of thought can be followed in using and proliferating the term precarity across disciplines. While some use it as a labour condition, others find 'precariousness' as a generalized condition of human life (see Millar, 2017).[8] Thus, it is necessary to be mindful of these strands to avoid equating precarity with any *generalized* condition of vulnerability (Parla, 2019), insecurities and uncertainties. If, in its peculiar meaning, precarity captures the reconfiguration of employment relations and consequential insecurities under the neoliberal state-labour regime, using the concept in the Global South requires additional considerations.

First, this article contends that precarity, as it is used to describe labour conditions, can still relate to and describe the 'irregular' migration–

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[8] Generally, there are different scholarly ways of using the terms precarity and precariousness: as a labour condition, class category, and ontological experience (Millar, 2017). Precariousness is used to "denote a general, pervasive ontological condition of vulnerability, displacement, and insecurity," which is not necessarily tied to 'Precariat' labour conditions in the contemporary form of neoliberal capitalism (Kasmir et al., 2018, p. 1). This framing, Kasmir et al. (2018) argue, highlights experiences and feelings of anxiety, disenfranchisement, and loss of hope for the future. In its literal sense, precarity refers to those who experience precariousness and thus "conjures lifeworlds that are inflected with uncertainty and instability" (Waite, 2009, p. 7). Similarly, Anne Allison (2012), in her study of precariousness in contemporary Japan, uses "social precarity" to describe insecurity in life: material, existential, and social (p. 349). To her, social precarity is also about the conditions for social change, new forms of collective coming-together, and even political revolution. In this vein, scholars of critical refugee and citizenship studies (Goldring et al., 2009; Hodge, 2019) use precarity in its ontological condition sense (or, as Allison puts it, more "pervasive" sense) to cover a range of social vulnerabilities, subjection, and perils that refugees and 'illegal' migrants experience.

informal labour nexus in the Global South. Capitalism has always relied on exploiting mobile surplus populations. It thus is imperative to situate the constant production of precarity embedded in and constituted by the broader neoliberal regime entailing increasing demand for and recruitment of cheap, docile labour. Under such arrangements, 'irregular' migrants have become a desirable labour force for their flexibility, docility, and exploitability. To the extent that one should ask what their 'irregularity' is if they have become or been the norm in different contexts. However, it may be argued that informal and insecure labour has been the norm in the Global South, or as Millar (2016) puts it, "precarious work has arguably *always* been a part of the experience of laboring poor" in these countries (p. 34). It is then necessary to distinguish the precaritization of migrant labour in the Global South from the global condition and experience of precarity.[9]

Second, this article is in line with Canefe (2016), arguing that precarity is often associated with 'informal labour,' where the presence and regulation of the state is not well recognized in the existing literature. This should be particularly emphasized in understanding the informal labour-'irregular' migrant nexus since it is often thought that the 'irregularity' of migration and precarious labour is where the state or regulation is absent or not-enough-present. Whereas the state "actively legalizes or formalizes informal/precarious labor by intervening in the labor market via legislation promoting low wages, limitations of labor rights, and the resultant formalization of unstable and unprotected work" (Canefe, 2016, p. 12).

Ilcan et al. (2018) claim that the condition of precarity is not stable and is subject to constant changes due to the shifts in policies, institutions, practices and actors engaged in precarity's constitution. Suppose precarity can capture the production and experiences of 'irregularity,' informality, and insecurity in non-Western contexts. In that case, it should be noted that a) structures of precarity are embedded in the history and dynamics of capitalism *in that specific context* coupled with migration and asylum governance, b) certain groups in the Global South have been more susceptible to 'illegality,' 'irregularity' and precarity for their historical exclusion and marginalization, and c) as Erder and Kaşka (2012) suggest, the types, mean-

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[9]   For example, see Lewis and Waite (2015), who use the concept of "hyperprecarity" to distinguish the exploitation of migrant labour from the *global* precariat. Hyperprecarity, they argue, is produced via the interplay of neoliberal labour regime and restrictive migration regime, pushing certain migrant groups into 'unfree labour'.

ings and experiences of 'irregularity' might differ in a context like Turkiye. This research is mindful that different forms and degrees of precarity exist in each case, and the situational context can vary internationally in time and space. This work is in conversation with this body of research in the Turkish context and takes the concept of precarity in this sense to explain how Afghan refugees and 'irregular' migrants in Iran and Turkiye are subject to compounding precarity.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUNDS

The Iranian Context

The continuous migration of Afghans to Iran is embedded in a history of established cross-border, multi-directional mobilities. Afghans have been moving to and living in Iran as migrant workers, pilgrims or merchants longer than the modern history of these two countries (Monsutti, 2016). However, the chain of events in Afghanistan since the 1970s—the Soviet war and the US invasion, periods of civil unrest, and the Taliban's first takeover— marks their increased mass migration to the neighbouring countries, mainly Iran and Pakistan. Scholars have described Afghan migration to Iran in different periods.[10] Specific intensity, flow, and dynamics of Afghan mobilities and the corresponding migration policy characterize each period. This work would only focus on those directions and policies that have significantly determined their legal statuses and positions in the labour market.

Afghan migration to Iran increased continuously since the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. This period is characterized by the Iranian's "open-door" policies toward Afghans (Nasr-e Esfahani, 2018a). During this

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10 In the existing literature on Afghans in Iran, different aspects of Afghan migration and presence is studied. For a more detailed account of the history and demography of Afghans in Iran, see (Adelkhah and Olszewska 2007) and Nasr Esfahani (2018). See Monsutti's vast scholarship for more on their historical, multi-directional mobilities; Afghan migrant labourers' experiences and commonality; their social networks and economic strategies in a situation of conflict and forced migration; their transnational networks in the diaspora; the ways they define their mobilities in relation to belonging and identity; and understanding their mobility as an act with various political and moral dimension and effects (Monsutti, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2018, 2021). For ethnographic works on identity formation and cultural productions among Afghans in Iran, see (Olszewska, 2007, 2015a, 2015b; Rostami-Povey, 2007a, 2007b). For more on social immobility, aspirations, and class contentions among Afghans in Iran, see (Olszewska, 2013). Furthermore, on the experiences of second-generation and their experience of return, see contributions in (Chatty et al., 2010).

time, Afghans were granted refugee status on a *prima facie* basis, recognized as *mohajer,* and mainly were designated to live in urban and rural areas.[11] They could access public services and social benefits like (free) public education, healthcare, and the labour market (Adelkhah and Olszewska, 2007). Gradually, Afghans became a functional, available labour force for the Iranian labour market in dire need of it during the Iran-Iraq war. While some scholars find religious humanitarian reasons or the appeal of readily available labour behind the Islamic Republic's open gesture, Arash Nasr Esfahani (2018a and 2018b) argues that these were not the Islamic Republic's motivation to accommodate the large influx of Afghan migrants. To him, the young government of the Islamic Republic and its unpreparedness first makes them accept the high population of Afghans after the revolution. Either way, this article argues, employment of their cheap labour was welcomed and established by the Islamic Republic in the following years.

The Iranian government's early benevolent approach did not translate to proper employment opportunities for Afghans, as they were largely left alone for employment and livelihood. Nasr Esfahani explains (2018a) that the early presence of Afghans in the 'informal' labour market produced competitive antagonisms among local communities, particularly with those local workers in poorer conditions in the informal labour market. Later on, with the government's *sazanedgi* (reconstructionist) agenda and its need for cheap, flexible labour—combined with the antagonist dynamics between employers, the local labour force, and the state—there came to be an unofficial convention that Afghans should be only employed in specific sectors in the informal labour market.[12] In 1984, with tensions escalating between locals and Afghans over their share in the labour market, the Ministry of Labour issued a law that Afghans could only work in specific labour-intensive and menial sectors: brick kiln, construction, agriculture, gardening,

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[11] *Mohajer* means refugee with a religious connotation referring to migration in early Islam. This term is associated with the Islamic Republic's hospitable gesture of welcoming their Muslim brothers after the Islamic Revolution.

[12] Siavoshi (2022) explores how Islamic Republic migration governance is based on ad-hoc policies subject to political conditions, "ideological developments, factional competition, and general state interests (7). *Sazandegi* was a period and *discourse* in post-war Iran in the time of Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency marked by the Islamic Republic's selection of neoliberal practices attempting "a series of structural adjustments, including privatization of a sizable part of the economy and adoption of market-oriented measures to attract foreign investments" (Siavoshi, 2022, 4).

mining, stone-cutting, leather garment, cleaning, recycling and garbage, and else. Ever since then, their labour has been limited to precarious work, easily illegalized, and subject to hyper-exploitation.

From the early 1990s, the Iranian government took a more restrictive approach toward Afghans. Their numbers peaking at this time, Afghans became excessive, surplus labour force which was now a *burden* for the economy and the labour market in Iran (Nasr Esfahani, 2018a). Over time, Iran redesignated Afghans as 'avaregan,' a word that means forced migrants but this time with no religious benevolence overtones (Adelkhah and Olszewska, 2007). With this change in status, Afghans were still not recognized as refugees, absolving the Iranian government of any responsibilities. Many later established and institutionalized policies were introduced in this period. During this time, the former identification cards of migrants were confiscated, and the policy of temporary monthly residence cards was implemented that should be renewed (*kart-e amayesh*) (Adelkhah and Olszewska, 2007). This period was marked by the securitization and intensive criminalization of Afghans, the institutionalization of anti-Afghan sentiment, and frequent repatriation operations. The Iranian government gradually cut down social provisions and capitalized on their presence, labour, mobility, actions or inactions.

From the 2000s, Afghans were once again redesignated as *atba—e khareji* (foreign nationals), still sparing Iran of any humanitarian obligations toward them. This period was marked by limited or bare access to social services like education, public health, and any rights like property ownership (Nasr Esfahani, 2018a). Since the 2000s, Iran's policies have become more restrictive on Afghan mobility and labour. For Afghans, amayesh cards and work permits should be extended annually. Also, registered migrants with amayesh cards should reside in the city that has issued their cards. If Afghans want to go to other cities and towns, they should obtain a travel permit, 'barge-ye tarraddod,' that allows trips for 10 to 150 days.[13] After obtaining a travel permit from their home city, they should get a stamp from the authorities in their destination city. Throughout these years, the government took various campaigns for surveying, documentation, regulation of labour,

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13 In the established refugee regime in Iran, UNHCR does not conduct any refugee status determination nor application for resettlement. Islamic Republic's Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA) administrates asylum-seekers registration and the determination of refugee status.

and repatriation of undocumented migrants that make up the majority of Afghans in Iran.[14]

The Turkish Context

Afghan migration has not been the main factor for and (target of) changing Turkish migration policies like Iran. Before the 1980s, Afghan migratory movement to Turkiye was limited to "sporadic movement" of students and officials mainly via official venues. The movements never formed a considerable migratory pattern nor an Afghan community in Turkiye (İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018, p. 489; Karadağ, 2021). For decades, Turkiye has held a 'geographical limitation' to the 1951 Geneva Convention, meaning it does not provide a refugee status to those coming from non-European countries. With massive displacement of Afghans seeking refuge in other countries in the 1980s, Turkiye implemented a specific migration policy, to plan the transportation and settlement arrangement for the Afghans who were considered as 'soydaş,' meaning "based on the status of Turkish origin and culture" (Karadağ, 2021, p. 26).[15] Gradually, those early comers formed a sizable Afghan community where specifically Uzbeks and Turkmens constituted the relatively early comers of Afghan community in Turkiye which in turn establishes privileges and opportunities based on lines of ethnicity for further Afghans coming (İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018; Karadağ, 2021). The network dynamics of the Afghan community in Turkiye contributed to the growth of Afghan migration to Turkiye over 1980s and 90s.[16] With the Soviet departure, Civil war and later rise of Taliban in the 1990s, there was an increase in number, momentum, and diversity of Afghan migrants coming to and crossing Turkiye 'legally' or 'illegally.' Notably, since the early 2010s, there has been a significant rise in the number of asylum applications of Afghans and entrance, presence, and crossing of 'irregular' migrants from Afghanistan (İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018).

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14 In one of the latest government campaigns in 2015, a nationwide survey was conducted around categories of a) those with expired documents or overstayers, b) families of those registered in public schools, c) those with no documentation but married to an Iranian partner, d) undocumented partners or children of those with valid documents. However, such measures could not cover the majority of undocumented migrants who do not fall under such criteria.

15 Nevertheless, as Karadağ (2021) argues, Turkish governments never institutionalized this status, another example for ad hoc-based policies in a given time and for specific political interests.

16 For more on different phases of Afghan migration to Turkiye see (İçduygu and Karadağ, 2018).

While party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Turkiye has never lifted the geographical limitation in the original convention, meaning it only accepts refugees from European countries.[17] Turkiye's justification of geographical limitation is based on "domestic security considerations including its proximity to countries marked by instability on its southern and eastern borders and fears over becoming the EU's 'dumping ground'" (Biehl, 2015, p. 58). This means non-Europeans would be considered *conditional* refugees who can reside temporarily in Turkiye until resettled in a third country. Turkish migration law and practice have gone through transformations for the past few decades. In 2013, the Turkish government implemented its first comprehensive migration law, called Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). The shift to LFIP has affected available spaces for humanitarian assistance and have produced legal and bureaucratic barriers in the asylum procedures for refugees, particularly those from non-European countries.

Under LFIP laws, Afghans, as those from non-European countries, can only (and at best) be considered as "conditional" refugees and are subjected to "refugee status determination" (Leghtas and Thea, 2018; Karadağ, 2021).[18] To gain the status of conditional refugee or subsidiary protection status in Turkiye, Afghans need to register and process their international protection application and be resettled in a third country. However, migrants that either received that temporary protection (Syrians) or conditional refugee status cannot acquire any legal and permanent residence over their long-term stay.

Prior to 2018, non-European refugees had to undergo two parallel procedures: refugee status determination by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) and Turkiye's Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM). Through these parallel procedures, asylum seekers had to register first with the Association for Solidarity with Asylum-Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), "an implementing partner of UNHCR" (Leghtas and Thea, 2018, p. 7). These asylum seekers were then referred to one of the "satellite cities" where they were interviewed by the provincial of-

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17 Article 61, Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and International Protection.

18 The law also provides for the category of "subsidiary protection," which applies to those who do not qualify for refugee or conditional refugee status but who cannot return to their country because they would face a death sentence, torture or other ill-treatment, or indiscriminate violence" (Temporary Protection Regulation of October 22, 2014; Article 62, Law on Foreigners and International Protection; Article 63, Law on Foreigners and International Protection).

fices (PDMM). 'Non-Syrian' asylum seekers were later interviewed by UN-HCR in Ankara, which conducted a refugee status determination on their case.[19] They then had to wait for an interview with DGMM regarding their application for international protection under Turkish law (ibid, p. 7-8). In 2018, the Turkish government transferred responsibility for registering non-Syrian asylum seekers from the parallel procedure including UNHCR to Turkiye's DGMM alone (Karadağ, 2022). With this change in place, asylum seekers were directed first to PDMM offices in one of satellite cities to obtain a *kimlik*, an identification card for conditional refugees, and instructed to wait for any further notices in the process by authorities (Talwasa, 2020; Karadağ, 2021).

DISCUSSIONS

Afghan Precarity in Iran

As discussed above, the Iranian government's migration governance has been subject to transformations and vagaries based on domestic and foreign policy interests at different times. However, generally through the years, it has become more hostile and restrictive. These policies—and any sudden or calculated changes—can be described through specific interrelated modes: indeterminate temporariness, spatial confinement, 'illegality' of labour, and 'deportability.'

For Afghans, residence and work are kept authorized based on temporary permits (less than a year), thus, always leaving them in a suspended space of *indeterminate temporariness*. Many Afghans in the author's past and current research have expressed frustration at the structural uncertainties they experience throughout the years. Each time, even if successfully granted a permit, they would never know whether or not they can extend their permits for the next time. Deprived of rights and protections, this sense of 'suspended life' obscures their sense of the future, limiting their ability to plan and be prepared for the future. It impeded them in developing life course trajectories, financial

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[19] With the Syrian crisis, there came to be an unprecedent Syrian refugee migration to Turkiye in 2011 (Baban et al. 2017; Leghtas and Thea, 2018). The initial open border policy, which referred to refugees as "guests," was put in place under the assumption that Syrians would stay only temporarily in Turkiye (Bélanger and Saracoglu, 2018). Turkish LFIP was implemented due to these new conditions after Syrian mass migration to Turkiye. Under LFIP Syrians are given "temporary protection", which is not a full refugee status but automatically is granted with no refugee status determination.

and social capital, support and opportunity networks, and social ties. With a potential 'rejection' of the permit at the doorstep, they can see themselves in a blurred realm of 'legality' and 'illegality.' Given Iran's policies' arbitrariness and precarious status, any changes might easily lead to their further fragility and marginality (in particular, each time with a shock in the volatile conditions of Afghanistan and Iran). In a sense, Afghans in Iran feel an "extended or indefinite exile" in which they lack permanent legal status, experience circumscribed livelihoods (Hyndman and Giles, 2017), and are entrapped in spirals of risks, uncertainty and social immobility.

At the same time, even documented Afghans in Iran lack the most basic rights like the right to own properties or businesses, open up bank accounts, use public transport, and even a phone number. While they have built and relied on informal networks of trust and support among themselves and sometimes with the local community to navigate through such constraints, it has kept them in 'indefinite' marginality. Thinking with Atefeh Kazemi (2022), an Iranian Afghan scholar whose research is the social and spatial marginality of Afghans (Hazaras, to be specific), it can be argued that these established, structural practices in the Iranian migration regime have a "symbolic" function as well. Such practices remind them of their positions, bringing about a sense of humiliation, battered self-esteem, and never-ending dispossession.

In the Iranian migration regime, Afghans experience spatial confinement. Afghans cannot go to specific designated areas (no-go zones, like border areas), and their mobility is highly monitored and controlled. In this regard, Amin Moghadam and Safinaz Jadali (2021) look into this restrictive policy regarding freedom of mobility, explaining that Iran is a party to the 1951 Convention with reservations about freedom of movement (Article 26): In January 2001, the government implemented a by-law designating 'no go' zones. With later amendments, more areas included were not necessarily close to the borders, covering other provinces and areas (like northern provinces). A few of the interlocutors recalled that when they worked in these areas with more opportunities in the construction sector, however, their presence and mobility were highly illegalized, pushing them to invisibility.

Afghans have become an inseparable part of the Iranian labour market. Studies suggest that until recently, the Iranian labour market has offered them at least working opportunities for livelihood and sending remittanc-

es back to Afghanistan (Monsutti, 2005, 2007; Adelkhah and Olszewska, 2007; Wenona, 2010). However, with restricted routes to formal employment opportunities, Afghans can only engage in specific sectors, mostly manual, labour-intensive jobs. With such arrangements at work, not only those Afghan arriving but even those documented and educated Afghans might end up with no alternative but manual jobs that have no relation to their backgrounds, skills, training, and education. This set of restrictive policies denies developing labour experience and social mobility where Afghans might shift from one manual job to another and from one place to another. Despite the Iranian government's efforts to regulate the employment of Afghan workers in the labour market (in support of domestic labour force), employers do not accord with the law in practice. These labour relations are situated in the broader "implementation of the flexible labour market" after the 1990s, which has entailed the prominence of temporary employment arrangements and exploitation (Valadbaygi, 2022).[20] One specific advantage of the Afghan labour force is its *paralegality* which produces and maintains a cheap, flexible and docile labour force that is subject to hyper-exploitation. This zig-zag tactic of controlling and illegalizing Afghans makes and keeps them what Wenona (2010) describes as the "surplus labour force" for the Iranian economy.

In the post-2000s, Iran's policy toward Afghans has been structured around strict policing, illegalization, and systematic deportation. Such practices include hostile policing, detention and deportation, and anti-Afghan rhetoric in public media, consisting of public threats of mass deportation at different times. In the narratives of many Afghans in Iran, *afghani begir* is a common experience where either they or someone they know has been arrested by the 'catch-and-arrest' operations in public places, streets, or on the work site, sent to detentions centre for longs periods, and often deported back to Afghanistan. While these practices supposedly target 'undocumented' and 'illegal' migrants, they produce what De Genova (2002) calls migrant "detainability" and "deportability," targeting *potentially* all Afghans. This in turn can entrap them in a "circle of deportation" (Khosravi, 2016).[21] Afghan 'illegality' and 'deportability' work in tandem and through other

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20   Valadbaygi (2022) points to another aspect of labour hyper-exploitation in Iran: child labour. Afghans make up the majority of child labour in Iran.
21   For more on the deportation outcomes and experience for Afghans, see (Khosravi, 2016) and (Schuster and Majidi, 2018).

modes discussed, such as temporary arbitrariness and spatial confinement. In exploring the transformation of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, Maliha Safri (2011) explains how Afghans' arbitrary and temporary status could easily be transformed into their 'illegality' and 'deportability.' At one point, the Iranian government would allow their "permits to stay within the country to expire; upon permit expiration, registered Afghans were subject to forced deportation" (p. 595). After detention and deportation, 'undocumented' migrant labourers are sent back to Afghanistan; however, they might return. While such practices have been different in scope and intensity in years, they have led to the circulation of Afghans between Afghanistan and Iran, from one place to another within Iran, or from one job to another. Thus, always keeping them in a juxtaposition of immobility and circulation.

As of late conditions in Iran and Afghanistan, Sussan Siavoshi (2022) describes the dominant Iranian government's approach as a "policy of strict restrictions through intensified deportation" of Afghans (p. 7). The latest deportation numbers, particularly after the Taliban takeover, show this aggressive approach. In the most recent aggressive attempts, the Iranian parliament ratified the bill to establish *Sazman-e melli mohajerat* (National Organization for Migration), further increasing and institutionalizing the government's hostile approach. Strict repatriation policies, criminalization of those Iranian citizens who help foreigners purchase properties, and mass illegalization of (Afghan) migrants with different statuses and positions are the primary feature of this organization that prominently finds Afghans as a threat (Diaran, 2022).

These precarity structures hinder Afghans' daily life, constantly illegalizing them, pushing them to the margins, and entrapping them in precarious labour. Iran's treatment of Afghan migrants, either registered or undocumented, can be explained through what Alessandro Monsutti describes as "a game of cat-and-mouse" tactics: never letting them integrate into the host society or labour market, nor feel secure and certain about the present or the future, yet being lenient enough to use and keep this labour (as cited in Adelkhah and Olszewska, 2007, p. 144). These words were said more than fifteen years ago, but throughout the years, the Iranian government's approach has become harsher in keeping Afghans in their precarity, permeating the life courses of next generations.

Afghan Precarity in Turkey

For Afghans, Turkiye has been a destination and transit point to move further to Europe. Scholars explain the Turkish transit regime based on different reasons: Turkiye's geographical position and its "liberal, informal market economy" (İçduygu and Aksel, 2015) and its "gatekeep" position for Fortress Europe, making it a "waiting room" (Erder and Kaşka, 2012). An emerging literature situates this "geography of transit" in the broader transformation of migration governance in Turkiye in tandem with the 'externalization of EU borders' and harmonization with the EU migration management model (Üstübici, 2019). This 'transit' position on the frontiers of Fortress Europe has consequences in terms of 'irregularity' and illegality. Canefe (2016) finds Turkiye "acting as a sponge to absorb those economic migrants, asylum seekers, and so on that Europe has no desire to absorb" (p. 23). As well, Kaytaz (2021) asserts that this position has formed the basis for irregularization and detention through "underpinning policies on irregular migration" and constituting "category of deportable migrants, asylum seekers and refugees who do not 'belong' in Turkiye" (p. 10). Thus, 'irregular' and transit migration to Turkiye is "largely a by-product of the policies that seek to deter irregular mobility" (Dimitriadi, 2018). Following Angeliki Dimitriadi (2018), Afghan' irregular' migration to Turkiye should be understood through an interplay of Turkish migration policies, migration flows, and "what experiences the migrant will have at the time of being in transit" determining their (further) mobility trajectories (p. 17). Attending the latter, with restricted routes to legal status, protection, and decent employment, it is no surprise that these migrants might find Turkiye less of a country for resettlement where even regular migrants and asylum seekers end up pursuing 'irregular' pathways.

Research on Turkiye's current migration and asylum regime characterizes it with institutionalized indeterminacy, securitization and illegalization, and precarious labour (Biehl, 2015; Kaytaz, 2016; Leghtas and Thea, 2018; Kuschminder, 2018; Karadağ, 2021). Bureaucratic barriers in obtaining legal status and asylum processes leave asylum seekers in "indeterminacy and indefinite waiting" (Biehl, 2015, Leghtas and Thea, 2018). For the people waiting for an asylum decision, the identity card is related to providing access to essential social services like public health, education, and humanitarian assistance (Talwasa, 2020: Karadağ, 2021). Biehl (2015)

maps out how this imposed structural uncertainty impedes the daily life of migrants and asylum seekers, produces anxieties, and leaves them vulnerable to unpredictable futures. While there is "agency in waiting," such institutionalized indeterminacy might serve as "carrot-and-stick" tactics for security-mobility nexus (migration and border apparatus) to demobilize, contain, and illegalize/criminalize asylum-seekers—based on arbitrary and unpredictable treatment. Similarly, Eder (2015) explains how "the arbitrariness and uncertainty" embedded in the Turkish migration regime can add to migrant precarity, "forcing them to live on the edge of constantly changing borders of regularity and irregularity" (p. 133). Along the same line, Karadağ (2021) is among some scholars who find Turkish migration control a "modus operandi" of refugee governance. A specific mode of governance operating through and by indeterminacy, barriers, and impasses in bureaucratic procedures and asylum policies.

Increasingly Afghans have been subject to constant illegalization and criminalization after 2018 (Karadağ and Üstübici, 2021). However, the construction of Afghan 'illegality' is not confined to the territorial borders of Iran or Turkiye. Anderson (2016) underlines that while it is widely understood that mobility control is what keeps the 'illegal' migrants out, "a migrant is not 'illegal' until they have crossed the border or have attempted to do so, and very often not until well after that. Illegality is 'produced' by state laws and policies, for with selection and rules come exceptions, rule breakers and grey areas" (p. 311). Intensified after the Taliban takeover, strict border practices, systematic detention and deportation, security checks, police operations, and rising anti-Afghan sentiment in media and public discourse securitize and criminalize Afghans, making them 'detainable' and 'deportable'.[22] As of recently, many Afghans in the author's ethnographic research have experienced detention or deportation themselves, and all live with a sense that detention and deportation is always one step away.

Turkish asylum system also serves to irregularize and illegalize Afghans. The satellite-city-settlement system forces non-Syrian refugees, including Afghans, to live in remote towns with fewer working opportunities and fewer supporting resources and networks and does not allow them to

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[22] See *Iran/Turkey: Fleeing Afghans unlawfully returned after coming under fire at borders*. Amnesty (2022) for the perils Afghans experience moving to Iran and Turkiye since the Taliban takeover.

move freely to other cities.[23] Registered asylum seekers cannot live in big cities, including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, because their presence is illegalized there. The difficulties and ambiguities in registration procedures and lack of any protection for refugees push them to 'illegally' move to these big cities and work in the informal sector, where they are exposed to the risk of arrest, detention, or even deportation, and into situations where they are often severely exploited. Afghan documented and undocumented migrants move to Istanbul and Ankara to find jobs, where they must be "totally invisible" for fear of detention and deportation (Karadağ, 2021, p. 9). This invisibility further decreases their chances for international protection and any assistance. Moreover, due to the difficulty of registration processes in satellite cities, Afghans have to go to other places to register. They must either wait indefinitely or move to another city to open a new registration case. The constant production and reproduction of an illegalized, manageable and exploitable migrant body is constituted through what Karadağ (2021) calls a "security-mobility" nexus where fear of deportation always is on the doorstep. At the same time, mobility of ('irregular') migrant labour is tolerated to some extent making it possible to circulate labour population between and within cities for labour market needs. Similarly, Kristen Sarah Biehl (2015) characterizes Turkish migration and asylum policies as a form of (continuous) "securitization" of the migrant population through satellite city policy as "zones of exception"; where one always lives with a sense of "living on the border" and fear detention and deportation. These "politics of deterrence" (Karadağ, 2021) impede the daily life of migrants and asylum seekers, constantly illegalizing them, pushing them to the margins, and obscuring their sense of present and future (Biehl, 2015).

For Afghan migrants, not only are the routes to asylum and legal residence restricted and complicated, but it is also difficult for them to gain access to formal employment. Şenses (2016) contends that such constraints, compounded with barriers in the asylum system, have led to the growing engagement of 'irregular' migrants and asylum seekers alike in informal labour in Turkiye. With chances for obtaining work permits being low for migrants, Şenses (2016) argues employers might not even apply for work permits in the

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23 Satellite cities are generally selected as small and 'underdeveloped' Anatolian cities. These cities, Turkiye justifies, are 'secure,' silent and 'non-criminal' cities in Turkiye, so asylum seekers can live in their satellite cities within peace with Turkish society where they can take health and education services (UNHCR, The Practice of "Satellite Cities" in Turkey).

first place as they find the procedures way too complicated, and more importantly, they would find informal employment of migrant workers tempting for higher profits. According to Erdoğdu and Şenses (2015), 'irregular' migrants are mainly employed in textiles, agriculture, food processing, construction, tourism, and care service. Employment in these sectors is mostly in "small and medium-sized enterprises." In the textile industry, for example, work is "*subcontracted* to workshops located in residential peripheries" and consists of "unskilled, labour-intensive, and routine tasks" (p. 180). Research on 'irregular' labour in Turkiye highlights that "'informality' and lack of social protections have been pre-established and a 'perennial feature' in Turkey's political economy" (Ergül, 2008, p. 141). However, following the neoliberal trends of flexibilization of labour after 1980 and Turkiye's increasing integration with global markets, the informal economy has expanded with informal, unregistered employment as its "inherent structural feature." With such tendencies, "instability and profitability would not easily lend to regulation" of labour (Ergül, 2008, p.123). For instance, Toksöz et al. (2012) show that while big companies might be obliged to follow the rules to employ migrants, they would easily do it through subcontractors. In the same line, Eder (2015) outlines how female migrant workers in Turkiye are afflicted with a multi-layered vulnerability that she calls "violence of uncertainty." Their precarity is produced through global neoliberal pressures, compounded and increased with "volatility, informality and precariousness of the labour markets" in Turkiye (p. 134).

In the Turkish 'irregular' labour regime, Afghans are primarily employed in "leather, carpet, textiles, construction, shoes, bead making at home, domestic work, paper collection" (Toksöz et al., 2012, P. 92). Karadağ (2021) reports that Afghans make up the majority of precarious workers in big cities like Istanbul (and Ankara) engaged in labour-intensive, manual jobs. The volatility of the informal labour market, in tandem with their illegality,' push Afghans to "shift from one job to another and move from one place to another" (p. 31). In the current informal market, Afghans are among other migrant workers engaged in informal labour, deprived of social protection, services and fair wages and subject to hyper-exploitation, mostly in their informal employment (Şenses, 2017). This leads to absolute legal, social, labour, and political precarity or, as Secil Ertorer states (2021), 'multidimensional' precarity surrounding refugees, asylum seekers, and 'irregular' migrants in Turkiye.

Ethnographic Vignettes:"Chizi ra ke yad gereftim ina ka berim sare kar" ("[The only] thing we have learnt is to go to work")

Ali, a young Hazara living in one of the small towns in Turkiye, in an interview conducted in March 2022 by the author, describes his living and labour conditions with a sense of 'stuckedness'.[24] He is among many other Afghans who were born and raised in Iran and studied at its schools and universities but could never obtain citizenship and its rights and make a decent life. In his thirties, Ali moved to Turkiye when he could find no viable future in Iran. He applied for international protection and received *kimlik*. Since then, he has lived as a registered asylum seeker in a satellite town. Ali frequently expressed his frustration, and sometimes anger, with "unfree" labour, lack of access to social services, and restricted movement from one place to another. Like many other Afghans in the author's field research, he described his situation as *belataklifi* (indeterminacy), waiting for any decision about his asylum, work, and life situation. Ali has to work at a sewing machine in a *tekstil* (garment or textile workshop), an ill-paid job with no prospects. He describes his body and psyche deteriorating after crossing borders, pushbacks, and all the years spent (or lost) in Iran and Turkiye.

Ali's story is similar to the condition of many Afghans in Iran and Turkiye for the past few years, particularly in the wake of the Taliban takeover. However, what strikes the most in his account is his long-anticipated fear of a specific destined labour condition: *kargari*. In Ali's words, *the end* in Iran is "kargar-e sakhteman" (construction labourer), and in Turkiye, it is "sare mashin-e khayati" (at the sewing machine).Whether as 'regular' migrants, refugees, or 'illegal' migrants, the eventual state is the same for Afghans in Iran and Turkiye. His feelings point to a broader situation that he describes himself escaping from, yet he eventually finds himself brought back to it, putting it as *"we are born as kargar [labourers], and we will die as kargar"*. Ali's sense of fatalism long existed before coming to Turkiye and was evoked by the recent crisis in Afghanistan. His fear of ending up working as a 'labourer' *forever* unravels the fragile and subjugated positions of Afghan migrants within and between two countries that can endure. Ali's vignette encapsulates what this article calls the *entrapment* of Afghan migrants in the Iranian and Turkish migration and labour regimes. In this

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24   Their name has been changed to a pseudonym to protect their identity.

framing, this research follows one of the interlocutors using the term. "*ma harja miravim gir mekonim*," meaning "wherever we go, we get stuck or entrapped," pointing to a juxtaposition of spatial mobility and restricted mobility, also hinting to the lack of alternatives in labour and social immobility. This also relates to generational experience of refugee life in Iran, where young(er) Afghans recount that they do not want to end up become a *kargar* like their parents. For Afghan participants in this research, this entrapment has become a synonym to 'slow death.' Such accounts do not only describe the *here-and-present* precarious life and labour of Afghans in Turkiye. Rather, as interlocutors in this research narrate, they extend themselves in time and space and capture the constant production and reconfirmation of Afghan precarity throughout and beyond their life and migration course(s) in Pakistan, Iran and now in Turkiye.

This section presents several ethnographic vignettes of Afghan migrants is presented who have experienced working in informal labour in Iran and Turkiye throughout the author's research. Most participants did not see any viable future for themselves in Iran and Turkiye describing their labour precarity in terms of payment and wage theft, long working hours, physical and emotional tolls, insecurities, lack of protections and rights, harassments and abuses, and no possible way for development in their jobs. They knew the 'illegality' of their migration choices and somehow internalized such narratives ("we came here *khalaf*, *ghachaghi*" meaning unauthorized bases). They yet choose 'irregular' pathways and informal labour to go around *impasses* in obtaining legal status, freedom of mobility, and decent work. Most of them emphasized that they "have to" engage in 'kar-e siah', menial work and informal labour, to be able to pursue 'irregular' pathways to reach somewhere *better* and that they are stuck in such poor labour conditions because, in the first place, they have precarious legal status. Engaged in precarious labour, these Afghan migrants see it as the very motivation for going forward, given its hardship, ill-payment, and no viable future. Their narrative of 'entrapment in informal labour' also relates to the livelihood pressures they experience to send money back to their families, pay debts for their migration journeys, and compensate for the costs after deportation or other disruptions they encounter in life. Notably, some could not meet all these obligations *and* collect money to go forward to Europe; thus, they ended up stuck in poor labour conditions, unable to pursue any other path-

ways. However, their relationship with their labour in these two countries is ambivalent, heterogenous, and with various and uneasy feelings. On the one hand, while the poor labour condition was a reason to move forward, sometimes, through comparison, they feel nostalgic and miss the *relative* freedom or autonomy they enjoyed working in Iran. On the other hand, informal labour is where they can resort to it in Turkiye. It is 'always there,' available for them if they fail in moving onwards. Yet, they become *bored*, frustrated, and even run away from it for periods. In one encounter, a young Afghan migrant finds "boredom" and alienation he experiences in his labour and life as the main reason to 'illegally' move forward to Europe. This pervasive sense of precariousness can reach an extent that sometimes they see it as their 'fate.' This mainly happened during the times there was a 'shock,' like catch-and-arrest operations, pushed back on the way to Europe, detention, or deportations.[25] Despite offering an available pool of flexible jobs, the informal labour market in Iran and Turkiye was "the end of the line" wearing them out and pushing them to look for ways to run out of their precarity.

This article focuses on these comparisons they made in describing their labour precarity and 'irregularity.' For these migrants, meanings and practices around labour are associated with dignity, familial obligations, masculinity (Monsutti, 2007), and even reappropriated as 'self-investment' or 'project of the self' for journey and life.[26] This research would not flatten the heterogeneity of these perceptions and experiences but focus on parts they describe how precarity has affected them. In their narratives, these Afghans point to how informal labour has worked in dispossessing and disposing of them, similarly or differently, in these two countries. They emphasize three primary forms of (interrelated) 'currency': body, time (age), and de-qualification for their exploitation and dispossession.

The Afghan participants in this research mostly worked in construction, stone cutting, and textile in Iran and described their labour-intensive work with "body deterioration" (injuries generally affecting specific body

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25 The inspiration comes from Khosravi's "shock immobility" in thinking about ruptures, intervals between shocks, and how it affects migrants in the region (Xiang et al., 2022).

26 In Iran and Turkiye, Afghans have gained reputation for their trustworthiness, work ethics, thus preferred in the labour market by employers. In line with Anderson (2016), it can be demonstrated that many perceived advantages by employers preferring migrant employees, often racialized, like "reliability, honesty, and work ethics," must be understood partly in relation to and in terms of the level of "dependence" and retention in such labour relations (p. 310).

contours, like knees and legs, over time). In Turkiye, they again explained their working conditions with physical tolls for poor conditions (air quality, ergonomic setting), work intensity, long hours, and overload. These Afghans described their body "going weak slowly" with the intensive labour conditions they experienced and the injuries en route, including violent pushbacks and border-crossing. Furthermore, as undocumented migrants, they did not have proper access to medical aid. Mehdi Zaeimi (2018), an Iranian Afghan scholar, defines undocumented Afghan migrants as "animal laborans," in Hannah Arendt's terms, finding their only capital, "their bodies, their muscles" (p. 47). Similarly, Karadağ (2021) finds precarious illegalized Afghan workers engaged in "ascetic labour" in Istanbul, with their bodies and ability to work as their only capital (p. 9). The Afghan migrants in this research also find ascetic labour their only possible way of survival with no alternatives. They describe their labour as constant *tabahi* (loss and deterioration of body). This even extends to their future aspirations where reflecting if they reached Europe and found a decent job, some wondered what has remained of their body to live and work.

There is an emerging literature on refugee conditions, uncertainty, waiting, and temporalities, namely ethnographies of waiting in 'irregular' migration (Jacobsen et al., 2020), waiting and hope among 'irregular' migrants (Bendixsen and Eriksen, 2020), temporality and political agency of asylum seekers (Kallio et al., 2021), and the temporal aspect of migration governance and temporal subjectivity among migrants in the Turkish context (Biehl, 2016). In a sense, refugees, asylum seekers and 'irregular' migrants are not only out of place but also out of time: their fragmented journeys take time, they are put in indefinite waiting and uncertainty in bureaucratic and asylum procedures, are entrapped in circles of pushbacks, detention, and deportation. Their lives are starkly opposed to 'neoliberal temporally regimented' fast-paced time, which ironically dictates their own time and keeps them waiting. Here this article is inspired by Shahram Khosravi's (2018, 2022) works on deportation and his idea of "stolen time." Mapping out the temporal aspects of deportation, Khosravi (2018) explains that deportation is not only a "spatial expulsion" of the individual. Instead, it can rob the individual of "viabilities of life" (p. 39). Khosravi's (2018, 2022) emphasis is on the stolen time after deportations in terms of economic costs, rupturing social networks and livelihood development, further push-

ing them to 'illegal' return pathways and informal labour. However, one can argue that this temporal expulsion is extended; just like 'detainability', 'deportability', and precarious labour is *potential* for Afghans with different legal and social backgrounds. In particular, for Hazaras who are already vulnerable from their home country. The entanglements in migration and labour regime in Iran and Turkiye (indeterminacies, temporal expulsions, and social immobility) constantly steals Afghans of their time, and push them to "square one" after each rupture (Khosravi, 2018). To the extent that it can entrap them in circulation, thus further dispossessing. This resonated with the interlocutors in this research finding their precarious living and working conditions in Iran and Turkiye regarding permanent loss of "age" and years. This was well presented when they reflected on their future, noting that they have aged through all the years en route, between borders, and shifting from one job to another. When thinking about the future, some would wonder 'when' and at what age they are eventually somewhere 'safe' in Europe. If that happens any time soon, it will be challenging for them to resync with the temporal order of the world (for instance, studying or pursuing career goals). For those families with children, this was projected in what parents and elder siblings aspired. They find it "too late" for any change in their conditions. However, they still do not want their children to lose their days and years as they have.

Third, this article would highlight de-qualification as a distinct way they described their precarious labour conditions. The informants in this research spoke of restricted progress and development in career work in both countries (to a lesser extent in Iran, where some could progress in specific skills related to their work in construction and other sectors). While they did not necessarily aspire to permanent labour, they complained about the increasing volatility, fragmented nature of the jobs they have to do (*"kar-e ma davam dar nest,"* "our work has no durability"), and the impossibility of progressing in one's work (thus, staying as *kargar* forever). In a sarcastic remark, one of them explained the fragmented nature of his labour in Turkiye as if there is no difference if he worked for eleven months and left for a month or worked for three days each week and did not show up for the rest of the days in the week. Although some could gain academic training and degree, develop skills and recognition in their work in Afghanistan and Iran, they mostly have to forget what they have learned as they have to

engage in low-skilled or semi-skilled jobs (through established labour networks and according to the broader labour market forces). Zaeimi (2018) tells that 'undocumented' Afghan labourers can accumulate only 'ascetic' and bodily skills and qualifications in the tasks in manual jobs assigned to them. De-qualification can also occur if they work in the same occupation, like textile, where they refer to differences in work type, working tools, and working conditions. Also, the difference in similar informal sectors in Iran and Turkiye discourages some to follow working in their previous jobs. It is this de-qualification and flexibility of labour they experience from Afghanistan, Iran and Turkiye making one of them frame their labour as a 'meaningless loop,' where the only job they have learned is that they have to do *any* available work, "[tanha] kari ke yad gereftim in ast ke beravim sara kar."

Such narratives not only show the difference and similarities in experiencing two different labour regimes but also point to the entanglement of precarity in terms of 'double' disqualification, temporal expulsion, and exploitation. Based on these narratives, this article would argue that they yearn for freedom and more autonomy in their labour and life as they find their 'informal' labour the most concrete sign of their entrapment. Thus, express how they end up simply following the available labour conditions and employer's treatment. Notably, in some cases, these migrants reflected on their position in the labour market, sarcastically questioning why, when they are 'available' labour and can work decently, they are detained and deported and denied ways to legalize their work and stay in these countries.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

A key concern in this article is to "politicize" and "historicize" the roots of Afghan refugee precarity in Iran and Turkiye. That is to move away from yet another "Afghan crisis" narrative where they enter these countries readily 'illegally' and 'irregularly.' The established position of Afghans in Iran and Turkiye as 'irregular' migrant labourers asks for more critical investigation. This is of particular emphasis considering the late conditions in Afghanistan and ever-deteriorating conditions for Afghans in and between Iran and Turkiye after 2018.

Based on the existing literature, this article investigates how Afghan 'illegality' and 'informal' labour is produced and *reaffirmed* within and between these countries through specific *entanglements* of Iranian and Turkish

migration governance, border control, and labour regimes. This production of 'irregularity' of migration and informality of labour should be situated in compounded local, regional and global processes. Afghan displacement is a part of the broader phenomenon of migration from the Global South to the North. At the same time, migration management and labour in Iran and Turkiye are embedded in the global context of the neoliberal trends of flexibility and informality, making forced migration and 'unfree' labour a dominant mode. These trends work in tandem with stricter borders and increasing securitization policies in these countries. Particularly for Afghans and in the region, the Global North has extended itself to the source of migration to deny their entry, here the "externalization" of EU borders for the case of Turkiye.

Bridget Anderson (2010) explains how in the British context, migration control not only functions to control the flow of labour but also as a "mould shaping specific forms of labour positions and relations" through "categorization of entrance, imposition of labour relations, and indeterminacies in migration governance." Coupled with "less formalized migratory processes," she continues, it leads to the production of 'precarious' workers "that cluster in particular jobs and segments of the labour market" (p. 301). It can be argued that in both Iranian and Turkish migration and labour regimes, such relations and positions are *moulded* in ways that push Afghans into precarious legal and labour positions with no protections and are subject to exploitation. Over the years and as of late, in both countries, Afghan 'illegality' in De Genova's (2002) words, "provides an apparatus for sustaining their vulnerability and tractability" for 'irregular' migrants (p. 439). In Iran, pathways to precarity are so readily laid out that 'illegality' and precarious labour are potentially on the doorstep for any Afghan migrant. This has constituted them as an available labour force when required and easily disposable when not demanded. For Afghan 'irregularity' and informal labour in Turkiye, this article would refer to Canefe (2016) describing the Turkish case as a peculiar case with a readiness of the government "to turn irregular migrants into precarious workers and the careful management of their slotting into chosen sectors of the Turkish economy where there is a great demand for cheap and semi-qualified circular and flexible labour" (p. 20).

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3

Economic, Social and Environmental Triple Bottom Line of Sustainability Based Migration

Saliha Karadayı Usta*

ABSTRACT

The mandatory or voluntary migration of people can occur due to economic, social and environmental effects, and it is paramount of importance owing to the individuals' need of reaching higher standards of living. Sustainability is the ability/capability of being sustained, and it is based on the effort of people to maintain their lives in better economic, social, and environmental conditions. In the economic sustainability-based migration, people change their location for better working conditions, while the migration for social sustainability involves people changing their lifestyles. Forced migration due to the climate change and wars, is an indispensable condition triggered by environmental and political reasons. This research aims to examine how this triple bottom line of sustainability are handled in the literature via a bibliometric analysis, in order to reveal the relationships between concepts with visual maps and to clarify the causal relationships of the factors causing the migration. Following the conceptual explanations, analysis findings are supported with various real-life examples. Since the number of publications in the literature dealing with all three dimensions of sustainability for migration is limited, this study contributes to the literature in a theoretical way. In addition, a guiding conceptual model is presented for practitioners focusing on the industry as a result of the migration, hence a practical contribution is also provided.

Keywords: Migration, economic sustainability, social sustainability, environmental sustainability

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INTRODUCTION

Migration is moving from one country, place, region or locality to another usually periodically (Castles et al., 2013) to reach better economic, ecological and social conditions. Migration and sustainable development nexus brings the triple bottom line of sustainability into the debate (Salazar, 2022). The patterns and determinants of global migration illustrate that people in low-income, high-population regions tend to move somewhere else for financial reasons (food insecurity, low life expectancy, unemployment, political instability, and violence, etc.). Secondly, the regions having extreme climate (dry, wet, hot extremes) have both migration and emigration, and thirdly, the need for changing lifestyle triggers the social sustainability-based migration. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa has mass population displacement due to poverty, violence, and environmental stress as barriers against the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Li & Samimi, 2022). As another example, Eastern European and the Balkans' health systems are mutually interdependent, and migration seeking economic and social sustainability is remarkably high for healthcare services. Bottlenecks in financing and access to affordable medical care are dealt with by mobility in this area, and since the related authorities observe this activity, they try to fulfill the aim of environmental sustainability by precautions/enforcements to minimize carbon fuel consumption (Jakovljevic et al., 2021).

According to the UN Refugee Agency "forced displacement" report, 103 million forcibly displaced worldwide (Last update: 27 October 2022) including 53.2 million are internally displaced people, 32.5 million are refugees, 4.9 million are asylum-seekers, and 5.3 million are other people in need of international protection. 74% of the hosted people are in low and middle-income countries, while 69% of them are hosted in neighboring countries. 3.7 million refugees are hosted in Türkiye, and 72% of them are originated from just five countries: Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Ukraine, Afghanistan, South Sudan (UNHCR, 2022). Hence, migration policy is paramount of importance with the sustainable development context by reducing the poverty, inequality, insecurity, inclusion of immigrants to education and health care systems (Tkachova et al., 2021). Besides, migration and justice for the realization of sustainable development goals depends on a nested, translocal migration system (Janker & Thieme, 2021) by expand-

ing the individuals to households, next community, and then national and international scopes.

The motivation behind this research is that the literature has a limited number of reviews in the migration and sustainability nexus (Janker & Thieme, 2021). Although there are particular sustainable development papers, there is a gap addressing the triple bottom line of sustainability with the economic, environmental and social sides for the migration. Therefore, this study aims to examine how this triple bottom line of sustainability are dealt with in the literature via a bibliometric analysis, to reveal the relationships between concepts with visual maps and to clarify the causal relationships of the factors causing the migration. Following the conceptual explanations, analysis findings are supported with various real-life examples.

The following sections include a detailed literature review including economic, environmental and social sustainability-based migration, bibliometric analysis with visual map of keywords, real-life examples and conclusion.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scopus data base search on 21st November 2022 with the "migration OR immigration" AND "sustainable OR sustainability OR continuity OR maintain" keywords (search in the titles of the publications) provide 363 document results. As it is stated in **Figure 3.1,** there is an increasing trend line after 2005 for the migration literature and reached to its highest level in 2020. Several number of reasons behind the migration as an outcome, the development in technological infrastructure and digitally enabled accessibility opportunities, awareness in sustainability, and ease of information and knowledge gathering processes have all pave the way of increasing paper numbers of migration literature.

The journals such as Sustainability, Mountain Research and Development, International Migration, International Migration Review, Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues, and Tourism Geographies are the top publishers discussing sustainability context in migration. Moreover, the authors from United States, United Kingdom, China, Germany, Canada, France, and Spain as the country of residence are frequently conducting researches in this field of study (See **Figure 3.2**).

Figure 3.1 Number of sustainability research in migration.

Figure 3.2 Countries frequently publishing in the field of sustainability researches in migration.

The 67% of these papers are articles, while 12% are book chapters, 10% are conference papers, and the remaining part includes reviews, notes, editorials, erratum, books, and short surveys.

Social Sciences are dominant in literature with a percentage of 32.5, and Environmental Science follows it with a 15.2% rate, next, Economics, Econometrics and Finance with 7.3%, then, Energy with 6%, respectively. In addition, funding sponsors are mainly National Natural Science Founda-

tion of China, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, European Commission, European Research Council, National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, National Cancer Institute, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico Economic and Social Research Council.

The literature has three folds with sustainability domains as follows.

Economic Sustainability based Migration

Migration contributes to the economies by developing the labor-intensive industries with the gains from migrant workers, reduces income inequalities through remittances, circulates workers, and creates international retirement migrants (Bhula-or, 2020). Zhang & Liu (2022) indicate that foreign direct investments are significant in creating economic sustainability, and states that while the intellectual property rights protection strengthen the economic sustainability, the migration affects it negatively. In contrast, Hu et al. (2021) assert that domestic migration enhances pension system's fiscal sustainability under rapid urbanization and industrialization. Similarly, Alves et al. (2019) examines the effects of displacement on the economic sustainability of the pension system by using demographic forecasts and derives that there is evidence in explaining a positive impact of domestic migration on pension system triggering the financial balances. In brief, whether there is a domestic or international migration due to the economic concerns, the economical sustainability is supported by this mobility.

Financial problems-based migration can be male or female dominated according to the country or particular industry needs. The nonimmigrants remaining behind face social and economic difficulties, demanding gender equity and social sustainability (Prati et al., 2022).

The research focusing on the rural-to-urban migration emphasizes the economic and social sustainability enhancement, and assert that once the migrants return to their original places, they are generally behaving pro-socially due to the feeling of responsibility to implement the knowledge and skills they gained during the migration for the sake of their family members in their sending communities. (Le et al., 2021).

In addition, there are also studies emphasizing that the state of mobility which seems to be a tourism activity, has turned into labor migration (Salazar, 2022) for sustaining the economic wellbeing.

Wu et al. (2022) points out that migration costs indirectly affect air

pollution levels because when migration costs decrease, it supports residents to move out of their own cities with poor air quality to improve their welfare. The article also suggests that in pursuit of sustainable development, local governments are required to improve the livable degree of the cities' economic sustainability to prevent the brain drain due to the excessive residential migration. Also, there is a second suggestion about creating a household registration system in order to promote the free flow of workforce for enhancing the welfare of residents.

Calabrò & Vieri (2019) emphasized the importance of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and generates a 2030 Agenda covering a new general framework for countries to adapt their activities by integrating SDGs within the internal policies context by highlighting the agriculture playing a major role as a nice chance for socio-economic harmonization in host countries.

Indeed, Macintyre (2018) endorses the mining industry by means of displacement and sustainability. Accordingly, the commoditization of landed property with capitalism changes the knowledge and understanding of places and high-mindedness of development. Displacement occurs with several rates over the life cycle of the mine, however it has a lasting impact on the stability of the community with financial sustainability. Mining firms generally prefer some simplistic and inadequate solutions to the environmental and social issues in terms of sustainability.

Environmental Sustainability Based Migration

Environmental migration is based on environmental safety and security requirement of people in a specific region and requires countries' risk mitigation strategies for sustaining these people's lives. For instance, the environmental factors such as droughts, floods, higher temperature sand, extreme weather events and global warming bring about uninhabitable areas, and lead to the migration, displacement, changing population distribution, geopolitical changes with long-range impacts or planned resettlement (Reznikova & Danilina, 2021). Drylands in agriculture have been a serious problem throughout history by threatening social and environmental wellbeing, and by obstructing the sustainability with a consequence of depopulation in many areas (Ingram & Patrick, 2021). Climate change widens migration, especially from neighboring countries and within the country itself, and it is asserted that this kind of mobility decreases poverty and income inequality (Bhula-or, 2020).

Jiménez-Hernández et al. (2021) emphasizes the "coastal migration" due to the climate change caused sea level rise issue with different countries' case studies. The study takes coastal human population density, urbanization degree, and coastal-flooding penetration as factors to provide a coastal migration index, and as a result, a resettlement will be a must-have for many territories.

On the other hand, air quality is another issue forcing people for a displacement. Wang et al. (2021) suggest a mechanized tunneling process for dust suppression with an air curtain to minimize the mobility of people.

There are also many papers focusing on the recent waves of migration from central America due to the consequences of global environmental change with many challenging isuues (Bolaños-Guerra & Calderón-Contreras, 2021; Elazar & Weinfeld, 2018; Torres et al., 2016; Gupta & Sullivan, 2013).

Chien et al. (2021) draw attention to resource management and circular economy to maintain the conversation of the sources and mitigate the usage levels with recycling. Moreover, Pamucar et al. (2022) propose green strategies for planning urban mobility to adapt to climate change and create sustainable cities in terms of ecological preventions. The research emphasizes the necessity of paradigm shift from the traditional ways to novel approaches supporting environmental sustainability. Here, the local and governmental policymakers have an important role as a force to people and companies in the transition period. Although there might be conflicting needs of social, financial, and environmental issues; a scenario analysis approach must be followed for alternative green strategies. For example, Spain has a parking sector with a high level of market concentration as a mobility policy in terms of environmental sustainability criteria. Fernández-González et al. (2022) provides a detailed analysis endorsing that many the companies in this sector tend to stay in the market in pursuit of sustainability in mobility policies. As another example, Goossens et al. (2020) emphasizes the importance of livable streets by green gentrification as a precaution of a displacement of longtime residents. Similarly, Jones (2020) again elaborates the suburban gentrification, focusing on the natural reality of refugee displacement. And Solarin & Bello (2020) highlights the energy innovation requirement for environmental sustainability.

Besides, Normelani et al. (2020) considers this negative situation an opportunity and promotes the Asean countries' untouched natural beauties to attract people with tourism activities that also promotes the voluntarily displacement of people towards ecologically sustainable places. Similarly, Kazemian et al. (2020) assert that Asean countries are the trending good choice for the population by analyzing human capital investment and brain drain data.

Social Sustainability Based Migration

As clearly stated in the previous two sub-sections, economic and ecological problems also trigger social changes. These triple bottom line of sustainability should be considered as a single issue including many triggering conditions. Labor immigration, poverty risk, unemployment problems trigger social inequality, and migrants' tent to change the demographics for the sake of social sustainability of living (Ivanová & Grmanová, 2021). Especially, in this triple bottom line, rural-to-urban migration requires a detailed sustainable strategic city planning and changes the whole social pattern of the cities (Roy & Thangaraj, 2021; Iosim et al., 2022; Winterton et al., 2019).

In practice, the tourism activity like mobility that becomes an international workforce migration significantly affects social sustainability. First, tourism is viewed as a positive occasion, while migration is politicized recurrently, and considered as a challenge to social systems and cultures. Hence, this form-changing mobility affects social interactions between residents and migrants. Therefore, attitudes towards migrants and tourists are negatively affected. Just the opposite, migrant-local connections may develop in a positive way, creates opportunities for positive, symbiotic co-existence, alongside exploitative relationships, and contributes to a social sustainability (Choe & Lugosi, 2022; Jover & Díaz-Parra, 2022).

Furthermore, similar to the tourism mobility, according to a sociological study addressing the nexus of professional migration and social sustainability, the teaching / education / learning reasoned mobilities generates a place attachment, and migrants would like to stay in the destination places (Kataev et al., 2022; Amrith, 2017; Povoroznyuk, 2016).

The literature review is visualized in the following section, and the inter-relations between the sustainability-migration keywords are provided.

BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Bibliometric analysis is one of the most up-to-date techniques in examining the development of a specific discipline (Güçlü Nergiz, 2014). It enables the analysis of publications such as articles, book chapters, conference papers, reviews, etc., next, examines the researches in a particular academic field within a framework of several bibliometric features, extracts findings regarding scientific connections, and guide the possible future researches (Çiçek and Kozak, 2012).

By examining the previously explained literature review findings of keywords, a detailed keywords-based bibliometric analysis is conducted via VosViewer software (VosViewer, 2021) that integrates the Scopus files and provides meaningful visual maps of keywords. Accordingly, the bibliometric analysis of the 815 keywords are analyzed to result in significant results. For instance, in case of having 5 keywords occurring at the same document search, 8 out of 815 meet the threshold, and found that "migration" is discussed with "sustainable development goals" and "refugees". Moreover, when the minimum number of occurrence of a keyword is 4, 13 of them meet the threshold, and "mobility", "employment", "disaster risks", "gender" and "return migration" keywords are covered in the literature. Here, China comes to the forefront as a keyword too.

The case of 3 keywords occurring at the same search provides 31 research meeting the threshold, and adds "lifestyle migration", "social sustainability, "Spain", "Mexico", "Germany", "labor migration", SDGS, "remittance", "migration policy", "climate change adaptation" to the literature search.

When the number of occurrences of a keyword is 2,86 out of 815 meet the threshold, and these keywords are grouped in the review (See **Figure 3.3**):

- Agro-ecology, ecological migration, environmental migration, forced migration, ecological footprint, disaster risk reduction, carbon emissions, continuity, sustainable development,
- Migration, human security, translocation, resilience, Pakistan,
- European Union, labor mobility

- Sustainable development goals, integration, policies, energy, refugees, culture, poverty, China
- Migration policy, migration and development
- Global migration governance, SDGS, economic development, remittances, human capital, immigration, environmental sustainability, migration development nexus
- Sustainable economic development, population, undocumented migration, Mexico, Arizona, Latin America
- Lifestyle migration, social sustainability, impact, community, Spain, ageing, rural, family migration

Figure 3.3 Visual map of migration studies related sustainability.

Source: Prepared by the author

As it is obviously stated in the bibliometric analysis, ecologically-driven and human security required mobilities are "forced migrations" in order to maintain continuation of the human life. Secondly, the labor migration is a remarkable research topic in the literature for the sustainable economic development of both individuals and countries. Thirdly, as the least stud-

ied subject, lifestyle migration for the social sustainability having impacts on communities are addressed in the findings of bibliometric analysis. Besides, some countries and regions are significantly underlined in the findings emerging in particular field of research topics like China, Pakistan, Mexico, Arizona, Latin America and Spain, etc.

DISCUSSION

Worldwide population movements include the key issues such as challenges, trends, global governance, ethnic diversity, transnationalism, racism, transformation of societies, formation of ethnic minorities and multiculturalism. The examples can be grouped as *(i)* international migration before 1945: colonialism, industrialization and migration to North America and Oceania before 1914, labor migration within Europe, and the interwar period, *(ii)* migration in Europe since 1945: migration in the post-World War II boom, European migrations in the period of economic restructuring (1974–mid-1990s), Southern European migration transitions, migration in central and Eastern Europe, migration trends of the new millennium, migratory consequences of the global economic crisis, and Europe's changing population, *(iii)* migration in the Americas: from 1945 to the 1970s, since the 1970s, and regional trends and policy developments, *(iv)* migration in the Asia–Pacific: development of Asian migration, Asian migration to Western Europe, North America and Oceania, and contract labour migration to the Middle East, within Asia, and qualified migrants and students, *(v)* migration in Africa and the Middle East: historical and colonial roots of contemporary migrations, postcolonial migration within Africa, intercontinental migration to Europe and the Gulf States, forced migration in the Middle East, changing intra-African migrations after 1989, new African migrations to Europe, the Middle East and China, and the political salience, *(vi)* migration, security and the debate on climate change: international migration and security nexus, growing concerns in environment, climate change and migration, *(vii)* quest for control: employer sanctions, legalization and temporary foreign-worker admission programmes, refugees and asylum, regional integration, the 'migration industry', human smuggling and trafficking (Castles et al., 2014).

Economic concerns-based migration has been seen in the form of "economic survival" for years. For example, rural–to-urban of youth in

Uganda (Bwambale et al., 2022), to-European Union countries (Nicolăescu & Petre, 2017), Mexico-to-USA (Schmalzbauer, 2011) migration are the most studied fields of study in the literature.

Social concerns-based migration has been seen due to religious reasons such as Hījrāh in Islām (ul Ain Khan & Ahmed, 2019), or interestingly owing to the alcoholism (Buu et al., 2007), because of brain drain (Elshani, 2020), or just simply the need of changing the lifestyles (Chen & Bao, 2020).

Environmental concerns-based migration has been seen in China with a resettlement (Hu et al., 2018), in inner Mongolia (Jin, 2010), in small islands (Keshen & Lazickas, 2022), in Bangladesh (Best et al., 2021), in Morocco and Congo (Ou-Salah et al., 2022), in Nepal (Bhusal et al., 2021), in Poland from urban to rural (Jończy et al., 2021), and so on.

In order to discuss the findings of this study, the essential economic, social and environmental based sustainability requirements take a different form when the issue is immigration. People migrates to survive or obtain the humanitarian financial living conditions. Besides, needs of acceptance by people, or the need to feel valued by particular communities are the main reasons behind the social migration. In addition, owing to the climate crisis based inevitable movement requirements, people are constrained to environmental migrations which results in a several resettlement problems.

The following section includes the concluding remarks of this paper.

CONCLUSION

Forced or voluntary population migration may occur due to economic, social and environmental impacts and is critical due to individual needs to achieve a higher standard of living. Sustainability is the ability to develop sustainably, based on people's efforts to live their lives under better economic, social and environmental conditions. Migration based on economic sustainability involves people changing their location for better working conditions, while migration based on social sustainability involves changing their lifestyle. Forced migration due to climate change and war is an unavoidable situation triggered by environmental and political reasons.

This study intended to elucidate the causal links of the reasons influencing the migration, investigated how the literature addresses the "triple bottom line" of sustainability, and revealed the relationships between

concepts with visual maps. The conceptual explanations were followed by various real-world examples supporting the analysis's conclusions.

Ecologically-driven and human security-required mobilities are "forced migrations," as it is clearly mentioned in the bibliometric analysis, in order to maintain the continuation of human life. Second, the literature on research topics for the sustained economic development of people and nations highlights the importance of labor migration. Thirdly, the results of the bibliometric analysis address lifestyle migration for the social sustainability that affects communities as the least researched topic. Real life examples were given accordingly. Since the number of publications in the literature dealing with all three dimensions of sustainability for migration is limited, this study contributes to the literature in a theoretical way. In addition, a guiding conceptual model is presented for practitioners focusing on the industry as a result of the migration, hence a practical contribution is also provided.

This study makes a theoretical contribution to the literature because there aren't many articles dealing with all three aspects of sustainability for migration. Additionally, as a result of the migration, a guiding conceptual model is supplied for practitioners focusing on the industry; as a result, a useful contribution is also made.

This study is limited with the on-hand documentations. Since the real situations of the refugees are not properly recorded by many countries or authorities, this research has a limitation in reviewing the whole reality of migration. The further researches might conduct in-depth interviews with the refugees with several nationalities. As it is clearly understood, since the migrants are dealing with to survive, not having opportunities to deliver their requirements or thoughts, the only knowledge we have is limited with the publications of immigrant-receiving countries' authors.

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The Rise of the Migration Industry: The Example of Border Management Systems in Turkiye

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ABSTRACT

International migration is a multifaceted phenomenon associated with many problems such as economic concerns, political pressure, internal conflict, war, unemployment, poverty, and hunger. This phenomenon has consequences in economic, political, and social areas. In the period of neoliberal globalization, where migration movements have evolved into migration crises, refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons have become more visible, especially with irregular migration movements. Migrant receiving states claim that economic and security concerns increase with the intensification of irregular migration flows. At the same time, these states demand more regular migration be managed in accordance with the law and irregular migration be stopped. Therefore, the efforts of states to manage regular migration and prevent irregular migration require them to come together with other states and non- state actors in the ever-developing migration industry. The migration industry is an immense business area compatible with the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. The migration industry is an industry that spans a wide range of business areas, from actor diversity to sector diversity. There are migration management fields such as border management, externalization, first reception, integration, detention, deportation, and so on within this diversity. One of the most

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prominent security tools of migration management is strengthening the security and controls of border management. Within the scope of border management, sectoral activities are carried out in areas such as borders, walls, fences, and technological equipment within the migration industry. In this chapter, it will be discussed how the border management systems in Turkiye have changed after 2015 compared to previous years, how they are financed and how other states, non-state actors, and migrants are affected by border management policies within the scope of the migration industry. For this, firstly, the fundamentals of the migration industry will be discussed. Secondly, border management, one of the largest sectors of the migration industry, will be elaborated through the example of Turkiye. Finally, the migration industry will be evaluated within the framework of the dynamics of neoliberal globalization.

Keywords: Irregular Migration, Border Management, Migration Industry, Neoliberal Globalization

INTRODUCTION

International migration is a multifaceted phenomenon associated with many problems such as economic concerns, political pressure, internal conflict, war, unemployment, poverty, and hunger. This phenomenon has consequences in economic, political, and social areas. In the period of neoliberal globalization, where migration movements have evolved into migration crises steadily, refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons have become more visible, especially with irregular migration movements. Migrant receiving states claim that economic and security concerns increase with the intensification of irregular migration flows. At the same time, these states demand more regular migration to be managed in accordance with the law and irregular migration to be stopped. Therefore, the efforts of states to manage regular migration and prevent irregular migration require them to come together with other states and non-state actors in the ever-developing migration industry.

The migration industry is an immense business area compatible with the dynamics of neoliberal globalization. The migration industry includes areas such as border management, externalization, first reception, integration, detention, deportation as an outcome of the migration management policies of the states. States' implementation of more restrictive migration

management policies in response to the increase in irregular migrant flows and the search for new ways by irregular migrants to overcome these implementations has created a vicious circle. This vicious circle has become the driving force of the migration industry. Border management systems are at the forefront of the most prominent sectors in this cycle. Border management systems are the control, surveillance and strengthening of land, sea, and air borders to curb irregular migration flows. Public-private partnership has an important place in the implementation of border management systems, where significant technological, security, defense, and construction investments are at stake. States that believe that migration is manageable with the management mentality of neoliberalism, transfer their responsibilities and obligations by outsourcing their migration management to private companies. Therefore, private actors from different sectors have a say in the management of the human-based migration phenomenon, where control and accountability mechanisms should be at the highest level.

This chapter discusses and details the concept and the rise of the migration industry with a case study from Turkiye. Firstly, the concept of the migration industry is explained. Secondly, the reasons behind the rise of the migration industry are listed and the financial dimension of this rise is revealed. Thirdly, border management systems as a leading sector in the migration industry is discussed and finally, the part of public-private partnership in the implementation of border management systems is exemplified through a case study from Turkiye. In the conclusion part, the migration industry is evaluated within the framework of neoliberalism and human rights of migrants.

THE CONCEPT OF THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY

The actors and sectors covered by the migration industry and the relations between them have changed with the dynamics of global migration. Migration industry studies, which have been conducted for nearly 50 years, indicate that this concept is covering more elements day by day. The first academic use of the migration industry concept may be seen in the study of Robert Harney in 1977 with *commerce of migration* (Harney, 1997). Harney coined the concept commerce of migration to describe agents who earn money by serving migrants during the Italian emigration of the early 20th century. Different concepts corresponding to the migration industry

emerged also in the studies carried out in the following years. In 1997, Salt and Stein focused on migrant trafficking, the core of the illegitimate migration business, with the concept of *migration as a business* (Salt and Stein, 1997, p.469). Castles and Miller, with reference to Nigel Harris, emphasized that the *migration industry* is a vast unseen international network that supports the global labor market (Castles and Miller, 1998, p.98). On the other hand, Kyle and Koslowski highlighted those who serve global migrant smuggling with the concept *of migration merchants* in their work in 2001 (Kyle and Koslowski, 2001). In 2002, Ivan Light referred to the migration agentship of immigrants with the concept of *immigrants place entrepreneurs* (Light, 2008). The common point of these studies is associating the migration industry with illegal or illicit initiatives. However, Rubén Hernández-León, with his work published in 2005, gave a broader perspective on the concept and scope of the migration industry (Hernández-León, 2005).

The migration industry may contain all types of actors and sectors that provide financial gain from all migration-related actions. Some of these actors are travel agencies, employers and labor recruitment agencies, lawyers for legal counseling, money lenders, formal and informal remittance services, migrant networks, smuggling, and trafficking networks, counterfeit document providers. Some of these sectors are transportation sector, security systems sector, recruitment sector, third sector including non-governmental organizations and humanitarian organizations. Each actor and each sector may be defined as intermediaries with various roles between migrants and public institutions in complex migration processes. These intermediaries serve both migrants and public institutions with their facilitating and controlling roles[1] at the same time (Agustin, 2008, pp.4-8; Sorensen and Gammeltolf-Hansen, 2013, p.7). For example, recruitment agencies, which act as intermediaries on behalf of states with labor shortages, facilitate both the processes of migrants who want to immigrate regularly and the implementation of bureaucratic processes. However, there is a more complex network of relations behind this apparent picture. While intermediaries serve public institutions and facilitate their work, they also take on a controlling function for the movements of migrants. For example, visa consultancy companies not only provide services to migrants regarding visa applications but also carry out monitoring and screening procedures and security checks on be-

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[1] The *rescue role* of actors in the migration industry is excluded within the context of the chapter.

half of the state during the visa application processes. Another example is the private security sector. While private security companies stationed at the borders facilitate the state's functions by checking borders, border crossings, and travel documents, these companies also assume a restrictive function to migrants' movements by controlling them on behalf of the state. These examples may be multiplied for every actor and sector for where they are in contact with migration-related issues. At this point, it is noteworthy that private actors and private sectors in the migration industry are in such a relationship with public institutions. Therefore, it would be appropriate to take a look at the connection between the migration industry and neoliberal globalization.

Economically developed countries promote the mobility of capital, goods, information, and services as well as human mobility to ensure the continuity of neoliberal globalization. However, they also restrict human mobility with a set of rules and laws so that their sovereignty is not hollowed out in this globalizing world. The desire of states to know and determine who can enter their country and for how long is a reflection of their sovereignty. For this reason, states intend to manage and direct the regular and irregular migration flows. Moreover, the absence of a uniform body and a binding regime within the scope of global migration governance leaves migration management to the initiative of states and their outsourcing. In the migration management processes, facilitating or controlling regular and irregular migration flows may be implemented by the states themselves as a migration policy or may be exported through privatization and outsourcing. As a result, an ever-developing migration industry emerges especially in response to restrictive migration policies. Therefore, in migration industry, private actors undertake the responsibilities of the states and states transfer their responsibilities and obligations to private actors through privatization or outsourcing mechanisms.

THE RISE OF THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY

The rise of the migration industry is directly linked to three interrelated reasons: (1) the acceleration of the globalization process with the end of the Cold War and the integration of the neoliberal paradigm with globalization, (2) restrictive migration policies produced by states' desire to control irregular migration, and (3) the state being the main financier of the migration

industry. Firstly, the acceleration of the globalization process with the end of the Cold War has increased human mobility and the integration of the neoliberal paradigm with globalization diversified actors that involved in migration processes as mentioned in the previous section. Secondly, when the world became smaller and people began to move more since the 1990s, negative views towards irregular migrants in the societies of migrant-receiving states increased. Therefore, the increase in irregular migration flows from east to west and from south to north due to instability in global politics, emergence of refugee crises, and increasing integration problems of immigrants have strengthened the perception of migration as a threat. Migrant-receiving states' efforts to minimize these negative social and economic views about irregular migration and irregular migrants accelerated the development of the migration industry. Also, the mentality that the cost of not managing and regulating migration would be higher has led political powers to intervene in human mobility and produce more restrictive policies against migrants. As the state increased its interventions on migration management, irregular migrants and intermediaries continued to find new ways. Therefore, the fact that irregular migrants finding new migration routes in the face of the restrictive migration policies of the state caused the migration industry to rise in the way of curbing irregular migration. Thirdly, one of the reasons for the rise of the migration industry is that states are the main financier of this industry. One the one hand, economically developed states finance the migration industry in order to protect their national interests, security, economic and social structures. On the other hand, another reason states are the migration industry's main financiers is that states are shareholders in migration-related sectors such as security, border management, biometrics, deportation, and detention. Shareholder states keep the migration industry alive and profit by financing it. As highlighted before, states include private actors in migration management through privatization and outsourcing, with the management mentality of neoliberalism. As a result, the actors involved in the migration industry diversify and expand their scope on a sectoral basis. Therefore, the migration industry becomes a large and rising business area including states, public and private banks, development agencies, multinational companies, investment partnerships, third sector, and so on. Regular and irregular business areas in the migration industry are of different nature. The establishment of monitoring and screening systems at the borders, the

provision of catering services in detention centers where irregular migrants are held, the repatriation of a deported migrant by plane through a travel agency, the recruitment of security companies that will control the borders to curb irregular migrants exemplify this diversity.

Sectors within the migration industry are profitable business areas. However, it is generally hard to define the financial dimension of the booming migration industry for three reasons. Firstly, it is not possible to determine the global financial dimension of the migration industry. For example, knowing the profits of the security companies working in migrant detention centers on a global scale requires examining the annual earnings of the private security companies, working in detention centers in each country, if there are any. Secondly, the exact amount of the migration industry is unknown due to the inability to calculate the revenue generated from the extensive use of cash in irregular or illegal business areas. However, it may still be seen that this industry generates big profits with some estimations. Thirdly, the migration industry is very conducive to grow up through both regular or legal channels and also irregular or illegal channels. For this reason, the migration industry has numerous branches and it is not possible to identify all these branches one by one. For example, it is not always possible to measure the incomes of NGOs, philanthropic organizations, migrant networks, or clandestine organizations through migration. Therefore, it may be claimed that few businesses may give the global financial dimension of the migration industry. One of them is migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and the other is remittance flows. Both are one of the largest business areas feeding the migration industry.

Migrant smuggling generates an estimated revenue of approximately $10 billion per year (FATF, 2022, p.1; Migration Data Portal, 2021; IOM, 2017a). To explain it in further details, in 2015 when the migrant crisis in Europe peaked, turnover on Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean routes is estimated to be between €3 and €6 billion (European Parliament, 2021, p.5). According to the estimates made in 2017, from Africa to Europe and from South America to North America $6.75 billion were estimated to be obtained through migrant smuggling (Migration Data Portal, 2021). According to Europol data, migrant smugglers are estimated to have generated €190 million revenue from smuggling on land and sea routes in the Western, Central, and Eastern Mediterranean in 2019 (Europol, 2019).

Another big business area of the migration industry is global remittance flows. According to World Bank remittance data source, officially recorded global inward remittance amount in 2019 is $720 billion ($128 billion in 2000 and $473 billion in 2010, see **Graph 4.1**) (World Bank, 2021a). $548 billion from this amount was delivered to low- and middle-income countries. The remittance cost of sending an average of $200 varies from region to region, but generally it is between 3% and 10% (World Bank, 2021b). Since these numbers reflect formally recorded remittance inflows, when remittances made with informal channels are included, a market emerges where huge profits are made.

Graph 4.1 Global migrant remittance inflows, in US$ million

The migration industry contains profitable business areas and apart from migration smuggling or remittance, emerging sectors of the migration industry draw attention. These include private security companies, transportation companies, and consulting companies. These companies have become the rising sectors of the migration industry because of the increase in irregular migration flows, refugees, and asylum seekers, and the desire to regulate regular migration with stricter measures. It seems difficult to provide a global financial information on the migration-related activities of the private sector. In this context, conducting regional or national research is more appropriate. In the next part of this chapter, private companies that play an active role in the field of border management in Turkiye will be highlighted and public-private partnership will be reflected more concretely.

BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY

Border management systems is one of the largest sectors of the migration industry. Border management is a comprehensive term that includes border security, border controls, and border strengthening. Border management consists of systems which on the one hand, the control of regular and legal passages, and on the other hand, the prevention of irregular and illegal passages of all living and non-living entities. Border management systems are installed on the border of one state or the border lines of a group of states in a region. Border management systems can bring to mind the technological systems that are visible above the borders at first glance. But it is actually the control and strengthening of all the borders surrounding a state, on land, at sea, and in the air, with technological equipment, artificial intelligence, and arms deployment. For border management, human, physical, and information resources must be provided. In order to carry out operations during border management, it is necessary to train human resources, strengthen physical resources with infrastructure, and finally manage information resources with intelligence and analysis tools. In this context, border management systems should have the capacity to produce security, control, and information solutions against the challenges that may arise in every new situation. To provide this capability, in most countries border security, control, and strengthening solutions are integrated with border policing and militarization. As a result, the border management sector, which is an example of public-private partnership that spans a wide range, emerges.

Border management is a suitable business area for the development of public-private partnership. The security and control of borders is not only based on human resources as in the past, it is now possible with complex technological tools. The need of states to protect their borders with security tools arising from irregular migration flows and the threat of terrorism allows public and private actors to share their interests on the same ground. Governments purchase services to control and strengthen their borders from private sector actors such as technology, software, defense, security, and construction companies. In addition to the service procurement demands of the states, lobbying these private companies is also effective in the growth of the public-private partnership. Private security, defense, technology, and construction companies submit several reasons to market their expertise and justify that states need border management systems. These reasons can be

expressed with human mobility, goods flows, and political and economic challenges at the borders. The human mobility challenges at the borders are from both checking regular and legal travelers and curbing irregular migrants and criminals. It is claimed that irregular migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, migrant traffickers, smugglers, and transnational criminals are perceived as a threat by states and challenged to border security. The challenge due to the flow of the black market and the gray market goods and illegal goods at the borders requires the establishment of specific technologies for detecting and surveillance of these goods. Political and economic instability, internal conflicts, military tensions, economic sanctions, and economic asymmetries between economically developed countries and economically underdeveloped countries, and illicit trade flows engender challenges at borders. Ultimately, the threats and security gap discourses that private companies put forward to increase the demand for border management systems legitimize border management. Border walls and fences built by European states, especially after the 2015 migrant crisis against the threats and securi-

Map 4.1 Border walls and fences in Europe


RUS* = Kaliningrad

Source: Algan Tezcan, 2022, p.146. (Author's own mapping. The form of the map is inspired by the source DW, 2021.)

ty gap at the borders, exemplify this legitimization (**Map 4.1,** retrieved from doctoral dissertation, Algan Tezcan, 2022, p.146). After 1990, 56 modern border walls or fences were built around the world, 20 of them were built after the 2015 migrant crisis and 11 of them are on European territory (Vernon and Zimmermann, 2021, pp.34-36). Walls or fences built between almost every country are also equipped with superior security tools including various technological and artificial intelligence. The increase in irregular migration flows to European countries causes investments for borders to increase exponentially every year. Therefore, examining even the technology, security, and construction companies that build border walls and fences may determine how vast and profitable this sector is for investment.

The increase in irregular migration flows towards economically developed European countries causes these European countries to invest more in border management systems. To illustrate these investments, looking at the budgets allocated by the European Union (EU) and the Frontex to border management may provide a substantial framework for the financial dimension of border management. The European Commission prepares a budget covering a period of 7 years for border management and common visa policy on behalf of the European Union. Between 2007 and 2013, €1.7 billion was allocated for border management under the name of External Border Funds, while €3.9 billion was allocated for border management for the next 7-year period between 2014 and 2020 (European Commission, 2021a). In the 2021 and 2027 period, it is foreseen to allocate €6.2 billion to border management under the name of Integrated Border Management Fund (**Graph 4.2**) (European Commission, 2021a). The total European Union border management budget reaches €14.3 billion, with €8.1 billion planned to be transferred to European decentralized agencies in addition to the European Integrated Border Management Fund budget for the 2021-2027 period. The European Union border management implementations include national border surveillance, administration of common visa policy, border security infrastructures, management of external borders, and curbing irregular migration.

In addition to the European Union budget, Frontex's budget is also important. Founded in 2005, Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), the guard of the external borders of the European Union, had a budget of €19 million in 2006. In the following years, irregular migra-

Graph 4.2 EU budget for border management in 7-year periods

tions, especially from the south and east to the European Union, increased and these flows turned into migrant crises. Therefore, the budget that Frontex will spend on the operations to be carried out on the external borders has been increased. While Frontex generally had a budget of around €100 million until 2015, after the 2015 migrant crisis this amount increased aggressively to €839 million for expected budget in 2023 (**Graph 4.3**) (Frontex, 2022a; 2022b).

The financial dimension of the border management systems within the migration industry covers many sub-sectors associated with border management. Border management industry provides security and facilitation of regular and legal cross-border flows of people and goods with security, technology, construction, military, and financial business areas. As one of the main branches in border management, the border security market covers the surveillance and inspection of ground, aerial, and naval areas where living and non-living beings can pass, by instruments such as police or military patrols, aircraft, drones, ships, or submarines. These inspections and surveillance are carried out with the support of technological equipment such as radar, laser, camera, display, wireless, and biometrics. According to market research companies in the area of business intelligence, the value of border security market was esteemed $44 billion in 2020 and it is estimated to reach between $60 and $70 billion in 2028 (The Insight Partners, 2021;

Graph 4.3 Frontex Budget, 2006 - 2023 (in € million)

Year	Value
2006	19
2007	42
2008	70
2009	88
2010	93
2011	118
2012	85
2013	94
2014	98
2015	142
2016	254
2017	302
2018	320
2019	333
2020	460
2021	544
2022	754
2023	839

Source: Frontex, 2022a; 2022b.

Imarc Group, 2021a; Market Data Forecast, 2022). This indicates that the annual growth rate of the global border security market in less than 10 years will be 6 or 7%. One of the sectors with the largest share in border management systems is the biometrics technologies sector. Biometrics technologies, which find application on smart borders or smart walls in the field of border management, identify and recognize individuals according to their physical characteristics (fingerprint, face, iris, retina, palm print) or behavioral characteristics (typing, signature, voice patterns). According to market research companies, the value of the global biometrics market reached $27 billion in 2021 and it is estimated to reach $74 billion in 2027 (Imarc Group, 2021b). In addition to the biometric technologies sector, the e-passport and e-visa market rose especially after the COVID-19 pandemic and increased its market share. Estimated to have a market share of $11 billion in 2022, the e-passport and e-visa market is estimated to reach $17 billion in 2028 (Market Watch, 2022). To name some of the companies working in these business areas, in the border security sector Airbus SE, BAE Systems, Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries, Thales; in the biometrics sector 3M, Apple Inc., Bio-Key International, NEC Corporation; in the e-passport and e-visa sector India Security Press, Gemalto, Japan National Printing. These

companies are financed by important key players of the migration industry such as governments, development banks, or investment companies. Moreover, it is worthy to note that some states are also shareholders in the border management systems companies. The states that are shareholders in these companies can, on the one hand receive the security-oriented service they need in the field of border management, and on the other hand, as a shareholder of the company, they generate a profitable financial income from the migration industry. To illustrate some of these states, France owns 11% of Airbus SE, Germany 11%, and Spain 4% (Airbus, 2022). While France owns 25% of Thales (Thales, 2022), one of the leading companies in the border security field, Italy has 30% shares of Leonardo S.p.A., one of the leading companies in the defense field (Leonardo S.p.A, 2022). These ratios seem to be important enough that states can make profits from the private sector and realize their political interests in the field of security and defense.

BORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE MIGRATION INDUSTRY OF TURKIYE

The development of border management systems within the migration industry in Turkiye is directly linked to the mass migrations from Syria to Turkiye since 2011 and subsequently to the crossing of nearly 1 million irregular migrants from Turkiye to the Greek islands in 2015. Especially after the 2015 migrant crisis, the EU's externalization policy of migration management has accelerated Turkiye's border management. Thus a large border management sector emerged within the migration industry including public and private actors. Turkiye's border management should be divided into three as land, maritime, and air border management. After the mass migration flows in 2011 and 2015, there have been important developments in land border management field to curb the irregular migration flows from Turkiye's southeast and eastern borders. In order to draw attention to these developments, in this part of the study, border management systems will be limited to land and Turkiye's land border management implementations will be discussed.

Border management systems in Turkiye are carried out mainly through two financial resources: national resources and EU resources. Integrated border management implementations carried out with internal or external resources are initiatives realized within the scope of public-private

partnership. Almost all of the border management implementations are carried out by private sector actors, security, technology, defense, and construction companies, that have won government tenders. Firstly, the implementations made with national resources among the border management systems and the evaluation of the implementations within the framework of public-private partnership will be discussed. Secondly, the implementations with EU resources and the extent of the outsourcing and privatization relations in these implementations will be evaluated.

Turkiye's implementations with national resources within the scope of border management are listed under six items in the performance program published by the Ministry of Interior in 2022: (1) border lighting, (2) patrol road, (3) security wall construction, (4) watchtower, (5) camera and sensor system, (6) high security wire-fence system (Ministry of Interior, 2021a, pp.44-45). Accordingly,[2]

1. In 2020, 101 km of border lighting was completed; it is aimed to complete 20 km border lighting in 2021 and 25 km in 2022.

2. In 2020, 21 km of patrol roads were completed; it is aimed to complete 45 km of patrol roads in 2021 and 50 km in 2022.

3. In 2020, 31 km of security wall were built; it is aimed to build 45 km security wall in 2021 and 50 km in 2022.

4. In 2020, 324 watchtowers were established; it is aimed to establish 200 watchtowers in 2021 and 141 in 2022.

5. 1 camera and sensor system was installed in 2020; it is aimed to install 1 camera and sensor system in 2021 and 2022.

6. In 2020, 52 km of high security wire-fence system was established; it is aimed to establish a 12 km wire-fence system in 2021 and 50 km in 2022.

The budget of these six items is allocated by the Ministry of Interior and it is estimated that 264 million Turkish lira will be allocated for 2021 and 1 billion Turkish lira for 2022 (Ministry of Interior, 2021a, p.45). The reason why the budget to be allocated in a year this high is the anticipated

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2 Since the 2023 performance report has not been published as of October 2022, these items include 2020 data, 2021 and 2022 forecasts.

increase in the number of watchtowers. Examples of security wall construction, lighting, and wire-fence can be detailed from these integrated border management systems built with national resources. The length of the security walls on Turkiye's land borders has reached 1.028 km, with the implementations carried out between 2015-2021 (Ministry of Interior, 2022, p.95). The 837 km Turkiye-Syria security border wall was constructed between 2016 and 2018. Modular concrete walls are equipped with various technological tools such as watchtowers, lighting systems, laser, radar, and mobile armored vehicles (AA, 2022). 135 km of the security wall, which was started to be built on the Turkiye-Iran border in 2017, was completed in 2021 (the Iğdır-Iran and Ağrı-Iran border is 93 km in total), and the construction of the second section of 295 km (Van-Iran) continues as of 2022 (Ministry of Interior, 2022, pp.95-97). Border lightings have been established on the borders of Syria, Iran, Georgia, Armenia, Greece, and Bulgaria, and an integrated system with cameras and security sensors is being built in these lighting works. Watchtowers installed in cross-border regions (such as Mardin, Şırnak, Tunceli) to prevent illegal crossings and ensure border security are surrounded by high-security wire-fences. In 2021, the protocol for the construction of a 33 km high-security panel fence on the Şırnak-Iraq border became official (Ministry of Interior, 2022, p.97).

To detail the public-private partnership within the scope of Turkiye's border management systems, outsourcing security walls built using national resources through tenders may be examined. Housing Development Administration (from now on TOKİ, *Toplu Konut İdaresi* in Turkish), which is affiliated to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, was charged by the Ministry of Interior with the task of construction of the security walls on the eastern borders of Turkiye. Accordingly, since 2016, there are four tenders opened by TOKİ under the title of "Building phase of border physical security wall construction works and post-construction consultancy (construction work supervision and building inspection) service procurement". *Emay Uluslararası Mühendislik ve Müşavirlik Anonim Şirketi* (Emay International Engineering and Consulting Inc., from now on only *Emay*) won all of these tenders. The tenders were respectively opened in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2021, and a contract was signed between TOKİ and Emay in the construction phase and post-construction consultancy areas after each tender.

Accordingly;

- In 2016, the tender for the physical border security wall construct-ed in Gaziantep, Hatay, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak and adjacent provinces, that is, on the Turkiye-Syria border, was awarded for 5 million Turkish lira (EKAP, 2016),

- In 2017, the tender for the construction of the physical border se-curity wall and post-construction consultancy in Şırnak, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Hatay, Iğdır, Ağrı and adjacent provinces, namely on the Turkiye-Syria and Turkiye-Iran borders, was awarded for 5 million Turkish lira (EKAP, 2017),

- In 2018, the physical border security wall construction and post-construction consultancy tender, which was built in Hakkari and adjacent provinces, namely on the Turkiye-Iraq and Turki-ye-Iran borders, was awarded for 4 million Turkish lira (EKAP, 2018),

- In 2021, the physical border security wall construction and post-construction consultancy tender, which was built in Hakkari and adjacent provinces, namely on the Turkiye-Iraq and Turki-ye-Iran borders, was awarded for 8.5 million Turkish lira (EKAP, 2021) to Emay company. Considering that four to six different companies bid in each tender, it seems remarkable that these pro-jects tendered by TOKİ are only won by Emay within the scope of public-private partnership.

Border management projects supported by EU financial resources in Turkiye are funded through Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). Various border management projects were designed within the scope of IPA-I between 2007-2013 and IPA-II between 2014-2020. Between 2021-2027, projects continue to be designed within the scope of the IPA-III pro-gram. Accordingly, some of the border management implementations pro-jected during the IPA-I period are: integrated border management action plan, border control and surveillance equipment procurement, demining in Turkiye's eastern border regions, technological border surveillance equip-ment provision for cleared areas, increasing Turkiye's border surveillance

capacity, increasing the border surveillance capacity between Turkiye and Greece, regional cooperation in border management with Greece and Bulgaria (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2021). Some of the border management implementations projected during the IPA-II period are: establishment of National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center (NACORAC) and establishment of the integrated border management database project, increasing the border surveillance capacity of the Turkish and EU borders, increasing the border surveillance capacity at Turkiye's eastern and western borders, increasing border surveillance capacity at Turkiye's southeastern border, demining and increasing border surveillance capacity at Turkiye's eastern border, updating the national action plan for Turkiye's implementation of integrated border management, increasing the capacity of the Coast Guard Command, supporting the institutional capacity of the Directorate General of the Provincial Administration in NACORAC (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022a). The grant will be allocated in the IPA-III period by considering the performance-based approach instead of project design. For the fund to be allocated to Turkiye within the scope of IPA-III, an evaluation will be made according to the performance of the projects produced under the themes of "migration and border management" and "border and cross-border cooperation" (Ministry of Interior, 2021b, pp.6-7).

The total budget allocated for projects financed by the EU in 2021 was reported as €183 million by the Ministry of Interior. €160 million of this amount is directly from the EU contribution (Ministry of Interior, 2021c, p.101). To give details, watchtowers and armored vehicles were procured within the scope of IPA-I and IPA-II periods in order to increase the border surveillance capacity of Turkiye on the Greek and Bulgarian borders, and training activities in the field of integrated border management were also planned. In this context, €9.25 million of €20.4 million IPA financial aid was transferred to Turkish authorities by the EU for cross-border operations (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2019). Demining works on the eastern border have been funded by the EU since the IPA-II period and it is foreseen that the works will be completed by 2025. $29 million has been allocated for demining and increasing the border surveillance capacity at the eastern borders (UNDP, 2022). Within the scope of the regional cooperation project, the first phase of the "Regional Cooperation on Border Management among Turkiye, Greece, and Bulgaria" project was completed for €3 million be-

tween 2014-2016 (IOM, 2017b). With this project, efforts have been made to align Turkiye's border management, especially at its western borders, with the EU acquis. €11 million EU contribution has been allocated to the NACORAC and integrated border management database project, which is planned to be established as of 2017 (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022b). In addition to all these, the Joint Action Plan prepared after the migrant crisis in 2015 and the EU-Turkey Statement signed in 2016 stated that the EU will contribute to Turkiye's integrated border management, especially strengthen the capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard, patrols, and surveillance tools, and establish closer collaboration between Turkiye and Frontex. However, with the suspension of the statement by Turkiye in 2017, the commitments were left unfinished.

To detail the public-private partnership within the scope of Turkiye's border management systems, the outsourcing of surveillance systems built using EU resources through tenders may be examined. The projects with a large amount of tender from the border management implementations designed under the IPA programs are listed below. Each project was carried out in the first or second period of IPA programs. The Central Finance and Contracts Unit under the Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance (CFCU) is the contracting authority in tenders. For each project under IPA programs, 75% or 85% of the budget was covered by the general budget of EU and the rest 25% or 15% by national sources:

- In 2016, Otokar, Turkish private defense company, won the "Supply of technological border surveillance equipment for the cleared regions" tender within the framework of the IPA-I program for €47.4 million (TED, 2016). In this context, Otokar provided 82 Cobra-II reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles to be used in the eastern borders of Turkiye. 75% of the tender financing was covered from the general EU budget under the IPA-I program, and 25% from national contribution.

- In 2017, within the framework of IPA-I and IPA-II programs, "Supply of mobile surveillance units for increasing border surveillance capacity of borders between Turkiye and EU" tender was awarded to Aselsan, the largest defense electronics company of Turkiye, for €29.6 million (TED, 2017). Within the scope of this tender, 57 ar-

mored and unarmored radars, electro optical sensors and vehicles equipped with detention systems were supplied in two lots. 75% of the tender financing was covered from the general EU budget under the IPA-II program, and 25% from national contribution.

- In 2018, Aselsan won the "Supply for Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity of Turkey" tender for €108.2 million (TED, 2019a). Within the scope of this tender, border post command and control system, including control shelters, surveillance units, control computers, radars, and electro optical equipment were provided to support the border security of Turkiye. The project was implemented in four lots. In one lot, 75% of the tender financing was covered from the general EU budget under the IPA-II program, and 25% from national contribution while in three lots, this rate was 85% and 15%. The aim of the tender was stated as aligning the border management standards with EU's integrated border management policies and strategies and modernizing Turkish border security and surveillance.

- In 2018, 7 information technology companies from Turkiye (İnnova Bilişim, Atos Bilişim, Akgün Bilgisayar, Aday Grup, Balkan Elektronik, Ado Bilişim, Verify Veri İletişimi) and 1 company from Lebanon (Intertech Group) won the "Supply of Equipment for Establishment of a National Coordination and Joint Risk Analysis Center (NACORAC) and an Integrated Border Management Integrated Database" tender, which was held in 11 lots, for €10.6 million (TED, 2019b). 85% of the tender financing was covered from the general EU budget under the IPA-II program, and 15% from national contribution. NACORAC is in the process of being structured under the Directorate General of Provincial Administration but is not yet operational as of October 2022.

- In 2020, Aselsan won the "Supply of Equipment for Increasing Border Surveillance Capacity at South Eastern Borders: Security, fire-fighting, police and defense equipment" tender for €27.7 million (TED, 2020). Within the scope of this tender, an electro optical border surveillance system was supplied for increasing border surveillance capacity at South Eastern borders. 85% of the tender

financing was covered from the general EU budget under the IPA-II program, and 15% from national contribution .

Aselsan (*Askeri Elektronik Sanayi*, Military Electronic Industries), which won the majority of EU tenders, is Turkiye's largest defense electronics company today, founded by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation in 1975 to meet the communication needs of Turkish Armed Forces by national instruments. Aselsan not only implements tendered projects on its own, but also outsources them to other security, defense, or technology companies, thus affecting growth on sectoral basis. For example, it subcontracted the €29.6 million worth of armored and unarmored 57 vehicle tenders awarded in 2017 to Katmerciler, Turkish defense company, for €10.5 million (KAP, 2017). Therefore, whether with national resources or EU funds, Turkiye's integrated border management practices create a wide public-private partnership ground within the migration industry. Only land border management implementations were considered in this part of the chapter. However, the sea route is being used by irregular migrants heavily in recent years. Therefore, when the developments in the field of land and maritime border management are considered together, the public-private partnership in the border management sector increases its share in the migration industry.

DISCUSSION

The rapid rise of the migration industry, the investments made by the European Union to prevent mass migration flows, and finally the investments made by Turkey to strengthen its borders in recent years show how the migration industry has grown in only one business area and on a limited geography. In this case, three points stand out to be discussed. The first point is that the line between public and private becomes intensely blurred. In these investments, migration industry's private actors undertake the responsibilities of the states through privatization or outsourcing. In other terms, the management mentality of neoliberalism entrusts the management of an human-based issue to private actors through privatization and outsourcing channels. At this point, the participation of more and more migration industry actors in migration management increase the cooperation between private and public in the implementation of migration policies, but at the same time blur the line between these two. Therefore, the state's seeking of

new channels to increase its control mechanisms does not show that it has lost its control capacity but strengthened it with private sector actors. This picture shows that the migration industry is well embedded in the neoliberal globalization paradigm.

The second point is the discussion of how profitable the migration industry is for public and private sector. It is an inevitable fact that the migration industry contains profitable business areas. In particular, states transferring of their migration-related responsibilities and functions to private companies through outsourcing and privatization, in line with the neoliberal globalization paradigm, increases the profitability and rate of return of the migration industry. In other words, it makes the migration industry attractive in terms of investment. Moreover, the implementation of stricter policies by the states against increasing irregular migration flows, but the fact that irregular migrants seek new ways to overcome these strict policies creates a vicious circle. This vicious circle has become a locomotive of the public-private partnership in preventing irregular migration flows. Therefore, reducing irregular migration flows has been linked to strengthening borders and controls with a public-private partnership, rather than improving migrants' conditions by going down to root causes. One reason for this is the aim of reaching the exact solution of curbing irregular migration flows with rigid border policies, and the other reason is that both the public and the private sector do not give up on this profitable investment area.

The third point of discussion is human rights. Migration management is not just a political outcome, it concerns people, citizens, immigrants, emigrants, refugees, and displaced persons. The most important challenge of the migration industry, which is well embedded in neoliberalism, is the ignorance of the human rights of migrants. Especially with the increase of public-private partnership, the inclusion of more private companies in migration management policies through the migration industry harms the human rights of migrants. On the one hand, the devastating effects of the security and defense systems that security, defense, and technology companies set up at borders to repel irregular migrants as part of border management directly violate the human rights of migrants. On the other hand, in more indirect ways, the infrastructures of the border management policies of the states are outsourced to private companies. In this way, the profitable

gains of increased partnership between the state and the private sector and the instrumentalization of migrants for profit violates the human rights of migrants. Although these violations are tried to be enlightened by the civil society, it is known that they are often ignored or papered over by the official authorities.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides an overview of the implementation of border management systems in Turkiye based on the concept of the migration industry. Accordingly, the development and rise of the migration industry has allowed the development of various sectors within this industry over time. Border management systems, one of these sectors, are systems that may be applied on land, sea and air borders based on human, physical, and information resources. This chapter includes the land border management systems implemented after the Syrian mass migration from the south of Turkiye in 2011 and the mass migration from Turkiye to the Greek islands in 2015 as a case study. Land border management implementations show that a significant number of private sector companies have been involved in migration management over a period of several years. In other words, the state has made it a profitable tool to transfer its responsibilities and obligations in the field of migration management to private companies through privatization and outsourcing. With the purchase of goods and services from private companies, a comprehensive migration industry has emerged in a period of about 10 years in Turkiye. However, the point that should be underlined is the use of mechanisms with limited control and accountability in managing a human-based phenomenon such as migration. Public-private partnership is at the forefront of these mechanisms. Public-private partnership is also the most used tool by the migration industry, which is a product of migration management that is compatible with the management mentality of neoliberalism. Sectors of the migration industry, which are kneaded by a public-private partnership, are away from a human-oriented and rights-based approach. In this chapter, millions of euros spent for border management systems in Turkiye were mentioned. Considering the human rights of migrants, questions such as *what difference could be made if these huge amounts were spent on the integration, employment, and safe travel of migrants* arise. The migration

industry is in a vicious circle where irregular migrant flows increase and states desire to curb these flows and thus open up new investment areas for the private sector. This cycle that provides financial profit to the actors of the migration industry does not make it possible to answer that question in the short term.

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5

Economic Challenges of Syrians in Turkiye
Asli Topsoy*

ABSTRACT

The primary concern for refugees in the host country is to ensure their ability to sustain themselves economically. This is an essential component of their integration into the host society and requires active participation in economic activities. One of the initial challenges for Syrian refugees who have come to Türkiye following the outbreak of the civil war and conflicts in Syria in 2011 was ensuring their livelihoods. A very small proportion of those coming from Syria stays in the shelter centers; the majority reside in urban centers. This fact has served to increase the participation of Syrian refugees to the labor force, yet it also presents a plethora of challenges. The factors that influence the economic participation of refugees include the host country's economic structure, legal framework and policies towards refugees, as well as the education level and professional skills of the refugees. In this section, the financial support provided to Syrians in Türkiye, the participation of Syrian refugees to the labor force in Türkiye, their means of survival will be examined in the context of Türkiye's economic structure and policies towards refugees. The study is descriptive in nature and utilizes interpretive analyses based on quantitative data. Furthermore, the regulations implemented by the Turkish government to facilitate the economic integration of Syrians with temporary protected status and the future prospects for Syrian refugees would be evaluated.

Keywords: Turkish economy, Türkiye, Syrian refugees, informal economy, labor force.

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INTRODUCTION

The Syrian refugee crisis, which began with the outbreak of civil war in March 2011, has resulted in one of the largest forced migrations of people in history, with an estimated more than 13 million Syrians fleeing their homes (UNHCR, 2022). This has resulted in the Syrian refugee population becoming the largest in the world, with Türkiye and Lebanon hosting the largest number of refugees among Syria's neighboring countries. The initial influx of Syrian refugees into Türkiye occurred in the Hatay region in April 2011. The number of Syrian refugees who fled to Türkiye from the war was 14,237 in 2012, but this number rapidly increased, particularly in the first five years, reaching 3,426,756 in 2017. As of January 2023, the number of Syrian refugees under temporary protection in Türkiye is 3,513,776 (PMM, 2023a). In addition, there are Syrians who have obtained citizenship, live in Türkiye with temporary residency permits, and enter Türkiye illegally through the border. Although statistical information on the number of Syrians granted citizenship is not available, according to the statement of the Minister of Interior, as of December 19, 2022, the number of Syrians who have been granted citizenship of the Turkish Republic is 223,881, of which 97,095 are children under the age of 18 (Ministry of Interior, 2022). As of January 19, 2023, the number of Syrians living in Türkiye with a residency permit is 99,663 (PMM, 2023b).

The defining characteristic of this irregular migration movement was that a large population is moving in a relatively short period of time, without giving sufficient opportunity for preparation to the receiving country. The initial interventions in migration movements are usually humanitarian aid activities for protection purposes. However, as time passes, the priority shifts to ensuring sustainable livelihoods for the migrant communities as they begin to establish their lives within the host country.

Syrians faced several challenges in Türkiye, such as legal status, language barriers, housing, employment, education, and healthcare. Most of the Syrians in Türkiye were not registered, which meant they were not entitled to certain rights and protections, such as healthcare and education. Many Syrian refugees in Türkiye did not speak Turkish, which made it difficult for them to communicate with the local population and to find employment. Finding affordable and safe housing could also be a challenge for Syrians in Türkiye, especially those who were not registered.

One of the main challenges for Syrian refugees who have lived in Türkiye for over 10 years and established their lives in cities has been to create their own livelihoods. With very limited financial support, Syrian refugees have integrated into the work force in Türkiye and are trying to sustain their lives. This chapter will evaluate the conditions for Syrian refugees to secure employment and livelihoods in Türkiye within the framework of the country's economic structure. Attention will be paid to examining the refugee 'without reducing him/her to an economic input'. To this end, firstly, the financial support provided to Syrians in Türkiye will be outlined and then the opportunities and difficulties they face in the Turkish labor market will be described within the determining characteristics of the Turkish economy.

METHODOLOGY

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the economic challenges faced by Syrian refugees in Türkiye with a descriptive perspective. The challenges Syrians faced were examined at the systemic level, such as the economic structure of Türkiye and the characteristics of the Turkish labor market, and at the micro levels, such as conditions of workplace and livelihood difficulties. The qualitative framework enables a detailed exploration of the experiences of Syrians living in Türkiye. Moreover, interpretative analyses were also conducted by utilizing quantitative data. The quantitative data were obtained from various official sources such as The World Bank, OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) of Türkiye, and the related ministries. These sources provided information on the economic conditions of Syrians in Turkey, including their employment status, income levels, and access to social services. In cases where official data were unavailable or incomplete, data from field researches conducted by relevant organizations and institutions were utilized. The combination of qualitative and quantitative data helped to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the economic challenges faced by Syrians in Türkiye.

FINANCIAL AID PROGRAMS FOR SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKIYE

Traditionally, aid to people affected by a crisis is provided through materials and services such as tents, food, clothing, and medical treatment. The

image of humanitarian aid workers delivering aid supplies to those affected by events such as earthquakes, wars, and migration has been ingrained in people's minds. Cash aid was not a frequently used method in crises until a few decades ago. Cash aid refers to providing cash transfers or vouchers to individuals, households, or community recipients (Vogel et al., 2022, p. 350). While there are comments that cash aid is a result of market-based approaches increasing in the humanitarian aid sector (p. 354), in recent years it has been seen as more effective and efficient and has gained prominence. Cash aid does not incur the organizational costs required for creating, transporting, and delivering the necessary aid. It allows recipients to prioritize their own needs. Additionally, it is noted that cash aid also preserves human dignity by giving aid recipients the power of choice (OECD, 2017, p. 3).

When Syrians began to cross the border into Türkiye, they initially came to shelter centers where in-kind aid was provided. However, cash aid has also been frequently used in support projects for foreign nationals under temporary protection and continues to be used in Türkiye. The agreement signed between the EU and Türkiye on March 18, 2016, created various initiatives to manage the irregular migration of refugees to Europe during the Syrian refugee crisis, as well as the EU grant of 3 billion Euros to Türkiye for refugees (Rygiel et al., 2016, p. 316). Additionally, many I/NGOs' and humanitarian organizations' initiatives have supported to create funds for Syrian refugees in Türkiye. There are four financial support programs for Syrian refugees in Türkiye funded by various international organizations and organized by the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC). These are: In Camp Food Assistance Program, The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Program, Complementary Emergency Social Safety Net (C-ESSN) Project, and Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Program. The most prominent is the ESSN program, the world's largest cash aid transfer program.

In Camp Food Assistance Program

The In-Camp Food Assistance Program, implemented towards foreign individuals residing in six temporary shelter centers in Türkiye, which was launched in October 2012, is jointly carried out by the TRC, the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) and the World Food Program (WFP) of the United Nations. Beneficiaries receive a monthly per capita aid of 150 TL, which they can use for food purchases in contracted supermarkets within

the shelter centers through the KIZILAYKART[1]. The program, in operation since 2012, aims to ensure individuals' access to food of their own choice. The program is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through the TRC and WFP. 43,847 people have benefited from the food support program within the camps (TRC, 2023a). While people of different nationalities such as Ukrainians who fled from the war and came to Türkiye are included, the majority of beneficiaries are Syrians. A report released by WFP in mid-2022 states that high inflation in Türkiye has made the living conditions of foreigners who rely on the food support program and live in the camps more difficult. The 100% annual inflation rate in food has increased the cost of a food basket created with 150 TL to 423 TL (WFP, 2022).

The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Program

ESSN program boasts the largest cash-based support program in the world in terms of the number of beneficiaries and planning for regular and long-term assistance. The EU-Türkiye agreement signed on March 2016, involves the provision of financial assistance by the EU to Türkiye for the purpose of supporting the basic needs of foreign nationals who are in need and meet at least one demographic criteria and are not residing in Temporary Accommodation Centers (European Commission, 2022). This assistance, called The Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), is one of the main outputs of the Türkiye-EU deal and provides a monthly allowance of 13 Euro per person and is financed by the EU's Office for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). The program is implemented in partnership with the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Federation (IFRC), the TRC Society, and the Turkish Ministry of Family and Social Services, and is distributed through the KIZILAYKART. The ESSN program was implemented on November 28, 2016, and the funds for this program are not provided by the Republic of Türkiye (TRC, 2023b). The eligible groups for ESSN support are: (i) single women between the ages of 18 and 59 who have no family support; (ii) single elderly individuals over the age of 60 who have no family support; (iii) single parents with at least one child under the age of 18; (iv) families with at least one member who has a disability of 40% or more; (v)

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[1] KIZILAYKART is a cash-based humanitarian aid platform operating in the organization of the Turkish Red Crescent.

families with more than 4 children; (vi) families with many dependents (children, elderly, disabled) (Erdoğan, 2022, p. 84).

Within the framework of these demographic requirements, 3 million refugees applied to the ESSN, but only half of them met the conditions to benefit from the ESSN. Once a household meets at least one of the established criteria, all its members receive an individual benefit that is consolidated onto a single household bank card (Refugees Association, 2022a). Considering that only those with temporary protection status in Türkiye can apply for ESSN, it is seen that the utilization rate of ESSN by Syrian refugees in Türkiye is below 50% (TRC, 2023b).

Complementary Emergency Social Safety Net (C-ESSN) Project

Complementary Emergency Social Safety Net (C-ESSN) Project was implemented at the end of 2020 and is a cash-based support project funded by the EU. C-ESSN was designed to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable groups who have temporary protection status and cannot be directed to the workforce. Foreigners with temporary protection status who are unable to work can apply for T-SUY by documenting their health status and receive a monthly cash assistance of 250 TL if their application is successful. This project is also implemented through the TRC Platform, like the ESSN. Within the scope of the project, 386,497 people receive regular assistance, with 55% being women and 45% being men; a recipient cannot benefit from the ESSN and T-ESSN at the same time (TRC, 2023c). The European Union has committed to funding the C-ESSN Project until January 2023 (Refugees Association, 2022b).

Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Program

According to current data, approximately half of Syrian refugees in Türkiye with temporary protection status are in the age range of 5-18, which means they are of school age (PPM, 2023a). Protecting the right to education of children who fled or were born in Türkiye due to the war is necessary; right of education is one of the most basic human rights. It is also known that schooling has multiple effects, including supporting the socio-economic integration of refugees. From an economic perspective, it is important to avoid raising a lost generation, to properly utilize human capital in the medium

and long term, and to ensure their participation in the economy as highly skilled labor force in the future.

According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), the total fertility rate in Türkiye was 1.70 in 2022 (2022a). In a study conducted by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (HUIPS) in 2019, the total fertility rate of Syrians in Türkiye was determined to be 5.3 (p. xv). This shows that the Syrian population of school age is growing faster than the native population, making access to and participation in quality education for Syrian children even more important. In this context, a cash assistance program has been developed to support Syrian children's participation in education.

The Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) Program, which started in May 2017, is jointly implemented by the TRC, the Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services, the Ministry of National Education, and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). The aim of the program is to ensure children's access to and regular attendance of school. To this end, cash support is provided to children who regularly attend school. Payments made under the Conditional Education Assistance framework are determined to be 60 TL per month for girls and 55 TL per month for boys in elementary school, and 90 TL per month for girls and 70 TL per month for boys in high school; every two months are depending on regular school attendance (TRC, 2023d). To be eligible for the payment for the month, an attendance rate of 80% or higher must be achieved in that month. A total of 855,079 children have benefited from the program and currently 467,363 children are benefiting (TRC, 2023d).

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TURKIYE

It will be functional to give basic information about the Turkish economy before moving on to the working conditions, economic activities, and position of the Syrians in the Turkish economy. The economy of Türkiye is generally composed of industry, agriculture and service sectors. The industrial sector plays a significant role in production while agriculture is one of the country's most important economic activities. Among other sectors, tourism, finance, and retail trade are significant (OECD, 2021a).

The industrial sector plays a significant role in the Turkish economy. Especially textile, food, metallurgy and automotive sectors have a significant

place in the Turkish economy. However, there are challenges in terms of high technology in the industrial sector. These challenges include lack of investment, inadequate high-skilled workforce and high costs. The agriculture sector is also important due to the use of the country's vast lands. However, there are challenges in the agriculture sector too, such as low productivity, high production costs and difficulties in exporting products.

When examining the basic characteristics of the labor market in Türkiye, one of the most striking facts is high unemployment. The population of Türkiye was announced as 85 million 279 thousand 553 at the end of 2022 (TURKSTAT, 2023). OECD (n.d.) defines the working age population as those aged 15 to 64, and the ratio of the 15-64 age groups to the population of Türkiye is 68% (TURKSTAT, 2023). According to the latest data of OECD (2022), Türkiye is the 5th country with the highest unemployment rate among OECD countries. The data provided by the TURKSTAT (2022b) shows that the unemployment rate in Türkiye in 2021 was recorded as 12%, while the employment rate was 45.2%; the service sector had the highest percentage of employed individuals, accounting for 55.3% of the total employed population, followed by the industrial sector with 21.3%, the agricultural sector with 17.2%, and the construction sector with 6.2%. On the other side, despite the efforts to overcome the issue, the rate of informal employment[2] remains high in Türkiye. According to the statistics provided by Social Security Institution (SSI), the rate of individuals working informally, or not affiliated with the SSI, was recorded as 29% in 2021 (SSI, 2022). When examining the sectoral distribution of informal workers for the same year, it is seen that 84.56% of agricultural workers were informally employed, followed by the construction sector with 31.95% and other sectors with high rates of informal employment include tourism, food and beverage, and logistics (SSI, 2022).

Another indicator reflecting Türkiye's economic structure is the size of companies in the private sector. According to the latest data published by TURKSTAT in 2021, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) constitute 99.7% of the total number of businesses in Türkiye; 71% of total employ-

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2 The infromal economy definition of ILO is all labor and business activities that are not legally or effectively covered or are inadequately covered by formal agreements (n.d.). The informal employment is the employment that operates outside of government regulations, and as such, is not subject to labor market policies such as severance or payroll taxes (Albrecht et al., 2009, p. 1105).

ment was carried out in SMEs (2022c). Considering the prevalence of informal economy, it should be remembered that informal employment increases as one moves towards small-scale companies, as there is no informal work in large and institutional companies, whereas it is seen in small-scale firms.

The Turkish economy, with its high rate of informal work among small-scale businesses and high youth unemployment, presents significant challenges for Syrian refugees. Despite these difficulties, Syrians have started establishing a new life in the cities after leaving the shelter centers (camps). According to the data released in January 2023, only 47,603 of the 3.5 million Syrians under temporary protection remained in the shelter centers. 99% of them live in cities and one of the important characteristics of Syrians in Türkiye is that they have turned into 'urban refugees' especially after 2013 (Erdoğan, 2022, p. 63). International aid funds support those who have received temporary protection status, but they have also become part of the working life in Türkiye in addition to these financial support programs.

Based on global migration patterns, the propensity for voluntary return is contingent upon the duration of migration and the mode of settlement. When refugees are residing in special areas close to the border such as camps, with a relatively short period of residence, the inclination towards return is likely to be higher. Conversely, if the settlement is characterized by prolonged coexistence within the host community, the likelihood of return tends to diminish (Dustman et al., 1996, p. 240; Erdoğan, 2015, p. 80). Although expectations have remained strong in Turkish society for Syrians to return to their country since they first started coming in 2011, academic studies suggest that their return is not very likely. When they arrived, they stayed in camps and their basic needs were met in the camps. However, now the majority of Syrians live in cities. Given that most of the Syrians have been in Türkiye for approximately 10 years, it is a necessity for them to participate in economic activities to support themselves. According to government statistics, 58% of Syrians under temporary protection status are between the ages of 15-64, that is, they are at the age of joining the workforce (PPM, 2023a). Hence, Syrians are working in different jobs in many sectors. In the Turkish labor market, Syrians can be classified under three categories: Informal workers, formal workers and self-employed (entrepreneurs).

SYRIANS IN THE TURKISH LABOR MARKET

The working conditions of refugees are affected not only by the economic structure and conditions of the country they migrated to, but also by the skills of the migrants themselves. Therefore, first, it is necessary to highlight the education and skills of the migrants coming to Türkiye. Looking at it from a macroeconomic point of view, according to World Economic Forum (WEF) data, Syria was not in the economically developed country category even before the war. It was located far behind the regional and global markets. In 2010, per capita GDP was 2,877 USD in Syria; also below the average of the Middle East and North Africa region. In the Global Competitiveness Index prepared by the WEF in 2012, using data measured before the start of the civil war, Syria was ranked 134th out of 142 countries in the labour market efficiency (WEF, 2011, p. 336). When it comes to Syrian refugees coming to Türkiye, a similar profile could be seen. Conflicts in Syria have concentrated in the northern region, which is also close to Türkiye. As a result, most of those who came to Türkiye are also from the northern region of Syria. It is known that before the civil war, a large part of the population in northern Syria lived on agriculture. Production was limited to agriculture in the region, except for El Bab's past as the industrial area of Aleppo, and yet irrigation was carried out through wells or very outdated systems. Apart from agriculture, production in small ateliers has provided limited contributions to the people in the region. People living there have proficiency in handcraft jobs and it is known that the region is one of the high unemployment areas in Syria (Erkmen, 2022).

The one who wants to learn about the mode of living, sectors worked in, jobs performed, working conditions, and compensation of Syrians in Türkiye should first look at the Syrian refugees who work informally. Informal workers, who cannot be accurately quantified due to their unregistered status, are the largest group among the working Syrian refugees. A broad survey conducted by The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Türkiye (TEPAV) in 2021 with approximately 16,000 Syrians in twelve cities, where more than 83% of Syrians live, is one of the comprehensive researches that provides information on the number of informal Syrian workers. Although 55.8% of the participants in the survey stated that they have a job, almost 9 out of every 10 Syrians in this group are working in the informal economy.

Only 2.7% of the Syrian respondents indicating their current working status in Türkiye have a work permit. 28.3% of the informal Syrian workers reported that they are working at irregular/daily jobs and therefore do not have a regular income. Syrians working irregularly are primarily seen in sectors such as construction and textile (TEPAV, 2021, p. 21). It should be noted that the sectors in which Syrians work are the sectors with the highest informal employment in Türkiye.

When Syrians started to come to Türkiye, the legislation in force did not allow the employment of foreigners under temporary protection. However, the increase in their numbers, especially as of 2013, made it necessary for them to work, and the Turkish government made changes to the Temporary Protection Regulation included in the Foreigners and International Protection Law, allowing foreigners under temporary protection to obtain a work permit. The 'Regulation on Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection'[3] went into effect on January 15, 2016 and opened the way for the legal employment of Syrians. According to the regulation, foreigners who have been under temporary protection status for at least 6 months can work by obtaining a work permit in the city where they are registered (with the exception of cases requiring permission to move to another city). The employer will make work permit applications and wages cannot be lower than the minimum wage. Foreigners can only work in jobs that are not designated as being carried out only by Turkish citizens, and no more than 10% of employees at a workplace can be foreign. This regulation also opened the way for foreigners under temporary protection to participate in professional training courses organized by Turkish Employment Agency (MLLS, n. d.). In the report prepared by Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) in 2015 and giving space to the opinions of the Turkish business world, employers representing large and institutional firms also expressed their discomfort with the employment of Syrians without registration. Institutional companies mentioned the difficulties of competing with cheap labor and informality and indicated that it would be more appropriate to grant working rights to Syrians just for this reason (Erdoğan, Ünver, 2015, p. 61). It would not be incorrect to say that these and similar approaches encouraged the legal regulation of work permit for Syrians. However, open-

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3   The full version of the Regulation is available at https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/3.5.20168375.pdf

ing the way for work permit did not achieve the expected result. As seen in the **Figure 5.1**, despite the increase in the number of Syrians with work permits every year, the number reached 91,500 in 2021 (MLSS, 2021); 4% of working age Syrians.

Figure 5.1 The Number of Work Permits Issued to Foreigners (Total) and Citizens of Syrian Arab Republic (Syrians) in Türkiye, 2016-2011.


Source: MLSS, 2021.

According to the report of TİSK, the most important reasons for the unregistered work of Syrians are; some of them immigrated to Türkiye irregularly and do not have temporary protection status, difficulties in obtaining work permits and residing in a city other than the city where temporary protection was obtained (2020, p. 67). The report prepared by International Crisis Group (ICG) also states that the formal employment process takes away the comparative advantage of Syrian workers over Turkish citizens, as they can now easily get jobs by accepting lower pay without social security (2016, p. 8). Furthermore, the cessation of ESSN support when they are employed legally makes unregistered work more attractive for Syrians.

Frequent job changes are another characteristic commonly observed among Syrian workers who are working informally. Although short periods of unemployment do not pose a problem in terms of a steady income flow

for Syrians, it signals that they are capable of taking on any type of job, regardless of conditions. It is understandable that they can learn about the market by moving from one job to another when entering a new labor market. However, a higher employee turnover rate can deter employers from requesting necessary work permits (Caro, 2020, p. 9). The views of employers in Türkiye on employing Syrians also differ. Those who have positive attitudes emphasize the importance of Syrians in filling the labor shortage in labor-intensive jobs that Turkish people do not want to do. Additionally, some think Syrians are an opportunity for companies that export to the Middle East and/or wish to develop business relationships with the region, due to their proficiency in Arabic language and knowledge of the region. The humanitarian aspect of the issue, and the emotional approach that Syrians should be supported, are also reasons expressed by employers who have positive mind set towards Syrian employment. However, negative attitudes are more widespread than positive ones. The main reason for this is the high rate of unemployment in Türkiye and the belief that employers are primarily responsible for providing employment to their own citizens. In addition, employers have concerns that Syrians may face difficulties in adapting to the working environment due to language and cultural differences. The long process of obtaining a work permit, the workload and cost involved, and the belief that Syrians will not have a sense of belonging at the workplace are factors that discourage employers from employing Syrians (TİSK, 2020, pp. 67-71). The fact that work permits are only granted for 1 year and that the same procedures need to be repeated every year is seen as an obstacle to long-term Syrian employment (p. 88).

Another important aspect regarding the Syrians is the lack of a resettlement policy implemented by Türkiye for the incoming refugees. Syrians have settled in the cities of their choice, and clustered in certain cities. According to recent data, approximately 80% of the Syrians with temporary protection status live in 10 of the 81 provinces in Türkiye (PPM, 2023a). Cities like Kahramanmaraş, Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa in southestern of Türkiye and share border with Syria have faced with refugee population intensively (See **Figure 5.2**). As a result, shifts have been observed in the job market and the economic equilibrium, particularly in cities where Syrian population is high relatively.

Figure 5.2 Ratio of Syrian Population to Native Population in Cities with the Highest Syrian Population (%)[4]

Supply and demand equilibrium, the basic principle of economic theory, provides clear predictions about the effects of a sudden increase in the labor supply would have. This includes a decrease in wages and the displacement of local workers in the unregulated job market due to the influx of refugees. Tumen (2016) states that the influx of Syrian refugees in Türkiye resulted in a small, but statistically significant decrease in informal employment opportunities for native workers. As the refugees entered the Turkish job market primarily through informal employment, it created cost benefits for employers in sectors that rely heavily on informal labor (p. 459). Caprio and Wagner (2015) point out that the arrival of Syrian refugees who primarily work in informal jobs leads to a significant number of Turkish workers being pushed out of the unregulated job market: Roughly six Turkish workers losing their jobs for every ten refugees. Regardless of factors such as gender, age, and education, all types of informally employed Turkish workers are affected. The largest losses are seen among Turkish workers without any formal education (p. 4). The entry of refugees into the market has also

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4   Refers only to the Syrian population with temporary protection status.

opposing impacts on prices. On the one hand, the reduction in labor costs is expected to lower the prices of goods produced. On the other hand, the increase in demand for goods and services due to refugees being both consumers and providers of labor should drive up consumer prices. They also found that the presence of refugees leads to a rise in consumer prices (p. 22). Both natives and Syrian refugees have been negatively affected by the price increases resulting from shifts in the market equilibrium brought on by the refugee shock in Türkiye, who are already experiencing inflationary trends.

The deterioration of the market equilibrium to the disadvantage of the natives brings burdens to the 'Syrian perception' of the native society, making refugees' integration more difficult. As the number of Syrians in Türkiye increased, as the number of Syrians left the shelter centers and started to live in cities and their participation in economic life increased, the perspective of Turkish citizens towards Syrians also changed. In Murat Erdoğan's (2015) wide field study across the country, the ratio of Turkish citizens who said "*Syrians are stealing our job*" was 56.1%. This ratio is also higher than the average in border cities where the population density of Syrians is higher. This perception, which is very common in society, returns to Syrians as a burden in the workplace, and Syrians may be exposed to exclusionary treatments (Erdoğdu, 2018, p. 847).

In Türkiye, another category of Syrian workers are entrepreneurs who run their own businesses. In addition to Syrian workers, who are mostly working informally with only a small portion working formally, there are also entrepreneurs who have established their own businesses in Türkiye. Unfortunately, updated official data on the number of Syrian-owned companies in Türkiye is unavailable. However, according to the data provided in a report written by Erdoğan and Ünver in 2015, the number of Syrian companies listed on the 'List of Firms Working with Foreign Capital in Türkiye' published by the Ministry of Economy was 2,827 as of June 2015 (p. 52). According to a market research conducted by Building Markets on Syrian SMEs in Türkiye in 2017, the total number of Syrian companies in Türkiye exceeded 10,000 and in this sample, 74% of Syrian SMEs are in the "micro" category (<10 employees), 24% are in the "small" category (10 to 50 employees), and 2% are in the "medium" category (50 to 250 employees). Most employees indicated that they previously worked in Türkiye as unregistered workers (2017, p. 9). The Trade Minister announced that the

number of companies with at least one Syrian partner was 15,159 in mid-2019 (Cumhuriyet Daily, 2019). Although official data is not available, it is evident that the number of Syrian-partnered companies has increased over the years.

Deniz and Reyhanoğlu conducted a study on the factors that push and attract Syrian entrepreneurs to establish their own businesses in Türkiye. They found that language barriers, social exclusion, harsh working conditions, and low wages despite hard work were the factors that motivated Syrians to start their own businesses. On the other hand, it was observed that most Syrian entrepreneurs in Türkiye come from families with a history of entrepreneurship. The desire to be one's own boss, the desire for respect, the desire to make more money, the desire for growth, and the desire to turn differences into opportunities were the most important factors that made entrepreneurship attractive to Syrians (2018). In a different field study, Syrian entrepreneurs in Türkiye were asked about their preferences if the conditions in their own country normalize, and whether they would choose Türkiye or Syria and their goals regarding their entrepreneurship. Syrian entrepreneurs stated that they would continue to invest in their own country but would grow their business in Türkiye. They also stated that Türkiye is more developed in entrepreneurship compared to their own country and that the legal regulations, although difficult, are more accurate. The entrepreneurs interviewed stated they did not consider returning to their own country (Duman, Özdemirci, 2020, p. 648).

Last but not the least, the incidence of child labor among Syrian children in Türkiye is also high. Although the school attendance rate among Syrian children is not at a very poor level, it is still behind that of Turkish children. The rate of school enrollment drops particularly when reaching high school level (See **Table 5.1**). According to experts, economic difficulties are one of the most important reasons for this decrease. Children are forced to work due to financial difficulties (Alican Uludağ, 2022). Türkiye ranks seventh among the OECD countries with the highest child poverty rates (OECD, 2021b), and child labor is a problem for Turkish children too. According to the results of the TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Survey for 2021; the labor force participation rate of children aged 15-17 was 16.4%; when the labor force participation rate was analyzed by gender, it was seen that this rate was 22.9% for boys and 9.5% for girls (2022d).

The research on Syrian child labor in Türkiye indicates that Syrian refugee children in Türkiye exhibit a substantial probability of participating in paid employment, with 45.1% of 15- to 17-year-old boys and 17.4% of 12- to 14-year-old boys engaged in such work; although the rate of participation among girls is lower, with 4.7% of 12- to 14-year-olds and 8.1% of 15- to 17-year-olds employed in a paid capacity, it is still noteworthy (Dayıoğlu et al., 2021, p. 15).

Table 5.1 The schooling ratios among TR citizens and Syrian Arab Republic Citizens under Temporary Protection for 2021-2022 term

	T.R. Citizens	Syrian Arab Republic Citizens under Temporary Protection
Preschool	%92.17	%34.34
Primary School	%95.81	%75.13
Junior High School	%95.40	%80.00
High School	%89.68	%42.65

Source: Ministry of Education, 2022a, b

CONCLUSION

Türkiye currently hosts the world's largest refugee population. Having such a large population arrive in a short period of time is inevitable to create economic difficulties for both the country and the refugees. Although support programs have been created, including cash assistance, no financial support lasts forever, and the integration of Syrian refugees into the labor market was inevitable.

Türkiye's economy has long been suffering from structural problems and needs structural reforms. High unemployment rate, high inflation rate, low wages, widespread informal economy, inability to shift to high-tech production, and insufficient number of start-ups are the main problems that need to be solved in Türkiye's economy. Syrian refugees also experience these economic facts. They work in the informal sector, mostly in labor-intensive industries, with low wages and long working hours; except for a few who have started their own businesses.

High-tech and high-value-added production, which are the basic needs of the Turkish economy, can only be achieved with a high-skilled

human capital, which can only be achieved through well-designed education system. While Türkiye's population is getting older, birth rates have declined in recent years. Additionally, high-skilled and well-educated young people in Türkiye have recently been migrating to EU countries. However, birth rates among Syrian refugees in Türkiye are much higher than the natives, indicating that the proportion of Syrian refugees in Türkiye's population will not decrease but increase. As the probability of returning to their home country is low, policy makers should first combat child labor and prioritize children's education. Education will contribute to the integration of Syrian refugees and provide them with the skills to become high-skilled individuals. In addition, fighting the informal economy and making the necessary procedures for obtaining a work permit more accessible will improve the living standards for both Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees. Efforts should be made to encourage the international community to take on a greater sense of responsibility and provide financial support for structural reforms while making the necessary structural adjustments. Syrian individuals who are currently of working age should be encouraged to work in different kind of sectors by developing their various educational and vocational skills.

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Civil Society and Security

How Group Identities Influence the Views About Assistance to New Immigrants? A Study on The Opinions of the Turkish Origins in Germany About the Assistance to Syrian Immigrants

Sezen Ceceli Köse*

ABSTRACT

This study examines the welcome culture or initiative to Syrians migrants on the axis of people of Turkish origins in Germany. Unlike other European countries, German government pursued an open door policy to the Syrian refugees in 2015. Germany's refugee reception policy generated an act of positive inter-group behavior like the coordinated efforts to assist the new migrants in different forms. The paper examines the motives of Turkish origins, who are a non-dominant and migrant origin society in Germany, that assist Syrian immigrants. Perspectives of Turkish origins on aid /helping to Syrian immigrants are examined within the conceptual standpoint of Social Identity Theory. While aiming the test the hypothesis that "those who have shared group affiliation with Syrians help more", the study reveals the differences and similarities between the people of Turkish origin according to their ethnic, religious, ideological and migrant group identities. The purpose of this study is to elucidate the views and the motives of former immigrants to new immigrants. Shared in-group identities, feeling of empathy and shared problems may influence how former immigrants approach new immigrants. Common in-group identities based on religion or being migrant are expected to affect the views and helps on Syrians positively. I evaluate those assumptions based on my in-depth qualitative fieldwork. The findings are based on my qualitative fieldwork

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in Berlin and Cologne between November and December 2018 and May 2019. A qualitative research had been conducted where in-depth semi structured interviews are conducted with 75 Turkish origins.

INTRODUCTION

This study analyzes the perspective of individuals of Turkish origin in Germany on the 'open door policy' within the context of 'assistance.' It engages that issue within the conceptual framework of Social Identity Theory, whose body of literature largely focuses on intergroup relations with an eye on discrimination, racism, prejudice and homogenization as well as hostility, lack of trust, aggression and alienation. Over the last two decades, however, a series of publications have concentrated on 'helping' (van Leeuwen and Zagefka, 2017, p. v- vii). This study follows in the footsteps of those works to analyze the assistance provided to Syrians following Open Door Policy's adoption within the context of intergroup relations. Specifically, it opens to discussion the idea that helping is not exclusively about the well-being of Syrians and zooms in on assistance provided to Syrians by individuals of Turkish origin in Germany. In this regard, this study sheds light on the social categories, the distinction between 'us' and 'them' and the group identity of people of Turkish origin as well as identifies their concerns, expectations and views regarding their standing in Germany on the basis of group identities.

When it comes to providing humanitarian aid to Syrians, there are differences among individuals of Turkish origin in Germany based on their definitions of 'ingroup' and 'outgroup' as well as their closeness or distance to the various outgroups. This study focuses on the approaches of individuals of Turkish origin and attempts to account for such differences within the context of the Social Identity Theory.

In this regard, its main hypothesis is that 'individuals that share a group identity with Syrians provide more help.' Concentrating on that hypothesis, this study establishes whether individuals of Turkish origin in Germany help Syrians and how their preferences changed over time – sorted by their respective social group identity. Furthermore, it tackles those questions not only as a dynamic between Syrians and people of Turkish origin but also within the framework of their relations with the dominant community in

Germany and their sense of belonging due to their having migrant origins. This study aims to analyze the relations among different groups of migrants as well as migrants and the dominant community. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to the body of academic literature on intergroup helping from the standpoint of Social Identity Theory by exploring 'helping between migrant groups' – which has not been studied adequately.

The study primarily identifies the preferred sample and methodology for its research question in the methodology section and proceeds to provide a general view of the body of literature on 'Social Identity Theory and Helping.' The study's findings are analyzed in the section called 'Assistance by Individuals of Turkish Origin in Germany to Syrians: Who Helps Whom, and Why?' Last but not least, I attempt to establish where this study falls within the body of literature from the perspective of intergroup helping according to Social Identity Theory.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a limited and highly representative *realistic/representative universe*, as opposed to an *ideal universe*. Provided that the inclusion of all individuals, who ought to be taken into consideration regarding the question at hand, would be impossible due to financial, temporal and practical restraints, some members of the relevant groups were selected in an attempt to reach reliable and valid conclusions that provide insights into the bigger picture. The creation of sub-groups with a certain number of subjects made it possible to reach conclusions through inductive reasoning.

A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with individuals of Turkish origin in Germany regarding Syrians during the development of the sampling framework. For this purpose, the relevant individuals and organizations were contacted online, without going to the relevant locations, to schedule interviews. The field research was subsequently expanded through *snowball sampling*, which could be described as making initial contact with a single person from each minor universe and reaching others through them – which goes beyond *intentional sampling*, or the act of finding individuals to respond to the research question. To ensure that the study's level of representation is not reduced by contacts with similar individuals, a certain quota was put in place in an attempt to make initial contact with different

kinds of participants. In other words, a high level of diversity was ensured by contacting subjects with reference to other participants.

Interviews were held in the German cities of Berlin and Cologne, where there is a large community of people of Turkish origin and Syrians. As such, I attempted to identify any parallels or contrasts between interactions, discussions and relations in places densely populated by two migrant groups. The field research in Berlin was conducted in November and December 2018, whereas the research in Cologne took place in May 2019. A total of 75 participants (33 in Berlin and 42 in Cologne) were interviewed. As such, this study solely reflects the views of those interviewees.

INTERPRETING THE PROVISING OF ASSISTANCE TO SYRIANS BY INDIVIDUALS OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN GERMANY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GROUP IDENTITIES

Social Identity Theory is essentially an approach, which posits that group identity enables individuals to make sense of their social existence and makes it valuable. According to that theory, group identity determines how individuals perceive their ingroup and outgroup. In this regard, what matters most is the pursuit of self-respect. The ability to derive self-respect from one's group identity rests on a comparison between the ingroup and the outgroup.

The notion that individuals view themselves and others as members of a given social group leads them to identify with the group, of which they are a member (Turner, et al. 1994: 454- 455). This process of identification –or, in other words, social categorization— assigns a certain position to the individual within society and provides them with some level of continuity (Tajfel, 1974: 68-69 ve 1982: 3). Through social comparison, individuals determine positive and negative extremes and adopt a stance that constantly reaffirms that they are right and superior in intergroup relations. In this regard, social categories essentially serve to preserve one's superiority and to reinforce the positiveness of one's own group by stigmatizing other groups with lower status (Hogg, 2016: 7). Furthermore, as Brown (2000: 749-751) maintains that distinction between 'us' and 'them' determines not only the cognitive nature of individuals but also their behavior, position and motivation.

In the process of social categorization, the dominant perception is that intergroup differences are greater than intragroup differences and that the outgroup is more homogeneous. (Tajfel, 1978: 63-65; Allen and Wilder,

1978: 107-108 and Simon, 1992: 2). The first belief promotes a sense of empathy toward the ingroup, whereas the second fuels anger toward the outgroup. (Ackerman et al., 2006: 836-837, 840). In short, those perceptions take the distinction between 'us' and 'them' to a polarized state and generate a sense of competition. At the same time, they form the basis of judging the outgroup as well as ingroup favoritism. (McDermott, 2009: 348 and Turner, et al. 1994: 457). All those theoretical assumptions serve to identify the main dynamics of the motivation behind intragroup helping. Help is rooted in the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup. There are parallels between members of the same group perceiving each other more positively, them trusting each other and a sense of cooperation among them, and helping. The perception that the recipients of help are part of the ingroup leads to them being given priority in the provision of help (Dovidio, Gaertner and Abad-Merino, 2017: 7). Empathy toward members of the ingroup due to their similarity to oneself accounts for the motivation behind helping. At the same time, this behavior serves to strengthen the ingroup.

Studies on helping the outgroup, in turn, rest on a variety of models for explanation. For example, Kogut and Litov (2017: 88-90) posit that helping members of the outgroup amid humanitarian crises is related to one's economic and political interests. Moreover, they stress that being aware of outgroups and emotions like concern and sadness may be viewed as linked to group identity and a sense of proximity or distance. As such, social support in response to humanitarian crises must not be reduced to improving the living conditions of those groups alone. Instead, one must be aware that such forms of support simultaneously represent an attitude that creates an advantage for the ingroup (Kogut and Litov, 2017: 87-90). A similar argument resulted in Nadler's (2015) development of the Intergroup Helping as Status Relation (IHSR) model, which analyzes how power relations are sustained, furthered or challenged through helping.

With regard to helping the outgroup, Ford (2011) identifies the main element as cultural similarity/distinction, whereas Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010) focuses on the recipients being skilled or low-skilled. Meanwhile, Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2018: 2-3, 11-13) maintain in their migrant-focused analysis of that issue that behavioral tendencies change as a result of the simplification rooted in the distinction between involuntary and economic migrants. The authors conclude that refugees received more

help than those individuals that arrived there through labor migration. In Social Identity Theory, the body of literature on 'helping' leads to various conclusions, such as the possibility of establishing a link between helping and power relations, differences in helping preferences, the likelihood of strengthening intragroup solidarity and shifting borders between different groups. All those studies have the potential to reveal the social categorization and social comparison, in which individuals of Turkish origin in Germany engage toward Syrians, and, by extension, their perceptions of 'us' and 'them' as well as what motivates their behavior.

The participants of Turkish origin in Germany view the Syrian migration as a game-changer. Accordingly, a mass influx of Syrians has changed the demographics of migrants in that country. As such, Syrians became one of the largest migrant communities in Germany –only second to the Turks.[1] Secondly, there is a perception that the dominant group treats Syrians more positively than other groups of migrants because they are victims of war.[2] The emergence of various volunteer movements, operating within the framework of what is called the 'welcome culture' toward the Syrians in Germany, and that country's Open Door Policy toward Syrians lead to the conclusion that Syrians are in a more favorable position than other individuals with migrant backgrounds.[3] Finally, there are certain forms of geographical, eth-

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[1] When the Syrians reached Europe's borders, Germany was at the top of their list of target countries. A quick look at the data from 2014-2017 reveals that the vast majority of the 1.5 million asylum seekers, which arrived in Germany during that period, consisted of Syrians. Indeed, almost one million people arrived over the course of just two years: 326,900 in 2015 and 631,085 in 2016. (Bamf.de Migration Report 2015 and 2016) Accordingly, the number of Syrian immigrants in Germany quickly increased within a short period of time. In 2017 alone, the country approved 94 percent of all asylum applications by Syrians. Consequently, the Syrians became the largest group of asylum seekers and the third largest migrant community in Germany. (Statisctic Bundesamnt, 2018; aktaran: Al Husein ve Wagner, 2020: 3).

[2] Public attitudes towards the support for migrants can change related to cultural smilarities, national origins, level of education, work skills, etc. But as Verkuyten, Mepham and Kross (2018) stressed that the comparison between voluntery and involuntery migrants is also an important one. 'Forced migrants' and 'fortune migrants' perceptions affect the support or opposition on immigrants. In general, a profile of newcomers that matches that involuntary migrants such as refugee is created more sympathy and support. Whereas who labelled as voluntary migrants opposite attitudes.

[3] The 'welcome culture' or 'wilkommenskultur' is an identification or definition of Germany's refugee policy in 2015 when Germany welcomed nearly 1 million refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the largest of any country in the European Union (Windel, Balanam, and Perkins, 2020: 1, 4-5). That term especially used to illustrate that Germany has a capasity to help refugees. More importantly, using this term also labelled like a new era in migration policies Germany which is more multucultural.

nic and religious affinity between individuals with Turkish background and the newcomers. Within all those contexts, the Syrian migration represents a shuffling of the deck in Germany. This new state of affairs entails certain risks and opportunities for the group identity of people of Turkish origin. Their perspective varies, depending on whether the Syrians are perceived as part of the ingroup or the outgroup, and that variation plays a defining role in decisions to help.

As a migrant community, people of Turkish origin are located on the negative side of the power asymmetry in Germany. They are among those groups that are affected by debates over migration and migrants as well as the dominant community's acceptance and rejection. Whereas the most recent migratory wave led to an uptick in the number of migrants in Germany and that country's government began to use the phrase 'country of immigration' in the official discourse rendered migrant identity more acceptable, those developments simultaneously fueled anti-immigrant sentiment. At the same time, anti-immigration sentiment remains the subject of frequent public discussions that focus on non-Western groups and communities of Muslim origin. Secondly, there is a difference between the treatment of the newcomers, by virtue of their being war victims, and the hostility toward other immigrants. Indeed, many authors, including Verkuyten, Mepham and Kros (2018) or Kogut and Litov (2017), stress the importance of making comparisons between involuntary and voluntary migrants. Accordingly, the host community tends to be more hostile toward voluntary migrants and less enthusiastic about their rights, whereas empathy toward involuntary migrants is more widespread and stronger. In other words, the perception of refugees as victims of humanitarian crises and their desperate need for protection ultimately puts other migrants at a disadvantage. As such, immigrants represent a general category of individuals, who arrive and stay voluntarily, that becomes the target of hostility – as opposed to the recipients of protection. (Wyszynski, Guerra and Bierwiaczonek, 2020: 1-2 and Erbaş and Türker, 2019: 891, 894). At that point, there are certain dilemmas in the perspective of individuals of Turkish origin. In their opinion, it is a positive development vis-à-vis the acceptance of individuals of migrant background that the German state and society welcome the Syrians. As a matter of fact, that development has the potential to expand and strengthen their group. However, it has also been established that individuals of Turkish origin feel alienated by the perception of Syrians as victims of war

and, by extension, their sheltered status and acceptance. Together with the sense that the Syrians achieve a higher social status quickly, whereas the Turks accumulated influence gradually since the 1960s, the distinction between 'us' and 'them' grows stronger.

FINDINGS

People of Turkish origin in Germany delivering aid to Syrians: Who assists whom, and why?

H.I. Individuals, who have a shared group identity with the Syrians, provide more aid

This study focuses on the role of people of Turkish origin within the movement to provide aid to Syrians during their migration to Germany and its aftermath. Indeed, the positions of people of Turkish origin in Germany within the movement in response to the 2015 influx of Syrian migrants varied. Extreme cases include individuals who led help efforts as part of a group that joined society later and others who said that they provided no help whatsoever. In this sense, intergroup helping depends on the categories of 'us' and 'them' as well as varies on one's closeness or distance to those categories. In this regard, this part of the study focuses on the differences among individuals of Turkish origin under two sub-categories, those who helped versus those that did not, based on their social identity groups.

a. Those Who Help:

Among the participants of Turkish origin that provided assistance to the Syrians, there were three main groups. The first group consisted of asylum grantees, who provided the most assistance to the newcomers. That group was also distinguished from the rest of immigrants by the variety and continuity of their assistance. To be clear, the assistance provided by asylum grantees was not limited to financial aid. Instead, such individuals played a leading role to make life easier for Syrians in Germany. Accordingly, respondents identified various types of material and emotional support that they provided, such as checking on a given family through regular contacts, covering the expenses of their children, helping with- and guiding them through the bureaucratic process, and giving them clothes and furniture.

"Like a part of our family"

"Essentially, our family began to take care of two Syrian families like a foster family. One of those families includes three girls. The other [couple] have a son and a daughter. We take care of everything from school-related issues and household needs to their health. They are like a part of our family. They visit our home and we visit them. (K7)"

Asylum grantees are motivated to provide assistance by a sense of shared identity based on migration. That the Syrians were compulsory migrants and the ability of asylum grantees to empathize with them due to the similarity of their experiences results in preferential treatment within that group. Indeed, two of the three respondents, who stated that they had attempted to make contact with Syrians prior to their arrival in Germany and started to take certain steps in advance to make their lives easier, were asylum grantees. Those two participants were also noteworthy due to their Armenian background.

The second group, which played a prominent role in assisting the Syrians, consisted of conservative participants with a strong Muslim identity. Whereas their main source of motivation was the perception that Syrians belonged to the same religious group as themselves, that was not the sole point of reference. That is because those respondents make aid-related comparisons with other Muslims. The context of that comparison, in turn, consolidates their uniqueness within the Muslim community. In this regard, their assistance, rooted in religious fraternity, also represents their superiority as a nation. Accordingly, their Muslim identity and national affiliation appear completely intertwined, as they view their Turkish origins as distinguishing features in comparison with Muslim and Middle Eastern countries. Certain cases, where other individuals of Muslim background failed to provide assistance or ignored invitations by people of Turkish origin, support that discourse. Another defining factor in the assistance provided by those respondents to Syrians was the perceived connection between the well-being of Syrians and their own well-being. In other words, the expansion and growing strength of Germany's Muslim community would also make their own group larger and more influential. With regard to their claim to uniqueness within the Muslim community, that development would also make them more powerful within the minority.

"I did not see them carrying out any major activities"

"Well, I can truly spot the difference of our nation here. Where do I see it? Mostly in helping each other. Well, we collected aid here at the mosques, supplied anything from clothes to food and diapers –whatever was need-ed— and delivered them. In my social environment, I have not seen Arabs helping [the migrants]. Take my apartment building, for example. There are Iraqis, Syrians and Egyptians here. In other words, the majority of the occupants are Arabs. Well, I did not see them carrying out any major activities. (B16)"

For individuals with a conservative worldview and a dominant Muslim identity, providing assistance to the Syrians was essentially about view-ing Syrians as their Muslim brothers and sisters. In this sense, they have a primarily moral and religious approach to aid. At the same time, any in-crease in the number of Muslims in Germany represents some kind of ad-ditional strength. Even though the Syrians are not part of that same group, they are viewed as a group of people with whom the original group could cooperate or protect. Since there is a sense that the incoming group's stand-ing in Germany will improve, those individuals of Turkish origin, who de-fine themselves with their Muslim identity, the influx of additional Muslim groups would serve to consolidate their position within the society. Among those individuals with a strong Muslim identity, however , a small minority viewed the arrival of Syrians as a negative development. Only five partici-pants supported that view. It is possible to define that that perspective as believing oneself to be on the same side with the newcomers, despite the fact that the newcomers, despite the fact that the newcomers are not part of the same group, or maintaining that one's own group stands to benefit from the situation.

"I believe that they will stand with us rather than the Germans"

"I wonder whether I am subjected to certain things because I am Muslim or Turkish. The Syrians, who come here, will feel the same way. They, too, will face challenges especially because they are Muslim. In my opinion, we are on the Muslim side together with the Syrians. I see them as partners. We will support and befriend them. In other words, I believe that they will stand with us rather than the Germans. Our religious affinity and that Christians see us as their enemy will bring us closer. We are [from] neighboring countries anyway, so we are alike. (B25)"

Another point, which must be underscored here, is that this kind of aid differs from assistance provided by asylum grantees. Specifically, the majority of assistance was limited to one-time offers of used furniture, clothes, et cetera. Only a small minority formed continued relationships with the Syrians. Instead, a more common phenomenon is to assist a different Syrian each time. In this sense, assistance is generally provided spontaneously as opposed to regularly. Most cases involve taking a Syrian, who lost their way, to their destination, contributing to an ongoing collection of assistance and feeding a hungry person that arrives at their place of work. Obviously, there are certain individuals among the providers of assistance, who are in the opposite situation. Yet their number is low.

The third prominent group of assistance providers consists of leftists. [4]For them, the definition of 'us' and 'them' primarily relates to the hierarchy of power. Since the Syrians are disadvantaged by the society's power asymmetry, the leftists, a former disadvantaged group, attach importance to solidarity among migrants. Especially, they call on those communities, which were originally migrants, to act with more common sense. As an ideological and moral position, such individuals have typically played an active role in acts and movements of solidarity and unity. They talk about aid organizations, events designed to inform the public and similar efforts that they support through community initiatives, in which they participate by virtue of being members of a leftist group. That group maintains that Syrians are more deprived than previous migrants within its migrant-based perspective. Accordingly, they strongly emphasize the importance of unity to support disadvantaged individuals and ensure that they integrate into society At the same time, they criticize the perspective of older migrant communities –especially people of Turkish origin— on the Syrians as 'standardizing' and 'alienating.' Accordingly, they stress that those communities do not play a sufficiently prominent role in acts of solidarity in Germany, such as the provision of assistance, and treat it as a problem.

> "I believe it was last year that a certain person called me. I was saying that [Chancellor Angela] Merkel did the right thing, et cetera. The person complained that "they come here and take our jobs and our women, wives and daughters cannot go out." It was obvious from their voice that they

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4 However, this tendency becomes the opposite as it closer to the center left. For this reason, the center left was excluded with the expressionof the left-wing in this study.

> were quite young, so I said: "I assume that there were people [from your family] that were here before you. How many generations has it been?" They said: "Yes, my grandfather originally came here, et cetera." I asked them whether their grandfather was alive. They said he was. I said: "Speak with him, because what you are saying now – people were saying those same things to your grandfather about the Turks." They stopped talking then. Obviously, this is something that happens frequently. Clearly, the newcomers pose a challenge to those people who have not established themselves in this society. In other words, a college professor of Turkish origin does not really interest anyone. Or anyone that has a good job, position and income. In other words, I assume that there is an underlying fear of the competition. A kind of comparison or a sense of loss. I also think that people –especially those who have always been excluded— keep looking for something beneath them to be excluded – even if they do not do it consciously. (B1)"

In light of those findings, Social Identity Theory posits that shared identity results in helping behavior among the member of those three groups. In this context, their attitude resembles the 'common ingroup identity' model that Gaertner and Dovidio's (1993, 2000, 2012) developed in the early 1990s by inspired on Allport (1954) and Cook's (1985) work on the "contact hypothesis" regarding intergroup judgement and conflicts. That model relates to bringing together the mutual relations between groups with different social identities under a superordinate group through shared bonds. The common superordinate social category (such as Muslims or people of migrant background as opposed to Turks and Syrians) emphasizes that not all social groups are hierarchically ranked and, by extension, such a notion of unity would serve to eliminate the conflicting atmosphere among different social groups (Dovidio, Gaertner and Saguy, 2007: 299-300, 319). To sum up, the assumption is that shared social categories reduce prejudice, whereas the absence of common social categories leads to the opposition. From that perspective, it is possible to argue that social sub-categories rooted in being Muslims, involuntary migrants or simply immigrants undermine prejudice and lead to the prioritization of helping.

b. Those Who Do Not Help:

Some participants of Turkish origin in Germany stated that they either helped Syrians 'very little or once' or 'did not provide any help' and were 'not considering helping.' A closer look at the social identity groups, to

which such individuals belong, primarily reveals that such inclinations are stronger among labor migrants and white-collar migrants. According to this study, less than half of those participants, who are part of the above-mentioned group of migrants, participated in the movement to help Syrians. In this regard, it is possible to argue that those two groups of migrants contributed less to the 'welcome movement' that emerged in Germany. That inclination, which one could describe as being indifferent or unwilling to help, is linked to certain ideological and religious inclinations – in other words, group identities.

Accordingly, those individuals that provided no assistance overwhelmingly have center- left ideological inclinations, weak Muslim identity and strong Turkish identity. That inclination, which manifests itself particularly among first- and second-generation labor migrants, is commonly seen among individuals that do not define themselves with a strong Muslim identity and could be identified as neo-Kemalists or seculars in Turkey's ideological spectrum. That intersection entails a certain 'othering' discourse in their perspective on Syrians. Furthermore, that attitude is integrated into a strong anti-Arab sentiment. As such, ethnicity-based generalizations and simplifications go hand in hand with attempts to distinguishing the ingroup on the basis of religion, to prove the ingroup's superiority and to highlight a certain cultural distance. However, those participants, who stated that they had either not helped Syrians or played a rather active role within the assistance movement, do not always cite their group identity to account for their actions. Instead, their main argument is that the German state addresses all of the Syrians' needs. Accordingly, they stress that no Syrian, except a few exceptions, has ever approached them or their associations with such requests. That is why they do not believe themselves to have such an obligation or responsibility.

Social Identity Theory identifies several ways to account for obstacles before helping. For example, the Slovic's 'numbing model' (2007) suggests that people are less motivated or inclined to help others if the perceived victims are too many, increasing in number and encountered regularly. Kogut and Litov (2017b: 88), in turn, underscore that there is a direct link between helping someone and viewing themselves as a victim or destitute. Accordingly, assistance is limited to individual and momentary action toward a single member of the relevant group if the outgroup's members do not seem

destitute. In this sense, there is no general idea of helping the outgroup. As such, it is possible to comment that those participants, who believe that the Syrians are not in a difficult position since the German authorities make available social amenities and grant asylum rights, are closer to the latter position. Such persons have no sense of having anything in common with Syrians – ethnically, religiously or by virtue of being immigrants. They not only lack empathy toward the Syrians' well-being but also experience concern over the possibility of being viewed as part of the same social category as them. That is why they make a strong effort to distinguish themselves from the Syrians and they do not generally think about helping the Syrians.

Individuals of Turkish origin, who do not define themselves with a strong Muslim identity despite being Muslims, maintain that the influx of Syrians is likely to influence their lives negatively. The participants, who fall under that category, have expressed their frustration with all Muslims and/ or people from Muslim countries being reduced to a single group. In their view, the heterogeneity of Germany's nearly five million Muslims tends to be ignored. That situation is blended with Syed and Pio's argument (2016: 3-5) that all Muslims are the same, irrespective of their theological, ethnic, denominational and political differences and the ideological struggle among them, and that Islam is incompatible with the West. Muslims in Europe insist that they push back against this generally accepted prejudice and the homogenization of Muslims. Accordingly, the participants have repeatedly made the case that Turkey was different from the Arab world and the Middle East, noting that their national identities were incompatible and there was no common ground between their approaches to Islam. According to those respondents, who exclude the Syrians, they were aggrieved anew by the latest migration wave. Anti-immigrant or anti-Muslim sentiment applies, they say, not only to Syrians but also to themselves despite having lived in Germany for three or four generations. Accordingly, those participants, who believe themselves to be aggrieved, distinguish themselves with their attempts to prove that they are unlike the Syrians. They are particularly frustrated with the lack of emotional support and tolerance following their arrival and believe, in a sense, that the financial opportunities made available to the Syrians disturb the balance between themselves and the Syrians to their disadvantage. In this regard, the argument that the Syrians are well-off and do not need help actually reflects intergroup rivalry. That arguably de-

fensive argument that those participants made against the Syrians deserves attention due to its ability to stop them from helping.

> "There is a difference when it is convenient"

> "I don't know – we are not like the Syrians, but those people, who are angry with them, also treat me poorly. Everything is getting worse [and] Germany ceases to be attractive. That is the case even in Cologne. And this is one of the most Western places one could think of. In my opinion, this is what they fail to detect. Maybe it's a mistake to think of it as failing to detect or understand. This is a policy. I say damnit, this means "we do not want Muslims to be equal." We were born here. They actually know and study how we are. This is a country that got back on its feet, thanks to its universities, despite losing the war. They research, but their behavior does not reflect it   Indeed, our mosques,

> associations and everything else are separate anyway. The Indonesians, the Afghans, the Albanians do not matter. In other words, the Germans come to us when they have to make a decision about Muslims. That's what I mean. There is a difference when it's convenient. (K18)"

It is also possible to account for the relatively reluctant attitude of those participants toward helping Syrians with reference to the question of social comparison (e.g. among which groups a comparison is being made) in Social Identity Theory. For example, Tajfel and Turner argue that what makes comparison meaningful in intergroup relations is the similarity, proximity and a situational defining feature of 'the other' (1982: 277). Triandafyllidou, in turn, posits that there is no single group in the 'other' category for groups.

By contrast, Triandafyllidou (2001: 33-34, 38) argues that "the other" does not consist of a single group, even though comparisons are made with a specific group in mind. As such, she comes up with the idea of 'significant other.'[5] Accordingly, what makes any given group a 'significant other'

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5 At the same time, the author makes a distinction between internal and external 'significant others.' Accordingly, Significant Others that belong to the same political unit are considered internal, whereas those that are part of a different political unit are seen as external. For example, ethnic minorities and immigrant communities within the dominant group can be described as internal, whereas those living in another country are external. The internal 'significant other' is believed to undermine the nation's unity and/or authenticity and the external "significant other" is seen as a threat against territorial and/or cultural integrity from the outside. That is why the internal significant other relates to identity politics in a given country and represents a force that undermines its cultural and political order and, by extension, could get in the way of its unity (Triandflyllidou, 2001, pp. 31-38).

is its *close* relationship with the group's identity and uniqueness. In this sense, she underlines that 'the other's 'close relationship' –as opposed to it being more powerful and greater or its access to resources— is the defining factor here. Triandafyllidou proceeds to argue that the relationship tends to be positive if respect and appreciation trump the perception of threat and danger. By contrast, the perceived threat and danger tends to make the relationship more negative and conflicting. Essentially, the conceptualization of 'the significant other' maintains that minor differences exist between multiple groups that engage in intense competition. Indeed, Tajfel's (1982: 25) hypothesis of similarity, too, rests on the view that any given group tries harder to preserve their uniqueness as the other group resembles it more and more closely. In this sense, he maintains that a similar 'other' tends to be perceived as a threat to the ingroup's social identity, arguing that such relations are motivated by the attempt to make the 'other' group unlike one's own group. Similarly, White and Langer (1999: 539, 555) tested that hypothesis with a focus on relations between minority groups and concluded that being relatively similar or related plays a defining role in the development of one's attitude, whereas being different alone yields on no significant results. Accordingly, the define the hostility and prejudice of the members of a given minority group toward the members of another minority group as 'horizontal hostility.' Furthermore, the authors concluded that horizontal hostility was stronger than vertical hostility. In light of all those comments and analyses around the question of who "the other" is, what stops the individuals in this social category from helping the Syrians are their negative discourse regarding the Syrians, their attempts to prove that they are different and superior, and, in particular, their concern over the possibility of being seen as one and the same as the Syrians by the general public and even in a political sense. The Syrians, who could be defined as 'the significant other' in some sense, fuel concern and a sense of loss of status due to the possibility that they could be viewed as having a common ground or identity as the relevant participants. As such, their attempts to prove the existence of certain unbridgeable gaps between themselves and the Syrians, on the basis of cultural differences, religious identity or ethnic background, serve to get in the way of them helping the Syrians.

> "The same goes for the Turks. Well, the Turks were shy in the beginning as well. The Turks, with whom I speak, [complain that] the Syrians have arrived and our peace will be disturbed, because there will be talk

about foreigners in general due to the inability of the Syrians to adapt. Indeed, people will say that Muslims cannot adapt to the country. There was a sense that us, the Turks, will be targeted primarily. The Turks were restless. [The Syrians' arrival] had an impact on my life and, generally speaking, the lives of foreigners here, because it fueled xenophobia and Islamophobia in Germany. Going forward, it will have a long-term impact. In that sense, this was obviously not quite positive. For example, here is what happens: I was verbally assaulted the other day, as I was walking down the street. (B21)"

The distinction between involuntary and economic migrants, too, factors into the decision by those participants not to help. In other words, they believe that the Germans supported the Syrians as victims of war, yet offered no such support or sympathy to themselves – 'voluntary' migrants. Furthermore, some see the newcomers as some kind of burden on their shoulders.[6] In this sense, the Syrians, who are sheltered and protected, are on one side and they themselves, who constantly have to deal with anti-immigrant sentiment, are on the opposite. That is why they feel some kind of anger toward the Syrians, as the latest wave of migration undermines their position in Germany after long years. Holding the Syrians responsible for that devel-

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6 It is certainly true that the anti-refugee, anti-asylum seeker and anti-immigrant discourse and movements in Germany became more influential in the wake of the Syrians' arrival. For example, Igarashi (2021: 2) stresses that the number of violent incidents targeting refugees in Germany increased by 16 times, citing the 2016 report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights – meaning that the number of such incidents increased more rapidly in that country than anywhere else. According to the same report, an average of three acts of violence targeted refugees per day in 2015 (Igarashi, 2021, p. 14). Furthermore, the mass influx of Syrians, which started in 2014, led to an increase in the number of similar acts targeting other groups of immigrants in the country. According to Germany's Interior Ministry, an average of 10 anti- immigrant attacks took place per day in 2016, injuring 560 individuals, including 43 children. Three fourths of those attacks targeted immigrants outside of their place of residence. Some 1000 attacks, in turn, occurred in their housing areas. Altogether, there were 3355 attacks against immigrant or asylum seeker housing facilities, 2545 attacks against individual immigrants, 988 attacks against residences and 217 attacks against refugee organizations and volunteers. (BBC, 26.02.2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 39096833). Those developments also had an impact on Germany's political climate, as the AfD, an anti- immigration party, received approximately 15 percent of the vote nationwide and even more support in certain parts of the country. Moreover, as Rommel (2017: 134-135, 139, 146) maintains, Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident), a movement widely seen as an East German phenomenon, engaged in certain activities in Germany's Western provinces. Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that the Identification Movement does not exclusively appeal to uneducated young people and, instead, incorporates the highly-educated bourgeoisie under the "New Right" umbrella through their opposition to globalization, postmodernity and supranationalism.

opments, especially those individuals, who are unhappy with their economic conditions, responded with carelessness. This observation supports the argument of Wyszynski, Guerra and Bierwiaczonek (2020: 9), who study the issue of helping Syrians in Germany, that people are less likely to help a group that they perceive as a threat against the established order – that this is the defining factor in intergroup relations. In that study, the authors established that an increase in the level of the symbolic as well as realistic threat perception is inversely correlated to helping. Indeed, the participants in question are skeptical toward any attempt to support the Syrians because they believe themselves to have been hurt by the newcomers. In this sense, their reluctance to help is rooted in what they perceive as a symbolic and realistic threat. They also justify their decision not to help with reference to material factors, as opposed to just group identity, and from a more rational perspective.

> "They did not need our help in the first place. As I just mentioned, my daughter's neighbor – they live across the hall from each other. … They were provided an income. Their rent was paid. Their children are receiving an education. If necessary, they receive psychological support. In other words, the state essentially takes care of them in every sense of the word. As such, they do not need the people all that much. Why shall I provide additional help to them? After all, they do not seem, well, how should I put it? They are not sheepish or aggrieved. Looking at them, they are fine. Sometimes I say that they are doing better than myself. (B4)"

Finally, the white-collar migrants in Germany, who participated in this study, are among those groups that provide the least amount of assistance to Syrians. Accordingly, only two participants stated that they have provided assistance. One of those participants live in Cologne and the other resides in Berlin. Furthermore, the ability of white-collar individuals, who participated in this study, to present a general view is limited due to their low numbers. Still, it is possible to draw certain conclusions for the purpose of analyzing their assistance framework. First of all, the white-collar participants have a very weak sense of "us" and "them" regarding the Syrians. In other words, those participants do not believe that the Syrians are on par with themselves in their social comparisons. In this context, one could argue that Syrians do not represent as "significant other" for those individuals. Moreover, the majority of this group of participants maintain that the mass

influx of Syrians did not have any impact on their lives in Germany. Indeed, some of the white-collar participants could not help but express their surprise at those questions, stating that they had not thought about such factors prior to the study. The question of assistance attests to that fact.

> "I found myself thinking why I haven't thought about it before

> "I came to Germany quite recently – after 2015. When I arrived, I did not see the Syrians. Perhaps I occasionally come across them, but the truth is I cannot tell whether they are Syrians or Jordanians. I cannot tell who is a refugee and who is Syrian. ... I did not provide any assistance. Well, thinking of my place of work – sometimes there is talk about their arrival and what is going to happen. They ask me about Turkey. What I can say for sure is that they are not everywhere and seen everywhere – as in Turkey. I

> have never witnessed any assistance. My social circle is limited to my workplace. There are few or no Turks in my neighborhood either. In other words, to be honest, I have not witnessed any situation or conversation to make me think about helping someone. Perhaps there are some. I think that the Turks must be helping through the mosques. I do not know, though, because I do not go [to the mosque] or interact with Turks. These questions have really pressed me hard. I found myself thinking why I haven't thought about it before. (B33)"

The second finding related to white-collar migrants is that both individuals, who provided assistance, were trained in the social sciences. The other individual, who studied social sciences, stated that they had not provided any assistance because they, too, had migrated and did not lead a comfortable life. One of individuals, who provided assistance, recalled that they hosted an event for LGBT+ Syrians, standing in solidarity with them and making an effort to ensure that they could go to Germany. In this sense, they prioritized their own group whilst providing assistance to the Syrians. The devout female participant, in turn, participated in many events for helping the Syrians. She talked about leading efforts to help Syrians not only in the mosque but also associations, community centers and workplaces. The participant accounted for those efforts with reference to the disadvantages faced by compulsory migrants and on a religious basis. They offered assistance on the basis of migrant identity and religion, yet argued that the arrival of Syrians would "undermine the status of people of Turkish origin in Germany", noting that they "did not think of Syrians as the equals of Turks" and saying that there were "unbridgeable gaps between the approach to religion among

people of Turkish origin and the Syrians." Despite making those points, they have a generally positive view of the Syrians because they lack a strong sense of 'us'. As such, it would be wrong to interpret their assistance on the basis on intragroup help. They provide assistance, yet their discourse on the Syrians bears similarity to the first- and second-generation labor migrants. In turn, they are distinguished from those groups by the fact that they do provide assistance.

To sum up, asylum grantees, leftists and individuals with a strong Muslim identity among the participants of Turkish origin in Germany provide assistance out of empathy with an aggrieved group, preferential treatment toward another part of the group and the idea that their group identity stands to benefit from the new arrivals. By contrast, white-collar migrants have a weak sense of unity or affinity with the Syrians on the basis of their group identity. As such, providing assistance is not really on their agenda. For the labor migrants, who do not have a strong Muslim identity and define themselves as center-left, the main issue is to make a distinction between themselves and the Syrians. In particular, how they are perceived by Germans and the general population informs their negative attitude toward the Syrians as well as their failure to participate in assistance movements. As such, the fear of being perceived as one and the same as "the other" is brushed off with the notion that "the Syrians are already in a good situation." Accordingly, providing assistance is limited to the dominant community's responsibility or the state's obligation. The members of this social category, who believe that the influx of Syrians has affected them negatively, provide almost no assistance to the Syrians. Instead, they use a discourse that identifies the Syrians –and, more broadly, the Arabs— as the other. The generally accepted view is that the state provides adequate assistance to the Syrians, which leads them to play no active role regarding the provision of assistance.

DISCUSSION: THE REFLECTION OF HELPING BY INDIVIDUAL OF TURKISH ORIGIN IN GERMANY ON THE BODY OF ACADEMIC LITERATURE

The existing body of literature on intergroup helping, which approaches that issue from the standpoint of Social Identity Theory, has a broad focus. Especially those studies, which relate to the 2015 migration wave in Europe,

the motivations behind helping have an important place. In their analysis of the solidarity movements that emerged in Belgium amid the 2015 migration wave, Roblain et al. (2020: 3-4) conclude, building on Klandermans' (2014: 20) analysis of the relationship between social networks and social activity, that intergroup helping behavior is influenced by the approval of others and the intensity of social networks. Kende et al. (2017: 73), in turn, established that the volunteer movement in Hungary was aligned with the goal of social change and therefore resembled political activism.

There are studies on intergroup helping that identify the countries, where support is stronger, and the groups that play a more active role in solidarity movements as well as the groups that adopt the opposite stance, who supports which forms of helping and which migrants receive more support than others. For example, Koos and Seibel (2019: 706, 722-724) maintain that refugees receive more support in developed welfare states and countries, where there are more people with migrant backgrounds, whilst stating that there are opposite trends in places with right-wing political parties and movements on the rise. Their research, which puts the level of popular support for solidarity at 64 percent across Europe, 93 percent in Sweden and 23 percent in Czechia, posits that economic deprivation and high unemployment are not inversely correlated because refugees are not directly involved in the marketplace and the heightened level of contact in countries with many inhabitants of foreign origins tends to promote solidarity. Meanwhile, on the helping relations between the host community and immigrants, Burhan and van Leeuwen (2016) state that those individuals, who believe that immigrants pose a threat to the national economy less strongly, express support for assistance designed to empower immigrants, whom they deem unable to address their own problems. Furthermore, that study established that immigrants, who are considered culturally compatible with the host society, are not perceived as a threat by weak and moderate nationalists, who play a more active role in helping immigrants compared to rigid/strong nationalists. Building on Brickman et al. (1982), Jackson and Esses (2000: 421-422), in turn, identify three types of help that the host society provides to immigrants: empowerment, direct assistance and group exchange. It is possible to argue that this classification of help, which could be summarized as both sides (i.e. the host society and the immigrants) assuming responsibil-

ity, makes it possible to identify the host society's reasons for helping on the basis of morality and the Enlightenment or account for the decision to deny assistance. Judging by the perception of economic competition and the lack of interest among members of the host society, who wish to be socially dominant, in immigrants accumulating economic or other kinds of power, the authors concluded that there was weak support in empowering assistance. As such, they underscore that the determination of groups to maintain their advantaged position stands in the way of helping (Jackson and Esses, 2000: 425, 431).

Certain studies also treat intergroup helping as a strategic choice. For example, van Leeuwen and Zagefka (2017: 11-12) argue that the decision to help could be viewed as discrimination and looking down on the out-group as well as demonstrating ingroup quality and richness and intragroup preferential treatment. In turn, Halabi and Nadler (2017: 207-210) reference Nadler's (2012) model of helping behavior between social groups to argue that the perception of the status hierarchy, in particular, as illegitimate and unstable tends to undermine intergroup helping relations. The authors thus stress that helping tends to be undesirable if it appears to be centered on dependency. At the same time, they maintain that the high-status group would be willing to provide assistance in an attempt to prevent any status change that it perceives as a threat to itself and to stop destabilization at its expense. Syed and Pio's (2016) study on the dynamics of helping between Israeli Jews and Arabs provides such examples. Essentially they point out that the relationship between the providers and recipients of help, together with their respective positions, tends to change under safe and unsafe conditions. Accordingly, in a state of safety, the advantaged group helps the disadvantaged group in a way that views the recipient as passive and the provider as a problem-solver – meaning that the relationship is based on dependency. By contrast, autonomy-oriented helping is about viewing the recipients as influential and talented and providing them with certain tools to develop solutions themselves. In an unsafe hierarchy, in turn, the low-status group is expected to be grateful recipients. That expectation essentially rationalizes, legitimizes and institutionalizes the underlying inequality that gives rise to dependency-oriented helping. In other words, there is an inherent power relationship in the act of helping. Based on that assertion, Wyszynski, Guerra and Bierwiaczonek (2020) stress in their article on assistance provided to

refugees, immigrants and economic migrants in Germany that the ways in which immigrants are labeled plays a defining role in the development of the host community's approach to the relevant groups. They highlight that assistance provided to refugees is dependency-oriented and paternalistic, whereas the other categories reduce their assistance and engage in reactionary behavior.

The above-mentioned studies demonstrate that the research on assistance movements, which emerged in the wake of the 2015 migration wave toward Europe, focused on the majority in analyzing the question of intergroup helping with an eye on the host society. Accordingly, they have not focused on whether or not older immigrants or minority groups in the relevant countries have been part of such movements. In this sense, there are limited opportunies to draw comparisons between the ways in which those groups, which are disadvantaged under a given society's power asymmetry, could help incoming immigrants. Nonetheless, it is possible to reach certain conclusions.

CONCLUSION

The sense of solidarity, which is rooted in assigning labels to different groups of migrants vis-à-vis people of Turkish origin in Germany helping Syrians, is among their top sources of motivation. Empathy with the challenges and deprivation linked to being a refugee, in turn, is most strongly felt by asylum grantees. This situation, which creates a potential to unite with the Syrians under a superordinate identity and could be explained with reference to intragroup favoritism, also matches Halabi and Nadler's (2017) model of dependency-oriented help giving. Such a classification between immigrants, however, exerts the opposite influence on labor migrants. The authors note that the status hierarchy's perception as illegitimate and unstable creates a chaotic atmosphere. The Syrians are thus viewed as a game-changer and fuel concern, especially among the vast majority of first- and second-generation participants, over their future in Germany. Accordingly, those individuals believe that the Syrians are prioritized over themselves and receive more support. At the same time, there is growing concern over being directly impacted by the rising anti-immigrant sentiment in society. As Koos and Seibel (2019) point out, the participants, who share that view, are increasingly

threatened by the rising wave of right-wing movements, keeping in mind that the Alternative for Germany's (AfD) momentum in all federal states. As such, those individuals maintain that all those developments could hurt their economic standing in Germany and express concern over the possibility of losing status due to being seen as one and the same with the Syrians. That group plays a passive role within assistance movements and makes attempts to prove to society that they are not like the Syrians. In turn, it is possible to say that the conservative Muslim participants, who have a strong Muslim group identity, highlight the skills and positive aspects of their own group – as mentioned in van Leeuwen and Zagefka (2017). In addition to caring about the well-being of Syrians, they, as a group, are derive satisfaction from the sense that they are one step ahead of other immigrants and other Muslims. Treating the leftists as a social group category, in turn, one finds that they attach importance to actively using social networks and value to the act of helping – as seen in Roblain et al (2020). Finally, it is possible to argue that white-collar individuals, who play no active role in helping, are a weak example for being explained with reference to social group identity.

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Securitization of Migration in the European Union: Frontex and Refugees

Veli Özdemir*

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) member countries have started to create a standard migration policy, especially since the 1990s, deciding that a common approach to migration movements towards Europe would be more effective than creating separate policies. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency(FRONTEX) was established to ensure the security of the EU borders, mainly the Schengen area. However, in recent years, the increase in migration to Europe, especially from North Africa and the Middle East, has increased security concerns. New discourses and policies have been developed to prevent asylum seekers from entering Europe, and migration has been securitized. EU has signed Readmission Agreements with its neighboring countries to alleviate the refugee burden and prevent them from entering Europe. In addition, Member States have started to follow stricter immigration policies and have seen refugees as a security threat. In this context, FRONTEX, which operates for the security of the external borders of EU Member States, has started to play a new role in preventing refugees from entering the borders of EU countries, and its jurisdiction area has been expanded. With the new duties and authorities, the FRONTEX has started the border patrol by using military ships. This process resulted in the death of many refugees, and criticism of FRONTEX increased.

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In this chapter, EU's current migration policies will be explained and examined, the precautions taken to increase security measures within the scope of FRONTEX will be evaluated. In addition, how FRONTEX functions and how discourses and practices are legitimized will be analysed within the scope of the securitisation theory. This chapter is based on the assumption that these discourses and practices are deliberately used to facilitate the transfer of migration-related issues to an emergency policy dealt with outside of the usual policy-making processes. It further argues that the extraordinary policy measures that the EU can take against international migration are legitimized and put into practice through these expressions.

Keywords: European Union, Migration, FRONTEX, Securitization, Refugees

INTRODUCTION

Until the 1990s, when the Cold War ended, migration movements were generally characterised as a demographic and sociological phenomenon. However, later on, internal conflicts and turmoil in many parts of the world, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East, caused mass migration. These mass migration movements have been perceived as a threat by states and structures such as the European Union (EU), and migration movements have been included in the field of security. As a matter of fact, the 'Arab Spring' that started at the end of 2010 caused uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. Millions of migrants fled from the chaos began to flock to the EU member countries, which they saw as safe lands. The migration wave, which fundamentally shook the dynamics of the EU's migration policy, peaked in 2015 and was characterised as a 'migration crisis' by the EU Commission (EU Commission, 2015). EU has put forward various programmes and mechanisms to cope with this phenomenon, which is seen as a problem. In order to ensure border control, member states decided to establish the "European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of EU Member States" (FRONTEX). FRONTEX was established in 2004 to support operational co-operation between the member states regarding the management of external borders and became operational in 2005. In this context, FRONTEX, started to play a new role in preventing refugees from entering the borders of EU countries, and its mandate was expanded. With the new tasks, FRONTEX was provided with a military ship and started border patrolling. In this process, criticisms against FRONTEX increased.

The main criticism is that the EU has securitised migration through FRONTEX and normalized and put extraordinary practices through institutions into practice. As a matter of fact, FRONTEX's operations and border control practices in the Mediterranean basin have caused the death of many refugees. It will be tried to reveal how FRONTEX functions in the EU's policy of securitising migration and how discourses and extraordinary practices are legitimised through FRONTEX. In this context, the securitisation theory, the process of securitising the EU's migration policy, and the role of FRONTEX will be examined respectively. In this section, unlike the Copenhagen school, securitisation theory will be conceptualised in a way that it encompasses not only discourses but also practices. Although it is not established as a securitisation tool, FRONTEX's duties and operations will be discussed in relation to the EU's founding values and human rights violations. Based on the assumption that FRONTEX is deliberately used to facilitate the transfer of migration-related issues to emergency policy, this study argues that through these expressions, the EU legitimises and puts into practice the extraordinary policy measures against international migration.

SECURITISATION THEORY AND THE PROCESS OF SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Securitisation Theory

The new threat perceptions that emerged towards the end of the Cold War led to questioning the traditional state-oriented understanding of security. Security perceptions and definitions of the mainstream International Relations theories of idealism and realism were critically examined. The widening and deepening approaches that have come to the fore argue that in addition to the military security concept, many sectors, such as political, economic, social, and environmental sectors, should be included in the concept of security. The Copenhagen School has significantly contributed to security studies, especially since the mid-1990s, and pioneered a transformation in the critical security context. According to the securitisation theory developed by this school, security is multi-sectoral and socially constructed.

Security is defined as "*emergency/extraordinary measures taken to ensure survival in the face of threats to the existence of any reference object*" (Buzan et al., 1990, p.3). It is necessary to draw special attention to the emphasis on

survival here. Securitisation theory is initiated with the discourse of survival, which is used to legitimize the extraordinary measures taken to fight against threats to survival. On the other hand, since security is socially constructed, assessing whether threats are 'realized fully' is impossible. Therefore, what security researchers need to focus is the process by which an issue is socially constructed and recognised as a security threat (Leonard, 2010, p.235). This process, the construction of the scope of security, is referred to as securitisation by the Copenhagen School. Indeed, according to Waever (2005), securitisation is the speech act in which the securitising actor declares an existential threat to a specific reference object and claims the right to use extraordinary means to ward off that threat. If the target audience accepts this claim and gives the securitising actor the right to violate rules that would otherwise be binding, the issue becomes a security problem and is securitised (Waever, 2000, p.250-51). However, to further develop and improve the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory, many researchers have made various proposals on the theory in recent years, and an intense debate has occurred.

In contrast to the Copenhagen School a group of researchers led by Didier Bigo (2000), the founder of the Paris School, emphasises the importance of the practices rather than speech acts. Bigo (2000, p. 94-95), while acknowledging the importance of the speech acts in securitisation as presented by the Copenhagen School, states that an alternative and more practical approach to securitisation should be considered. Instead of focusing only on macro-level political discourses, as the Copenhagen School have done, he states that the technocratic practices of the experts in the field of security, whom he called "professionals of unrest", should be examined (Leonard, 2007, p.15). He emphasizes that it is possible for securitisation to take place without discourse and claimes that some of the practical work, discipline, and expertise of the military and police may be equally important (Bigo, 2000, p.194). In other words, in the process of securitisation, the actions of the bureaucratic structures or networks connected to security practices and the specific technologies they use, may play a greater role than speech acts (Huysmans, 2004). Balzacq (2010), another representative of the Paris School, extends the Copenhagen School's speech act approach by including actual practices. At this point, it should be noted that the Paris School complements the Copenhagen School's approach. Both Schools use the aforementioned concepts of securitisation theory, but focus on different aspects of the process. While

Copenhagen School try to develop a new analytical approach to security studies and examine the consequences of the security discourse, the Paris School focuses on the role of the security professionals and experts in the securitisation process (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2015, p.9-10).

Another critical contribution to the securitisation theory is the Aberystwyth School, whose prominent representatives are Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones. The Aberystwyth School criticises the Copenhagen School primarily on the level of analysis. It claims that the Copenhagen School considers the state as the main object of reference in the securitisation process. According to the Aberystwyth School, individual security must be ensured first. Therefore, individual security should be taken as the ultimate reference object in the securitisation process. This is because ensuring individual security will also ensure the security of states, which are political structures composed of individuals. Since military, political, economic, environmental, and social threats in the securitisation process ultimately target individuals, the main objective of security should be to ensure individual security (Kolasi, 2014: 144). Following the criticism on the level of analysis, one comes across with another criticism on the ethical-political ground. The main focus of the criticism is the importance that the Copenhagen School attributes to de-securitisation. According to the Copenhagen School, issues that do not concern survival should be resolved through negotiation within political boundaries, and the scope of security should be limited. Issues other than threats to the survival of the reference object should be resolved through negotiation within the boundaries of politics, in other words, they should be de-securitised. If the scope of security is kept broad, many issues will be resolved through emergency and extraordinary methods. Therefore, the scope of security should be kept as minimal and as ethical possible (Rumelili and Karadağ, 2017, p.72). The Aberystwyth School, on the other hand, emphasises the political and the constructed character of security and advocates expanding the scope of security. Taking into account the risks of de-securitisation in threats to the object of reference, it proposes to solve threats by politicising them instead of de-securitising. According to the school, if security issues are only de-securitised and not politicised, the concerns and problems of individuals, who are the main object of reference, will be left at the mercy of state elites who remain insensitive to these problems (Bilgin, 2008, p.99-100).

New threats emerging in the post-Cold War period have caused the

concept of security to broaden and deepen, and the reference object of security has changed from the state to the individual and society. The concept of migration has also transformed from a demographic, social and socio-economic based concept into a new security issue. McDonald (2008, p.70) cites the closing of borders to migrants and asylum seekers after the 11 September terrorist attacks as an example of the positioning of migration in the new security understanding rather than in the traditional security understanding. However, migrants have started to be perceived as a threat to individual security, the cultural identity of societies, economic integrity, and the internal stability of countries (Huysmans, 2006, p.64). As a matter of fact, although there are different dimensions of migration in the EU, common migration policies have been established and moved to the supranational ground, refugees and asylum seekers have been perceived as a threat in discourse and practices, and a process of securitisation has been experienced with the policies established over the years. Before addressing the place and impact of FRONTEX in this process, it is necessary to mention the EU's process of securitisation of migration.

The Securitisation of Migration in the European Union

The understanding of security as a product of social constructionism, which argues that security is a social construction due to its relationship with common identities in the political and social sphere, is important in terms of migration (Stivachtis, 2008, p.14). While a new understanding of security was being constructed in post-Cold War Europe, migration was positioned as a threat within this understanding with the impact of a series of events that followed. According to Buonfino (2004, p.23-24), the interaction between the media, public opinion and national governments in Europe on migration has made migration one of the biggest security issues for Europe in the 21st century. Again in this period, civil unrest and conflicts in many parts of the world have caused people to leave their homes and migrate en masse. The EU member states, which were heavily affected by this migration wave, have aimed to establish common migration and asylum policies on the one hand. On the other hand, they have tried to create an area of freedom, security and justice within the EU.

Three main factors have influenced the desire to strengthen co-operation between EU Member States with regard to external border controls, which led

to the creation of FRONTEX. First of all, migration flows to EU member states have gradually increased, especially after the end of the Cold War, and migrants and asylum seekers have become a more controversial issue in the EU. The fact that the terrorists who carried out the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were migrants led to the association between migration and terrorism pushed EU member states to take various measures to reduce the number of migrants, including the strengthening of border controls to restrict the access of migrants and asylum seekers to their territory (Neal, 2009, p. 338). Moreover, as the EU was moving towards a major enlargement in 2004, including the Eastern European Countries, some concerns were expressed that future member states would constitute the EU's new external borders and that they would not be able to control these borders effectively. From such a perspective, the EU considered FRONTEX as the most effective way to increase cooperation between member states in controlling the external borders of the Schengen Area, to strengthen the border control capabilities of future EU member states and to overcome the difficulties in standardising controls at Schengen borders (Monar, 2006, p.75). Finally, it was also considered that tightening external border controls would make an important contribution to the fight against terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (Monar, 2005, p.147).

It is important to briefly explain these three factors affecting the development of the common migration policy and the securitisation of migration in the EU in order to reveal the impact and development of FRONTEX in the securitisation process. The impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the securitisation of migration has been widely discussed. The general consensus is that the terrorist attacks gave securitisation actors in the EU the opportunity to establish a link between migration and terrorist threats, which further worsened the image of irregular migrants (Debruyn, 2017, p.16). In late 2001, the first part of the classical securitisation process began to emerge, with securitising actors developing discourses linking migration to security, borders and terrorism. Again in this period, a threat to the object of reference was defined, political unity was sought to be created and the construction of instruments to combat the threat began (Neal, 2009, p.340).

Andreas (2003) argued that the process of securitisation of migration in the EU has been openly acknowledged and has accelerated since 2001, while Messina (2014, p.533) argued that the September 11 terrorist attacks were

a critical juncture and an important accelerator of the securitisation of migration in Europe. For Huysmans (2000, p.770) migration has been securitised through European integration, arguing that migration has become increasingly mediatised and linked to riots, domestic unrest, unskilled labour, welfare chauvinism and crime. Similarly, many researchers claim that the EU has been securitising migration since the early 2000s. (Bigo, 2008; Leonard, 2009; Leonard, 2010; Leonard, 2011; Düvell and Vollmer, 2011; Balzacq and Carrera, 2006; Karyotis 2007; Kostakopoulou, 2009). Even the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticised the securitisation of migrants and refugees in the EU (Addressing Refugees, 2006).

Two other important factors affecting the common migration policies and the process of securitisation of migration in the EU were the enlargement process and the 'Arab Spring' (Özerim, 2014, p.40). Harmonisation with the regulations established for Europe's Common European Migration Policy was not easy for the new member states, and this process also had reshaping effects on the relevant policies of the EU. The political developments originating from North Africa and dubbed as the "Arab Spring" have increased migration to the EU, especially from Tunisia and Libya. The 2011 European Commission report titled 'A Global Approach to Migration and Mobility' is of significant importance in this respect and underlines the need for a more inclusive and harmonised migration policy due to the developments related to the Arab Spring (European Commission; 2011, p.2). Indeed, the approach in this report, especially the use of an external threat as a justification for the EU's deeper integration on migration, is a good example of securitisation practices and discourse in the ongoing process of supranationalisation of migration policies. However, the report mentions the EU's global approach within the scope of 'geographical priorities' and draws attention to regional dialogue in the review process (European Commission, 2011). This approach actually stems from the need to respond to African migration and asylum movements. In this document, which expresses the effort to establish a global approach to migration, it is clearly emphasised that the *"EU-Africa Strategic Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment"* should be prioritised in the relevant process (European Commission, 2011, p.8). Similarly, there is also a report reflecting the impact of the "Arab Spring" in the migration and security context. The European Commission's 2011 report *"Dialogue with Southern Mediterranean Coun-*

tries on Migration, Mobility and Security" can be evaluated in this context. However, the process that fundamentally affected the EU's migration policy in the context of migration and security took place in 2015. As a matter of fact, in the process that started with the Syrian civil war, the EU Commission (2015) characterised this situation as a 'migration crisis'. Finally, with the "*New Pact on Migration and Asylum*" announced by the European Commission in September 2020, new basic priorities were set in EU migration policies. However, this has been a security-oriented pact that focuses more on strengthening borders, focusing on return policies and placing more responsibility on source and transit countries located at the EU's external borders. In other words, it supports the process of securitisation of migration.

Considering 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, EU enlargement processes in the early 2000s, and the Arab Spring starting from the 2010s, it is generally accepted that the EU has included the issue of migration within the scope of security and that migration policies. These policies have continued to be supranationalised with this process, but there are also other approaches. As a matter of fact, the securitisation of migration in the EU is seen as another reflection of the sovereignty-based conflict between nation states and international migration when it is examined within Europe's effort to create an identity just like a nation state model. While constructing the European identity, Europe also creates its own others, thus positioning the outsiders, i.e. third country nationals or non-members, in a different place. As a result, the hegemonic discourse at the nation-state level in Europe that migration is a threat is also reflected at the supranational level (Buonfino, 2004, p.43). Another important point is that actors are among the most important elements to which importance is attributed in the securitisation of migration in Europe. From this point of view, focusing only on the changing conditions in domestic political and social structures or migration flows is not enough to explain the positioning of migration within the security sphere. This is also a process based on actors. According to Bigo (2008, p.63), the reason behind the popularisation of such security-based discourse is not the increase in threats, but the increase in the threats posed by actors. The social and economic crises that European countries are experiencing clearly strengthen the actors' hands in this regard.

These processes have impacted EU member states and left the EU in a dilemma between 'providing humanitarian aid' and 'avoiding the financial

burden'. In this context, one of the most important reasons for increasing the EU aid channeled to the countries in the North Africa in exchange for the operationalisation of readmission agreements is the desire to prevent migrant and refugee flows through these countries and to protect their borders. As a matter of fact, FRONTEX has controlled the EU borders with its activities, operations and practices so far and has carried out activities to stop migration flows. To understand the role of FRONTEX in the process of securitisation of migration in the EU, it is necessary to evaluate its operations, its main tasks and the practices it applies while fulfilling these tasks.

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MIGRATION POLICY AND FRONTEX

The EU member states have made a series of arrangements in order to achieve full integration by ensuring the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. The Schengen Agreement, which was signed in 1985 to abolish internal border controls in the member states regarding the free movement of persons and conduct border controls at external borders, entered into force in 1995 and a Schengen Area was established between the signatory states. Several initiatives have been taken to protect the Schengen Area and develop practices for the effective management of the EU's external borders and co-operation between member states. Firstly, in October 2001, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Italy and Spain launched a feasibility study on the establishment of a 'European Border Police', but some countries, led by the UK, opposed the idea. Nevertheless, the idea continued to be discussed intensively, and in the second half of 2003, when Greece held the rotating presidency, the Council revived the idea of a mechanism for the joint management of the EU's external borders. In 2004, the terrorist attacks in Madrid contributed to the realisation of this idea and a consensus was reached on a new mechanism for the joint management of external borders (Neal, 2009, p.340-345). As a result, FRONTEX, an independent supranational organisation, was established on 26 October 2004 to coordinate operational cooperation at external borders and the agency started its operations in May 2005. On 14 September 2016, it was renamed the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex, 2021a). Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, FRONTEX has legal personality, operational independence and a budget at its disposal.

Launched in 2005, FRONTEX plans and coordinates joint operations with the member states, implements these operations and evaluates the results

of these operations in order to achieve the goal of preventing and reducing irregular migration, which is at the heart of EU migration policy. During these operations, FRONTEX uses its own budget and the relevant program budgets of the EU as well as the personnel and equipment of the member states (Aras, 2014, p.79-80). With the launch of FRONTEX, a debate has started among researchers working on securitisation on whether it was established as a functional actor of the EU's securitisation policy on migration, and even if it was not established for this purpose. It is further argued whether its operations and practices contribute to the EU's securitisation policy on migration. The debate has focused on whether FRONTEX reflects the emergency response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which included extraordinary measures.

While it is widely acknowledged that the terrorist attacks of 11 September and Madrid were an undeniable reality in the process of securitisation of migration in the EU (House of Lords, 2003; Levy, 2005), the formal-discursive principles of securitisation theory seem to have been rather vague at the time of the establishment of FRONTEX. According to Neal (2009, p.343), the link between migration and security, terrorism and borders was institutionalised in 2001 and 2002, but the consequences were not the urgent and extraordinary measures that securitisation theory expected. Two years after the securitisation moves of 2001 and without any concrete progress between 2001 and 2003, it is difficult to claim that 9/11 and the accompanying securitisation moves had a direct positive impact on the creation of FRONTEX (Neal, 2009, p.342-345). However, this does not mean that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had no impact on securitisation at all.

According to the Regulation No 2007/2004, FRONTEX has six main tasks. These are (1) to coordinate operational co-operation between member states on the management of external borders; (2) to assist member states in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; (3) to conduct risk analyses; (4) to keep abreast of developments in external border control and surveillance; (5) to assist member states when increased technical and operational assistance is required at external borders; and (6) to assist member states in organising joint return operations (Frontex, 2004).

Among FRONTEX's tasks, coordinating joint operations at the external borders of Member States has received the most attention, especially

from pro-migrant Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the media. It is empowered to coordinate joint air, land and maritime operations proposed by Member States or proposed to be launched according to a risk assessment carried out by the Agency. Even though it has been stated that FRONTEX's official position in these operations is only that of a coordinator and that the responsibility for the control of external borders lies entirely with the EU Member States, some researchers, such as Baldaccini (2010, p.234), have argued that FRONTEX bears a certain degree of responsibility for incidents that occur during the joint operations it coordinates.

It can be argued that joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX are securitisation practices in two respects. First of all, such coordinated operations between various states are traditionally organised to tackle more traditional security issues, such as military aggression by a third state, piracy or drug trafficking. Considering that some of the actors involved in these joint operations have a quasi-military status in their countries (e.g. the Guardia Civil in Spain), it would not be wrong to consider the involvement of this quasi-military force, which is involved in traditional security threats, in joint operations aimed at stopping migration flows as a securitisation of migration flows (Lutterbeck, 2006). In addition, joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX can be described as "extraordinary measures" taken within the scope of securitisation, since they have the characteristics of extraordinary measures. On the other hand, there are debates on the legality of joint operations at sea. As a result, such joint operations, which are traditionally conducted to deal with security threats, can be seen as "extraordinary" in some respects as they are organised to stop migration flows (Leonard, 2010, p.241).

Another important task of FRONTEX is to assist Member States in training national border guards, including establishing common training standards, and providing technical and operational support where necessary. To date, FRONTEX has organised specialised courses on various topics such as detection of forged documents and stolen vehicles, joint extradition operations and air-sea cooperation for pilots carrying out surveillance operations. The *Rapid Border Intervention Teams (*RABIT) organise training activities to enhance the competence of national border guards in the EU and to strengthen operational cooperation during joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX. In addition, in the event of an unexpected migration flow at the external borders of the EU, they are deployed urgently at the request of

the relevant border country (Leonard, 2010, p.241). At this point, it should be noted that unexpected migration flows and emergency deployment at the borders directly overlap with the securitisation theory's discourse of "existential threat" to survival and the "emergency" measures taken to deal with this threat. In other words, it would not be wrong to consider these practices as securitisation practices.

Another of FRONTEX's main tasks is, in its own words, "*to analyse the situation and collect intelligence-based data in order to assess changes, risks and threats with possible impact on the security of the EU's external borders*" (Frontex, 2009, p.29). Given that such intelligence structures have traditionally been developed only to monitor traditional security threats, it is clear that FRONTEX's activities in the field of risk analysis are securitisation practices that contribute to the securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU (Leonard, 2010, p.243). On the other hand, risk analyses identify migration flows approaching the borders, defined as "threats". Therefore, the discourse of threat to survival in the speech act process pointed out by the Copenhagen School is put forward through risk analyses, and the demand for authority, which is the second stage of securitisation, is implemented through the previously mentioned joint operations. This process transforms the speech act into practice and migration is securitised.

Research and development activities are another area where FRONTEX can be seen as a case of securitisation practices. The Research and Development Unit conducts research activities in various fields such as automated border controls, biometric technologies in border controls, and unmanned aerial vehicles in border surveillance systems (Frontex, 2021a). Through such activities, FRONTEX is developing increasingly close relationships with private sector companies specialising in security and surveillance technologies, suggesting that surveillance and control technologies which have traditionally been used to address security issues can also be used to deal with migrants and asylum seekers. The use of such technologies can therefore be considered as securitisation practices that contribute to the securitisation of migration in the EU.

The last task assigned to FRONTEX by the Establishment Regulation is to assist member states in organising joint return operations within the 'EU return policy' framework. The agency is tasked with determining practices such as organising joint flights and obtaining travel documents for deportees

in the process of returning illegal migrants found in Member States to their countries of origin (Frontex, 2004). FRONTEX's joint return operations can also be seen as practices of securitisation as they are to a considerable extent "extraordinary" in nature. Indeed, nowhere else has there been such a high level of co-operation between such a large group of states in coordinating operations aimed at deporting irregular migrants. At this point, in order to make sense of the contribution of the main tasks assigned to FRONTEX to the securitisation of migration in the EU, it is necessary to examine Bigo's approach to the securitisation of migration. According to Bigo (2002, p.65-67), the securitisation of migration arises from the relationship between the mobilisation of certain groups of people by the successful rhetoric of political leaders and the private sphere of security experts. It also involves a series of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, categorisation and proactive preparation. In this sense, the above-mentioned tasks overlap with Bigo's securitisation approach.

Moreover, although FRONTEX has six main tasks, the main task, which is seen as the heart of the Agency's activities and on which a large part of the Agency's total budget is spent, is joint operations. EUR 370 million of the 2021 budget of EUR 543 million is allocated for operations; in other words, 68% of the total budget is used for operational activities (Frontex, 2021b). This is because joint operations constitute the core of FRONTEX's tasks and are the most criticised area of activity. In this context, it is necessary to examine some of FRONTEX's joint operations in the context of the securitisation of migration and briefly look at the criticisms against these operations. Joint operations are carried out at land, air and sea borders and are large-scale operations whose communication and coordination are fully provided by FRONTEX. They are hosted by one member state, staffed, and technically supported by the other member states (COWI, 2009, p.73).

FRONTEX operations start with an intelligence-based risk analysis in response to a request from a member state (Carrera, 2007, p.10). As a matter of fact, all operations coordinated by FRONTEX are preceded by an intelligence-based risk analysis to determine the extent of the threat. The intelligence in question is obtained from the observation of movements at external borders, migration trends, the migration potential identified by the consulates and embassies of the member states in the countries of origin and transit, and the methods used by migrant smuggling networks. A detailed

operational plan is then prepared according to the risk analysis. The operational plan includes the number and type of technical equipment (ships, aircraft, patrol vehicles, etc.) as well as the number and specialisation of border guards to be deployed. After all the equipment envisaged in the operational plan is provided, the joint operation coordinated by FRONTEX is launched.

The operations carried out by FRONTEX at the land borders of EU Member States are characterised as "Land Operations". The aim of land operations is to prevent migrants trying to cross the EU external borders illegally by improving border controls, keep irregular migration under control at border crossing points, increase operational cooperation with neighbouring countries, and prevent smuggling activities (Frontex, 2021c). Joint Air Operations are conducted at the airports of EU Member States and include enhanced border controls. The content of air operations generally includes document and visa violations of third-country nationals, high-risk flights and proactive measures accordingly, updating profiles of potential illegal migrants, detecting and detaining human smugglers, etc. (Frontex, 2021c). Joint maritime operations are organised to detect and prevent illegal migrants wishing to reach EU countries by sea and to combat human traffickers. The most comprehensive and long-term joint operations are carried out at sea. Especially after the Arab Spring, the seas have been the most important route of mass migration movements towards EU member states. During these operations, push-back activities and migrant deaths from time to time cause the maritime operations coordinated by FRONTEX to be frequently criticised by NGOs and Human Rights Organisations. However, FRONTEX does not assume responsibility for these deaths (AP Frontex, 2021).

FRONTEX has carried out many joint maritime operations since it started its operational activities in 2005. Among these operations, HERA I and HERA II, launched in 2006 upon the request of Spain, and HERMES, launched in 2011 at Italy's request, stand out. Operation Poseidon, which currently covers Greece's maritime borders with Turkey (Altınop, Özoflu and Özbey, 2023) and the Greek Islands, supports Greece in the fight against cross-border crimes as well as border surveillance, life-saving at sea, registration and identification capacities with 600 personnel supported by 23 countries. In addition to these tasks, Operation Poseidon has become a multi-purpose operation that detects a wide range of cross-border crimes, such as smuggling illegal substances and weapons and detecting forged documents

(Frontex, 2021d). Operation Themis, which replaced the Triton operation launched in Italy in 2014, was launched in February 2018 and is still ongoing. The region between Spain and Morocco, known as the Western Mediterranean route, has long been used by migrants. FRONTEX contributes to the Spanish authorities in many areas such as border control and surveillance, and control of ports through Operation Minerva (Frontex, 2021d).

DISCUSSION EUROPEAN UNION VALUES AND FRONTEX

The EU defines itself as a 'community of values' and attaches significant importance to sharing fundamental values in its founding treaties (Pace 2007, p.668). Indeed, in 2003, the EU Presidency officially characterised Europe as a 'Community of Values' (Wagnsson 2010, p.1098). The development of values and principles has been taken further with the Lisbon Treaty. However, although there are debates about the reality of the EU as a community of values and principles, it would not be wrong to say that it is discursively a community of values. This discourse becomes extremely important for the development of a common identity, a sense of political community in the absence of a common ethnic identity. This is because the core values on which the EU is allegedly based are important for European identity and European legitimacy, failure to implement them in the EU policies can have strong negative effects in the eyes of EU citizens and in the perception of third country citizens, threatening the legitimacy of the European project (Canivez 2010, p. 864).

According to the vast majority of EU citizens, human rights, peace and democracy are the values that the EU mostly represents (Balfour 2008, p.165). Moreover, these values, which are recognised as fundamental, are explained in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, which states that the EU is founded on "*freedom, human rights, democracy and equality*". In Articles 3.5 and 21.1, the EU undertakes to strictly adhere to the values of solidarity and equality, the protection of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and international law in its relations with the outside world. Article 6.1 states that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is legally binding. The Charter adopts a number of fundamental rights, many of which are relevant to external border control. The most important are the articles on human dignity (Article 1), the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment or punishment (Article 3), the right to liberty and security (Article

6), the protection of personal data (Article 18), protection in the event of expulsion or extradition (Article 19), the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial (Article 47). As regards the Copenhagen Criteria, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and respect for minorities are also protected.

The 'Schengen Borders Code' is also very important for analysing the values applied in the control of external borders. These rules have been reinforced by a Council Decision of April 2010 on FRONTEX's activities at sea, which explicitly states that FRONTEX missions must respect fundamental rights, the principle of non-refoulement, and the specific needs of persons requiring international protection. In this context, FRONTEX operations are in theory carried out in compliance with relevant EU law, including the "Charter of Fundamental Rights", relevant international law on the basis of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and respect for fundamental human rights, in particular access to international protection and the principle of non-refoulement (Frontex, 2014). Furthermore, the Agency is obliged to organise a training programme for all border guards of the Member States participating in the "European Border Guard Teams", as well as for FRONTEX staff, prior to operations, covering the rules of relevant EU and international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection and access to guidelines for identifying persons in need of protection and referring them to appropriate authorities and facilities (Frontex, 2014).

However, an examination of FRONTEX since its inception reveals that it is only part of a larger shift towards greater surveillance, including the increasing use of 'smart' control, technology and especially biometric data on 'security' grounds (Bigo 2011, Baldaccini 2008, Walters 2011). Indeed, there is a notable contradiction between these obligations of FRONTEX and what is actually done on the ground. In this sense, FRONTEX's operational activities have been seriously criticised by NGOs, human rights activists, migrant associations, national and international media for causing human rights violations. Although FRONTEX's mandate is to conduct search and rescue operations at sea, criticisms have come to the forefront regarding its focus on stopping or reducing irregular migration to the EU in order to contribute to the EU's internal security (Leonard, 2010, p.232-242).

Indeed, in its risk analysis published in 2017, FRONTEX declared its objectives as "*to deploy border and coast guard forces quickly and efficiently,*

to support return operations and contribute to building the capacity to collect and process personal data, to support the EU's migration management process, to promote closer cooperation with key non-EU countries in migration-related areas, and to protect free movement within the Schengen area through these efforts". Therefore, ensuring border security dominates the Agency's activities. However, in its risk analysis, the Agency emphasises that it "continuously monitors the latest products, services, technologies and developments in the field, encouraging the use of such tools in the protection of border security and developing a proactive action capacity to prevent illegal migration and cross-border crime" (Frontex, 2017). The occurrence and recurrence of tragedies in operations coordinated by FRONTEX, as well as the migrant disasters caused by the Greek Coast Guard pushing back migrant boats in the Aegean Sea, have led to questions about the legality of FRONTEX's operations. Foremost among these allegations is FRONTEX's Poseidon Naval Operation in the Aegean Sea.

Reports by Amnesty International and the migrant organisation ProAsyl have revealed that pushbacks by the Greek Coast Guard in the Aegean Sea have become commonplace since 2012. These reports claim that boats carrying migrants are pushed back from Greek territorial waters towards Turkey, thereby violating the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of mass deportations guaranteed by international law (ProAsyl, 2013; Amnesty International, 2013). Another criticism of FRONTEX is related to removal operations. The use of force against migrants who resist during removal operations has the potential to gravely violate fundamental human rights (Migreurop, 2013, p.32). In joint operations, FRONTEX provides operational and technical support to host countries. Therefore, it does not bear responsibility for alleged push-backs and migrant deaths. However, although such operations are not organised by FRONTEX itself, many operations such as the Poseidon maritime operation are carried out under the operational command of FRONTEX. Therefore, FRONTEX should also be held responsible for incidents and violations of rights occurring in the operational area.

On the other hand, the fact that FRONTEX does not accept responsibility for such alleged human rights violations is reflected in the European Parliament's (EP) reports. The FRONTEX Investigation Group established in the EP to investigate allegations that FRONTEX violates fundamental human rights conducted a 4-month investigation and submitted its report

to the Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee (EP Frontex, 2021). The report stated that "*FRONTEX does not assume its responsibility to protect fundamental rights at the EU's external borders, prevent these violations or mitigate risks for the future*" and that "*the Agency has also overlooked evidence that migrants are illegally turned away at the Union's borders*". It is also stated in the report that the Agency "*found evidence to support allegations of violations of fundamental rights in the Member States with which it conducts joint operations, but concluded that it did not carefully and effectively address and monitor these violations*". Finally, one of the main characteristics of the Agency is the lack of transparency of its activities. Due to its intelligence-based structure, FRONTEX's official website does not include information on where and how operations are conducted. The lack of openness and transparency in its activities brings along many criticisms and allegations.

The policies and practices implemented by FRONTEX cause all migrants to be seen as potential criminals. This situation is transformed into a securitisation of migration policy, an exclusionary discourse, xenophobia, and crisis (Gonzales-Fuster, Gutwirth, and De Hert, 2009). It also leads to the questioning and exclusion of migrants with legal status within the EU. This situation also causes a social cohesion problem in the EU, which defines itself as value-based. Although FRONTEX helps to reduce the migration pressure in the short term, it erodes the values of the EU with its practices and operations and opens them to the discussion. In conclusion, although FRONTEX claims to be committed to fundamental human rights, its practices and operations jeopardise the fundamental values with which the EU defines itself.

CONCLUSION

While a new understanding of security was being built in post-Cold War Europe, migration was positioned as a threat within this understanding due to a series of events. Migration has thus become an important agenda item both at the level of member states and at the EU level. In the EU, supranational regulations on migration have been crafted in the process and it has been addressed as a security issue. However, the expansion of the scope of the policies included in the integration and the transformation in the understanding of security have also reshaped the EU's understanding of security. The 11 September and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe, the dynamics of the integration

process itself, the intensive irregular migration caused by the "Arab Spring" in North Africa and the related anti-migration actors have played an important role in shaping this process. In order to manage the process, the EU has developed some mechanisms, notably FRONTEX, and securitised migration. In this context, FRONTEX has emerged as a functional actor to deal with the threat defined by the EU within the framework of the securitisation of migration policy with its activities, operations and practices to date. However, it would not be wrong to say that FRONTEX practices are contrary to the set of values and principles with which the EU defines itself and cause human rights violations. As a matter of fact, the practices implemented by FRONTEX blur the definitions of illegal migration, asylum seekers and migrants and prevent asylum seekers from exercising their legal rights.

However, although it is acknowledged that FRONTEX was not established as a direct securitisation tool and that the climate of insecurity caused by the 11 September terrorist attacks was effective in the establishment of the Agency, its practices and tasks have been transformed in the process. As a matter of fact, after FRONTEX became operational, it is clearly seen that the activities in which it performs its main tasks in its Charter, and especially the joint operations it coordinates among these activities, have given functionality to the securitisation of migration in the EU. The threat to survival discourse is constructed through FRONTEX's risk analysis reports and the organisation of joint land, air and sea operations and joint extradition operations are suggested as urgent measures to be taken to combat the threat. In addition, criticisms from NGOs, human rights activists, migrant associations, national and international media that FRONTEX's operational activities lead to human rights violations are legitimised by border security, threat discourse and policy practices against these threats.

As a result, the EU has not developed a mechanism to monitor whether the activities of FRONTEX, which plays an important role in combating illegal migration, are carried out in accordance with the relevant EU legislation and international law norms. FRONTEX, which has an autonomous structure, does not share sufficient information with the relevant EU authorities and the public on its operational activities and their results. This situation further increases the uncertainties about the functioning of FRONTEX. On the other hand, the EU should demand that countries hosting joint operations coordinated by FRONTEX establish an independent mechanism

to effectively investigate allegations of violations of fundamental human rights, such as push-backs, unlawful detention of migrants and harbouring them in camps with inhumane conditions. Such rights violations, which are frequently raised by many national and international media organisations and NGOs, erode the values that the EU has been defending for years.

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Discursive Divergences of the European Identity Construction between Hungary and Germany during the European Refugee Crisis of 2015

Melek Aylin Özoflu*

ABSTRACT

This research investigates discursive divergences of identity construction between Hungarian and German ruling parties with respect to the existence of the 'refugees' as the 'Others of the European identity'. While these two like-minded parties originally belonged to the same European party family in the European Parliament at that time, it is observed that their approaches and policy responses differed considerably, which paved the way for the differentiation of the discursive instrumentalization of the European identity construction. By adopting a critical constructivist lens to understand *how*, rather than *why*, this research will present divergences of their discourses in constructing in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination during the European refugee crisis of 2015. In doing that, it seeks to analyse the ways in which the cleavage within the in-group of European identity was uncovered by certain discursive practices. This is mainly conducted through a critical discourse analysis of the texts uttered by Prime Minister Victor Orban and then Chancellor Angela Merkel on the refugee crisis during key time periods starting from the beginning of 2015 to December 2016 as the peakiest timeframe of the crisis.

Keywords: refugee crisis, European identity, identity construction, Hungary, Germany

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INTRODUCTION

The eruption of the Civil War in Syria that resulted in the massive oppression of the Syrian government and violent attacks of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) triggered the worst refugee crisis in the world since the Second World War. The number of Syrian displaced people has reached to 6.6 million since the beginning of the War (UNHCR, 2022). Although Syrian civilians mostly fled to the neighbouring countries including Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq at the beginning of the war, the escalation and prolongation of the conflict generated problems of accommodation, which needs to be supplemented with access to social facilities including employment, healthcare, and education, employment in these host countries (Kirişci, 2014). Accordingly, as the neighbouring countries were being overwhelmed by the financial and social burden of the situation, the number of Syrian civilians trying to reach Europe has increased considerably as of the summer of 2015 (Pew Research Center, 2016). In the midst of the crisis, the EU received more than one million asylum applications (Pew Research Center, 2016). The massive flow of people to the EU generated a refugee crisis within the Union because of the divergences of the member states in responding to the humanitarian crisis. Such divergences stemmed from their different geographical proximities to the war, security perceptions of the member states, prioritization of their own national interests and disordered information such as disinformation and misinformation (Altıntop, 2023).

Accordingly, member states were mainly split into three camps; pro-refugees, anti-refugees and member states that are vulnerable to the flow of people such as Greece and Italy (Greenhill, 2016). Such a split culminated in the reciprocal accusations of the member states, and the enforcement problem of the formulated solutions at the European level. In this sense, the EU internalized the refugee crisis which turned into a Schengen crisis simultaneously. Moreover, the humanitarian aspect of the crisis brought into the questions of EU's norm and value-based identity which has been previously promoted by Brussels's elites.

Börzel and Risse argue that the crisis brought about the question of 'who belongs to us' (Börzel & Risse, 2018). The reason for this is that the political and media discourses communicating about the crisis generated articulations of different interpretations of meanings attained to the nature and formation of the in-group of European identity. Especially identity con-

struction in political discourse is operationalized and instrumentalized in order to justify the government positions and policy responses to the crisis. In this regard, the political discourses articulated within the national political settings of the member states were presumably shaped according to their adopted stance during the crisis. Accordingly, since the chosen case study countries i.e., Hungary and Germany occupied totally opposite positions on the refugee crisis within the EU, they present a suitable comparative case study ground in terms of the construction of the identity with respect to 'the other'. Although historical, political, economic, and social differences between these two countries can explain the divergent attitudes in responding to the flow of people as studied in the literature previously (Karacan, 2019) the question of how they are discursively divergent in forming an identity remains yet to be analysed.

In parallel to this argument, the current study investigates how discursive constructions of the European identity with respect to the concept of 'influx' of 'the Other' are divergently instrumentalized in forming in-group/out-group relations within the political discourse of leaders of ruling parties in Hungary and Germany. To this end, it will focus on the discourses uttered by Viktor Orban and Angela Merkel communicating about the crises from the nexus of identity politics during key time periods starting from the beginning of 2015 to December 2016 as the peakiest timeframe of the crisis. Despite their shared foundational values as being continental Christian democrats and belonging to the alliance of centre right-wing, the two ruling parties constituted exact opposite approaches regarding the influx of Syrian refugees. Accordingly, the discursive construction of the crisis and constructed European identity is instrumentalized and shaped differently by the two leaders. This study will reveal how the discursive construction of the European identity was instrumentalized differently by the two ruling parties. In this way, it will also answer whether different government stances with respect to the crisis led to differences in the operationalization of the identity construction. In doing so, it will contribute to the existent empirical knowledge on European identity construction in Hungary and Germany. Moreover, it will shed light on the basic divergences of identity construction of like-minded governments, which is an overlooked issue by the literature.

To this end, this research will first discuss the context of the refugee crisis with a specific reference to the divergent strategies of Hungary and

Germany regarding the influx of people. Second, it will outline the critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the method of the study, followed by an analysis of the divergent constructions of the European identity contributing to the formation of in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination towards the existence of 'the other'. It will conclude with a discussion of the ramifications of discourses for the different instrumentalization of identity construction.

REFUGEE-CRISIS AND POLICY RESPONSES OF HUNGARY AND GERMANY

In order to present a well-directed analysis of the divergent responses of Hungary and Germany to the refugee crisis, it is necessary to briefly discuss their respective historical stances towards migration. Their divergent stances originated from their considerably divergent national experiences with migration. Hungary as an Eastern European country has a history often fuelled by the inter-group discrimination between 'us' and 'them' along with the recurring conflicts and existence of others as a threat to its autonomy and sovereignty (Lampland, 1995, Yiğit & Uyar, 2021). Following the political revolution in 1989, dynamics of identity construction started to be conveyed in a way to 'fetishize the national state' based on cultural nationalism, which promotes and prioritizes the in-group of Hungarian national identity with respect to the existence of the other (Örkény, 2005). Although the infamous historical gap and divide between East/West started to be narrowed down following the big boom enlargement of the European Union and transition of the central and eastern European countries (CEECs), the ethnocentric definition of Hungarian national identity remained to imply the presence of the common descent, same ethnic origin, and shared religion (Ibid). Thus, Hungary traditionally adopted a lukewarm stance towards waves of migration from its 'cultural aliens'.

Germany, on the other hand, had an extensive experience with migration (Green, 2013). Following the Second World War, it welcomed the migration flow of economic migrants from countries including Italy, Greece and Turkey in order to compensate for its labour force shortage (Yiğit Uyar, 2022). In this respect, migrants contributed highly to the recovery of Germany as well as Western Europe. Although the concept of economic migrants

was regarded as temporary by being defined mainly as 'guest workers' in the beginning, the non-national population of Germany continued to increase over time (Destatics, 2021). Moreover, the fact that German national identity was constructed in close alignment with the European identity against its Nazi-past otherness to Europe (Kattago, 2001) contributed to its development of having an inclusive identity towards its others. Accordingly, over time it became a much more diverse and multicultural society.

During the refugee crisis, their traditional stances towards migration played presumably a concrete role in addition to other factors in proposing policy responses to the flow of people. Although discussing the root causes of such divergent positions is beyond the scope of this research, defining their policy positions in responding to the crisis is helpful in grasping and investigating whether European identity construction is manifested by the political discourses of the national leaders in order to justify their respective government positions and policy responses to the crisis.

Hungary made its anti-refugee stance clear immediately after the beginning of the flow of people to European soil. The reference point of justification for such a point is defined by President Orbans' statement, "…the security of Hungary also means the security of Europe." (Miniszterelnok, 2015). In the summer of 2015, more than 390,000 asylum seekers crossed the Serbian-Hungarian border. The blockade of thousands of asylum seekers that gathered at the Keleti railway station in Budapest symbolized the Hungarian firm stance towards the refugees. In order to prevent the influx of people, Hungary built barbed wire fences along its border with Serbia (BBC News, 2015). Such a firm attitude demonstrated the divergent responses between Hungary and Germany in responding to the crisis, which locates these two countries on two opposite corners.

The refugee tension was released by Merkel's famous statement, "We can do it/ *Wir schaffen* das" (Merkel, 2015) when Germany unilaterally dropped Dublin regulations and declared its 'open door policy' in August 2015 to accept the admission of about 800 000 Syrian refugees (Ibid). Germany played a key role in formulating a long-lasting solution to the crisis by launching initiatives and arrangements including EU-level summits (European Council, 2015), EU-Turkey joint action plan (European Commission, 2015) and resettlement scheme within the EU as well as the redesign of the

Common European Asylum System (CEAS) under the European Agenda on Migration (European Parliament, 2017). It is of critical importance to highlight the ad-hoc basis of these attempts under the pressure of the ongoing massive influx and waves of terrorist attacks all around Europe. Yet, Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs), especially Hungary, objected to the proposed resettlement schemes, which generated further cleavage over the already divided position of the EU Member States (EUObserver, 2015). The predominance of national interests gave the pave for the further polarization of the situation by generating a solidarity crisis simultaneously. The divergent and unilateral positions of the member states were interpreted as the death/collapse of the Schengen by the literature (Bal, 2016; Fijnaut, 2015).

One of the critical reasons generating anti-migration sentiments and politicized responses to the crisis was also the repetitive terrorist attacks all over Europe that began with the Paris attacks of November 2015 followed respectively by the Brussels bombings in March 2016, the Nice attack with a truck in the Bastille day in July 2016, Normandy church attack in July 2016, and Berlin Christmas market attack in December 2016 (Express. co.uk, 2017). The context of perceived Europe-wide insecurity amid the refugee crisis strengthened the hands of xenophobic and anti-refugee rhetoric highly emphasizing the EU's inability to control its borders to invoke fears of immigration.

RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS

Discursive practice can be summarized as 'an instrument through which people actively produce social and psychological realities' (Smith, 2015). Therefore, it encompasses broader aspects, practices and structures of the social and cultural world that surround and inform their production (Fairclough, 2013). In order to reveal such structures of the discursive phenomenon, CDA offers discourse analytical research that basically focuses on the reproduced, enacted and legitimated hidden power relations, inequality and social-power abuse within the social and political context of the discursive practice (Van Dijk, 1993). CDA aims to reveal the meaning-making beyond sentence level (Wodak, 2015) by regarding the discourse as the main form of social practice in describing and constructing the social world, social structures, social relations and social identities. With this aspect, it enables discourse to be

addressed both as a producer and product of the social reality. Moreover, it offers insights both as a methodology and theoretical framework.

Therefore, an analysis adopting the lenses of the CDA would be enlightening in grasping the way of European identity construction through the political discourse communicating about the crisis. Through utilizing the critical stance of the CDA, the research aims to reveal the way in which representations of the self and other are co-constructed discursively as a part of the discursive phenomenon of identity.

To this end, in particular, Ruth Wodak's discourse historical approach (DHA) is preferred as a research methodology for discourse analysis. The fundamental methodological principle of DHA, the triangulation approach covers four levels of analysis including text level, intertext level, extralinguistic level, and socio-political and historical context within which discursive practices are embedded (Wodak, 2013). Thus, it necessitates adopting multi-theoretical, self-reflective and multimethodological accounts in the in-depth analysis of discursive construction. Moreover, the social critique that the DHA follows interconnects the three related aspects 'text or discourse immanent critique' trying to reveal inconsistencies, contradictions, paradoxes within the text or discourse structures; 'socio-diagnostic critique', which clarifies the persuasive character of discursive practices thereby presenting the interdisciplinary nature of the DHA; and 'prognostic critique' aiming to facilitate the transformation and improvement of communication (Ibid). With these adequate insights, DHA provides a suitable ground to understand and analyze the complexities of identity construction. Therefore, the approach will help this research enlighten the discursive construction of the in-group of the 'imagined community' of Europeans in contrast to its constructed others.

The official archive websites of both governments were utilized to obtain the necessary data (http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/cgi/archive.php and https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news). In total, the number of the text corpus analyzed is 169. The excerpts obtained from Prime Minister Victor Orban and then Chancellor Angela Merkel to be illustrated in the analysis part represents 'typical discourse fragments employed by a wide range of discursive strategies' within the main body of texts (Jäger & Maier, 2009).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The findings of the qualitative analysis found that while both Hungarian and German governments constructively represent themselves as 'the fighter of Europe' and defending European values and moral obligations, their definitional standpoint has differed considerably in terms of the understanding of the in-group European community. In this respect, there are critical national variances. The two prevalent themes of the main divergence are discerned as different interpretations of the self-definition of the in-group identification and designated in-group behaviour derived from (the group membership) EU membership of the member states. The diverging standpoints for the construction of both themes served as a ground for justification and legitimization to both leaders within their respective national political settings since their discursive constructions of the European identity were often employed and addressed in relation to their policy responses and political behaviour with respect to the specific necessities of the refugee crisis.

Merkel's discursive construction of the European identity represents a typical pro-European way that extensively relies on the rules, norms and values-based positive representation of the European self which is based on the common history and vision for the future (Özoflu, 2022).

> Then Chancellor Angela Merkel: "*[The reluctance of the other member states]* **is not the EU we want… The situation is not worthy of Europe,** *Europe as a whole must also move on this issue.*" (Merkel, 2015)

> Then Chancellor Angela Merkel: "*[the situation] put our European values to the test as seldom before. It was no more and no less than a humanitarian imperative…I want Europe to pass this social, economic, cultural and moral test.*" (Merkel, 2015)

> Then Chancellor Angela Merkel: "*They [refugees] have not brought us less freedom, but more freedom. They have not brought us less diversity, but more diversity…Europe was built on principles and values such as freedom of movement and it is meant to be united in diversity, enriched by different cultures, traditions and languages…"precious assets" of European values, tolerance – the combination of freedom and responsibility – towards the Eastern countries and its citizens has trumped skepticism.*" (Merkel, 2015) (Merkel, 2015)

> Then Chancellor Angela Merkel: "*In the refugee crisis we must not give in to the temptation to fall back on national government action. On the contrary, what we need now is more Europe.*" (Merkel, 2015)

In the excerpts above, Merkel endeavours to compel EU-wide political responsibility, solidarity and association while asserting the self-definition of the Europeans as an in-group. The-value based identification of the in-group intersects with the designation of the in-group behaviour in Merkel's statements. In addition, the constructed pro-refugee stance is highly rationalized through the self-definition of the in-group identification focused on the value-based notion of group membership to the European identity. Accordingly, self-identification in Merkel's statements communicating about the refugee crisis relies on claiming solidarity and responsibility in mediating both intra- and intergroup relations. According to her construction of the European identity communicating about the crisis, the designated in-group behaviour of defending European moral values is defined as taking responsibility for refugees and burden sharing among member states which is highly aligned with the EU-level proposed solutions. In this way, the underlying social cognition is formed upon the expectation that the member states would follow the ingroup behaviour.

In fact, the excerpts presented here illustrate how she prototypically constructs European identity as inclusive of 'its others' which manifests itself in fostering intergroup cohesion between the host community of Europeans as in-group of 'us' and the Syrian refugees as out-groups of 'deserving others'. The portrayal of the Syrians as 'needy and deserving others' highlights the 'moral obligation' thesis in formulating the crisis response of Merkel's government as well as its EU partner states. In this way, she justifies and legitimizes her stance of 'open door policy' implicitly.

In the third excerpt, Merkel portrays how she reacts and faces the so-called arising discourse of fear of becoming 'less free' and the growing discursive terrain on security because of the presence of Europe's others (Diez, 2001). In this respect, Europe as a cultural space is realised through the cultural diversity it sustains by her vision. Such envision emerges as an antithesis of the portrayals of refugees as the diluter of / threat to European cultural homogeneity. In this regard, Merkel's construction of the in-group is rather different from the essentialist interpretations of the European cultural space and identity.

Therefore, such a non-essentialist stance of the in-group interpretation allows her to seek the supranational level of the European polity as well. When the statements are interpreted intertextually especially together

with the analysis of the last excerpt, her statements, which are denounced through the narrative of 'more Europe', often appear as an answer to the unilateral responses of other member states. In this respect, discursive engagement plays mostly as a critical tool in the prioritization of the supranational approaches against the nation-centric inclinations of other member states. In addition, the German leader's stress on the value of solidarity also draws attention to the shared European polity.

On the other hand, Orban's discourse illustrates a Eurosceptic stance of problematization of the European identity building an antagonistic relationship between the European elites versus European people as a referral of the gap between 'us' and 'them' by employing narratives of intergroup differentiation. Such a stance is used to legitimize the nationalist approaches which have been planned to be adopted by the Hungarian government. The fundamental differences between the two leanings of European identity construction resulted in the divergent determinants of in-group favouritism. In addition, they also necessarily culminated in the different construction of the in-group with respect to the existence of the 'refugees' as the 'Others' of the European identity. That, in return, generated both intra- and inter-group differentiation in constructing the formation of in-group behaviour and in-group European identity:

> PM Viktor Orban: *"The coexistence of different cultures always poses a great challenge, and that it is always risky – especially in the case of Christianity and Islam. Hungary has not taken this risk and will not do so in the future either. Hungary respects the different path that France and Germany have taken, but it is reasonable to expect others to respect the Hungarian decision. "We do not want a multicultural society."* (Orbán, 2015)

> PM Viktor Orban: *"We must take the issue of migration and immigration seriously, because it will not be possible to reverse these processes retroactively: there will be no route back from a multicultural Europe towards a Christian Europe or the world of national cultures."* (Orbán, 2015)

> PM Viktor Orban: *"What we have at stake today is Europe, the European way of life, the survival or disappearance of European values and nations, or their transformation beyond recognition. Our answer is clear: we would like Europe to be preserved for the Europeans, he said. The Hungarians have decided; they do not want illegal migrants."* (Orbán, 2015)

> PM Viktor Orban: *"It is Hungary's historic and moral obligation to protect Europe, and when Hungary is protecting its borders, it is also protecting Europe."* (Orbán, 2015)

The excerpts above show the exclusive way of European identity construction by Orban. In contrast to the non-essentialist accounts of Merkel in constructing the European in-group, the rigid essentialist basis employed by Hungarian Prime Minister Orban is prominent in his statements often accompanied by topos of threat in his portrayal of the Syrian refugees as the 'others' of the European identity. The representation of the refugees as a threat against the 'European way of life' implicitly highlights the superiority of the European self. Based on the negative othering derived from such superiority of Europeans, the main tenets of incompatibility between European societies and incoming refugees are outlined. His statements communicating about the crisis often utilize the juxtaposition of the different religions namely Christianity and Islam. In this way, Orban designates refugees as cultural, religious and political others of the in-group of European communities. In this respect, the role of religion and religious identity within the construction of the nationalist stance is highly prominent. As put forward by Gerim's valuable findings, religion and nationalism are bonded to each other and in fact, religion reinforces nationalism in Orban's discourses constructing the Hungarian nation with respect to its others (Gerim, 2022). In the same way, his construction of the European identity at the inter-group level also relies on religious elements. Accordingly, religious elements are highly embedded and associated with the European values, way of life and culture within his portrayal of European communities. In addition to the religious elements utilized as a tool of justification for the anti-refugee stance, he constructs himself and his political party as the defender of the national and European front defending the in-group against threats from its others. In this respect, the designated in-group behaviour is defined as defending Europe and European values based on nationalist sentiments by not accepting refugees and which is considerably different from Merkel's construction of the in-group behaviour. Through such a stance, the intergovernmentalist tone which prioritizes the nation-centric approach is legitimized and justified by presenting it also as a moral obligation.

In this respect, the discursive divergence of the portrayed moral obligations by Merkel and Orban with respect to the European in-group is self-evident. As already discussed in the previous sub-chapter, the political stance of Merkel and Orban with respect to the outbreak of the refugee crisis has been highly divergent. The performed analysis found that their dis-

courses have been shaped in accordance with their respective agenda of policy-making and political behaviours. That manifests itself in their construction of divergent understanding of the in-group favouritism of the European community. While Merkel's in-group favouritism is based on the inclusiveness of common EU values and norms-based responsibility and rules-based interpretation, Orban's discourse of in-group favouritism manifests itself as an act of exclusiveness of the in-group leading to inter-group discrimination and othering. That culminated in a grounded difference in the construction of deserving versus undeserving others of the in-group of European identity.

CONCLUSION

This study investigated how the European identity as an in-group was constructed differently by the then two like-minded governments of Hungary and Germany during the refugee crisis. To this end, it qualitatively analysed Merkel and Orban's statements communicating about the refugee crisis. It is found that both Merkel and Orban constructively represent themselves as 'the fighter of Europe' and defending European values and moral obligations. Yet, their definitional standpoint has differed considerably in terms of the understanding of the in-group of the European community with respect to the existence of the 'refugees' as the 'Others of the European identity. Thus, the moral obligation as a designated in-group behaviour towards the crisis was constructed highly differently as well. In sum, the two themes observed through the qualitative analysis as diverging standpoints have been particularly prevalent, the different interpretations of the self-definition of the in-group identification and in-group behaviour derived from EU membership of the member states.

Another important finding reveals that the diverging standpoints for the construction of both themes served as a ground for justification and legitimization to both leaders within their respective national political settings since their discursive constructions of the European identity were often employed and addressed in relation to their policy responses and political behaviour with respect to the specific necessities of the refugee crisis. In this respect, the discursive construction of the European identity was instrumentalized differently by the two ruling leaders. Therefore, the study illustrates the conclusion that regardless of their 'then' being alike-minded

governments, different government stances with respect to the refugee crisis led to differences in their operationalization and discursive engagement of the construction of the European in-group with respect to its others. Such a conclusion paves the way for the fact that conducting comparative cases examining how definitional understanding and standpoints of the European identity of the alike-minded governments are diverging with respect to its others needs further attention, which signals future research agenda within the literature.

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9

Ethnic Conflict and Internal Displacement: Georgia

Indira Phutkaradze*

ABSTRACT

Conflicts in the world today occur in various forms. Conflicts between the domainant identity and ethnic groups within the framework of the homogenization policies of the state manifest themselves as political violence. Forced internal migration may occur as a result of such conflicts. Generally, migrations occur for many different reasons. Among these reasons, we encounter problems such as political conditions, military conflicts, and ethnic conflicts. This leads to different results.

After the end of the Cold War, wars between states have decreased since 1991, but armed Internal conflicts have increased. Georgia regained its independence, which was lost in 1921, with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The independence allowed Georgia to enter the international arena. Following the independence, Georgian governments tried to resolve the existing ethnic conflicts in the country (Abkhazia and Samachablo "South Ossetia") and tried to follow an anti-Russian, pro-Western policy. However, this process has not been easy for Georgia. This study will evaluate the causes and consequences of internal displacement due to ethnic conflicts in Georgia in the 1990s.

Various theories have been developed regarding the phenomenon of migration, both in terms of its types and its causes and consequences. One of the most striking of the classical migration theories is the push-pull

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theory published in 1966 by Everett S. Lee in the article named **"A Theory of Migration"** Within the scope of the push-pull theory, the evaluation of forced labor migration experienced within the country due to ethnic conflict in Georgia will provide the integrity of the subject. A suitable analysis can be made for the people who had to immigrate within Georgia country after the 1991-92 Samachablo ("South Ossetia"), 1992-93 Abkhazia, and 2008 Samachablo conflicts that carried out the push-pull theory in Georgia. It is understood that the difficult and anxious situation of people living in the conflict zone as a push factor on the one hand, and the presence of a safe environment as a pull factor in other regions of Georgia on the other hand are important factors in the choice of migration. The chaos and civil war experienced in the country due to ethnic conflicts in Georgia has created a circle of fear for civilians, and this has become a driving factor for migration movements. Living in the region captured by the post-war separatist forces has become a major threat for Georgians. Thus, the civilians who were concerned about their life safety due to the conflicts began to seek safer areas within the country.

Keywords: Georgia, Ethnic Conflict, Russia, Internal Displacement

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The history of humanity is, in a way, the history of migrations. With the emergence of humanity in the stage of history, the phenomenon of migration has also begun to exist. Because there has been and will continue to exist social mobility that has been going on for centuries due to reasons such as wars, conflicts, chaos, exiles, famines, and financial difficulties.

The Dictionary of Migration Terms prepared by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines migration as "Moving places across an international border or within a state. It is the population movement in which people are displaced regardless of their duration, structure, and reason. This includes refugees, internally displaced persons, displaced persons, and economic migrants" (https://www.iom.int/, 25.12.2022). Migration; It can be expressed as the geographical displacement of people due to social, economic, political, or natural reasons. This displacement can be international as well as within the borders of the same state. Regardless of the type of migration (voluntary/compulsory, temporary/permanent, inter-

nal/external, etc.), all kinds of population movements are included in the definition of migration (Adıgüzel, 2016, p. 3).

Why do people want to migrate? To give the most correct answer to this question, it would be a healthier approach to know what is the reason that forced to migrate. Migration based on political reasons is sometimes willing, sometimes forced, sometimes internal migration, and sometimes external migration (Aytaç and Sarı, 2020, p.1020) No matter how it occurs, migration is always the struggle of people to get better. Migration movements can be divided into different classifications with different approaches in terms of their causes and classifications. In these classifications, one of the basic criteria is whether immigration is optional or compulsory. Migrations are divided into two depending on one's initiative and forced migrations (Nakanishi H., Sirkeci İ., Cabbarlı H., 2008, p.9). Immigration caused by civil war or extreme chaos and wars between countries due to ethnic and political reasons can also be evaluated in the category of forced migration (Savaşan, 2007, p.9). Factors such as political instability, and ethnic and religious conflicts force people to leave their places (Wood, 1994, p.607). In general, forced migrations can be considered into two groups: nature-based and human-induced. On the other hand, human-induced forced migrations can be evaluated under two headings: forced migrations caused by violence/conflict (ethnic, political conflict, war) and forced migrations not caused by violence/conflict (ecological disasters, urban transformation). The reasons for forced migration due to violence/conflict can also be quite different from each other. For this reason, forced migrations due to violence/conflict can be grouped within themselves as forced migrations due to violence/conflict due to political reasons and forced migrations due to violence/conflict not experienced due to political reasons (blood feuds and the like). In short, it is possible to say that the type of forced migration is the forced migration of people or groups from their living spaces or being forced to migrate due to their ethnic, religious, political, and similar affiliations (Keser, 2011, p.11). The most typical example of forced migration is displacement resulting from violent conflict or persecution (Bartram, Poros, Monforte, 2017, p.152). Internally Displaced People - This concept is used for those who have to leave their place of residence due to violence or natural/human disasters. These people have not crossed the political borders of their country. How-

ever, they were exposed to immigration within the country for various reasons. Displacement, especially as a result of civil wars, is increasing worldwide. The definition of internally displaced persons made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1998 is as follows: "People or groups who have left their homes or habitats by force or in particular to avoid experiencing or experiencing the consequences of the effects of military conflict, widespread violence, human rights violations, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed internationally recognized state borders" (Bartram, Poros, Monforte, 2017,p.120-121). Migrations occur for many different reasons. This leads to different results. Although there are different types of migration in Georgia, one of the most important is forced internal migration, and it can be said that the main reason is ethnic conflicts. For example, ethnic conflict in Georgia is a conflict between ethnic Abkhaz and Ossetian groups (supported by Russia) and the central government of Georgia. Due to the conflict in question, people (the dominant class) had to flee or leave the places they lived in the country.

Migration from one region to another in search of better livelihoods is an important feature of human history. Internal migration movements have some determining factors among these factors, the political factor draws particular attention. When the political causes of migration are analyzed, the role of state policies can be seen. State intervention is carried out in line with certain political interests or situations of war (Yenigül, 2005, p.276). Political factors also have a significant impact on the desire to migrate back. For example, the war seriously prevents immigrants from returning to the places they came from, that is, from migrating back.

Various theories have been developed regarding the phenomenon of migration, both in terms of its types and its causes and consequences. One of the most striking classical migration theories is the push-pull theory published in 1966 by Everett S. Lee in the article "A Theory of Migration" (Lee, 1966, p. 47-57). Push and pull factors are two important arguments in explaining migration, especially in explaining its causes. Lee lists the factors that lead to migration as follows: 1. Factors related to the place where you live, 2. Factors related to the intended destination (target region), 3. Intervening obstacles and 4. Personal factors (Lee, 1966, p. 50). The push and pull theory was also developed on the repulsive and attractive causes of migration movements and analyzed the obstacles ex-

perienced during the migration process. According to Lee, every act of migration, no matter how short or long, easy or difficult, contains a starting point, a destination, and a set of obstacles throughout the displacement process (Lee, 1966, p.49). The issue emphasized here is the existence of the driving factors that will move people from the starting point and the factors that make the target attractive.

Push factors are political, economic, social, etc. factors that cause the individual to leave the area/region where he/she lives. may include problems, while pull factors are; It includes attractive opportunities in the country of destination. If we make the subject a little more specific, conditions such as security risks, war environment, terrorist activities, and ethnic wars in the country of origin (source) are push factors, while conditions such as safe environment and cultural/religious proximity in the destination country can be given as examples of pull factors (Yılmaz and Özer, 2022, p. 285).

Within the scope of the push-pull theory, the evaluation of forced labor migration experienced within the country due to ethnic conflict in Georgia will provide the integrity of the subject. A suitable analysis can be made for the people who had to immigrate within Georgia country after the 1991-92 Samachablo ("South Ossetia"), 1992-93 Abkhazia, and 2008 Samachablo conflicts that carried out the push-pull theory in Georgia. It is understood that the difficult and anxious situation of people living in the conflict zone as a push factor on the one hand, and the presence of a safe environment as a pull factor in other regions of Georgia on the other hand are important factors in the choice of migration. The chaos and civil war experienced in the country due to ethnic conflicts in Georgia has created a circle of fear for civilians, and this has become a driving factor for migration movements. Living in the region captured by the post-war separatist forces has become a major threat for Georgians. Thus, the civilians concerned about their safety due to the conflicts began to seek safer areas within the country.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA:

Georgia is a democratic republic located in the South Caucasus region. Its capital is Tbilisi. The area of the country is 69,700 km². Neighboring coun-

tries: Russian Federation in the north, Azerbaijan in the south-east, Armenia in the south, and the Republic of Turkey in the south-west (Phutkaradze, 2017, p. 43). Throughout history, Georgia has always been the scene of war between the three great empires, Russia, Ottoman, and Safavid (Iran) states (Surguladze, 1972, p.34). Georgia XVI.-XVII. Over the centuries, the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Iranian state became a field of competition and changed hands many times. The Georgian Kingdom, which was alone against the Ottoman and Safavid states, applied to Tsarist Russia for help. In 1783 (eastern Georgia) between King of Kartli-Kakheti II. Erekle and the Russian Tsarina II. Catherine, The Georgievsk Agreement was signed. With this agreement, on the condition that Georgia's political independence be recognized, the country came under the protection of the Russian Tsardom. However, in 1800, the territory of the country was violated by Russian Tsar Pavel I. Russia has made the country a province of Russia by ignoring the state structure of Georgia (Phutkaradze, 2017, p. 44-45).

Taking advantage of the negative situation in Russia during the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Georgia declared its independence on May 26, 1918. It was the first South Caucasian country to declare its independence. But this independence did not last long. Georgia, which the Red Army occupied in March 1921, was the last country in the South Caucasus to surrender to the Soviets. From 1921 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was the Soviet Republic within the Soviet Union. Having regained its independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia has been the subject of the policies of the great powers as well as grappling with internal turmoil, ethnic conflicts, coups, and economic crises in the post-Soviet period (Phutkaradze, 2017, p. 45).

Gamsakhurdia became the first president of Georgia, which declared its independence on May 26, 1991. Following the nationalist policy of Gamsakhurdia in the process leading to independence, the territorial integrity problem, one of Georgia's most important problems, was negatively affected (Tsankvetadze and Museridze, 2021, p. 2). It has increased the concerns of minorities in the country. Abkhazia joined the separatist movement, which started in 1989 Samachablo, in 1991. Shevardnadze came to power after Gamsakhurdia. During the period of Shevardnadze, the former foreign minister of the USSR, the ethnic conflict in the country became a "frozen conflict" without being resolved. Shevardnadze govern-

ment's most wrong move is to join the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) even though it is mandatory that Russia established the CIS to keep the countries that left the Soviet Union under its influence, and Georgia became a member of the community during the Shevardnadze period. CIS membership means Russian military presence in the country. With its participation in the CIS, the Tbilisi administration had to allow Russian military units to enter the region (Tellal, 2010, p. 208)

After the change of power in Georgia in November 2003, Saakashvili took office the most important goal of the pro-Western Saakashvili was to ensure territorial integrity. By gaining broad international support, Georgia has begun to take serious steps to eliminate its territorial integrity problems. Immediately after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, Georgia left the CIS. Subsequently, Russia recognized the independence of Georgia's two separatist regions on August 26, 2008. Georgia, which regained its independence after the collapse of the USSR, entered the process of building a new nation-state. In this process, there were problems with the Georgian state and many minority groups living in the country. Especially the problems with the Abkhazians in Abkhazia and the Ossetians in Samachablo turned into the most violent and bloody ethnic conflicts, in which many people lost their lives or were expelled from their places. The ethnic conflicts that Georgia experienced after independence and the threat to its territorial integrity stem from Russia's "Divide and Rule" policy. (Phutkaradze, 2017, p. 45-46). It was Russia that ignited ethnic conflicts - in Georgia, Russia pitted Georgians and Abkhazians, Georgians and Ossetians against each other. The case reached an armed conflict. Russia expelled Georgians from their native territories - those who were thrown from their ancestral home took refuge in different parts of Georgia. They became refugees. A forcibly displaced person is a person who was forced to change his permanent place of residence due to ethnic conflict and armed conflict in his previous place of residence, because violence was shown against him or his family members, or there was a real danger due to his ethnic (also racial and religious) affiliation.

In modern conditions, when the conflicted relationship between Georgians and Abkhazians/Ossetians is tense and unresolved when thousands of Georgians are pushed out of their land, separated and scattered in different parts of Georgia, when one of the indigenous parts of Georgia

– Abkhazia, and Samachablo - is in real danger of finally being separated from Georgian statehood, the correct and true illumination of the current conflict is not only of great scientific importance but also of great political importance. Among these problems, one of the most important is the issue of the ethnic origin of Abkhazians and Ossetians. Abkhazians and Ossetians are ethnically different people from Georgians, in their language, culture, and other characteristics (Rogava, 2014:7).

Ossetians living in the Central Caucasus today are not ethnically Turkish, they are people of Iranian origin belonging to the Indo-European race, and they speak the eastern dialect of the Iranian language group. It has been proven that the closest ancestors of the Ossetians were the Alans, a nomadic people of Iranian origin (Tavkul, 2002:77). V. Miller, A. Shegren, H Hufshman, and G. Akhvediani, who have studied the Ossetian language and its history, agree that Ossetians are people of Iranian origin. (Phutkaradze, 2017:53). According to the famous Ossetian historian Vasil Abaev, the Ossetian people belong to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family, but they did not come directly from Iran. They lived in the Ural and Don regions, came from there to the western and northern Caucasus, and then settled in the South Caucasus (Songulashvili, 2009:14-15). Some Ossetian historians argue that Ossetians have lived in the Shida Kartli region (the "South Ossetia" region) since ancient times. If this is true, then there must be any trace of Ossetian culture on these lands. However, during the excavations carried out by Georgian and foreign (German) archaeologists, no traces of them were found on these lands. There has never been a geographical or political reality called South Ossetia in history, so there have been no South Ossetian people. In addition to Georgian sources, there is no information about "South Ossetia" in Russian and other foreign sources until the 19th century. The term "South Ossetia" has used in the report sent to the Russian Emperor by General Karl Knoring, the civil affairs director of Tsarist Russia in Georgia, on March 26, 1802. In her report, General Knoring named the area inhabited by Ossetians in the large and small Liakhvi valley, which belongs to the territory of Georgia, as Ossetia. There are many fixed formulations in Russian documents between 1802 and 1837: Ossetia, Kartli's Ossetia, North Kartli Ossetian, Georgian Ossetian, and Imereti Ossetian. 1830 yılından in the article published by an anonymous author in the newspaper "Tifliskie

Vedomosti" ("Тифлисские ведомости"), the large and small Liakhvi, Ksany and Mecuda valleys - Shida Kartli region was called "South Ossetia". Between 1802 and 1830, Russia gave a foreign name "Ossetia" to a large part of the territory belonging to Georgia. This has been the anti-Georgian maneuver of the divide-and-rule policy by Russia (Phutkaradze, 2017:55). In summary, the term "South Ossetia" did not exist until the 19th century, the name of the region called "South Ossetia" today is Samachablo and it is the territory of Georgia. Ossetians, known as the nomadic "Alan" people of non-Georgian origin, who came from Ossetia in the North Caucasus (which became North Ossetia after the ethnic conflicts started), immigrated to Georgia Ossetian people, who are the most beautiful tool of Russia's divide and rule policy, are taking action today when they have the opportunity to claim these lands of Georgia.

When we look at history, today's autonomous republic of Abkhazia has always been located in western Georgia. Therefore, since Abkhazia is located within the borders of Georgia, Abkhazia has never been an independent republic. There are different opinions about the origin of modern Abkhazians. The opinions expressed about the mentioned issue can be grouped as follows: I. The migration of the ancestors of modern Abkhazians took place in AD In the I-II centuries, II. The ancestors of modern Abkhazians have been living in Abkhazia since ancient times; III. The settlement and assimilation of Abkhazian ancestors were carried out step by step and IV. The ancestors of modern Abkhazians came from the North Caucasus in the 17th century (Lortkipanidze, 2012:8-9).

DISPLACEMENT IN GEORGIA

It is mentioned, in the 90s in Georgia, the ethnic conflict took place first in Samachablo and then in Abkhazia, both autonomous units actively demanded to be separated from Georgia. By 1994, ceasefire agreements had been signed. Since then, both territories remained outside the control of Georgia. Hostile confrontations appeared from time to time, until an armed conflict occurred in Samachablo, meaning the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Although hostilities quickly ended and negotiations have moved on, these armed conflicts remain unresolved and the return of internally displaced persons is largely blocked. The process of resolving the conflict is currently underway

within the framework of the Geneva negotiations, and the representatives of Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia, and Samachablo are taking part in it. Negotiations between the parties occurred through the mediation of the United Nations (Georgian-Abkhazian conflict) and the OSCE (Georgian-Ossetian conflict). One of the main topics of these negotiations was the return of internally displaced persons (Georgia: Some progress towards a long-term solution to the internally displaced person issue.2012, p.3).

As a result of the Samachablo conflict, both the Georgian and the Ossetian populations left the region. In addition, in the 1990s, a significant number of ethnic Ossetians living in different regions of Georgia migrated to South Ossetia and the Russian Federation, in particular to the territory of North Ossetia. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, following the defeat of the Georgian military forces, almost the entire Georgian population left Abkhazia. However, in the later period, part of the Georgian population of the Gali municipality, which is located in the extreme southern part of Abkhazia, managed to return to their homes (From exclusion to inclusion; Ensuring the participation of IDPs - lessons from Georgia. Reconciliation Resources 2009, p.13). Gali municipality is the only place where some of the internally displaced persons were able to return. Before the war, the population of the district consisted practically only of ethnic Georgians. All parties to the conflict are trying to present the status of the Georgian population of the Gali municipality "in their way". In Abkhazia, they are viewed with suspicion as a potential "fifth column". In the rest of Georgia, they are also not trusted, since it is believed that by returning, they "consolidated" the illegal sovereignty of Abkhazia and cooperate with the "enemy", that is, the de-facto government of Abkhazia. Daily life in the Gali municipality is characterized by constant threats, shootings, and various forms of organized crime (From exclusion to inclusion; Ensuring the participation of IDPs - lessons from Georgia. Reconciliation Resources 2009, p.16-17).

There is a difference of opinion about the exact number of IDPs (according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), there are currently 293,000 internally displaced persons in Georgia), so this or that data cannot be a reliable indicator. The difference in data is mainly due to the different assessment and analysis systems. The Ministry of Resettlement and Refugees of Internally displaced people (IDPs) from the

occupied territories of Georgia is the only agency that collects official data on IDPs. According to government data, 256,000 people were internally displaced in non-disputed territories in Georgia in 2011: approximately 236,000 people were displaced as a result of the 1990s conflict, 17,000 as a result of the 2008 conflict, and 3,000 were displaced again. In 2010, the representative of the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons stated that 5,000 people were internally displaced in Samachablo due to the conflict of the 1990s, and about 15,000 due to the 2008 conflict. At least 5,700 people returned to their homes in Samachablo after the 1990s conflict, and very few after the 2008 conflict. The number of IDPs in Abkhazia is unknown. As for those who returned after the conflicts of the 90s, no official research has been conducted in this regard, although according to the available data, 45,000 internally displaced persons have returned to the Gali municipality, this group is still considered by the Ministry of Resettlement (Georgia: Some progress towards a long-term solution to the internally displaced person issue.2012, p.3 -4).

According to the Ministry of Georgia data, which is included in the 2007 State Strategy for IDPs, there were 247,000 IDPs from Abkhazia in Georgia at that time. However, according to the Ministry of Refugees and Resettlement data, the number of IDPs from Abkhazia was 209,000 in 2005. The Abkhaz side disputes these figures and claims that only 160,000 people were displaced from Abkhazia. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council data, by December 2008, that is, in 2008 After the August war, about 279,000 internally displaced persons were registered in Georgia. Most of them left their homes as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in 1992-1993; The second largest group consists of 2008. Persons internally displaced as a result of the August war - IDPs. Since the end of the war in Abkhazia, Georgian officials have consistently claimed that more than 300,000 Georgians were expelled from Abkhazia. However, this number does not look convincing. In 1989 Against the background of the general population census according to this census, three years before the conflict, 240 thousand ethnic Georgians lived in Abkhazia. If we also take into account that after the war some of them returned to the Gali municipality, this number will appear even more exaggerated (from exclusion to inclusion; Ensuring the participation of IDPs - lessons from Georgia. Reconciliation Resources 2009, p. 14).

A significant part of the Georgian population of the Gali municipality (whose population was almost entirely Georgians before the war) gradually returned home after the end of the war. The number of returnees remains a matter of dispute. Is believed that 47,000 ethnic Georgians currently live in the municipality. In May 1998, hostilities resumed in the Gali municipality, as a result of which 30-40 thousand people were again forced to leave their homes. A large part of them later returned, some only temporarily, to avoid losing their registration in the territory controlled by the Georgian authorities. This allows them to receive IDP benefits and other government assistance. Later, in August 2008, after the armed forces of Abkhazia occupied the valley, another 2,000 people left the Kodori valley. a result of the renewal of hostilities in August 2008, a new wave of internally displaced persons appeared. At the most acute moment of the August conflict, 131,169 ethnic Georgian internally displaced persons were registered by the Georgian side. Later, many of them has returned to their places of residence, called "buffer zones located in surrounded "South Ossetia". Currently, there is a large number of internally displaced persons in Georgia, which can be divided into two groups: As the majority, who were forced to leave their homes in the early 90s, and as the minority, who found themselves in exile as a result of the August 2008 armed conflict. In addition, by the end of 2008, approximately 7,000 residents of South Ossetia's Akhalgori district faced the threat of temporary displacement due to the lack of security conditions and broken infrastructure. IDPs from Abkhazia are scattered throughout Georgia, but most of them are concentrated in the western regions of the country, in Samegrelo and Imereti, as well as in Tbilisi and Batumi. IDPs from South Ossetia were mostly settled in the city of Gori and its nearby villages. As of 2009, approximately 45% of internally displaced persons live in collective centers, most of which are set up in former state institutions, military barracks, schools, rest homes, sanatoriums, and state housing (from exclusion to inclusion; Ensuring the participation of IDPs - lessons from Georgia. Reconciliation Resources 2009, p. 14-15).

Due to Ethnic Conflicts, Georgians became refugees in their own country. Forced displacement was carried out in three stages: from Samachablo - in 1991-1992, from Abkhazia in 1991-1992, and the third stage of displacement of IDPs is related to the 2008 Russia-Georgia war; At that

time, the Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali and the Kodori valley were emptied of Georgians. During the first two migrations, IDPs made up 6% of the population of Georgia. During the last 20 years, different numbers of the number of IDPs were mentioned. The 2008 war added 26,000 IDPs to Georgia. As of March 2015, 263,598 IDPs were registered in the territory of Georgia. The state created better conditions for the displaced people after the 2008 war than in the 1990s. The majority of IDPs live in the areas adjacent to the conflict - Samegrelo, Shida Kartli, and Imereti. Many refugees from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region also live in Russia and Ukraine. According to the 2002 census, 98.9% of displaced persons were Georgians (Thophchishvili, 2016: 294 -296).

As a result of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which started in the 1990s and are still unresolved, the population of these regions has been cut off from the rest of Georgia for almost three decades. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which have been under strong Russian influence for 30 years and are managed by the de facto government, can no longer be controlled by Tbilisi. The lack of daily relationships, limited opportunities for people-to-people communication, and, in fact, the absence of political dialogue further alienates Georgians, Abkhazians, and South Ossetians. As a result, the memory of peaceful coexistence before the 1990s is gradually fading, and public discourse in all three societies is fueled by contradictory and radical narratives about the nature of the conflicts and the "other" side (Tsankvetadze and Museridze, 2021:1).

Thus, as a result of the ethnic conflict, thousands of people were killed and maimed, hundreds were missing and wounded, and thousands of people were forced to leave their native land and became refugees in their homeland; In general, IDPs living in Georgia consist of two main groups:

- The first wave of internally displaced persons who left the occupied territories of Abkhazia and Samachablo /" South Ossetia" against their will in 1991-1993 and
- The second wave of internally displaced persons left the same regions as a result of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. The number of internally displaced persons from Abkhazia is almost 10 times higher than the number of internally displaced persons from the Samachablo.

Map 9.1 Number of internally forced displaced persons by year and region of origin, gender, and age percentage distribution in 2018.

Source: https://migration.commission.ge/files/mp19_web3.pdf.

A large part of the internally displaced population from the Samachablo lives in compact settlements, while the majority of internally displaced persons from Abkhazia live in private settlements. The distribution of internally displaced persons from the Samachablo and Abkhazia according to their place of residence is also different in the regions of Georgia. A large number of internally displaced persons from the Samachablo live in Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Shida Kartli, while the majority of IDPs from Abkhazia are settled in Tbilisi and Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti.

The state made significant efforts to improve the situation of internally displaced persons. He developed a legal framework regulating the rights and duties of IDPs, created a national coordinating body, raised national awareness in the field of the problems of internally displaced persons, collected data on the number of internally displaced persons and their location, and allocated resources to help them. After the 2008 war, the state did more for the displaced than in the 90s - it gave them shelters and some compensation. After the wars of the 90s, the state has not done

Map 9.2 Distribution of internal forced persons from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali religion by type of settlement and region in 2018.

Abkhazia: 🏠 Private 142,350 (45%)   🏠🏠🏠 compact 118,069 (55%)
Tskhinvali: 🏠 Private 7,373 (27%)   🏠🏠🏠 compact 19,535 (73%)

Source: https://migration.commission.ge/files/mp19_web3.pdf

anything like this. IDPs at that time had to find shelter in different regions of Georgia, their migration was a completely chaotic process, and to some extent, their self-establishment took place at the expense of the less socially disadvantaged host community. After the 2008 war, the problem of IDPs affected the host society less. Consequently, society became more tolerant of this flow of IDPs. It should be noted here that Georgia is still significantly dependent on external financing. The biggest donors are the European Commission and the US Agency for International Development. International non-governmental organizations are also actively involved in the process of assisting IDPs the United Nations and the Council of Europe are also working to improve the living conditions of internally displaced persons in Georgia (Georgia: Some progress towards a long-term solution to the internally displaced person issue 2012, p.15.).

CONCLUSION

Today, the migration approach is discussed in many aspects, both theoretically and practically. This situation makes it necessary to deal with today's reflections on migration as a process, not as an end. It emerges as a process

of mutual interactions and transformations rather than a one-dimensional linear development with migrations.

There are many theories about migration in the literature, and the push-pull theory is one of them. There are many basic dynamics to attract people to the region, both in the current place of residence and in the place to migrate, as well as other reasons that push them back Civil war, unemployment, political pressures, etc. political trust, geography, and cultural/religious affinity can be counted as pull factors that encourage migration.

Within the scope of the push-pull theory, the evaluation of forced labor migration experienced within the country due to ethnic conflict in Georgia will provide the integrity of the subject. A suitable analysis can be made for the people who had to immigrate within Georgia country after the 1991-1992 Samachablo, 1992-93 Abkhazia, and 2008 Samachablo conflicts, which carried out the push-pull theory in Georgia. It is understood that the difficult and anxious situation of people living in the conflict zone as a push factor on the one hand, and the presence of a safe environment as a pull factor in other regions of Georgia on the other hand are important factors in the choice of migration. The chaos and civil war experienced in the country due to ethnic conflicts in Georgia has created a circle of fear for civilians, and this has become a driving factor for migration movements. Living in the region captured by the post-war separatist forces has become a major threat for Georgians Thus, civilians who were concerned about their life safety due to conflicts sought safer areas within the country.

Ethnic conflicts in Georgia are still unresolved and the return of internally displaced persons is mostly blocked. However, it should be noted here that Gali municipality, located in the extreme south of Abkhazia, is the only place where some of the internally displaced persons could return. Before the war, the population of the district consisted practically only of ethnic Georgians. All parties to the conflict are trying to present the status, needs, and desires of the Georgian population of Gali municipality "in their way". In Abkhazia, they are viewed with suspicion as a potential "fifth column". In the rest of Georgia, they are also not trusted, since it is believed that by returning, they "consolidated" the illegal sovereignty of Abkhazia and cooperate with the "enemy", that is, the de-facto govern-

ment of Abkhazia. Constant threats, regular kidnappings, shootings, and various forms of organized crime characterize daily life in the Gali municipality. The state has made significant efforts to improve the situation of internally displaced persons, but Georgia is still dependent on external funding. The biggest donors are the European Commission and the US Agency for International Development, which is determined to continue helping the IDPs, especially in terms of livelihoods. All internally displaced persons have the right to voluntarily return to their place of residence, where their safety will be protected.

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10

Relations Between the State and Civil Society Organizations in Turkiye's Response to Syrian Refugees: Case of STL and IHH

PELİN GÜL*

ABSTRACT

Since the start of the civil war in Syria, civil society organizations (CSOs) in Turkiye have been notably active in the field of refugee relief. Over time, however, the importance of secular vs. Islamic CSOs has shifted. Drawing on competing models of relations between the state and civil society, this book chapter seeks to explain why secular CSOs have grown in importance in the following years of the civil war. While a society-centered model emphasizes the importance of civil society resources (such as social capital), a state-centered model instead emphasizes the enabling and constraining effects of political structures. Based on historical research and comparative case study, this chapter integrates macro and meso-level analysis as it attends to how macro-scale historical and political factors influence meso-level refugee reception in Turkiye. The historical review of the state-civil society relationship in Turkiye shows that Turkish civil society has tended to depend on state institutions. According to their secular vs. religious orientation and whether it accords with the preferences of relevant powers within the state (including the military), CSOs may be advantaged or disadvantaged. The comparison of the refugee relief work of an Islamic — *İnsani Yardım Vakfı* (IHH) — and a secular CSO — *Hayata Destek Vakfı* (STL) — between 2013 to 2019, this chapter shows that a large increase in international funding for refugee relief gave secular CSOs

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an opportunity to break the prevailing pattern of state dependency in Turkiye. This increased their importance, yet the state tradition of controlling civil society continues to set limits on their activities.

Keywords: Turkiye, Civil society, State-civil society relations, Syrian refugee crisis

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the state and civil society has been a subject of scholarly research in sociology and political science. These sources either focus on what civil society and its relations with the state *should* be or what it *is* (Nash, 2010, p. 215). Studies focus on normative civil society concept mostly see civil society as a monolithic group — a group puts pressure on the state to bring down repressive governments, hence it is in constant competition with the government — with a determined civic space (ibid, p. 214). However, societies are stratified with power relations, and these power relations may play an important role in the state's relationship with different segments of civil society. The relationship between the state and different segments of civil society may be particularly important in cases where centralist state ideas prevail as the state holds strong ability to control the civic space. The civic space is where different groups can freely organize and act to influence political and social structures. By controlling the civic space, the state can widen the space for some groups while restricting others. Therefore, this chapter adopts a state-centered paradigm to understand how Turkish civil society responds to the Syrian refugee 'crisis.'

   Although Turkiye, as a Eurasian country connecting the European and Asian continents, once was predominantly a transit and emigration country, today, it is a major migration destination. The county has experienced mass influxes of people from Eastern European and Western Asian countries since the 1980s, however, as of 2022, the country has become the world's largest refugee-hosting country, with 3.5 million refugees, composing over four percent of a country of 85 million (Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, 2022). Therefore, the political and societal responses to the refugees in Turkiye have become an interest to refugee scholars. Studies on the responses to the refugees in Turkiye primarily focus on media (e.g., Aridici, 2022), political actors (the state and political parties) (e.g., Aydemir, 2022),

public (e.g., Morgül, 2022), and civil society (e.g., Danış and Nazlı, 2019). While the studies on the responses of media, political actors, and the public mainly follow the domestic political divisions, studies on the responses of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) categorize these organizations depending on the scope of operations (e.g., Danış and Nazlı, 2019), their staff (e.g., Turkish, Syrian, and international) (e.g., Mccarthy, 2018), and/or ideological political divisions. This chapter focuses on ideological political division —Islamic vs. secular— among CSOs because of two reasons: 1) CSOs in Turkiye historically have been divided depending on their political ideologies (secular vs. Islamist) (Mackreath and Sağnıç, 2017, p. 11); and 2) this chapter aims to uncover the role of state-civil society relations and ideological orientation in CSOs response to the Syrian refugee 'crisis.'

This book chapter draws on a comparison of the refugee relief work of an Islamic — *İnsani Yardım Vakfı* (IHH) — and a secular CSO — *Hayata Destek Vakfı* (STL) and an extensive review of the historical development of the state-civil society relationship in Turkiye. To identify the power dynamics between different segments of CSOs and their relationship with the state, first, this chapter examines the historical evolution of civil society and the state-civil society relationship in Turkiye. The historical review enables the researcher to present political structures' enabling and constraining effects and mechanisms. The historical review shows that CSOs in Turkiye may be advantaged or disadvantaged depending on the preferences of the power within the state (i.e., Islamic vs. secular). Therefore, Turkish civil society has tended to be dependent on state institutions. Each time the segment of civil society that is not linked to the state's ideology extends the civic space; the state curbs this growth through its controlling mechanisms. State's control over civic space traditionally occurs through laws and repressions, and in addition financing the CSOs, as a newer additional controlling mechanism.

This chapter, then, draws on a comparison of the refugee relief works of an Islamic (IHH) and a secular (STL) CSO between 2013 and 2019 to understand their roles in addressing the Syrian refugee 'crisis.' The comparison shows that the IHH's works target refugees' basic and immediate needs, whereas the STL's works aim to help refugees' settlement and integration as well as respond to their basic needs. This comparison suggests that, on the one hand, the state's insufficiency to respond to the refugee 'crisis' led Islamic CSOs' to support the state in responding to the immediate needs of the

refugees. On the other hand, the increase in the number of refugees living outside camps increased the need for refugees' settlement and integration, by extension, the importance of secular CSOs. Examination of their projects with funders shows that there has been a large increase in international funding for refugee relief, which allowed secular CSOs to break the prevailing pattern of state dependency in Turkiye. This increased their importance, yet the state tradition of pressuring and constraining civil society continues to set limits on their activities.

STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP

Civil society is one of the most discussed phenomena among social scientists. Scholars explain civil society and its functions differently based on its relationship with the state and market within different schools of thought. According to liberal thought, the government derives from people and represents different groups within society; hence, it has a fiduciary relationship with society. When the government lacks impartial judges, liberal thought expounds that civil society functions as a resolver by providing equal, partial and legitimate political authority, which assumes the role of making an impartial judgement (Dunn, 2001). On the contrary, Hegelian thought sees civil society as subordinate and anti-thesis to the state. According to Hegelian thought, the state is the embodiment of the people's ethical will, consisting of different levels of social life: family, civil society, and the state itself. The relationship between these levels is that the state is a synthesis, representing the universality of the thesis of families and individualists of the anti-thesis of civil society. On the other hand, Marx argues that bourgeoisie civil society and the state serve the private side of society rather than the whole public, as the Hegelian view argues (Ehrenberg, 1999; Hunt, 1987). In Marxist thought, Gramsci inverts this negative meaning of Marxist civil society by referring to civil society as a superstructure, conceding to the bourgeois state and 'hegemony' (Hunt, 1987).

In the 1990s, the debates around civil society moved in the direction of the state's role in the absence or proliferation of civil society. Although such discussions have been in academic debates since de Tocqueville (1836) argued that civic associations, equipping citizens with power, prevent despotism and arbitrary rule of a prince, the discussions about the role of the state in the absence or proliferation of civil society revived in the 1990s. On the one side,

neo-Tocquevillian scholars argue that voluntary associations spring up from below as individuals come together to associate the civic associations. They highlight the features of these associations, such as networks, social norms and trust that promote cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1991). According to Putnam (1993), norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement lead to social trust, making voluntary associations possible. In turn, these voluntary associations strengthen reciprocity and civic engagement. Accordingly, Putnam (1995) argues that civic community associations promote good governance, democratic institutions, and economic prosperity. Alternatively, Putnam builds on his work on individual attitudes and the local social networks rather than structural dynamics.

On the other side, Skocpol brings the enabling and constraining effects of political structures into the conversation. She critiques the Tocquevillian view of the state's socio-political impact as it disregards the structures and activities of states and their influence on group formation and the political capacities of different segments of society (Skocpol, 1985). In the conversations about civic engagement, Skocpol (1996) argues that the society-centered model of the neo-Tocqueville view fails to include cross-class and organizational dynamics. Skocpol shows how politics and governments' structures proliferate or diminish some voluntary associations by providing an 'opportunity structure' for some voluntary associations over others, rather than voluntary associations spring up from below (Skocpol 1997, 1996). In other words, civic communities are the by-product of the political structures rather than local influences.

Following the neo-Tocquevillian argument that civil society springs up from below, some scholars of Turkiye argue that dramatic events led Turkish civil society to mobilize from below (e.g., Bee and Kaya, 2017, p. 140; Sunata and Tosun, 2019, p. 700). Nonetheless, this chapter confirms the state-centered approaches' argument that the Turkish government's controlling mechanisms vary depending on the orientation of the CSOs as the Turkish government plays favorites (Mccarthy, 2018, p. 184; Kubicek, 2002, p. 771; Danış and Nazlı, 2019, p. 145). Next section will show how historically, political structures have influenced Turkish civil society and repeatedly reorganized the power dynamics within civil society and present the Syrian refugee 'crisis' as the latest attempt of Turkish civil society to break the pattern of state dependency. Yet, the Turkish government maintained its controlling mecha-

nisms over the CSOs, and government-aligned CSOs enjoyed their ideological ties with the government during the refugee 'crisis' (Mccarthy, 2018, p. 184).

CHANGING AND VARYING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TURKISH STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The Turkish state's relationship with different segments of civil society has changed and varied depending on the preferences of the state's dominant power. As the dominant power within the state has reorganized over the years, the power dynamics of state and civil society as well as of different segments of civil society have repeatedly shifted — determining the advantaged and disadvantaged CSOs. There have been six turning points characterize this changing and varying relationship between the state and different segments of civil society: the Demokrat Party (DP) period (1950-1960), post-1960 coup d'état, the post-1980 period, the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, the European Union (EU) accession process, and finally the Syrian refugee 'crisis' (Karaman and Aras, 2000, p. 49; Ulusoy and Kirval, 2017, p. 14; Sunata and Tosun, 2018, p. 686).

State Control over the Civic Space: Laws and oppressions

The first constitution of the Turkish Republic, the 1924 constitution, established a paradoxical state-civil society relationship. The constitution established the groundwork for democratization in the new republic, following the fundamental principles of Kemalism[1]; that is, the Turkish identity formed with the establishment of Turkiye in 1923. The state-civil society relationship was paradoxical because while religion was used in the nation-building process to unify ethnolinguistic groups, the Kemalist state identity also required the elimination of Islam in the political and social realm (Yavuz, 2000). The constitution aimed to control manifestations of Islam through state institutions (e.g., establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs), by instituting westernized reforms (e.g., closing Islamic shrines and convents) and by banning the establishment of religious associations (Law No.677, 1925). The new republic even furthered its disassociation of religion from the public and political sphere in the following years. After Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925,

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1 Kemalism refers to a set of ideological principles formulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), Turkiye's founder and first president. The pillars of Kemalism are republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and revolutionism.

the state closed all CSOs that did not share the state's official ideology (Çaha, 1995, p. 107). Later in 1938, the state introduced the Law for Associations (No. 3512) to enforce CSOs to obtain the government's permission for establishing associations (Sezer, 2008, p. 35). These rulings and pressures determined the relationship between the state and civil society in the new republic, favoring CSOs aligned with state's ideology and oppressing the ones did not.

The power dynamics between the state and different segments of civil society shifted after the first free and fair elections of 1950. This election brought a center-right populist party, the DP (1950-1960), to power. The DP period had a similar paradox that was established in the establishment of Turkish Republic: The DP promised political freedom and liberating policies for civil society while it, in fact, repressed political opposition and allowed only the CSOs linked to its ideology. In its first years, the DP followed liberatory policies for civil society (e.g., 5680 Press Law, 1950). As a result, there was a dramatic increase in the number of CSOs at the time. However, in its following years, the DP increased its authority on dissidents and civil society to oppress the criticism (Şağan, 2013, p. 329). The DP not only banned the leftist CSOs but also established an investigatory commission to acquire information on the opposition's activities. Alternatively, the DP changed the power relations between the state and different segments of civil society by oppressing the CSOs are not linked to its ideology.

The 1960 coup d'état led to another shift in the power relations of the state and different segments of civil society. The military government, took the power from the DP, enhanced democratic institutions, and guaranteed free speech and association though the 1961 Constitution (Akboğa, 2011, p. 63). The İnönü administration (1961-1965) came to power after the coup, further strengthening inclusive political and social space by lifting the restrictions on establishing labor union with the Law for Labor Union in 1963 (Akboğa, 2011, p. 65). As a result of these laws, political and civic participation of both Islamic and secular CSOs increased in the post-1960 coup d'état (ibid, p. 65).

Nonetheless, this short period gave way to another power shift within the state when Turkish military participated in politics in 1971. The Turkish military delivered an ultimatum to the Prime Minister Demirel to oust the government. The ultimatum led to the constitutional amendment, assuring state's power over civil society by restricting rights gained with the 1960 Constitution. The military government had restricted the right to establish

associations (Official Gazette No: 13964, 1971) and closed the CSOs with contradictory ideologies toward secularism. Even though these changes gave advantages to secular CSOs by limiting the space for Islamic ones, they also escalated the conflict between them, which led to another power shift within the state, the 1980 coup d'état.

During the early 1980s, the new military government reassured the state's power over civil society by ratifying the 1982 Constitution. The new constitutional reform and a new Associations Law (Law No 2908, 1983) further restricted the autonomy of CSOs from the state by limiting collective agreement and union rights (Varon and Dereci, 2017, p. 10; Trends in Turkish Civil Society, 2017). After the 1980 coup d'état, the military regime aimed to depoliticize the society in the name of national unity; hence it closed about half of the CSOs in Turkiye (Şimşek, 2004, p. 48). As a result, the civic space has diminished for both segments of civil society, Islamists and seculars.

Nonetheless, the post-1980s period turned the consequences of the suppression of the military regime around. It ushered in another ironic state-civil society relationship: depoliticization goal of military regime followed by democratization and politicization, by extension proliferation of civil society (Göle, 1994, p. 215). This proliferation was engendered by not only domestic but also global conjuncture of the time. In the post-1980s, civil society emerged globally as neo-liberalism, and its values of minimizing the state's role in the public realm and limiting state power diffused following the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Paker, 2004, p. 183; Onbaşı, 2008, p. 15; Ertürk, 2006). This upsurge coincided with Özal's administration (1983-89 as the Prime Minister, 1989-93 as the President) and his neo-liberal policies in Turkiye. The Özal administration's economic liberalization policies transformed Turkiye's socio-economic trends (Göçmen, 2014, p. 96). While the feminist, LGBT rights, and Kurdish nationalist movements became apparent in the public realm, religion also became a strong force in politics and civic space (Trends in Turkish Civil Society, 2017). Moreover, the cooccurrence of Özal's liberal policies and increasing rural-to-urban migration led to an increase in the public visibility of Islam and Islamic CSOs (Göçmen, 2014, p. 96). From the beginning of the Özal era to 2004, the number of CSOs tripled (Trends in Turkish Civil Society, 2017). These CSOs, with the rising movements, challenged state power by demanding greater rights. Alternatively, with the global and domestic factors, civic space in Turkiye had extended and diversified in the post-1980s period.

The positive changes that led to more inclusionary civic space in Turkiye continued until the late-1990s. The state loosened legal pressure on civil society by easing the various legal regulations of the 1982 constitution regarding founding organizations and unions in 1995. Following, the 1999 Habitat II Conference, with United Nations held in Turkiye, mobilized Turkish CSOs to participate in the global civil society movement. In this sense, the conference led Turkish civil society to act together as a social actor (Kuzmanovic, 2010, p. 431).

Following these improvements in civil society, another power shift within the state occurred, leading to another strike on civil society. On 28 February 1997[2], the Turkish military reorganized power dynamics within the state and civil society by signing a decree targeting the Islamists in political and social realm. The 1997 post-modern coup, privileging secular values in state institutions and the whole of civil society, shrunk the civic space once again (Onbaşı, 2008, p. 21).

In sum, from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until the end of the 1990s, three turning points characterized changing and varying relationships between the state and different segments of civil society: the first years of DP administration, the post-1960 coup d'état, and the post-1980 period. First, the DP administration organized an open civic space in its first years (1950-1954) by adopting liberatory policies, followed by shrinking civic space by oppressing dissidents in the following years (1954-1960). Similarly, the military government, took power from the DP in 1960, widened the civic space by guaranteeing free speech and association for both Islamists and seculars with the 1961 Constitution, followed by the military memorandum of 1971 and its consequences of the constitutional amendment, limiting the civic space for Islamists and privileging seculars. Following these changes in power dynamics, the 1980 coup d'état and its consequence of the 1982 Constitution shrunk the civic space for Islamists and seculars by assuring the state power over civil society. Until the post-modern coup in 1997, global conjuncture of the time and the Özal administration's neoliberal policies (1983-1991) eased the pressure on civil society– privileging Islamists.

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2   The 1997 military memorandum is called the "post-modern coup" due to the nature of the intervention, being through media to pressure Prime Minister Erbakan to resign, rather than the Turkish military taking over the government directly (Morgül, 2022).

A New Controlling Mechanism: Financing

Since the 1997 post-modern coup, there have been three events characterize the changing and varying relationship between the state and different segments of civil society: the 1999 Marmara earthquake, Turkiye's EU candidacy process, and Syrian refugee 'crisis.'

First, the state's insufficiency to respond and manage the aftermath of the 1999 earthquake, causing the demise of 17,480 people, led to a less controlled civic space, which saw an unprecedent rise in CSOs involved in political and societal issues (Mackreath and Sağnıç, 2017, p. 28). The state's response to the crisis was insufficient as the state was unprepared: late relief and rescue, low-quality care, closed roads, failed communication, no coordination between authorities, foreign assistance, and the Prime Ministry (Paker, 2004, p. 78; Jalali, 2002, p. 125). In responding to the crisis, CSOs stepped up to provide relief services for the victims and represent the interest of multiple segments among these victims (Mackreath and Sağnıç, 2017). Many CSOs across the country arrived at the affected areas shortly and started new initiatives, distributing the roles of each organization during the crisis. Even the state relied on these initiatives (Kubicek, 2002, p. 767; Jalali, 2002, p. 131).

As the CSOs exceeded their capacities in the post-earthquake, they attempted to extend the civic space through involvement in political and societal issues. While Islamic CSOs accused the government of cooperating only with the CSOs close to its ideology, some professional associations criticized the government's response to the quake (ibid, p. 129). For instance, the chairman of the Turkish Medical Association at the time criticized the Ministry of Health for failing to provide help services for survivors of the quake (ibid., p. 126). However, the government responded to such criticisms by freezing or closing their bank accounts, directing their funds to the state and prohibiting them from working in affected areas (Kubicek, 2002, p. 767). Even though the CSOs kept pushing the government's repression of civil society (e.g., publishing manifesto and protesting), it did not stop the government's attempts to oppress opposition in civil society. In short, while the insufficiency of the state's response to earthquake widened the civic space with a more independent civil society, the state continued to limit CSOs.

Second, the Europeanization process also led to civil society's autonomy from state institutions by encouraging the state to lift sanctions on civil

society and providing funds to Turkish CSOs (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 131). As requirements of Copenhagen (accession) Criteria, the Turkish state started to ease its influence on civil society in the late 1990s (Akboğa, 2011, p. 74). Moreover, even though Turkish CSOs traditionally rely on membership fees for income, state and international organizations' funds also become a source of income for CSOs in the 2000s (Sunar, 2018, p. 15). Civil Society Dialogue (CSD), introduced by the EU in 2005 as part of the EU accession process, is an example of international funds to Turkish civil society. The EU funds to Turkish civil society contributed to their attempts to break the existing dependency on the state. Due to the EU accession process, the civic space extended as the Turkish state lifted its restrictions on civil society and CSOs, not in alignment with the state's ideology, gained access to EU funds.

The AKP government inherited this loosened state pressure on civil society when it came to power in November 2002. While the government prioritized democratization objectives in its first years (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 55), its control over civil society, privileging Islamists, continuously increased in the following years (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 136). In its first years, the government contributed to civil society's independence, passing a new Associations Law in 2004 (Official Gazette No:25649, 2004). This law dismantles the sections of the previous Associations Law, which required CSOs to receive permission from the state for foreign funds, cooperation, and activities with foreign associations. Some other important revisions of the law include (1) audit officials have to give 24 hours' notice to associations unless random audits can be reasoned; (2) security forces are required to obtain a warrant for searching associations; (3) government funding up to 50 per cent may be allowed (2004 Associations Law; Trends in Turkish Civil Society, 2017; Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 59). While these legal changes introduced by the AKP seemed to provide a more open space for CSOs, Islamic CSOs gained a privileged position when the party introduced the 2006 Anti-terror law (Rumelili and Boşnak, 2015, p. 136). This law has been used to prosecute political dissident civil society activists with its vague definition of 'terror' and restricting freedom of speech (ibid). Following the 2006 anti-terror law process, the state's control over civil society has continuously increased.

After the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the 2016 coup attempt, the Turkish state's tradition of controlling the civic space has reached a level where the cost of non-compliance with the state has become higher (Akkoyunlu and

Öktem, 2016, p. 514). In the summer of 2013, the Gezi Park protests started with a group of activists against the government's urban development plans in Gezi Park, Istanbul. When security forces violently repressed the protests, the protests brought together various groups opposing the AKP government's authoritarianism and conservatism (Gürcan and Peker, 2015, p. 325). The AKP government has taken repressive actions to the people and CSOs joined the protests (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016, p. 1594). The government started criminal investigations against CSOs and their organizers under anti-terror law as they were seen as alleged protest organizers by the state (Amnesty International, 2013). To illustrate, police arrested some fifty members of the Taksim Solidarity Platform, which included members of multiple political parties and CSOs in the Gezi Protests (ibid). The pressure continued as the state increased its audits to the secular CSOs compared to the audit imposed to government-aligned ones (Doyle, 2016, p. 255). While the civic space for seculars has become smaller after the July 15th coup attempt in 2016 when the government's actions to suppress opposition peaked. Six days after the coup attempt, the Turkish government announced a state of emergency, paving the way for further state control over civil society through executive decrees. Under the state of emergency, the government issued executive decree No. 677 on November 22nd, purging over 140,000 civil servants, closing 1,500 CSOs, and seizing their assets for their alleged links to 'terrorist organizations' (Kingsley, 2017). Shutting down many politically dissident CSOs is an explicit threat to the organizations that were still active. The power increasingly accumulated in the hands of President Erdoğan during and after the 2013-2016 period, and his control over non-compliant CSOs diminished the civic space to a minimum (Sertdemir and Özyürek, 2019, p. 700).

In sum, two events characterize the changing and varying relationship between the state and different segments of civil society from the 1990s until the refugee 'crisis': the 1999 Earthquake and the EU accession process. While these two events initially contributed to Turkish civil society's attempts to break the pattern of state dependency, the strong state tradition of favoring CSOs share a similar ideology with the state power and oppressing the ones do not have never disappeared. More importantly, as President Erdoğan has accumulated power in his hands (especially after the transition to the Presidential system from the Parliamentary system with the 2017 Presidential referendum), the state's control over the dissents in civil society has become stronger (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2018, p. 45).

CIVIL SOCIETY'S RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEE 'CRISIS'

Historically, Turkiye is known as a transit country for migrants and a country of emigration. Nonetheless, Turkiye has experienced mass influxes of people since the 1980s: the 1989 arrival of Bulgarian refugees, the flow of peshmerga fleeing from Iraq, the influx of people fleeing from the Iran-Iraq war, a large number of people fleeing from Yugoslavian civil wars, and people flee from the Kosovo crisis (İçduygu and Aksel, 2013, p. 176). Although Turkiye has experienced these flows since the 1980s, it has been subject to an unprecedented scale of migrants since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. With the Syrian civil war, Turkiye has become one of the leading receiving countries for refugees. As of 2022, Turkiye hosts the world's largest refugee population, with an official number of 3.5 million refugees (Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, 2022).

While the number of refugees outside the camps was low in the initial years of the war, a dramatic increase occurred between 2014 and 2015, from 770,000 to 1,700,000 (Kirişçi, 2014, p. 5; Elma and Şahin, 2015, p. 434). *Even though* the government initiated some long-term policies for the integration of the refugees (e.g., the creation of a Directorate General of Migration Management) as of 2014, it has mainly targeted the refugees' needs in the camps and responded to the needs of refugees outside camps with short-term solutions (e.g., the Temporary Protection regime and the Regulation on Work Permits of Refugees under Temporary Protection). Therefore, the need to assist refugees outside camps has increased since 2014 (Mccarthy, 2018, p.182).

In response to the upsurge of refugees outside of camps, a considerable increase in the number of CSOs occurred. According to the official data, the number of CSOs in Turkiye boosted from 87,982 to 106,337 between 2011 and 2016 (Ministry of Interior, 2022). Nonetheless, these CSOs' assistance to refugees varies depending on the relationship between the CSOs and the government. On the one hand, Islamic CSOs' relationship with the government is cooperative rather than competing. Therefore, Islamic CSOs act as a social welfare apparatus of the state in the refugee 'crisis' (Sunar, 2018, p.). On the other hand, secular CSOs are in constant competition with the government. Therefore, their refugee relief work is independent from the state institutions (Mccarthy, 2018, p. 184-185). As a result of this varying relationship with the government CSOs' response to refugees varies in three ways.

First, Islamic and secular CSOs' language in describing the refugees differs. Islamic CSOs predominantly use religion-oriented language describing refugees. They describe the refugees with the term *muhajirs,* an Arabic word for Muslim emigrants. This term is associated with the *Ansar*, who hosted the first Muslim migrants in their homes. In contrast, secular CSOs use right-based discourse for the refugees due to the implication of hierarchy between *Ansar* and *muhajir* discourse (Mackreath and Sağnıç, 2017).

Second, Islamic CSOs have been in the field of refugee relief since the beginning of the Syrian war, whereas secular CSOs' had eschewed the effort. At the beginning of the conflict, some secular CSOs construed the refugees' arrival as the Turkish state's retaliation against the Syrian regime (Çorabatır, 2016, p. 13). Hence, they were leery of the refugees initially, but their involvement in refugee relief work increased over the years. On the other hand, Islamic CSOs have been in the field to cover the government's insufficiencies in immediate response to the refugees due to their role as social welfare institutions supporting the government (Sunar, 2018, p. 79; Danış and Nazlı, 2019, p. 144).

This varying relationship of Islamic and secular CSOs with the government determines CSOs' role in refugee reception: while Islamic CSOs mainly target responding basic needs of the refugees in the border cities and camps, secular CSOs target assisting the refugees with their settlement and integration as well as the basic needs (see Mackreath and Sağnıç, 2017, p. 16).

Even though the number of refugees outside camps dramatically increased as of 2014, Turkish government has continued to frame the Syrian refugees as a temporary phenomenon. However, the need for refugees' settlement and integration has even further increased with the 2016 EU-Turkiye deal. In March 2016, the EU-Turkiye deal was signed with the aim of stopping the movement of refugees from Turkiye into Europe. According to the deal, every person arriving irregularly in Europe was to be returned to Turkiye, and the EU was to accept one Syrian from Turkiye in return. In exchange, Turkiye would receive ğ6 billion in refugee assistance, and Turkish citizens will be granted visa-free entry to the EU countries (European Parliament, 2022). This deal, removing the international protection for asylum seekers arriving in Europe from Turkiye and the continuation of the Syrian civil war ensured Syrian refugees' stay in Turkiye be longer than initially anticipated by the Turkish government (Baban, Ilcan, and Rygiel, 2017, p. 43). Therefore, the need for

refugees' settlement and integration has increased in Turkiye over the years. As a result, secular CSOs' importance in refugees' settlement and integration has also increased (see Çorabatır, 2016, p. 13).

Third, CSOs' project funders vary depending on the organizations' orientation. As mentioned above, CSOs' primary source of income has been membership fees, as the government and international organizations' funds have been limited. The distribution of these limited funds also depends on the organizations' orientation. While Islamic CSOs enjoy government funding and cooperate with state institutions as well as other government-aligned CSOs, secular CSOs rely on international funds and donations. In the next section, I compare an Islamic and secular CSO's refugee projects and financial partners in these projects to illustrate the differences in their role in response to the refugees.

The IHH as an example of Islamic Civil Society Organization

The IHH is determined as an example of Islamic CSO due to its Islamic fundraising discourse (*zakat*), its membership with Islamic cooperation organizations (e.g., the organization of Islamic Cooperation Humanitarian Funds), and the religious content of the introductory video on its website. The video opens with the first verse of the Quran and continues with stories of political Islamists and people performing Islamic prayers (IHH, n.d.).

According to the IHH's Syrian report (2012-2019), the organization's projects provide food, clothing, household goods, shelter, health, and educational support in the refugee camps and Syria. While the organization spent on its refugee projects 423,856,180 TL, 89% of this amount (379,758,033 TL) was allocated to provide food to the refugees in the camps (IHH Syrian Report 2012-2019, 2020). Similarly, the IHH's all other refugee projects target the basic needs of the refugees in the border cities and camps. To illustrate, the organization spent 619,432 TL between 2013 and 2019 on sheltering projects, mainly building container housings and tents in the camps (ibid.). Moreover, after completing the shelters, the organization hands over the management of these shelters to the government agency, the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (also known as AFAD). In this regard, the organization acts as a state assistant in the field to cover the state's insufficiencies in response to the immediate needs of the refugees in border cities and camps.

The relationship between the IHH and the government is reciprocal, as the government collaborates with the IHH. The IHH has ninety-six partnerships with its refugee relief projects. These partners can be categorized as Islamic organizations, Western institutions, the government and government-aligned CSOs in Turkiye. Unsurprisingly, most organizations cooperating with the IHH share a similar religious orientation. Moreover, a few of the IHH's partners are Western organizations (such as the UNHCR, WHO, and UNOCHA). As the international funds to CSOs in Turkiye have increased for refugee relief work, cooperation between the IHH and Western organizations is also expected. More interestingly, the rest of the partners are either state institutions or government-aligned CSOs. Examples of partnerships with state institutions include the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Family and Social Services, and the Turkish Red Cross. Lastly, state-aligned CSOs are Islamic Ansaar Foundation, Orphan Foundation, Memur-Sen, Hak-İş, Alliance of International Doctors (ibid., 44).

However, the IHH's report on its refugee projects and their funders is not transparent as it does not include information about the amount of funding provided by which organizations for each project (ibid.). Therefore, there is no way to show how much of its funding comes from the state institutions.

The STL as an example of secular Civil Society Organization

Even though the number of CSOs increased with the refugee 'crisis,' secular CSOs were still in disadvantaged position due to state's control through its mechanisms (laws, oppression, and funding). That said, international funding has provided an opportunity for secular CSOs, to actively participate in civic activities.

The STL was identified as a secular CSO due to its universal humanitarian principles and priority of vulnerable minorities of the organization on its website:

> 'Our association's activities are guided by humanitarian standards and principles that are based on universal values. These principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence and accountability. Our priority in disaster preparedness and risk reduction is to prioritize participation and strengthen grassroots coordination in order to maximise the local capacities. When it comes to responding to natural or man-made disasters, we prioritize assisting the most vulnerable – those who suffer the impacts

the most. In this vein, as Support to Life, we define our mission as helping disaster-affected communities and individuals meet their basic needs and rights, and acting in accord with universal humanitarian principles while doing so." (STL, n.d.)

As a secular CSO, the STL's refugee projects target not only the basic needs of the refugees in the border cities but also assisting the settlement and integration of the refugees outside of camps. The STL's pattern of dependency on the state has broken with the increase in international funds for projects on refugee relief. To show this, the STL's annual financial and activity reports between 2013 and 2019 were examined below.

According to the 2013 reports, the STL's projects targeted responding to refugees' immediate needs and were primarily funded by foreign organizations. While the organization's total income was 9,531,196 TL, 88% (8,344,662 TL) came from foreign associations to be spent on refugee projects (STL Annual Report, 2013). In 2014, the STL's projects extended from responding to the immediate needs of the refugees to creating a space for social harmony between the refugees and local communities (STL Annual Report, 2014). Like in 2013, a large number of the STL's projects' funders in 2014 consisted of foreign organizations (STL Annual Report, 2014). While the organization's total income for the year was 21,656,418 TL, 87,3% (18,909,672 TL) of this income came from foreign organizations, to be allocated to refugee projects (STL Annual Report, 2014).

The pattern of receiving international funding for refugee projects continued from 2015 to 2019. The STL's 2015 projects aimed at the settlement and integration of refugees outside of camps (e.g., Eliminating child labor in seasonal agriculture) as well as the basic needs of refugees in border cities and camps (e.g., Distribution of relief items to Syrian refugees outside of camps in Hatay). In 2015, the organizations' total income was 25,595,513 TL, of which 90% (23,197,928 TL) came from foreign organizations aiming to contribute to the refuge relief (STL Annual Report, 2015). Similarly, the STL's 95% (52,489,570 TL) of 2016 total income (55,079,544 TL) came from international funds to be spent on projects for refugees outside of camps (e.g., Facilitating the Protection of Syrian Refugees in Istanbul) and in border cities and camps (e.g., Multi-purpose cash assistance and protection for urban Syrian and non-Syrian refugees in southeastern Turkey) (STL Annual Report, 2016). In parallel, the organization's 2017 total income was 30.234.267,

of which 94% was sent by foreign organizations to be spent on projects for refugees outside camps (e.g., Improving the employability of Syrian refugees and vulnerable host community members in agricultural sector) and in border cities and camps (e.g., Distributing of e-vouchers to displaced people in Mardin province) (STL Annual Report, 2017). Uniformly, 94% (30,566,077 TL) of its 2018 income (32,630,651 TL) came from foreign organizations for its projects for refugees outside camps (e.g., Enhancing access to effective services and protection for people of concern in Turkey) and in border cities and camps (e.g., Creating livelihood opportunities for the non-camp Syrian refugees in Mardin) (STL Annual Report, 2018). Finally, the STL's 2019 total income was 53,179,184 TL, of which 99% was provided by foreign organizations on projects for refugees outside of camps (e.g., Building resilience amongst Syrian refugees in Istanbul) (STL Annual Report, 2019).

The above examination shows that the STL, as a secular CSO, works toward not only the basic needs of the refugees in border cities and camps but also the refugees' settlement and integration into the country. Moreover, it showed that the refugee relief works of a secular CSO are primarily funded by foreign organizations rather than the state (Sunar, 2018, p. 20, 66). That said, this does not mean that the STL never collaborated with state institutions. The STL has collaborated with various institutions, including some state institutions. For example, the STL organized workshops on refugee-related topics (e.g., refugee law) for various groups, including the employees of the Directorate General of Migration Management (STL Annual Report, 2019). However, these collaborations were neither financial nor as strong as the government's collaborations with IHH. In this sense, the STL exemplifies how the increasing international funds for refugee-related projects led to more civic space and less state dependency of secular CSOs in Turkiye.

DISCUSSION

This study supports the state-centered approaches' emphasis on the importance of the enabling and constraining effects of political structures on civil society rather than the importance of civil society resources. The findings suggest that Turkish civil society has historically depended on state institutions. Comparison of an Islamist (IHH) and a secular (STL) CSO in their response to the Syrian refugees illustrates the political structure's influence in

the CSOs' varying response to the Syrian refugee 'crisis.' The findings show that a large increase in international funding for refugee relief gave secular CSOs an opportunity to break the prevailing pattern of state dependency in Turkiye. Nevertheless, the state tradition of playing favorites among CSOs and controlling the CSOs with a different orientation than the power within the state is still prevalent.

These findings show that the Turkish state continues to control civil society through various mechanisms (i.e., laws, repression, and financing). **Even the studies argue civil society springs up from below recognizes the importance of political structures on civil society (e.g.,** Sunata and Tosun, 2019). Nonetheless, the findings of this chapter show that the state control determines the roles of CSOs in their responses to 'crises,' rather than civil society's own efforts.

Studies on the state-civil society relationship and its influence on the CSOs' response to the refugees in Turkiye mainly focus on Islamist CSOs (e.g., Sunar, 2018; Danış and Nazlı, 2019; Mccarthy, 2018). While these studies recognize the importance of political structures on Islamist CSOs' response to the refugee 'crisis,' they mainly focus on Islamist CSOs and their supporting role to the state's response to the 'crises.' However, methodologically, comparative studies of competing actors (i.e. Islamists vs. secular CSOs) may reveal the differences between these actors and to what extent context influences their roles in response to the refugee 'crisis.' Through historical review and comparative study of an Islamist and secular CSOs, this chapter showed how the government inhibits the adaptation and integration of refugees through pressuring and constraining secular CSOs' activities.

CONCLUSION

This chapter argued that although Islamic CSOs have been notably active in the field of refugee relief since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the importance of secular CSOs has become more apparent over the years. To explain why the shift occurred, this chapter first reviewed the historical evolvement of the state-civil society relationship in Turkiye. The historical research enabled me to present the political structure's mechanisms to control the civic space (i.e., laws, repression, and financing). This chapter also showed that Turkish civil society has been bifurcated as Islamic vs. secular. As the

power within the state undergoes a transformation over time, its relationship with different segments of civil society also changes. The government fetters one segment of civil society while facilitating the other, depending on the un/alignment between the government's preference and CSOs' orientation. Therefore, Turkish civil society has tended to be dependent on state institutions. The historical review also showed that there have been some turning points over the years that either the state reduce its control over civil society, allowing the disadvantaged segments of civil society to be more independent from state institutions — first years of the DP administration, post-1960 coup d'état, the post-1980 period, the EU accession process — or the civil society successfully extended the civic space by responding the needs in the crises — the 1999 Earthquake and refugee 'crisis.' Yet, each time the civic space widened as the segment of civil society, whose orientation does not accord with the preferences of the power within the state, successfully break the state dependency, the state power hampered it through its controlling mechanisms.

This chapter then drew on a comparison of the refugee relief work of an Islamic (IHH) and a secular (STL) CSO between 2013 to 2019 to explain why secular CSOs have grown in importance in the following years of the civil war. It has examined the IHH and STL's projects and funders. This examination showed that while the IHH, as an Islamic CSO, has served as an assistant to the government in the basic and immediate needs of refugees in the border cities and camps, the STL, as a secular CSO, works towards refugees' adaption and integration in addition to their basic and immediate needs. Therefore, as the number of refugees outside camps increased, the importance of secular CSOs' works increased. Moreover, while the IHH partners with state institutions, and other state-aligned CSOs in Turkiye, the STL's partnerships and funds entirely depend on international funding. In this sense, the STL exemplifies how the increasing international funds for refugee-related projects led to more civic space and less state dependency of secular CSOs in Turkiye. This book chapter showed that a large increase in international funding for refugee relief allowed secular CSOs to break the prevailing pattern of state dependency in Turkiye and gain importance in refugee relief work. Nevertheless, the state tradition of controlling CSOs with a different orientation than the power within the state continues to limit their activities.

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11

Migration and Assimilation Challenges: A Case Study of the Partition Refugees and Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

Sadia Khanum*

ABSTRACT

Pakistan came into being in 1947 as a result of a very traumatic partition of India, millions of Muslims forced to leave India for Pakistan and an equal number of Hindus and Sikhs compelled to leave their homes and belonging in Pakistan and migrated to India. Peaceful co-existence of centuries became a tale of the past when partition was announced and the world witnessed a terrifying outbreak of religious hatred and violence between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. Millions left their homes and crossed borders in search of peace and better life. The partition refugees' journey to the new state was full of turbulence from the start and it changed the country's political, social and economic orientation altogether. The assimilation process has been a roller coaster ride and the refugees played a significance role in the nation-building process of Pakistan. The mass migration of Afghans to Pakistan was another traumatic case where Afghan refugees were forced to take shelter in Pakistan after the former Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan hosted up to three million Afghan refugees with its very limited resources and that event has a long lasting imprint on Pakistan's state and society. Afghan refugees (mostly Pushtoon ethnicity) share religious and cultural bonds with Pakistan's Pushtoon population however, despite close religious and cultural similarities Afghan refugees could

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not assimilate in Pakistan's society completely due to the compulsions of the modern nation-state. Pakistan witnessed many social, economic and political problems because of Afghanistan's troubled socio-political situation and by hosting a big number of Afghan refugees for decades. This paper provides insights into 1947 and 1979 migrations to Pakistan by comparing and analyzing the context, statistics and consequences of two different nations migrating to Pakistan (Indian Muslims and Afghan Muslims).

INTRODUCTION

The concept of the modern nation state is very fascinating as it rationalizes the human quest to own and manage the territory they belong to. The twentieth century world witnessed the materialization of the ideal of nation state in its fullest, especially after World War I and II when many nation states came into being out of the ashes of old empires and as a result of decolonization. However, the zest of owning a state soon diluted or posed some real tough challenges for the newly independent/decolonized nations. Freedom movements were either violent in nature or turned violent on D-day. India's partition and the birth of two nation states, India and Pakistan, was the similar kind of occurrence. The freedom from the British Empire was the result of a constitutional struggle without violence or bloodshed but the plan of partition turned out to be one of the most violent events of modern history. India was divided in August 1947 and millions of people were forced to leave their homes and businesses and migrated to Pakistan and India as a result of bloody riots and mass killing. The new states were not prepared for receiving and managing millions of refugees, especially the new state of Pakistan, which faced acute financial and management problems in rehabilitating refugees. The rehabilitation of refugees from ethnically diverse backgrounds was the real challenge as assimilation was not easy and meeting the high hopes and expectations of people from the new state needed highly skilled governing bodies and institutions and Pakistan unlike India lacked in both. This chapter explores and analyzes how well Pakistan could manage post-independence inward migration from India and the different socio-economic and political challenges it faced.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 created another challenging crisis for Pakistan as it had to host 3 million Afghan refugees in its limited resources and in the case of Afghan refugees the assimilation process was more difficult legally and socially as compared to partition period's refugee influx (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont, 1988). Afghan refugees despite their religious and cultural similarities with Pakistan's pashtun population are a different nation and belong to a different state hence, state and society hosting and facilitating them since 1979 but resistance is there to their legal and cultural assimilation in society.

In case of the partition refugees, the international community and major powers did not help the two newly formed countries of India and Pakistan. Pakistan hardly received any international assistance as the European countries were in their own post War reconstruction and rehabilitation. The United States also was less interested as South Asia had no direct stakes in the newly ignited Cold War between the US and the USSR, hence, the US' missing 'strategic interests', could not motivate them to assist the newly established state in managing such a huge human crisis (Gatrell, 2013). On the other hand, the Afghan refugees' exodus directly concerned the US and allies as it was the result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, therefore, they provided financial assistance to Pakistan in managing 3 million Afghan refugees in different regions of Pakistan especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Schöch, 2008).

The chapter does not focus much on theoretical and conceptual debates on refugees and migration but an effort to highlight the challenges of Pakistan in managing inward migration and refugees' influxes. Emphasis is on comparing the state and society response to two similar (refugee) crises with different ideological attachments. The partition refugees were welcomed and rehabilitated with the spirit of nationalism (though some ethnicities were more privileged than others) while the Afghan refugees were treated as guests and Muslim brethren in trouble with an expectation that they would leave for their home countries once the crisis over.

The first part of the chapter discusses partition refugees, their rehabilitation process challenges in a multiethnic society of Pakistan. In the second part, the focus of discussion and analysis is Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their socio-economic problems.

METHODOLOGY

Available data from authentic government and non-government agencies and individuals have been consulted and interpreted to understand the challenges of assimilation of three different groups of refugees; 1. Partition refugees of 1947 were divided into two groups, Punjabis and non-Punjabis/Urdu speaking refugees, 2. Afghan refugees who started arriving in Pakistan post the 1979 Soviet invasion. The qualitative research method has been applied by using census reports, UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Government of Pakistan's five years plans and other national and international investigation data on refugees' socio-political and economic status in Pakistan. It is a descriptive and analytical study of exiting literature and data on the partition refugees and the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Deductive method of deriving a conclusion has been practiced in this research and the focus is to understand why there was/is a difference of attitude in dealing with the partition refugees and Afghan refugees despite the fact that both share religious, cultural and historical similarities with the local population.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF ASSIMILATION

The concept of classic assimilation theory asserts that immigrants adopt the culture of the native society through a linear process of convergence (Park, 1928). The theory emphasizes the importance of immigrant assimilation for preserving social cohesion and views it as a one-way process toward upward social mobility (Scholten, 2011). However, it has been criticized for not accounting for the diverse experiences of immigrant groups and ignoring the influence of contextual factors (Tubergen, 2006).

The theory of segmented assimilation was introduced in the 1990s as a modification of traditional assimilation theories (Portes & Zhou). According to this theory, the assimilation experiences of immigrants may differ based on their socioeconomic status and other factors like human capital and family structure (Xie & Greenman, 2011. The theory acknowledges that assimilation outcomes can vary greatly between generations. Segmented assimilation refers to a situation where one group is better equipped to assimilate more easily (Boyd, 2002).

Another opinion regarding assimilation is that the push for it may conceal hostile attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, viewing them as unwelcome competitors for limited resources (Danso & Grant, 2000. Such attitudes can negatively affect the integration experiences of these populations in the host country (Esses et al., 2001.

The study would explore the case of refugees Pakistan had received and tried to assimilate them through different incentives (ideological, economic and socio-political) or failed to assimilate then for the lack of incentives and motivation on state and society level.

THE PARTITION REFUGEES' DEMOGRAPHICS

India's not very thoughtful partition by the British colonists resulted in the mass migration of Muslims from India to Pakistan and of Hindu and Sikh from Pakistan to India. As a result of poorly planned partition and demarcation of new political borders, catastrophic violence in different regions of India and Pakistan broke out, especially in Punjab. Communal violence led to the 20th century's biggest mass migration as it is estimated that "up

Map 11.1 South Asia *circa* 1947

Source: Zamindar, V. F. (2010). The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia. Columbia University Press., p.xvi.

to one million people were killed during the violence in 1947, and around 50,000 women were abducted. Some 12 million people were displaced in the divided province of Punjab alone, and up to 20 million in the subcontinent as a whole" (Vazira, 2013, p. 1). For India too, it was difficult to manage these refugees but since it's administrative and financial machinery was functional from day one therefore they managed it well, on the other hand for Pakistan such a huge exodus overwhelmed and overburdened the already stressed newly decolonized state in absence of any government and experienced men power. Pakistan's insufficient economic resources also added to troubles further. The horror of partition and refugee crisis kept haunting Pakistan for a long time economically and politically. It was a huge task to convert devastated masses into a nation.

The refugees came to Pakistan from different regions of India and they had multiethnic and multilingual belongings. Mostly Muslim population of central India or Hindi Bellt migrated to Pakistan. They were all Muslims and welcomed by the Muslims in Pakistan, however this is worth keeping in mind that migrated refugees had different ethnic and cultural backgrounds from the Pakistani Muslims and despite sharing the faith and

Map 11.2 Refugee Movements

Source: Peter Gatrell. (2013). *The Making of the Modern Refugee*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 152.

cause they all wanted to keep their identity, culture, language and ethnicity alive (Bharadwaj, Khwaja, & Mian, 2009)   It took a long time for the refugees to assimilate into newly established Pakistan's multiethnic and multilingual society.

Majority of the partition refugees rehabilitated in Sindh and Punjab provinces of Pakistan as these two regions' climate and socio-economic and political environment was suitable for them and similar to their old homelands in India. The refugees, who opted Sindh province especially metropolitan Karachi for residence and livelihood, are called muhajirs. Their presence had changed the demography of Sindh in general and Karachi/Hyderabad particularly. The term Muhajir (people who left their homes and migrated to another place for the sake of protecting their faith, peace and lives (Khan & Manzoor, 2018) initially was just a term for newly arrived Indian Muslims however, it gradually became an expression of common identity to unite and protect the political and economic rights of the community in Pakistan. The multiethnic and multilingual urban Sindh gradually proved a tough region for the Urdu speaking immigrants hence, their Muhajir identity in politics and economy survived to date. On the other hand, it was easier for the Punjabi immigrants to assimilate perfectly in West Punjab as they did not face any cultural, linguistic, or historical ethnic differences. They did not insist on keeping their Muhajir identity for long and started their lives with the new identity of Punjabis and Pakistanis.

Post-Partition mass migration from Indian Punjab increases the population of urban West Punjab in Pakistan manifolds. Many of the big towns and cities that had the most concentration of refugees became tremendously populous; the population of Lahore increased 46 per cent, Rawalpindi 40 per cent, Lyallpur 70 per cent and Montgomery 44 per cent (Helbock, 1975). Pakistan's Punjab province accommodated more than 4 million refugees. Overall in Pakistan, every tenth person was a refugee and in big cities like Karachi and Lahore every fifth person was a refugee (Gatrell, 2013).

After the above mentioned brief review of refugees' demographic and ethnic/linguistic origins, next is the mapping of socio-economic and political assimilation and challenges of refugees in newly independent Pakistan.

ASSIMILATION CHALLENGES OF THE URDU SPEAKING REFUGEES

Locals welcomed the partition refugees generously as they accepted them as part of their newly established nation-state and highly admired their sacrifices in the making of Pakistan however; it was not the same in case of authorities as managing them in already a resource scarce country was a huge challenge. The refugees also migrated from India to Pakistan with high expectations from the new country in terms of socio-economic and socio-political acceptance and opportunities.Karachi's (the country capital that time) demographic changes, because of the overwhelmed number of refugees it received, created some severe management problems for the local authorities in accommodating the partition refugees and that had become a very serious ethnic and political dispute in the long run (Rizvi, 2008). The Urdu speaking migrants felt discriminated and that is how their political representation in the form of Muhajir Qaumi Movement later MutahidaQaumi Movement (MQM) got momentum in urban Sindh's political arena (Talbot, 2007). Some years passed and the local population had also started expressing their socio-economic and political concerns as the refugees' share in the economy and decision making was considered unfair to the locals. If we see the statistics of demographic change in Sindh before and after partition and mass migration, we come to know that Sindhi speaking locals decreased considerably in Karachi and replaced by Urdu speaking migrants from India.

Table 11.1 Demographic Changes due to Partition

	1941	1951
Population	450,000	1,137,000
Sindhi spoken as mother tongue (%)	61.2	8.6
Urdu spoken as mother tongue (%)	6.3	50
Hindu population (%)	51	2
Muslim population (%)	42	96

Source: A. Hasan, M. Masooma. (2010). Urban SlumsReports: the Case of Karachi, Pakistan. , p. 3. Retrieved from https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/Karachi.pdf on 22-09-2022

The mass migration of 0.6 million people from India to Karachi changed the city's population by 161 % and the cultural and ethnic orientation as well (Talbot, 2007).

The result of such demographic transformation was as usual not very pleasant socially and politically; the local population started using the

term 'Muhajir' in negative connotation over the years, as Oskar Verkaaik observes: 'Once it had meant "welcome". Now it meant: "you are not from here" (Verkaaik, 1994, p. 13). The term Muhajir frequently become an identity of the Urdu speaking refugees and by 1980s the formation of the Muhajir identity based political activism started. Consequently, Muhajir Qaumi Movement and later Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) came into being and the Urdu speaking refugees have had their own political representation in the provincial and national legislature.

The local Sindhi elites considered the new political and economic stakeholders a threat to their monopoly and regarded their advances as a shift of power away from the old centre Sindh towards the new capital of Karachi. It was not merely a concern as Karachi gradually not only becomes the economic hub of Pakistan but also Sindh's and the Urdu speaking refugees also claimed their fare share in the city. The refugees also include a business class who migrated to Pakistan in the search of better opportunities and a business friendly environment where they could work without any religious or nationalist hostilities from Hindu rivals. They prospered in new country but their aspiration and successes and local population's insecurities created a complex situation. The refugees soon became an oligarchy, established good links with the Pakistani military, and benefited from government subsidies (Ansari, 2005).

New colonies built to accommodate the enormous number of refugees in Karachi in 1940s and 1950s such as Nazimabad (Ansari, 2005). Pakistan's government hired internationally acclaimed engineers to construct new settlements and refugees named those new colonies and district after their ancestral villages, or their leaders, freedom fighters or reformers (Gatrell, 2013).

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STATUS OF THE PARTITION REFUGEES

Pakistan's government facilitated rehabilitation of refugees and created employment and business opportunities. The quota system was introduced to facilitate the downtrodden groups and ethnicities and subsequently, refugees' participation in politics, bureaucratic management and private businesses increased manifold. The Muhajir community in Karachi was only the 3 % of

the country's total population but they had nearly 21 % of the jobs. The One Unit Plan initiated by the government in November 1954 to create a balance between the East and West Pakistan had further benefited the Muhajir community as their share in civil services increased to 47 percent (Kennedy, 1991). The big industries were in their control as they had the required qualification and experiences. Muhajirs held many top positions in the civilian bureaucracy, public enterprises, and the military (Kennedy, 1991).

The rehabilitation of the Punjabi refugees was a much easier task as they share the same ethnic, linguistic and cultural traits with the host population in Pakistan's (West) Punjab and their expertise in agriculture and textile industry made them one of the finest labor force in the country. They suffered the panics and traumas of the partition but once settled it was easier for them to resume their traditional sources of earning in their new country (Rao, 1967).

Pakistan's Five-Year Plan (1955–60) financed the housing schemes for its new population in the urban Punjab and government encouraged people to own and cultivate lands (Jamil, 2019). Refugees also took benefit of government schemes and established new factories in major urban centers of Punjab, the textile industry had started flourishing (Vernant, 1953). The refugees set up micro level businesses and shared the burden of the new state. They contributed to the services and production sector and revitalized the society's cultural domain by introducing new variants in food and dresses (Rahman & Schendel, 2003). The partition related traumas were bitter and long lasting for all the refugees however, the blessing in disguise was the socio-economic and political transformation and new opportunities for the masses to bring the change in their own lives and contribute in overall state and society's growth and development. Industrial growth in Karachi, Lahore, Sialkot, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi and agricultural reforms and prosperity were the result of new ideas and services from the people with diverse background. The zest to change the destiny and hard work resulted into the 'Green Revolution' that later contributed in country's economic growth (Gatrell, 2013).

The challenges of peaceful co-existence of different ethnic groups especially in Sindh had created chaotic situation as migrations to Karachi and urban Sindh were contested by locals and Muhajirs both in 1970s (Shah, Sareen, 2019). Pashtun, Punjabi and Afghan migration to urban

centers of the province caused ethnic tensions as each ethnicity claimed their stakes in economy and politics. The competition among these groups had led to some serious law and order problems and rioting. Some serious clashes between the Muhajir and Sindhi communities took place when quota in government jobs was fixed for the rural areas people and local Sindhi population was the beneficiary of the new quotas/reservation and Muhajir community did not take it well that later caused political confrontation and the rise of MQM (Baig, 2008).

The Muhajir community had no political party of their own before 1970s and they trusted mostly religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-i-Ulema- Pakistan (JUP) for their no ethnic agenda and religious representation (Effendi, Hussain, 2018). The ethnic differences and their socio-economic consequences resulted into a separate political party for the Urdu speaking Muhajir under Altaf Hussain's leadership. He emerged as the powerful voice for Muhajir rights in Sindh.

During the Cold War period, under the dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq, the Muhajir political and ethnic strife for the protection of their rights intensified. Bihari and Afghan refugees' arrival along with Pashtoon and Punjabi economic and political stakes in Karachi and urban Sindh created a sense of economic and political deprivation among Muhajirs. That was the formal beginning of the "Muhajir Nationalism" in Pakistan ("Profiling the Violence in Karachi," 2009). The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran affected the overall law and order situation in the region and an environment of militancy prevailed throughout 1980s and 1990s. MQM's political struggle was also got its militant orientations that "managed to successfully weave subversive urban youth culture, with aspects of gender, leisure and global youth culture, into an ethnic religious ideology of protest and revolt, thereby contributing to political crises that seriously undermine the legitimacy of the state (Verkaaik, 2004, p.8)".

The ethno-militant orientation of MQM costs it big in long run in national politics as it could not win support among masses outside urban Sindh and in the second decade of the twenty first century it splited into two and lost its glory.

Punjabi-speaking immigrants or those who had decided to settle down in Pakistan's Punjab find it convenient to support and join Pakistan's already mainstream political parties. They did not form their own

separate political party as the similarity in culture, ethnicity and sources of income aligned them with the local population in their demands and aspirations.

In sum, the assimilation process of the partition immigrants was easier as their displacement resulted from the nation-making and nation-building process. Difficulties and challenges of accommodating such a big number of new arrivals were numerous for economically and politically instable new country but peoples' determination and the sense of ownership made it possible in Sindh and Punjab mainly. The "us" vs. "other" debate generated slowly and the common identity of religion and common enemy (India in this case) did not let them part their ways like East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Shared identity, language and culture made the process of assimilation easier for the new arrivals.

The case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is similar to and different from the partition refugee in many respects. Pakistan welcomed 3 million Afghan refugees post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 for the sake of common religious affiliation, cultural similarities and common geo-strategic interests, however, the assimilation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan proved to be a difficult task in long run. After decades, they remained outsiders for the local population and could not have citizenship or equal rights in the country. In this part we will see the reasons behind their dissimilation.

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 1500 mile long border and it has been quite a common practice for common Afghans to cross into Pakistan since 1947. Both sides of the Pak-Afghan border are home to the Pashtuns and keep crossing the border for social and economic reasons. (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency [PILDAT], n.d., 2019) They have families and businesses across border and the porous nature of border make crossing easier, however, the number of such visitors and their stay remain limited and for a short period of time.

The influx of the Afghan refugees to Pakistan started in the early 1970s when the political situation in Afghanistan turned uncertain after Daud's coup. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 triggered large-scale migration of Afghans to Pakistan and the number of refugees grad-

ually increased since then (PILDAT, 2019). Zia regime in Pakistan was an ally of US in containing the Soviet Union and launching jihad against communism hence, the open door policy was introduced to welcome the Afghan refugees to Pakistan and that continued till early 2000s. The government and people of Pakistan received and facilitated the refugees with Islamic zest as there was an emotional environment of brotherhood based on religious teachings of generosity vis-à-vis Muslim muhajireen (refugees).

It is imperative to review a brief history of Pakistan's diplomatic and strategic ties with Afghanistan to understand the challenges of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

THE DURAND LINE CONTROVERSY AND PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR "STRATEGIC DEPTH" IN AFGHANISTAN

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations were not cordial because of territorial disagreement on the Durand Line (Kaura, 2017). The constant border skirmishes and conflict keep haunting their bilateral ties. Afghanistan has neither recognized the Durand Line nor accepted its legitimacy rather deal it as a legacy of the Great Britain's arbitrary rule. On the other hand, Pakistan insists that it inherited the 19th century consensual border settlement between King Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan and the British India and it is a legitimate border now (Kaura, 2017). The Durand Line controversy had further led to political and law and order turmoil in Pakistan because of Afghanistan's support for the Pakhtunistan movement (separate state for Pakhtuns or accession of Pakhtun inhabited area with Afghanistan) in Pakistan's Khayber Pakhtunkha (earlier the North West Frontier Province) Qassem & Durand, 2008). Afghanistan was the only country that voted against Pakistan's membership of the UN back in 1947 because of the Durand Line controversy. Pakistan had to defend its eastern border with India because of their territorial and ideological conflicts and the western border with Afghanistan becoming a battlefield was not a good idea for the nascent state of Pakistan's survival. In this context of Pakistan-Afghanistan instable ties when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan took it as an opportunity to send the message of friendship and help Afghan citizens in their time of need and introduced an open door policy for Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Easterly, Threlkeld, 2021). Pakistan's security policies to ensure its "Strategic Depth"

(Easterly, Threlkeld, 2021, pp. 8-9)) vis-à-vis Afghanistan to protect its western border had also contributed in the country's decision to play an active role in containing Soviet in Afghanistan and beyond. Olivier Roy elaborates Pakistan's strategic depth policy as "geo-strategic perspective, designed at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with the aim of asserting the regional influence of Pakistan by establishing a kind of control on Afghanistan through a fundamentalist, Pakhtun-dominated movement" (Roy, 2004, pp. 149-160). The security threat from a hostile Kabul made it easier for Pakistan to join the US-led alliance, utilize its strategically ideal location, and protect its national interests in the region. US' containment policy was an opportunity for Pakistan to turn a hostile land into a friendly one and for this Pakistan become a transit for US financial and arms supply to the Mujahideen. Pakistan's quest to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan can be understood in the traumatic experience of losing its Eastern Wing (East Pakistan now Bangladesh) back in 1971. Zia regime planned and executed the idea of the 'strategic depth' keeping in mind the arch rival India and was best achieved thought to accomplish it by "building an Islamic block [sic] between the Arabia Sea and the Urals." (Reetz, 1993, pp, 28-56). Pakistan continued to pursue the same strategy after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan to ensure a Pakistan friendly Kabul regime.

Pakistan then had to accept a huge influx of refugees as a strategic blessing as a big number of Afghans presence in Pakistan multiplied Islamabad's bargaining leverage with Kabul on geo strategically important issues which was almost impossible before 1970s (Threlkeld & Easterly, 2021). Pakistan's geostrategic goals and shared culture facilitated the arrival of Afghan refugees in the country however; the side effects of hosting such a huge number of refugees for society are critical in nature and orientation. Afghan refugees' almost 50 years stay in Pakistan created so many socio-economic and socio-political concerns for the host state and society.

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN SINCE 1979: DEMOGRAPHY

Due to lack of proper registration and record we do not have accurate figures of Afghan refugees number in Pakistan since 1979. A rough estimate, however, suggests the figure of Afghan refugees in Pakistan since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was around 3.5 to 4 million (Yusuf, 1990). The refugees were scattered in different cities and towns, majority however

Table 11.2 Statistics on Afghan refugees registered in Pakistan, 31 December 1988

	Camps		Population					Average Size	
			Total		Adults (%)				
Area	N	%	N (000 s)	%	M	F	Children (%)	Camp+	Family
Pakistan	345	100	3,271	100•0	23	26	51	9,000	6•20
NWFP	251	73	2,137	68•4	23	26	51	9,000	6•22
Settled Districts	155	45	1,366	41•8	22	26	52	9,000	5•87
Abbotabad	18	5	143	4•4	15	23	62	8,000	6•02
Bannu	7	2	74	2•3	21	27	53	11,000	6•89
Chitral	3	*	38	1•2	23	31	46	13,000	5•81
Dir	10	3	90	2•7	19	28	53	9,000	5•70
D.I. Khan	11	3	88	2•7	21	28	52	8,000	6•77
Kohat	18	5	230	7•0	25	28	46	13,000	7•15
Mansehra	9	3	72	2•2	13	20	68	8,000	7•06
Mardan	17	5	107	3•3	21	27	52	6,000	5•92
Peshawar-I	31	9	283	8•7	23	26	50	9,000	4•88
Peshawar-II	29	8	226	6•9	25	24	51	8,000	5•41
Swat	2	*	14	0•4	18	29	53	7,000	5•55
Tribal Agencies	96	28	870	26•6	25	27	48	9,000	6•85
Bajaur	25	7	198	6•1	24	29	47	8,000	6•95
Kurram	34	10	348	10•6	29	28	43	10,000	6•85
Malakand	3	*	55	1•7	14	26	60	18,000	6•95
Mohmand	2	*	16	0•5	29	32	40	8,000	6•00
N. Waziristan	24	7	184	5•6	25	23	51	8,000	7•03
Orakzai	2	*	13	0•4	20	37	43	7,000	6•77
S. Waziristan	6	2	57	1•7	21	24	55	9,000	6•17
Baluchistan	77	22	836	25•5	23	27	50	11,000	6•27
Chagai	21	6	172	5•3	23	27	50	8,000	6•02
Gulistan	12	3	172	5•2	23	27	50	14,000	6•48
Loralai	10	3	105	3•2	23	27	50	11,000	6•20
Pishin	19	6	169	5•2	23	27	50	9,000	6•59
Quetta	5	1	121	3•7	23	27	50	24,000	5•93
Zhob	5	1	55	1•7	23	27	50	11,000	6•06
Chaman	5	1	42	1•3	23	27	50	8,000	6•86
Punjab**	16	5	180	5•5	16	23	61	11,000	5•67
Sind ***	1	*	19	0•6	24	28	58	19,000	6•23

* Less than 1%.
** Kot Chandna, District Mianwali.
*** Karachi.
+ To nearest thousand.

Source: Farhat Yusuf. (1990). Size And –Sociodemographic Characteristics Of The Afghan Refugee Population In Pakistan. J. biosoc. Sci, 22., pp. 269-270.

was located in the villages and urban centers of the NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. In Sindh, Afghan refugees big number has been residing and working (trade and business) in Karachi and their number gone as high as one million.

Map 11.3 Location of Afghan refugees in Pakistan

After many decades of Afghan refugees' stay in Pakistan, it has become their home as generations born and brought-up in different cities, towns and villages and many of them have acquired national identity cards. Their marriages with locals have further made the assimilation process easier for them. Pashtun/Pakhtun refugees' integration in local Pashtun culture was never a problem as they share the same language, culture and religion.

The Government of Pakistan and the UNHCR conducted a formal census to get the accurate states of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and their demographic location in March 2002 (Redden, 2005). The census was conducted in 2005 and data revealed that about 3 million Afghan refugees were living in Pakistan. 42% of them were concentrated in camps and 58% in urban areas (Redden, 2005). Pashtuns were in overwhelming majority as per ethnic orientation of refugees and constituted 81% of the Afghans in Pakistan. Other ethnicities were in smaller percentages like Ta-

jiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and Turkmen. The census data further revealed that the big number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan came immediately after the Soviet invasion which constitutes over 50 % in 1979 and 1980 alone. As per Redden, the census data reveals that a considerable number of Afghan refugees were born in Pakistan.

LEGAL STATUS AND REGISTRATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES AS PER THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN

The constitution of Pakistan does not have any provision for migrants or refugees hence; there are no constitutional protections for refugees and this also reflects in country's laws and law executing agencies behavior towards refugees. The perception among masses that refugees are illegal migrants and have economic interests (feeding on their tax money, sharing their insufficient resources) also contribute in adverse societal behavior. In the absence of local laws for refugees and their rights, it becomes difficult for legal practitioners to deal with them justly and things become more critical sometimes when practitioners and law abiding agencies lack the knowledge of international law on refugees' rights. Afghan refugees in Pakistan often face this problem as the local criminal laws have generally been applied on their cases.

The absence of accurate record of refugees (number, location) was a major hurdle in legislation process earlier but after the 2005 census of Afghan refugees in Pakistan it becomes easier to get them register and issue them the Proof of Registration (PoR) cards in 2007 (("Proof of Registration Card," n.d.). The registration drive had allowed the card owners to extend their stay in Pakistan until the end of 2009 (Tan, Baloch, Shahzad, & Ali, 2006).

The unregistered refugees however, still face derogatory treatment from the security agencies and the harassment or could be deportation by authorities. According to a survey, conducted by three international refugee organizations the Norwegian Council for Refugees, International Rescue Committee and ISCOS, there were some technical negligence in the registration process, "the registration was marred by problems like lack of guidance, transport, translators, female registration and women photographers. It mentioned other problems like Afghan infants not being included in the census, unsupportive registration staff, and problems with

technology, bribery, corruption and overcrowding" (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009, pp. 12-14). Despite these problems, the PoR card is a relief and security for them, As the Human Rights Commission further reports that, "59.6% of Afghans felt that the card represented protection from police harassment, suggesting that the current levels of police harassment is considered a problem and they feared that it would increase if they do not register." The registration process grants the Afghan refugee free movement and freedom to work on daily wages however, PoR card holders could not have government sector employment rights, purchasing and owning property or in some cases accesses to public sector hospitals. They cannot apply for citizenship as Pakistan's constitution does not have any provision that approves refugees' nationality.

The government of Pakistan in 2017 had introduced the Comprehensive Policy on Voluntary Repatriation and Management of Afghan Nationals. Under this policy Afghan refugees were granted "Afghan Citizen Cards" (ACCs). In extension to this policy a considerable number of Afghan refugees were registered and provided with ACCs in 2022 (Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees Punjab, n.d., UNHCR, 2022).

AFGHAN REFUGEES: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN

The goodwill and warm welcome of Afghan refugees in Pakistan from the state and society in 1979 and throughout the 1980s turned into a cold behavior as the period of stay extended and international support was suspended(United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). Pakistan's economic constraints were the major reason behind the change of attitude. UNCHR and the World Food Programme suspended the food supplies to refugees in 1995 (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). Pakistan came under severe economic sanctions because of its nuclear program and it further decreased all kind of international aid/assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Pakistan's economic constraint created a kind of hostile environment against refugees as their presence was burdening the local economy and management. The land utilized for the refugee camps is highly valued and the population bulge in Pakistan required more vacant land for housing and cultivating activities and then refugees' businesses competition with locals also cause negative reaction among the citizens (Amparado, Dempster, & Laghari, 2021).

Pakistan is home and the source of livelihood to these million of refugees for last 40+ years. Despite struggles they are still able to find many skilled based jobs in industry, agriculture and the construction sector of Pakistan and are the source of cheap labour (Boesen, 1990). They have their investments in transport sector and their direct stakes in real estate businesses are the cause of concerns for locals as skyrocketing rental houses/businesses prices are out of reach for them now.

The Afghan refugees' involvement in illegal cross-border trade causing the huge losses to country's economy; agricultural products smuggling to Pakistan often causes shortage of everyday commodities like wheat, rice and sugar (Weinbaum, 1993).

Afghan refugees' in large have brought their livestock with them that number more than 2.5 million herd of livestock (i.e. herds of sheep, goats, camels, cattle and yaks), Pakistan's already scarce forest sector has been badly affected by grazing and cutting of trees, pasture and greenbelts (Menemenciog, 1982). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees brought with them 45,000 camels and 25,000 donkeys as their source of income 9Boesen, 1990). The use of green areas for grazing has also created resentment against refugees among locals. The cutting of forests was resulted in land erosion in the mountainous areas of Pakistan, landslides and large-scale havoc and disruption of communications (Samdani, 1994). The statement of Akhtar Mengal (politician from Balochistan) illustrates the situation, "If we are unable to provide jobs to our people, how can we lift the load of surplus refugees?" (Amparado, Dempster, & Laghari, 2021).

The deteriorated security situation in 1990s and post 9/11 further raised a question on refugees' presence in Pakistan (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2001). Shi'i- Sunni conflicts and rivalries were the result of Iran's Islamic Revolution and the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan and refugees' arrival in Pakistan. The sectarianism in Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas (Pakistan's tribal belt) intensified with the arrival of Afghan refugees (Rizvi, 1984). Along with sectarian conflict, terrorism and other crimes also increased manifold. Many security agencies compiled investigation reports blamed illegal immigrants role in terrorist activities in Pakistan. A report by Pakistani government claimed that the Afghan refugee camps were involved in 90% of terrorist activities (Am-

parado, Dempster, & Laghari, 2021). A big number of Afghan refugees in urban and rural areas are outside the registration process and it gives birth to security concerns for the country. The scattered refugees outside camps have become the reason of socio-political and economic tensions.

REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

The withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan in August 2021 has accelerated refugees' insecurities and Pakistan is expected to receive more refugees. Hosting 2.5 million refugees (registered and unregistered) already with struggling devastated economy without any substantial support from international community is a tiresome job. All the efforts to repatriate Afghan refugees to their home country proved unsuccessful in the recent past. Every time government of Pakistan extends the deadline for repatriation without much success in convincing Afghan refugees to go back to Afghanistan. Some 1.52 million Afghan returned to home back in 2002 after the fall of Taliban regime but a big number of them (82%) refused to go back to Afghanistan voluntarily because of insecurity and uncertain economic and political conditions (Amparado, Dempster, & Laghari, 2021). In 2007, the registered refugees with a PoR card who refused to repatriate were given three years time to stay in Pakistan till December 2009 however, deadline was further extended to 2012 (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 2009).

The return of Taliban regime in Kabul and rigid gender rules (no education for girls and women, dress code and limited job opportunities) have further discouraged refugees to return to their homes. Pakistan on the

Graph 11.1 Voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan since 2002

Source: UNHCR. Retrieved Oct. 16, 2022. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/pak

other hand is willing to repatriate them as smooth as possible because of international pressure and conventional norms at home.

The process of assimilation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan could not materialized unlike the partition refugees of 1947. The gist of all the discussion, analysis and comparison is that despite many commonalities (ideological, ethnic, cultural and historical) the concept of "us" vs "others" embedded in the modern nation-state played its role in an unsuccessful assimilation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The territorial dispute of the Durand line (since 1947), political conflicts between two states (Afghanistan and Pakistan) and belonging to two different states made it difficult to accommodate the Afghan refugees in Pakistan permanently.

CONCLUSION

Pakistan's post independence journey had remained quite bumpy from the start. Accommodating millions of partition refugees immediately after carving the new border was a troublesome and time-consuming procedure, and the country had to face the crisis of Afghan refugees within 33 years of its formation. Poor economy, struggling democracy and turbulent border security kept the government and society on toes. The partition refugees were comparatively easier to accommodate and relocate since they were part of the nation-making and nation building process though the process itself was full of tests and trials. Scarcity of resources and complex politics exposed the ethnic cleavage of the newly established nation state. The competition and insecurity of new arrivals and locals created a chaos in country's economic hub Karachi and other urban centers of Sindh as the Urdu speaking migrants and local Sindhis could not come to terms in division of resources and authority. Things got further complicated when Pushtoon, Punjabi, Bihari and Afghan also moved to urban Sindh in search of better life and opportunities. The confrontation over resources changed the socio-political orientation of the province for good; however, the diversity further proliferated the idea of equal representation of all ethnic groups and deliberating and resolving their grievances and concerns in parliament. The assimilation process was difficult but constitutional guarantees enabled citizens to claim their rights through constitutional means.

The assimilation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan has been a tough task for government and society for two reasons. One, the concept of

nation-state does not fit well with accommodating refugees without conferring citizenship to them and Pakistan's constitution does not have any provision granting full citizenship rights to non-Pakistanis. Two, despite having similar culture, language and geography nationalist sentiments and socio-economic stakes do not let the host society accept refugees part of them unlike partition refugees. Internal and external security imperatives also played a role in making the assimilation difficult. The government of Pakistan tried its best to facilitate refugees within the given resources and constitutional arrangements and people of Pakistan also initially welcomed them and open their door for the troubled helpless Muslim brethren and neighbors. However, the extended stay of Afghan refugees in Pakistan gradually exhausted the host country, especially when the international community also gave up on them and left a major burden on the struggling Pakistan's economy. The overpopulated country with scarce resources could not bear the burden for long and same happens in case of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The competition over resources gradually awaken the resentment among locals, meanwhile the state also could not introduce better solution of assimilation of refugee because of local compulsions. 1.5 to 2 million refugees still reside in different regions of Pakistan and there is no certainty whether they would be able to return to their home country or the host country would promote them to full citizenship in the future.

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Migration Politics and Policies

International Migration in The World of Nation-States: Implications, Challenges, and Policy Responses

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ABSTRACT

This chapter intends to survey and systematize contrasting policy responses that nation-states produce when managing migration flows and mitigating migration-related effects and challenges. From the beginning of known human history, migration has been a potent force for cultural, political, and social change, but in the last couple of centuries, cross-country migration has been taking place in a unique context, defined by the dominance of national statehood as the principle of polity organization. The ideology of nationalism treats a nation as the principal source of political legitimacy and postulates that national boundaries, notwithstanding variations in precise criteria for their delineation, should ultimately coincide with political boundaries. Consequently, various shared characteristics, such as similarities in language, history, and culture, which foster the feeling of connectedness and commonality of political fate among co-nationals, play a vital role in the delineation and maintenance of national boundaries. In this context, nation-building models and ideologies are tasked with addressing international migration as the latter inevitably affects the socio-cultural makeup of the population in destination countries (and often in countries of origin). Relying on empirical cases from both Western and non-Western countries, this chapter explores how differences in nation-building models and principles

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correspond to different policies toward cross-border migration and migrant populations, such as migration restrictions, the segregation of migrants and denial of naturalization, ethnic preferences in migration policies, the expectation of linguistic and cultural assimilation, or the accommodation of cultural peculiarities of migrant groups. The chapter also discusses the role of nationalism and nation-building in facilitating forced migration through population exchanges, mass deportations, and ethnic cleansing. Finally, the chapter addresses cases in which sustained migration flows can sometimes turn into a driving force behind the alteration of fundamental nation-building principles in destination countries.

Keywords: International Migration, Nation-State, Nation-Building, State Policies Towards Migration

INTRODUCTION

Population movements and waves of migration have always been an integral part of human history, but inter-*national* migration is a recent phenomenon, which emerged only in the modern world, divided into nation-states. The last quarter of the 20th century was marked by continuing economic and cultural globalization, rapid expansion of transportation and communication networks, a surge in the number and scope of supranational organizations and institutions, and growing role of global non-state actors. Eventually, there seemed to be little space left for the nation-state and many of its outdated institutions in this new globalized world.

By the second decade of the 21st century, it has become apparent that the modern nation-state is much more resilient to the aforementioned forces; it remains the ultimate decision-making actor in important economic, social, political and security matters, especially in times of crises. In the spring of 2020, when multiple countries introduced travel bans and sealed their borders in an attempt to prevent the spread of coronavirus, the world once again witnessed the centrality of national institutions in regulating population movements. Moreover, policy decisions in this area haven't been dictated exclusively by utilitarian considerations and concerns. Such decisions are normatively charged and embedded in discourses on human rights, post-colonialism, as well as discourses on nation-building and national identity.

This book chapter surveys the relationship between discourses on nationhood and state policies towards migration and citizenship. It follows an analytical framework linking alternative ways of conceptualizing nationhood to policy responses in managing migration flows and mitigating associated effects and challenges. In terms of causality, this relationship between different types of discourse on nationhood and corresponding state responses to migration is by no means deterministic. Differences in prevailing conceptual models of nationhood contribute to framing debates about particular policy responses to existing and potential migrant populations. Policies themselves, however, are also shaped by other crucial factors, such as economic incentives, pressures and considerations, security concerns, overall state capacity, prevailing norms and values.

VARIETIES OF NATIONALISM AND MEMBERSHIP IN A NATION

Academic literature that engages with the topic of nationalism puts forward several alternative historical timelines, prerequisites for, and causes of the emergence of nation-states and their subsequent global dominance (Gellner, 2006; Anderson, 2006; Greenfeld,1992; Marx, 2005; Gorski 2000). Despite numerous disagreements, there exists a shared understanding that the nation-state as the institutional embodiment of nationalist ideology is a relatively recent phenomenon of European origin, which, among other things, was associated with the expansion of state institutions, development of modern bureaucracies, and a desire for cultural homogenization. In the 19th century, nationalism established itself as an ideological framework for state-building on the European continent (Hobsbawm, 1992; Kedourie 1993), and by the second half of the 20th century, nation-states became the hegemonic form of organizing political and social life of societies across the globe (Wimmer, & Feinstein, 2010).

The ideology of nationalism postulates that nation is the ultimate source of political legitimacy and state sovereignty. Therefore, every nation has a right for political self-determination in the form of an independent state, whose political boundaries should coincide with the national ones. Nations are imagined as horizontally organized and inherently limited communities (Anderson, 2006). The latter characteristic distinguishes nationalism from other ideologies with universal claims, such as socialism or religious fundamentalism. Establishing a political community based on

nationalism necessitates the demarcation of national boundaries and differentiation between those who are included as co-nationals and those who are excluded. The universal acceptance of the nation-state as the only conceivable form of modern statehood has resulted in a situation that from a formal point of view every independent country is treated as a nation-state whose citizens comprise the corresponding nation (Meyer et al., 1997). In this context, access to legal residency and citizenship for migrant populations becomes the legal equivalent of their membership in a nation. Consequently, the question of who can arrive and eventually obtain citizenship can become extremely important both at the conceptual level and at the level of policy choices.

Notwithstanding the universally shared fundamental principle of nationalism, particular nationalist ideologies and national-building projects are also the products of varying socio-political and historical conditions. This variation leads to differences in the ways in which particular nation-states define their nationhood, its limits and institutional realization. The most widely used distinction differentiates between 'western' and 'eastern` types of nationalisms (Kohn, 1965). 'Western' nationalism is claimed to be the organic outcome of increasing political participation in state institutions by the middle class, whereas 'eastern' nationalism is assumed to be the product of intellectuals who conceptualized nations as historical, cultural, and spiritual bonds. The former type is assumed to be rational, inclusionary, and based on agreed rules, while the latter type is emotional, ethnocentric, and based on the collective 'soul' of the people. A less normatively charged differentiation is between the 'old', state-centered nationalisms of pre-existing states, which began to redefine themselves in national terms around and after the French revolution, and the 'new', ethno-linguistic nationalism of stateless peoples, which became dominant towards the end of the 19th century after the unification of the German state against the backdrop of increasing centrifugal tendencies in ethnically heterogenous continental empires (Hobsbawm, 1992). In a multiethnic context, nation-building along ethnocultural lines necessitates 'unmixing' of ethnically diverse territories. For example, multiple forced migrations and population exchanges accompanied the nationalization of the Balkan Peninsula and the Ottoman Empire before, during and shortly after World War I (Veremis, 2017). Likewise, the deportation of ethnic Germans from

Czechoslovakia and Poland after World War II (Brubaker,1992), or expulsion of Serbs from Croatia in the 1990s (Tanner, 2010) were carried out with the aim of achieving an ethnically homogenous population make-up. The rise of an ethnocultural discourse on nationhood alone can be perceived as threat by ethnic minorities, who opt to leave in anticipation of discrimination and ethnic violence, as emigration of ethnic Russians from the re-nationalizing former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus demonstrates (Brubaker, 1996).

Distinction between civic and ethnic nationalisms remains widely used today, but it is criticized for inability to adequately address differences among temporal and spatial variations in nation-building and propensity to create a false perception that ethnocultural elements are only relevant for ethnic nationalisms (Yack, 2012). In reality, all nations can be traced to their historical ethnocultural cores, whose elements are creatively incorporated into the national identity and culture (Smith, 1987). In established states, such national culture is disseminated among population through various institutions, such as mass schooling (Gellner, 2006) and its ethnocultural origins become obscured. Historically, cultural homogenization was a necessary tool of nation-building. In many western countries, cultural and religious homogenization, which often took place in the form of expulsions, forced conversions and mass killings, preceded the adoption of supposedly 'benign' and 'inclusive' civic nationhood models (Marx, 2005). A more limiting interpretation of role of a common culture in the maintenance of national identity and a state's acceptance of and support for ethnocultural diversity is a relatively recent innovation, developed independently within two intellectual traditions. In the West, this reformulation was predicated on the rejection of racial and ethnic discrimination and took the form of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 1995). In the socialist world, new discourses on the 'brotherhood of peoples' and 'flourishing of nations' challenged the exploitations of some nations and ethnicities by others within the capitalist imperialist system (Slezkine, 1994; Martin, 2001; Akturk 2012).

Therefore, nationalist ideologies and discourses on nationhood can be located along the two following axes: the first axis corresponds to primary institutional focus being either on state institutions, such as constitutional arrangements and legal membership, or on ethnic institutions, such

as primordial ties and linguistic traditions; the second axis corresponds to the interpretation of cultural unity either in 'thick' and imposing manner or in a relatively 'thin' way when only minimal level of cultural cohesion and shared identity is expected. The combination of these two axes produces four 'ideal' types of discourses on nationhood. The relation between the four discourses and attitudes towards conditions for becoming co-nationals are presented below (**Table 12.1**).

Table 12.1 Variation in discourses on nationhood and attitudes towards conditions of membership in a nation for outsider

	National Culture	
Institutional Focus	**'thick'**	**'thin'**
State institutions	assimilation	inclusion
Ethnic institutions	exclusion	(multiple exclusions)

Source: Prepared by the author.

Discourses on nationhood that prioritize state institutions and a high degree of cultural unity do not preclude the possibility of expanding membership in the nation. Since national identity in nation-states, in which such a discourse is prevalent is practically synonymous with citizenship status, migrants can become co-nationals by obtaining citizenship through naturalization. However, new members are expected to fully assimilate into the national culture, even if this leads to the disappearance of their original ethnocultural identity. In contrast, discourses on nationhood that emphasize only minimal set of shared national values and even praise or celebrate cultural heterogeneity of citizens are open to new members joining the nation from amongst migrant population as long as they accept basic institutional arrangements of the state, such as its constitution and laws. Such nation-states often explicitly encourage their co-nationals of immigrant background to maintain their ethnocultural identities by creating dedicated institutions and introducing special legal arrangements.

Discourses on nationhood that focus on ethnic institutions and prioritize the role of ethnocultural core and common descent in the formation and maintenance of national identity effectively preclude the expansion of membership in the nation through the inclusion of migrant populations. Under normal circumstances, an individual must be born within the designated ethnocultural community to be considered a full member of the as-

sociated nation-state. In such nation-states, national belonging is conceptually distinct from citizenship status. Even autochthonous ethnocultural minority groups, who were present in such ethnocultural nation-states prior or at the time of their independence, are commonly designated as national minorities and excluded from the discourse on nationhood. Likewise, co-ethnics, residing in other countries, may be included in the same discourse as part of the nation, despite being foreign citizens. The right lower cell of the table, which combines ethnocultural discourse on nationhood with the lack of emphasis on cultural unity, is empirically unlikely, due to the inability of such a discourse to offer minimal level of shared identity and social cohesion at the state level. Hypothetically, such a combination could only exist in a polity, whose nation would be defined as cohabitation arrangement between designated ethnocultural groups, and outsiders would then be accepted or excluded based on their belonging to any of those groups. Therefore, attitudes towards membership in such a hypothetical nation for potential and actual migrant populations would not principally differ from those in an ethnocultural nation-state, dominated by a single ethnic group.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE POLICIES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Nation-states in which a state-oriented discourse on nationhood with a strong emphasis on cultural unity is the prevailing way of defining national identity, expect migrants' complete economic, political, and social integration, as well as assimilation into a predefined national culture. Some nation-states codify these expectations in legal form as conditions for citizenship acquisition. However, certain markers of 'sufficient' cultural assimilation can be intentionally left vague and open for interpretation by the body that makes the ultimate decision on granting or refusing citizenship.

In the West, assimilationist discourses on nationhood made their return during the first decade of the 21st century. This reintroduction was accompanied by changes in the meaning of this term (Brubaker, 2003). Having been previously associated with cultural chauvinism and mistreatment of minorities, assimilation is currently re-interpreted as continuous process that leads to the acquisition of the national language, acceptance

of prevailing attitudes towards religiosity and religious practices, and the adoption of dominant political, cultural, and moral values. The 2015 New Year address by Angela Merkel (Federal Government of Germany, 2015), which was given not long after Germany's decision to open its borders to refugees and migrants from the Middle East, contains references to such a revised meaning of assimilation:

> "Our values, our traditions, our understanding of the law, our language, our rules and regulations – all of these things undergird our society and are the fundamental requirements for the positive and mutually respectful coexistence of all the people in our country. This applies to everyone who wants to live here".

France is commonly recognized as the paradigmatic case of a state-oriented discourse on nationhood that emphasizes a high degree of cultural unity through common language, support for secularism and adherence to social and political values of the French republic. Historically, this expectation of cultural unity and cohesion was directed towards the local rural population (Weber, 2006), but was also extended to migrant populations. France's relative openness to newcomers and unconditional acceptance of third-generation and almost all second-generation migrants into the French nation was predicated on the role of education, military and other public institutions in socializing and assimilating migrants (Brubaker, 1992). After World War II, large numbers of labor migrants arrived in France from its former colonies and poorer European countries. This growth of the immigrant population raised concerns about shortcomings of state policies on immigration and citizenship with regards to the issue of cultural assimilation. In the 1980s, when public debate about state policies in this area reached its peak, even the far-right nationalist criticism was predominantly formulated in congruency with the state-centered unitary tradition of the French nationhood (Brubaker, 1992). In the following decades, policy changes have been in a general direction towards more stringent control on labor migration and a more explicitly formulated emphasis on assimilation as prerequisite for naturalization. For example, current iteration of the French legislation on naturalization (Ministre de l'Intérieur et des Outre-mer, 2020) lists multiple conditions that must be met by an applicant in order to be considered sufficiently assimilated into the French

society, such as B1 level of language proficiency, knowledge of French history and adherence to the values of the French Republic.

The French case demonstrates how state-oriented nationhood discourses influences policies on migration and citizenship in countries which faced sustained and sizeable immigration. Countries with similar discourses on nationhood which had previously faced limited immigration, may lack such clearly defined policies. However, once conditions change, the dominant discourse influences surrounding public debates and policy objectives, as the overhaul of the Portuguese immigration policy at the beginning of the 21st century demonstrates (Gil, & Picarra, 2021).

In theory, nation-states with state-oriented discourses on nationhood should follow universalistic, non-discriminatory principles in regulating migration, but the practical application of such principles can be distorted by perceptions and stereotypes about differences across groups of migrants. Some racial or religious groups can be denied residence and naturalization based on the assumption of their 'unfitness' for assimilation into the national culture. The United States of America, the proverbial melting pot of various ethnicities and cultures, had maintained racial preferences in its migration policies until its immigration regime was changed in 1965 (Joppke, 1999, 2005). Similar policies that discouraged non-European immigration were also in place in Australia (Joppke, 2005). During the debate, surrounding the preferred course of the French immigration policies, nationalist political groups speculated that migrants of Muslim origin would be incapable of assimilating into the French nation and should not be accepted (Brubaker, 1992). Similar arguments resurfaced in multiple European countries during the 2015-2016 refugee crisis.

Nation-states in which a state-oriented discourse on nationhood is accompanied by a rhetoric of only loosely defined national unity, mostly limited to a set of basic civic values, reject cultural assimilation as a desired policy outcome. On the contrary, such countries tend to provide a certain degree of institutionalized support for the maintenance of ethnocultural diversity within their nations. In the cases of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or Bolivia, such ethnoculturally inclusive discourses on nationhood were directed towards previously marginalized ethnic and racial minorities. In the cases of Belgium, Spain, and the USSR, they targeted historically subordinate ethnocultural communities. However, inclusive discourses

on nationhood can be relatively easily moulded to encompass current and future migrant communities, since the underlying normative principles of such discourses do not discriminate between communities on the basis of their origin (Akturk, & Katliarou, 2021). A close correspondence between multiculturalism policy indices for national minorities and/or indigenous peoples, and for immigrant minorities in such countries as Australia, Belgium, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom (Kymlicka, 2021) is an empirical illustration of this generalizing effect. Likewise, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s in the USA made a major contribution to the formation of a new discourse on a culturally diverse American nation. This discourse has been associated with subsequent changes in America's immigration policies.

In 1965, the USA ended ethnic and racial discrimination against immigrants outside of Western and Northern Europe and demonstrated further commitment to culturally diverse immigration with the adoption of the 1990 Immigration Act. Among other measures, the act introduced the Diversity Visa Program, which favored applicants from less represented countries. However, the debate on the extent to which diversity and inclusivity should play role in the construction of the modern American nation is far from being settled. So far, policy changes have largely been limited to the question of who can enter the country and stay there and haven't affected the area of naturalization and state involvement in diversity management to a similar degree (Bloemraad, 2006).

In Canada, a multicultural discourse on nationhood, introduced the 1970s, has become entrenched and reflected in the policies of official multiculturalism, which encourage the naturalization of immigrants, while simultaneously supporting the preservation of their ethnocultural distinctiveness (Kymlicka,1998). Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Department of Justice of Canada, 2022) presents this policy objective by stating that immigrants are sought "to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural character of Canada".

Sweden is another example of a nation-state that formulates its discourse on nationhood in terms ethnocultural diversity (Borevi, 2012). Already at the beginning of the 20th century, the Swedish nation-building narrative was focused more on modernity and progress than on ethnic

traditions. Progressivist orientation, a strong sense of social solidarity, and Sweden's experience with refugees during World War II can be considered the foundational elements of the current inclusive discourse on nationhood that shapes country's policies towards migrants. A multicultural immigration policy was formulated in 1975 when relevant legislation formally guaranteed freedom of choice in terms of cultural integration for all migrants. The policy's scope and content were adjusted on multiple occasions, but the general policy vision remained unaltered. Even the notion of the Swedish national culture itself has been subject to scrutiny for its potential exclusionary effects. In 1997, domestic policy experts concluded that Swedish history cannot be considered a constituting element of national identity, since it excludes many population groups from the discourse on nationhood Similarly to Canada, Sweden views naturalization and acquisition of citizenship more as a tool for civic integration than as a final 'prize' for its successful accomplishment. This approach to naturalization is at least in part responsible for the fact that migrants' naturalization rates are four times higher in Sweden than the EU average (Eurostat, 2022). Sweden's utilitarian approach to citizenship as a tool for achieving legal equality also played its role in discarding the idea of language proficiency requirements for naturalization, since it would have adversely affected some immigrant groups.

In contrast to state-oriented discourses on nationhood, ethnocultural nation-building projects define their boundaries primarily in ethnic terms, emphasizing cultural and linguistic ties, shared history, and common origin. Belonging to the nation in such discourses is nether defined by nor limited to citizenship status. The Fundamental Law of Hungary (Hungarian National Assembly, 2020) is a striking example of national boundaries, understood in such terms:

> "Bearing in mind that there is one single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities, shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the effective use of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary".

The example above clearly demonstrates that perceived national boundaries stretch beyond the borders of the Hungarian state. In congruence with this perception, Hungary and many other countries with predominantly ethnocultural discourses on nationhood have simplified schemes for the migration and citizenship acquisition of co-ethnics. Such schemes are implemented in Israel, Germany, Greece, Poland, and Kazakhstan among others. At the same time, ethnocultural minorities may be discursively excluded from the nation, despite having full citizenship status. For example, this juxtaposition can be found in the preamble to the Croatian constitution (Constitute, 2022):

> *"The Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the nation state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of its national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, Albanians and others who are its citizens and who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the exercise of their national rights in compliance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and the countries of the free world".*

In the most extreme cases, the exclusion of ethnically dissimilar elements may lead to the de-nationalization of parts of population. The confinement of native ethnic groups in quasi-independent Bantustans by South Africa's apartheid regime (Guelke, 2005) is the most blatant example of such exclusion through de-nationalization. However, it can be also implemented indirectly by establishing restrictive citizenship regimes that disproportionally affect ethnic minorities. After regaining independence from the Soviet Union, Latvia, and Estonia limited citizenship to persons and descendants of persons who had been citizens of those countries before they were annexed by the USSR (Barrington, 2000). Through these measures, residents who migrated to these republics in the Soviet period and their descendants were excluded from citizenship. The effective outcome of such citizenship regimes was the de-nationalization of the majority of ethnically Russian population in these countries.

In nation-states in which membership in the nation and its limits are defined along ethnocultural boundaries, both actual and potential migrants are likely to be perceived as a cultural threat. Such countries tend

to hold negative attitudes towards immigration, and favor strict policies towards labor migration, irregular migration and acceptance of refugees and asylum seekers. These policies can be developed pre-emptively even in the absence of actual mass-scale migration (Okolski, & Wach, 2020), as may be evident from the examples of migration and citizenship policies in many Central and Eastern European countries. For instance, Poland lists permanent residency in the country for three years among its prerequisites for naturalization along with proof of proficiency in the Polish language (Ministry of the Interior and Administration, 2022). However, permanent residency status itself can only be granted to candidates who meet multiple criteria in terms of their profession, income, and length of residency. Other countries in the region have similar hurdles for residency and naturalization that discourage immigration (Drbohlav, 2012).

The most extreme cases of exclusionary immigration regimes can be found in the Gulf states, such as Qatar and Kuwait. Despite the fact that these countries have to rely on foreign labor to carry out economic activities, they effectively deny labor migrants permanent status and options for naturalization (Babar, 2020). Germany, which until recently was the primary example of ethno-national statehood, implemented similar policies towards its 'guest workers' from Southern Europe and Turkey in the 1960s and 70s. Until the end of the 20th century, foreign workers were not given a legal option to obtain German citizenship through naturalization and were expected and even financially incentivized to leave the country (Akturk, 2012). Japan, whose discourse on nationhood remains firmly ethnocentric (Chung, 2010), continues to limit immigration and discourages the naturalization of foreigners, despite labor shortages and the ageing of its population. It even had to use a disguise of ethnonational affinity to justify the introduction of a work permit scheme, similar to permit schemes for 'guest workers' in Western Europe, by targeting only persons of Japanese descent from Latin American countries (Sharpe, 2010).

DISCUSSION

In practical terms, discourses on nationhood provide alternative ideational frameworks for policymaking in the area of managing ethnocultural diversity, including policies on long-term residency and citizenship acquisition by migrant populations. Therefore, an empirical analysis of migration policy in

a particular state should be conducted with that state's nation-building context taken into account. Such ideational frameworks may remain dormant in countries that haven't experienced a lot of immigration in recent history and haven't established a comprehensive set of policies and institutions, dealing with migration and citizenship. But even in such cases, the prevalence of any particular type of discourse on nationhood is a good indicator of potential policy preferences in this area.

Relationship between migration and nation-building is not limited to the influence of the latter on policy choices about immigration and citizenship. Under certain conditions, the prolonged presence of migrants in the country can challenge the dominant discourse on nationhood and aid its eventual transformation, which, in turn, contributes to the revision of official policies in this area. Germany can be an example of such a transition from predominantly ethnic understanding of nationhood to a more state-centered one. The continuing presence of 'guest workers' and their growing involvement in the country's economic and social activities had challenged Germany's self-image of not being a country of immigration to the point when it had to finally reform its previously exclusionary and segregationist policies on migration and citizenship (Joppke, 1990; Brubaker, 2003; Akturk, 2012). Historically, the notion of cultural and religious pluralism has been a crucial element of nation-building in the Netherlands and has been incorporated in its major political and social institutions. A culturally inclusive discourse on nationhood and on membership in the Dutch nation contributed to an early adoption of multiculturalist policies towards migrants in the country. Having faced social, economic and cultural challenges, associated with accommodation of its growing immigrant population, the Netherlands began to question the limits of multiculturalism and eventually reformulated conditions for national membership in more assimilationist terms, effectively abandoning multiculturalism by the end of the 20th century (Entzinger, 2003).

CONCLUSION

This necessarily concise survey illustrates the continuing relevance of nationalism and its varieties for the topic of international migration. By establishing the conditions and limitations of national membership (ranging from the complete exclusion of ethnoculturally different populations to their full

incorporation), different discourses on nationhood inform different policy preferences with regards to migration and citizenship. Hence, an analysis of the immigration and citizenship policies of particular countries has to include an assessment of their nation-building projects. In certain cases, such assessments can help predict the most likely future modes of policymaking in those countries which are yet to address the issue of management and regulation of immigration. Finally, it is worth reiterating, that the relationship between nationalism and migration is neither deterministic, nor unidirectional, and changing migration patterns may challenge previously established discourses on nationhood and even facilitate their reformulation.

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Politicization of Syrian Refugee Crisis by Far-Right Parties in Turkiye: Victory Party and Nationalist Movement Party

M. İNANÇ ÖZEKMEKÇİ*, ALPER ÇAKMAK**

ABSTRACT

Turkey currently hosts an unprecedented number of refugees, and the JDP government under its leader R. Tayyip Erdoğan employs pro-immigrant rhetoric both at home and abroad. Turkey is witnessing the populists' racist vocabulary gaining ground in the face of increasing numbers of migrants. This study sheds light on the impact of the institutional role of far-right parties on their discourse on migrants in Turkey and how being in or out of office affects the way far-right parties 'name, blame, and claim' the issue by applying Wodak's discourse concepts (Felstiner et al., 1980). The impact of institutional role on migrant rhetoric is examined using two far-right parties: the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP) in alliance with the ruling JDP and the Victory Party (VP) in opposition. It examines how the NMP and VP communicate their visions of Turkey in relation to migrants and why these far-right parties discursively manifest different positions. The essay argues that the far-right parties' discursive constructions of migrants, which typically involve constructions of the Other and threat, tend to moderate in relation to the number of responsibilities imposed by institutional roles. This approach helps to understand the differences between the responses of ruling and non-ruling far-right parties to the crisis.

Keywords: Victory Party; Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahçeli, Ümit Özdağ, far-right, radical right, refugees, institutional role, discourse, Turkey

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INTRODUCTION

White nationalism does not live in a bubble. Anti-refugee prejudices are not accidental phenomena. Statements directed at marginalized groups directly result from racism and hatred normalized by the media, both in far-right discourse and in the broader public. The growth of far-right extremism, saturated with demonizing and scapegoating populist statements, poses a threat to pluralism. Anti-immigrant rhetoric has fueled the 'populist turn' in Western democracies. This context has helped far-right parties increase their voter base (Rydgren, 2005; Stockemer, 2016). Exclusionary populism, in which far-right politicians portray immigrants as a threat to the economy and society, has its roots in anti-immigrant narratives.

Ümit Özdağ, a former Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, NMP) deputy, founded the Victory Party (*Zafer Partisi* or VP). Özdağ based his main campaign primarily on popular discontent with the increasing number of immigrants, which became increasingly visible in the public eye in the form of crime rates, ghettoization, and economic problems (Akbulut-Yüksel et al., 2022). Turkey is no longer an exception, as the racist vocabulary of populists has become endemic in the face of increasing numbers of migrants (Rydgren, 2005). However, Turkey seems to be an exceptional case considering Stockemer's (2016) empirical study that support for far-right extremism has almost nothing to do with actual migration numbers, as the rise of migration level has fueled the rise of the VP in Turkish politics.

The article sheds light upon how important governmental role is to the cycle of discursive politicization of migrants. We seek to understand the full extent to which far-right anti-immigration rhetoric is applied in a non-Western environment by highlighting the institutional role of the VP and the NMP. The underlying reason for this study is the NMP that shy away from using a discourse that could have made a significant contribution to the politicization of the crisis by employing its conventional far-right language.

This study analyzes the effect of institutional role on far-right parties in terms of their political discourse on migrants in Turkey, and how being in the office or not influences the way far-right parties *name, blame and claim* the issue by making use of Wodak's concepts of discourse (Felstiner et al.,1980). The impact of institutional role on framing migrant rhetoric is

examined through two far-right parties: the NMP in alliance with the ruling JDP, with the VP in opposition. It looks at the way NMP and the VP communicate their visions of Turkey concerning migrants and migration, and how these far right-wing groups discursively manifest their distinct standpoints. The essay contends that migrant constructs are paired with constructs of the Other, perceptions of national security, and threat, and that differences in rhetorical methods help frame the difference between governing and non-governing far-right political parties' responses to the crisis.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH FAR RIGHT: RUPTURES AND CONTINUITIES

Far-right nationalism in Turkey dates back to the second half of the 1940s, when the nationalist movement began to exhibit 'qualities that could be transformed into a political movement in terms of worldview, cadre formation, and ideological baggage' (Ertekin, 2008, p.349). This political movement, called Turkism-Turanism, became increasingly clear with ideological tendencies during World War II. The history of far-right nationalism evolved into a different process when Alparslan Türkeş, one of the officers involved in the 1960 coup, who opposed to the transition to civilian politics, took over the Turkist oriented Republican Peasant Nation Party and changed its name to the NMP. Unlike the secular Turkist-Turanists, Türkeş took a different stance regarding Islam.[1] This choice led to the first break in the movement when the secular Turkist-Turanist wing left (Bora-Can, 2000). In the period leading up to the 1980 coup d'état, the NMP emerged as a major actor in coalition governments and struggle against the radical left movements in the streets. Thus, it began to be extremely active in the parliament-party-street triangle.

The end of the Cold War and the independence of the Turkic Republics in Central Asia, as well as the rise of Islamist politics, which were perceived as a threat by the state, caused the party to turn in the ideological spectrum from a Turkish-Islamic synthesis to secular Turkism. However, this new ideological positioning prompted the Islamist wing within the party

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[1] Often known as Pan-turanism in recent times, Turkist-Turanist movement was a late 19th- and early 20th-century endeavor to bring all Turkic and Uralic communities living in Turkey and throughout Eurasia from Hungary to the Balkans together politically, culturally and linguistically.

to leave the NMP and form the Great Unity Party in 1993 (Bora, 2017). Following the sudden death of the father figure, Türkeş, the process of change initiated by new leader was used positively by the NMP. The new chairperson, Devlet Bahçeli, changed the image of the ultranationalist NMP with the slogan 'the new leader of the new party'. After Bahçeli assumed leadership, the NMP opened up to the center. The weakening of the center-right parties brought the NMP its greatest electoral success in the 1999 elections (Çarkoğlu, 2000).

The third rupture that the NMP experienced is the formation of the Good Party in October 2018, mainly by the old cadres of the NMP. This rupture was clearly evident in the June 2018 elections. The main reason for this change is the political alliance of the NMP and the ruling JDP, especially after the 2016 coup attempt. On the other hand, the loss of votes in the November 2015 elections and the alliance between the JDP and the NMP substantially deepened divisions within the NMP. In the June 2015 elections, the NMP achieved the second-best result in its electoral history, with 16.29% voter support and 80 MPs. After inconclusive coalition negotiations, elections were repeated in November 2015. The NMP's vote share fell to 11.9% and the number of deputies to 40 (YSK, 2015). Following the failure, Meral Akşener, Koray Aydın, Ümit Özdağ, Sinan Oğan and Servet Sazak demanded that an extraordinary party congress be convened. The split within the party eventually turned into a process in which the mechanism of expulsion and resignation came into play. However, after the July 15 coup attempt, the JDP aligned itself with the NMP on security issues with which it had been at odds in the past. The most important outcome of this alliance was the April 2017 referendum, when Turkey accepted the transition from the parliamentary system to the presidential system. While the NMP defended the change in the government model, the cadres who founded the Good Party in October 2017 continued to work against the change in the government model on the 'Turkish Nationalists Say No' platform.

The new party of today's Turkish far-right, the VP, was founded in 2021 and broke away from the Good Party. The party's leader, Ümit Özdağ, is the son of an active politician and military officer, Muzaffer Özdağ who participated in the 1960 coup along with Türkeş. Following his failed bid for party presidency, he was among the leading figures founding the IYI party. Özdağ, who continued in his position as deputy party leader, resigned from

his position after the local elections in 2019 due to disagreements within the party. Özdağ resigned from the party on March 4, 2021, and founded the 'Crescent Moon Movement,' which later organized itself into the VP.

METHODOLOGY, CRISIS, DISCOURSE CONCEPTS AND POPULISM

The migration flow to Turkey and the increasing number of people from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Ukraine are associated with the term refugee crisis. The term 'crisis' has a long record in political history and social sciences (Koselleck, 2006). Classical theorists such as Karl Marx (1981), Antonio Gramsci (1971), and Jürgen Habermas (1975) sees crisis as a critical moment and context that undermines the authority of the state and provides an opportunity to distort reality. A crisis is not just an abstract, independent, emotionless, and impartial event. For a crisis to be labeled as such, it must be a political priority in the rhetorician's agenda and/or subjectively recognized as such by leadership and party cadres.

The refugee crisis is an issue integrated into the general political divides prevailing the public discourse, or pushed by the far-right political figures as a brand new cause of conflict and polarization. In the assessment of the ways in which the ruling and non-ruling far-right parties respond to the crisis environment, the study first employs Felstiner's (1980) trilogy of *naming, blaming, and claiming*, and Wodak's (2015a) concepts of discourse to show the linguistic manifestations of migrants by far-right parties.

The fundamentals of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) are used together with Wodak's (2015a) concept of topos, which will be employed as a discourse-analytical tool. DHA is helpful for figuring out what the political discourse of rhetoricians makes of the refugees and migration flow because its focus is on the empirical inquiry of context and its dialectic interaction with the institutional role of the party. It also does this by exposing the discursive depictions rooted in the social and political context (Datondji & Amousou, 2019). DHA also incorporates intertextual and interdiscursive connections, tools for locating legitimacy challenges within language, and complex systems of primacy.

DHA contends that words do not possess any inherent power but rather functions as a tool for acquiring and retaining power through the usage of social actors who speak for diverse social subgroups (Wodak, 2015b).

In this regard, discourses refer to a type of behavior wherein relations of power are either legitimized or delegitimized (Datondji & Amousou, 2019). DHA focuses on ontological and linguistic practices to reveal hidden message contained within the discourse, which calls for a multimethodological, multi-theoretical, and self-reflective approach in the analysis of discursive creation (Wodak, 2015a).

Topoi are elliptic arguments (enthymeme) utilized by rhetoricians to persuade their audiences through appeals to logic and common sense (endoXon) (Wodak, 2018). Topoi are widely used to evaluate political speeches that attempt to make a significant change from their premise to their conclusion (Fairclough, 2003). Thanks to the concept of topos, which serves as a rhetorical and dialectical schema, this study provides a stable foundation for a systematic analysis of cultural elements, including viewpoints and ideologies, imagined worlds, cultural practices, and myths.

A 'modality of power,' defined as manifestations of reality that contribute to the production, maintenance, or modification of social relations of power, domination, and exploitation, serves as the conceptual basis for rhetoricians' discourse (Fairclough, 2003). The DHA removes the dominance of particular narratives by examining the ideologies that create, maintain, or contest dominance, exploring othering strategies that label a group deprecatorily. The definition of populism and whether it should be considered an ideology (Mudde, 2004, 2007; Taggart, 2000), a communication style (de Vreese et al. 2018; Aalberg et al. 2017; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Moffitt 2016), or a political campaign strategy (Weyland, 2001; Roberts, 1995) are all fiercely contested (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Although there are important exceptions, such as Müller (2016) and Urbinati (2019), studies generally agree on a minimal description: the juxtaposition of the 'good people' with a set of 'evil elites' and unsettling out-groups. Populists portray themselves as the 'genuine' democrats, committed to informing the population 'what has gone wrong, who is to blame, and what needs to be done to reverse the situation' (Betz & Johnson, 2004, p.323). The exaltation of the 'people' is thus accompanied by the demonization of its opponents, especially the 'elites' who are accused of being haughty and dishonest and often treating the 'people' badly, and the 'outgroups' who are accused of distorting the true character of the 'real people'(Canovan, 1999, p.5).

NAMING, BLAMING AND CLAIMING: VICTORY PARTY

Naming:

Extract 1

> "*Today, 100 years after our War of Independence, imperialism is attacking Turkey again. Imperialism, which 100 years ago hired the Greek army to put an end to the right of the Turkish nation in Anatolia, is now attacking the unity of Turkey with millions of refugees and fugitives driven to Turkey with a strategic migration engineering similar to the migration of tribes. Their aim is to detach southeastern Anatolia from Turkey*" (VP, 2021).

With the increasing visibility of refugees in the public eye, the radical right VP has emerged as a leading proponent of escalating hostility toward immigrants. The VP is a sign and outcome of today's general turmoil, uncertainty and vulnerability in Turkey's political context. It seeks to convey a sense of urgency to the public and to portray the self as a crucial political actor in Turkish politics. It challenges the prevailing narrative and provides a novel tale for Turkey. Özdağ names a crux, as it is a byproduct of 'strategic migration engineering', and is therefore able to paint the topos of threat in a very simple but powerful picture of the refugee influx as a dangerous drama of 'imperialism'. In this drama scene inoculated with the topos of comparison and history, the role of Greece 100 years ago as an apparatchik of imperialism is replaced by the role of refugees and fugitives with the same malignant aim. Özdağ uses the allegory of 'migration of tribes' to delineate the potentially harmful effects of the refugee crisis as the Turkish government has given in to the demographic assault on the country. Özdağ does not distinguish among refugees, fugitives, asylum seekers, or illegal migrants. Instead, they are all bundled together without regard to their legal status.

Özdağ employs topos of threat that requires a war to reclaim heaven (the homeland) for the audience from the invincible control and domination of the beast or demon (imperialism). The attribution '100 years ago' evokes not only the War but more importantly the Sèvres Syndrome, 'the collective fear that Western interest in Turkey is animated by a will to undermine the country's territorial integrity' (Onar, 2009, p.4). In the following lines, he provides another rationale inoculated with an analogy of Independence

War, expanding his points regarding Western interest in southeastern Turkey. By integrating the topos of history, urgency and threat, Özdağ creates an unflattering image of those who call the VP xenophobic by imputing to them all the groups that are supposedly Turkey's enemies.

Blaming:

Extract 2

> "*Today, the will of the Turkish Nation is represented in Turkish politics. In the face of the attack on the law of the Turkish Nation and the ongoing war; both the Palace Regime and the yellow opposition are in complete surrender. Erdogan is running a secret program for the Syrians. The Kurdish cadre in Erdogan's close circle, on the one hand, and the Arab racist cadre, on the other hand, are working to keep the Syrians in Turkey*" (VP, 2021).

Political rhetoric in Turkey today is heavily influenced by Özdağ's promotion of the anti-refugee campaign, especially among young Turkish citizens through social media platforms, and his obsession with conspiracy theories that 'the government is subcontracting imperialism' and 'running a secret program.' The goal of repeating this theme is to first put pressure on mainstream politicians before having an impact on the broader audience, depending on the frequency and intensity of the linguistic representations. Another likely explanation for this obsession seems to be the close connection between the nationalist premises on which plots and conspiracies are built and Turkish nationalism as an ideology from which far-right parties in Turkey feed.

In a context where the refugee crisis is flourishing due to the influx of refugees and the strategies of the established parties in power are failing to solve the problem, the speech turns the refugee crisis into a moral imperative and calls for national defense against 'evil' and the mainstream parties that caused it in the first place.

The VP uses the topos of danger and threat as synonymous with the racist Arab and Kurdish cadres in Erdoğan's entourage who pose a potential threat to the in-group of collective Turkish identity, and is portrayed as the vanguard of Turkishness and a safe haven against the Arab and Kurdish cadres. While the term 'palace regime' stands for the JDP, i.e., the ruling elites who are insulated from the problems facing large segments of society, the

term 'yellow opposition' refers to a seemingly dissident opposition that collaborates with the establishment in disguise, keeps its supporters in check, and prevents the emergence of real opposition.

Claiming to change the lives of average citizens, who are expected to imagine Özdağ as their hero fighting to defend their livelihoods, he challenges not only those in power but also the opposition parties, for they are portrayed as the establishment incapable of making radical changes and as helpless or useless representatives of the silent majority.

The VP, whose enmity supposedly speaks to the hearts of its audience, often mirrors the strategy and language of its European counterparts, and follows a similar path in accusing government of ignoring the needs and feelings of the average citizens. It seeks 'legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for the people: that is to say, they claim to represent the democratic sovereign not a sectional interest' (Canovan, 1999, p.53). Özdağ's discursive strategies have the potential to 'inoculate' their audiences against receiving messages of diversity or to limit the ability of audiences to adopt ontological positions that promote diversity.

Extract 3

> "*Now, in the face of the determined and uncompromising resistance of the VP, Kılıçdaroğlu, who tries to deceive the patriotic RPP members by tweeting 'We will send the Syrians to their country', on the other hand, bans the protests of the party members against the refugee policy. Today, they insinuate imperialism by saying ansar-muhajir*"(VP, 2021).

Özdağ portrays his party as the only actor aware of the challenges posed by immigrants and asylum seekers, while the other parties in power and in opposition fail to respond adequately because they are blind or aspirational instruments of the imperialist project. The main opposition party (RPP) and the ruling party (JDP), are defined as establishment parties, which describes them as powerful clique that governs an organization. The discourse on the growing concerns of average citizens invites those who do not want to witness the likely socio-economic changes Turkish citizens face on a daily basis.

Özdağ condemns the use of Islamic rhetoric as a tool to advance an imperialist agenda. Erdoğan persistently gives a prime example of mythopoeia, a 'moral story' in which 'protagonists are rewarded for engaging in

legitimate social practices or restoring the legitimate order' using Islamic ideals of benevolence (*Ihsan*) and tolerance. (Leeuwen, 2007, p.105). Özdağ's discourse aims to negate Erdoğan's discourse, imbued with the moral motivations, teachings, and practices of the Prophet Muhammad and the idea of benevolence or benevolence (*Ihsan*), which is established as a fundamental principle for peace through interpersonal behavior that considers the other (Nimer, 2000, p.220). The terms muhajir (*muhacir*) and ansar (*ensar*) contain connotations derived from the Prophet's hadiths on the Quranic verses he made while in Medina. While muhajir alludes to an emigrant, one who emigrates, ansar derives from the motif of helper (*nâşir*).

The VP blames the JDP's ansar and muhadjir discourse, RPP's initial proposal to naturalize Syrian migrants in 2020, then its tepid support to mitigate the rise of the VP, for the disintegration of Turkey's ethnically and culturally homogenous past. Özdağ refers to all other parties as the political actors 'whose ideas, values, and interests are at odds with those of the "silent majority"' (Canovan, 1999, p.3).

Although Özdağ is a scholar of political science and has published 46 books, he adapts his language to the everyday language of a layman. He expresses his opinion the way an average citizen would express his hatred and frustration, and he chooses words that cause controversy in order to attract the attention of the average citizen. Özdağ's sensationalist language contributes to the spread of the saga, which was inspired and embellished by stories familiar to the Turkish public. The use of such language provides the opportunity to appeal to the heart and mind of a simple villager who listens to the news on the radio while harvesting in the field. This language conveys the image of a hero who speaks to large segments of society deeply affected by the consequences of migration, and this hero speaks to protect people from the invincible enemy.

Claiming:

Extract 4

> "*Approximately 90 percent of the Turkish Nation, wants Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians to return. The Turkish nation is aware of the covert invasion. We will work tirelessly until the last refugee returns*" (VP, 2021).

Özdağ's VP is growing its influence in this turbulent and tumultuous climate where false information is being spread by portraying the human right at the expense of health, economic security and the imagined social norms of Turkish society.

Özdağ's full-fledged casuistry, with Syrian refugees and asylum seekers at its core, enables him to assume the role of populist 'challenger' and win popular support by offering radical alternative solutions to the crisis.

The Turkish nation is portrayed as having a superior moral code and common sense, thereby portraying him as an authority figure who should make decisions about the nation's future. By appealing to ordinary citizens through despair and anger, Özdağ delivers a resonating message in a convincing manner.

Extract 5

> *"The Turkish Nation does not make exclusionary racism against anyone, but the Turkish nation is subjected to racist exclusion by Syrian refugees. The VP will put an end to the racism against Turks in Turkey. After leaving the hospital, you will not see that the Syrian gets paid for free, while you have to pay for medicine at the pharmacy. We will save the school from an environment where the teacher lowers the level of the lesson because of Syrian student. The VP defends the right of the Turkish textile worker, who lost his job to the Syrian, and of Aunt Ayşe, who have to collect garbage because of 7 million Syrians."* (VP, 2021).

Özdağ's discourse, the VP, and his political persona all play a crucial role in constituting the central protagonist in the struggle against the invincible enemy, an enemy whose grandeur is narrated with an unofficial number. A central protagonist, as Özdağ perceives himself, always defends a group of people whose values are threatened and who desperately need a savior. Workers whose standard of living has declined or who believe they have lost their jobs because of refugees, as well as people who believe that demographic changes are endangering traditional ethnic structures and cultural norms, make up the imagined endangered nation.

Since the politician's profile reflects the interests and beliefs of the audience, it is expected that the audience will see Özdağ as a manifestation of their individual selves and as the political persona whose goals are shaped by their own views. Linguistic expressions such as 'tailors,' 'textile workers,'

and 'average citizens who have no choice but to go to the public hospital' promote the image of an organic economic coalition forged by the malaises of refugees among underrepresented working class and emerging middle class. Özdağ's speech is coupled with the topos of people and emphasizes the element of discontent through the concerns of economic redistribution, social equality, gender, security, and housing. Aunt Ayşe is a catchy phrase in Turkish politics, used by almost all politicians to portray themselves as representatives of the general population, possessing all the characteristics of the average person, and to beguile the hearts of the masses.

In an effort to dehumanize migrants and blame them for economic and social problems, while simultaneously drawing the profile of a champion shouldering the burden of defending the country against imperial powers, the discourse fabricates its own narrative of itself and migrants. Özdağ presents himself as if he has been entrusted with the noble task of saving Turkey, a service he must perform in the service of the nation.

Extract 6

> "*With the return of the refugees to their countries, Turkey will leap forward like a horse freed from its chains. After keeping its head under water for a long time, it will fill its lungs with clean oxygen like a breathing human being. The VP has prepared the Anadolu Castle project to repatriate the millions and stop the infiltration of terrorist organizations*" (VP, 2021).

The radical right in Turkey, as embodied by VP, appeals to the new egocentrism that pervades Turkish political context, which has been shaped by the influx of refugees. It manifests itself, among other things, in the image of '*Anadolu* Castle,' in the resurgence of nativist extremism, in hostility toward foreigners, and in criticism of the authorities as the perpetrators of these malaises in a political environment marked by vulnerability and tension.

It ties Özdağ to the plausibility of using the predictive role of 'smother,' a hurled epithet and invective used to desensitize audiences through the widespread analogy to talk about refugees, and consequently transfers the implications associated with 'smother' to many other asylum seekers and illegal migrants from Pakistan and Afghanistan. Such an analogy predicates the position of refugees as a suffocating object, with a metaphor of poison.

With this metaphor, he anthropomorphizes Turkey as a victim of refugees. The elimination of malaise is associated with the photo of a patient waking up from a coma.

NAMING, BLAMING AND CLAIMING: NATIONALIST MOVEMENT PARTY

Naming:

Bahçeli explicitly distinguishes between Syrian refugees and irregular immigrants, referring to the former as 'our guests' and the latter as 'part of an invasion,' alarmingly trapping the Turkish demographics. Despite his awareness that both categories reflect 'the tragedies of refugees, immigrants, and asylum seekers' and are 'the common problem of all who claim to be human' (Parliamentary Group Speech, 4.19.2022) - a surprisingly sensitive approach for a radical right leader - selective categorization among immigrants is inevitable. This is because the topos of definition allows Bahçeli, as an ally of the government, to create space to both defend the government's Syrian immigration policies in general and not compromise his political stance by making conventional populist claims about irregular migration. Moreover, such a topos of defining immigrants based on different categories of immigrants draws the boundaries of Turkey's 'landowning capacity' in which the authority of the state can be claimed, exercised, managed, or challenged when necessary from the standpoint of a far-right party supporting the government. Being a guest in Turkey, on the one hand, is a clear topos of definition that expresses the 'expected temporariness' of Syrian immigrants. On the other hand, it is a way of revealing the so-called generous, benevolent and moral qualities of Turks from which to draw national pride.

Extract 1

"*The Turk means refuge for the oppressed, shelter for the poor, defeat for the oppressors, devotion to Allah. Turkey has given lessons to all countries that are proud of their development and civilization and have humanitarian and conscientious qualities. Despite the scarcity of our bread, our table served out guests*"(Parliamentary Group Speech, 4.19.2022).

Controllability and caution are the main points Bahçeli emphasizes in his overall assessment of Syrian immigration flows since the 'undetected opening' of 'border gates in the name of diplomacy of conscience has caused great damage to the country's internal peace and tranquility, criminals have flooded Turkey under the guise of refugees, riots and terrorist incidents have seen a sharp increase.'(Parliamentary Group Speech, 4.19.2022). However, irregular migration is fraught with uncertainty, both now and in the future, unlike Syrian immigrants, where firm state control of migration rates is possible. In other words, NMP support for the government plays a definitive role in how immigration is discursively portrayed.

The fact that the NMP emphasizes control and caution allows it to use more reasonable language against Syrian immigration than the VP, due to its institutional position. Irregular immigration, on the other hand, is an area that should not be mitigated because it also reflects a deficit in state authority.

Blaming:

Regardless of whether the terminology used to define immigration is moderate or vigilant, the topos of threat is repeatedly evident in Bahçeli's remarks when it comes to approaching the issue with 'blaming'. The blame is insinuatingly aimed at the VP, which fills the gap in political discourse with sometimes loose language due to the NMP's support of the alliance, and is organized especially through social media. The practice of blaming is primarily attributed to the exploitation of the immigrant issue by another far-right party:

Extract 2

> "*Dirty information, unfounded allegations, distorted news with a predominantly emotional tone and a high dose of provocation about foreigners in Turkey have been intensively presented, especially on social media. Refugee crisis has become the soft core of Turkey, a vulnerability that may be exploited*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 20.05.2022).

A far-right party is ironically shaping the discourse around the immigration issue to prevent nationalist political mobilization against the government.

Increasing power capacity and political mobilization are strong deter-minants in populist new-generation far-right parties such as the VP. The rise of the VP, competing with a grounded NMP, is achieved by an agenda that could be radicalized as much as possible. In the context of authoritarianism, which is an important component of populist parties, this means that the far-right party conveys a message within the political alliance that it already holds both nationalist discursive authority and state interests over its ideo-logical counterpart.

Extract 3

> "*We have to assess the issue of irregular migration and asylum seekers on a realistic basis by being free of sentimentality and gradually remove it from the agenda of Turkey. Some of the provocateurs try to ignite the fire of social indignation*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 4.19.2022).

In a sense, the support provided to the alliance enables it to present the NMP as the representative of the state authority. The NMP speaks within the *raison d'état* that considers the long-term strategic interests of the state instead of daily politics. For example, the reason why Syrian refugees are not excluded from society is explained not only because of the positive-to-be fea-tures attributed to the Turkish nationalism, but also because Syrians hosted today would be our neighbors when they return in the long run. The insti-tutional role of the NMP pushes it to define the rival far-right party as an enemy of the state.

Extract 4

> "*Moreover, sick mentalities that lurk to increase social tensions, to expose a few individual insecurities as if they were everywhere have become wide-spread. The agents of the anti-Turkey movement are up to their mischief. Some claim that the number of refugees is 8 million, or 10 million. These are all absurd and unsubstantiated claims. The state's records are obvious and it is the data in those records that concern us*"(Parliamentary Group Speech, 4.19.2022) .

> "*If we muster the will to solve this problem, the security of our demo-graphic future will be assured. This is the decision of the People's Alliance. Those who think they are making politics with xenophobia are careless*

people who are not familiar with Turkish nation's morality and noble attitude" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 20.05.2022)

The VP's resistance to immigrants was coded as one of the key components of the game against state power. The topos of threat used to assign blame encompasses a threat to state power and allows Bahçeli to translate it into the topos of social and political responsibility that follows. At this point, the VP is presented as an actor that tries to destabilize Turkey by exploiting any problem raised by immigrants in the name of nationalism, because 'anyone who wants to drag our Syrian brothers who are under temporary protection into fighting and polarization and who tries to provoke and harass our nation is the enemy of Turkey' (Parliamentary Group Speech, 20.05.2022). Considering the incidents as a result of the reactionary statements on social media, Özdağ is the primary target for Bahçeli:

Extract 5

"*The game is sneaky, danger lurks. The pits of anger and hatred opened by emotionally triggered confrontations and deliberate support for such discourse will have disastrous results*"   (Parliamentary Group Speech, 20.05.2022).

Extract 6

"*A dreadful plot is fueled by the provocation of the refugee issue on an increasing scale… It is essential to be vigilant against the words, statements and violence traps of the captured circles that promote xenophobia and racism*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022).

Bahçeli's appeal to avoid discourse and language that promotes xenophobia and racism is very critical. This raises the topos of ethics and responsibility. However, for the voter who must choose between two nationalist parties, this call reveals the NMP's effort to purge itself of any possible negative features attributed to political correctness, and to demonstrate that the Party is the legitimate representative of genuine Turkish nationalism imbued with positive features. In other words, Bahçeli adopts a discursive stance aimed at easing social tensions caused by the settlement of Syrian refugees, and he defends this political action in the name of nationalism:

Claiming:

Extract 7

> "*We showed the enviable quality and prestige of the Turkish nation. At the same time, we touched Syrians with the compassion of the Turkish nation*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022).

> "*The only will that will solve all kinds of problems with national, spiritual and historical experience is the NMP and the alliance. The rest is just old and arrogant street gossip. Turkish nationalism categorically rejects xenophobia*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022).

The topos of responsibility portrays Turkish helping hand extended to the oppressed and to be vigilant against the exploitation of the subject, and for the future generations, to 'never leave the geography of the homeland, the population that will doubt, get into trouble, be strangers in their own land, locked in equations with unknowns'. In contrast to Özdağ's over-sentimentality, the first step for Bahçeli is to implement 'careful, cautious, prudent, and well-equipped policies' that should be 'managed in a bipartisan manner' (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022). Bahçeli thus offers measures disguised as raison d'état that should be outside the political realm. By positioning himself on the side of the state, Bahçeli presents himself as a wise man who thinks and acts in accordance with the interests of the state and the government's current policies, a discursive manner designed to rally far-right, nationalist voters against the charge of not being reactionary enough:

Extract 8

> "*Once the civil war is over, their return to their countries should be in accordance with human rights and with the consent of all*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022)

> "*Never forget that silence when one should speak, and speaking when one should be silent, is only for idiots*" (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022).

As he defines two different migrant groups, two distinct forms of claiming emerge for the immigrant problem, which 'should be seen as a national re-

Table 13.1 Politicization of Migrants by far-right parties in Turkey

Action	Contention	Output	THE NMP	Topos	THE VP	Topos
Naming	Political vs. non-political status of the problem/issue	A certain topic is recognized by political or social actors as having a public scope and political nature. The problem develops into a fresh topic of politicization.	Syrian guests overstay their welcome.	Topos of Burden	covert invasion	Topos of Definition Topos of Threat Topos of Urgency
Blaming	Attribution of accountability and ownership of the problem/issue	Political or social actors blame other actors for failing to address the issue, or failing to address it with the sufficient urgency and competence.	The VP is portrayed as the perpetrators of offensive acts against migrants	Topos of Threat Topos of Responsbility	Palace Regime &Yellow Opposition	Topos of Threat Topos of Warning
Claiming	Alternative solutions	Political social figures accuse others of failing to address the issue or doing so in an effective and timely manner.	The security of our demographic future will be ensured Turkey has not and will not turn his face towards those who take refuge in her holy presence	Topos of Responsibility Topos of Authority	*Anadolu* Castle All asylum seekers will be deported.	Topos of Authority Topos of Threat Topos of Comparison

Source: Adapted from Felstiner, W. L. F. et al., 1980 & Bobba, G. et al., 2021.

sponsibility to tackle (...) fundamentally with rational, equitable, humane, conscientious, and permanent strategies.' (Parliamentary Group Speech, 10.05.2022). As a result, ensuring legal clarity across diverse migrant groups, such as asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants, is a top goal for Bahçeli. Irregular migration, or an invasion without a name, should never

be allowed and should be stopped promptly, and any caught should be returned to their home countries. When it comes to Syrian refugees, Bahçeli envisions a repatriation process 'with dignity and security' and 'under the supervision of Turkey' that will take time because it is regarded unjustified owing to Turkey's obligations before international law.

DISCUSSION

The NMP and the VP dealt with the flow of migrants during this period from opposite institutional positions with different opportunities and limitations. The NMP was expected to respond quickly to the crisis as an important ally of the JDP, but it did not move beyond frustrated expectations as it maintained its tamed language. In opposition, the VP continued to criticize the government, although its main proposals seemed to be undermined in a political environment where the number of migrants, 3.6 million (UNHCR, 2022), had completely overflowed in Turkey. These two major trends had different effects on their populist rhetoric since their institutional roles required distinct crisis communication techniques.

The anti-Syrian rhetoric at the heart of Özdag's VP pushes propaganda against refugees and illegal migrants in Turkey, blaming them for the country's severe socioeconomic problems. In Turkey's political landscape, footage of disinformation about refugees shared online across the country within hours has the potential to become a source of division.

Radical right parties may have had it simpler or more difficult due to institutional factors such as the NMP's alliance with the ruling JDP government and VP's attempt to fill the role of nationalist opposition. The institutional role of the VP, the radical right opposition party, gives it a higher degree of freedom to name the situation with sharp and negative language and to reject outright the presence of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

The NMP's perspective evolved slightly as the number of migrants increased, becoming more inclusive and less dependent on contentious issues: all Turkish citizens must be protected, and mainstream parties are betrayers. The ambiguous circumstances provided the VP with a fertile discursive playground and an opportunity to blame the government for pretty much every single problem created by the refugees. In particular, the government and its allies were accused of putting Turkish citizens at risk due to poor handling of immigration control.

Despite the radical right's attempts to exploit the refugee issue, the representation of refugees in terms of naming, blaming, and claiming depends on the institutional role it plays, as the maneuver is limited when the radical party has a significant share of power in the government. Moffitt's (2015) claim that populist parties can often exploit crises to maintain high levels of polarization in policy debates and crisis management strategies seems more applicable to those not in power.

Bahçeli's speeches before the alliance show that Syrian refugees were not considered guests, as they are today. They were classified as refugees because their unplanned, and arbitrary entry, reception, and settlement in the country posed a major social, economic, and security threat (Parliamentary Group Speech, 26.04.2016). In the simplest sense, the refugees are an economic burden on which taxpayers' money that is not earmarked for the welfare of Turkish citizens is wasted.

> *"Syrian refugees are a multidimensional burden that must be overcome first, for both Europe and Turkey. Turkey will not be a refugee depot waiting at the EU's border gates. Another dilemma is that the EU sends back to Turkey refugees from other countries along with Syrians. The cost of settling in a Turkish homeland can never be measured. This beloved homeland has been the property of the Turkish nation for a thousand years"* (Parliamentary Group Speech, 26.04.2016).

In contrast to Bahçeli's post-2018 discourse, the preceding discourse emphasizes that Syrian refugees and irregular immigrants are bundled and that Turkey belongs to Turks. Looking at his speeches at propaganda rallies he organized in cities such as Hatay, Gaziantep, and Kilis where Syrian refugees densely settled, the demographic threat posed by immigrants as well as the social risks and burdens for which immigrants were directly blamed can be clearly seen (speeches at rallies in Gaziantep and Hatay, June 3, 2015). While Bahçeli emphasized the binding nature of the EU readmission agreement in his post-2018 speeches, we see that he criticized the agreement in this speech. The post-2018 NMP responded to the crisis by emphasizing the institutional role, unlike the VP, which attempted to modify the conventional populist arguments that could create a sense of danger, urgency, and despair.

CONCLUSION

Leaders in office see the migration issue as an opportunity to demonstrate their resources for taking care of citizens. By politicizing immigration as a threat to national sovereignty and exacerbating polarization by relying on opposing pundits and unofficial data, populists not in power have maintained or greatly expanded their prominence and public support. It has undoubtedly been a challenge for ruling parties to employ conventional populist strategies in the face of the threat posed by migration flows. The migration issue is a fertile playground for non-ruling far-right parties because the discourse has crept into both public and private life, making it much easier to spread a sense of danger, urgency, constriction, and panic.

Researchers typically think that radical right profits from crises. The overarching research point of this study concerns the potential that radical right in Turkey is gaining prominence in the political sphere and/or leveraging the specific refugee problem to advance alternative positions. Their institutional status is a significant factor determining if radical right parties respond uniformly or differently to the refugee crisis.

With its ability to maintain a high level of polarization and to wrap the issue in a sense of urgency and threat in daily life, the VP seems to be a perfect example. Nevertheless, the institutional role of the NMP has largely prevented it from becoming a more influential actor, as its ability to follow traditional radical demands that would beguile the minds and hearts of nationalist voters is limited by the JDP's Islamist and largely welcoming discourse toward refugees.

Tragically, the highly politicized issue of migration is the only one that has the potential to threaten the great partisan divide in Turkey by rallying a significant portion of the population under the banner of hostility to migrants.

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Anti-immigration Disinformation Campaigns in Turkiye: Actors and Their Purposes*

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ABSTRACT

Disinformation about immigrants is increasingly being operated on and significantly undermines democracy and the integration process. This study seeks to discuss and reveal the role of disinformation campaigns ruled by actors such as politicians and journalists in the public attitudes toward immigrants in Turkey. Anti-immigrant disinformation campaigns have a long history, however; it has become one of the main determinants of attitudes toward immigrants as a consequence of rising populism and the far-right around the world. Especially, the politicians fed by the polarization and the far-right politics are very insistent on showing that the source of the current economic, political and social problems is that immigrants are coming to their country. One of the main ways to do this is to scapegoat immigrants and hold disinformation campaigns about them.

To uncover anti-immigrant disinformation campaigns, this study will segregate between disinformation and misinformation and develop a model by which we can identify what is and is not disinformation. While disinformation is false content that is intentionally designed to cause harm, make money or gain political influence, misinformation is that person who shares

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the knowledge or news doesn't unaware that is false. This conceptualization enables a sharp distinction to be made between the actors who produce disinformation campaigns and unintentionally share misinformation. Thus, in order to unveil the actors creating the disinformation campaign, we will employ content analysis, retrieving data from the fact-checking organization in Turkey, to examine and categorize the false content about immigrants. As a result of the analysis, we will aim to show who carried out the anti-immigration disinformation campaigns and what their purposes are. Identifying the network of actors who operate disinformation campaigns and discovering their targets and goals may provide a framework for tackling and preventing the disinformation that undermine democracy and the integration process.

Keywords: information disorders, disinformation campaign, Syrian Immigrants

INTRODUCTION

The developments in digital tools and the essential role of the internet in our daily lives enable us to get information about anything we want to learn with just a click. In today's world, our learning process is beyond our individual experiences, so we mainly benefit from the digitalization of information as we live in an age of information. The question is, does all information we get through current media tools be counted as accurate and trustworthy? Is it possible to realize the risks and be ready to overcome them? Digitalization eases information spread; in our digital age, the volume and speed of information are beyond limits. However, suppose it is the case of false information, the consequences of that limitlessness can be destructive, especially if the information is about vital issues such as a pandemic, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or migration.

Considering the media as the primary source of information, we need to evaluate it in two pillars, traditional or mass and digital, in order to understand how false information spreads and the variety of threats caused by it. Historically, in traditional media, information is produced one-sided, meaning that we only decide the source we are informed of. However, we have no role in the production process. Although the communication tools are varied in mass media, the traditional editorial process enables checking the information in terms of accuracy and reliability (E. Erdoğan et al., 2022). However, in the digital age, the one-sided role of media in informa-

tion production has changed, and now ordinary internet users can take a role in this information ecosystem. Digitalization and social media platforms have simultaneously turned internet users into producers and consumers of information (Praprotnik, 2016). So now, any internet user can produce written or visual content, load it on social platforms, and spread it in a minute without any control mechanism.

On the one hand, the volume and speed of information circulated in digital media are reaching extreme levels, and due to the absence of fact-checking mechanisms in social media, the accuracy of the information produced by millions of internet users has become one of the urgent problems of today's digital world. On the other hand, traditional media channels whose revenue models depend on advertisement income have started using clickbait, and the editorial process has become less important than before (Ireton & Posetti, 2018). As a result, this new information ecosystem raised the risk of people's manipulation by social media platforms and media channels, especially in multi-dimensional cases such as migration and immigrants.

Media's modes of information production about social issues, developments, or various groups strongly influence societies' behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions. In other words, people's bias is affected by way of media presentations. According to Fürsich, mass media normalizes the social construction of the truth and has the power to decide which issues are brought to the public agenda (Fürsich, 2010). Therefore, it is possible to say that the perceptions and bias of public opinion about immigrants, refugees, or minority groups are strongly affected and shaped by the way how media presents the news about them (E. Erdoğan vd., 2022) and which type of information flew about them on social media. Anti-immigrant discourse that is spread in media targets manipulating public opinion through discriminative and otherizing discourses. When information that has social and political consequences is interpreted subjectively, anti-immigrant attitudes rise (Culloty & Suiter, 2021). As a result of the absence of control mechanisms, social media becomes an influential factor in anti-immigrant perceptions of those who get news and information mainly through these channels. Moreover, recent examinations both in Turkey and Europe show that these misperceptions negatively affect the immigrants' social integration and cohesion.

PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

Since 2015, the Syrian immigrants[1] flow has increased in Turkey due to crises and civil war in Syria. Turkey applied an open-door policy for Syrian immigrants (Ferris and Kirişçi, 2015), and since then, migration policies and the status of refugees in Turkey have become one of the prior issues on the public agenda. Traditional and social media have often discussed the arguments about the refugees and their status, and the spread of false information was inevitable in such rapid development.

Before evaluating the false information spread about Syrians, first of all, we need to understand the anti-immigrant attitudes of the public in Turkey. The findings of field research conducted by Emre Erdoğan and Pınar Uyan-Semerci (2020) in Adana in 2017 draw a framework of how Syrians are perceived in a negative way by locals and based on which concerns locals develop their attitudes. As their survey results show, 84,5 per cent of participants stated that Syrians are a burden, particularly to the health and the education system of Turkey; 83 per cent of them thought that Syrians are getting the jobs of people who live in Turkey, 83 per cent of them stated that Syrians made unemployment rates rise in Turkey. Besides seeing immigrants as an economic threat, Syrians have also considered a danger to security and morality in society, as 79 per cent of them thought that Turkey's moral values and traditions are under threat because of the increasing Syrian population, and 76,3 per cent believe that Syrians made crime rates rise in Turkey. Murat Erdoğan's (2017) research on society of Turkey's perception of Syrians in was also similar; 72% of participants agreed on concerns that Syrians are responsible, such as losing jobs, increased crime rate, corruption of public services, and threat to identity. A recent study conducted by Turper Alışık and Aslam (2022) with Turkish citizens shows that the misinformation about Syrian immigrants fosters the negative attitudes of natives toward refugees. According to the findings of their in-depth interviews with field experts of NGOs and migration governance units, and migration scholars, participants' perception toward Syrians is partly shaped by misinformation in general. Immigrants are commonly seen as a burden on the Turkish economy, they are regarded as a threat that might take political and cultural priv-

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[1] This concept used sociologically for all Syrian immigrants regardless of their legal status in this study.

ileges in the future because of relatively high birth rates and Islamist way of living, and they are perceived as a safety threat because of the visuals images and narratives that associating refugees with sexual and criminal offenses. The misinformation and disinformation examples that have been circulated in social and traditional media will be examined in the next part of this article. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that they significantly impact how immigrants are perceived.

There are studies held in Turkey and other countries to show the impact of how social media platforms provide a field to spread anti-immigrant discourses. For example, research on mostly watched YouTube videos taken between 2016-2019 displaying street interviews about Syrians in Turkey showed the volume. According to the research findings, 70 per cent of participants in street interviews used anti-immigrant discourse and stated their economic, security, socio-political and political concerns caused by immigrants (İşçi & Uludağ, 2019). It is possible to observe these perceptions in European countries, too. The anti-immigrant groups in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK ran coordinated campaigns against the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in 2018. Twitter analysis of these campaigns showed that discourse framed Muslim immigrants as threats to security, economy, and culture (Culloty & Suiter, 2021).

The perception of locals towards immigrants as a threat to social and economic order is also affected and shaped by media narratives. As we mentioned above, how issues like migration are narrated and emphasized in digital or traditional media directly affects people's perceptions, and it is not only the case in Turkey. For example, according to the research that evaluates nearly 1,500 news articles from EU member states published in May 2019 and July 2020; disinformation narratives about migration demonstrated immigrants as a threat to health, wealth, and identity, and they polarize public opinion and set political agenda (Butcher & Neidhardt, 2020). Recently, the anti-immigration policies of right-wing parties and politicians' discourse based on populism in the Western world have raised hate speech against immigrants, especially against the ones who migrated from Muslim countries. Due to the simplicity of producing and spreading disinformation in social media, anti-immigrant discourses easily reach the extreme and racist level (Culloty & Suiter, 2021). The structures of social media platforms that form filter bubbles restrict the platform users only to interact with sim-

ilar views just as theirs (Pariser, 2011). Filter bubbles cause the sharing of similar contents, so hearing the voice of "others" become nearly impossible. In the case of the migration discussions, it is possible to say that anti-immigrant discourse highly benefited from this feature of social media platforms and eased the spread of disinformation.

As the number of news about immigrants in media has increased for a decade in Turkey, research that evaluates the content of this news and focuses on how media outlets represent Syrians has increased too. Efe (2015), who analyzed the news about Syrians from different newspapers between 2011-2015, cited that, BirGün, Evrensel, Yeni Şafak, and Zaman newspapers mainly mentioned the issues directly concerning Syrians, while Cumhuriyet, Ortadoğu, and Sabah put Syrians in the agenda of political news. In 2015, the representation of Syrians in media was analyzed by Göker and Keskin (2015), and according to their findings on Cumhuriyet, Yeni Şafak, Zaman, Posta, and Hürriyet newspapers, Syrians were represented in the news not only as 'passive and victim' but also as 'the scapegoats'. Another research held by Pandır, Efe, and Paksoy (2016) shows that on the one hand, Syrians are represented as 'poor/helpless,' but on the other hand, they are perceived as a 'threat' to social security. At this point, it is crucial to consider the results of these media representations and remember how they can affect and shape locals' perceptions towards immigrants. The news that prioritizes 'victimhood' or pity for the Syrians prevents the public from making 'right-based' arguments, and the essential problem of 'not being represented' for Syrians comes to the agenda (M. Erdoğan et al., 2017). Some research show that the lack of contact is also one of the main reasons for negative perceptions towards immigrants (E. Erdoğan & Uyan-Semerci, 2018; Turper Alışık & Aslam, 2022) and when the negative perception is high in public, it makes difficult to discuss Syrians' current situation on right-based status.

How Syrians are represented on digital media tools is another topic that is needed to be discussed. The entries about Syrians in social dictionaries such as Ekşi Sözlük, İnci Sözlük, and İTÜ Sözlük, in which users make anonymous comments, were evaluated by Özdemir and Öner-Özkan (2016). According to their findings, the negative representations of Syrians and the perception to regard them as a threat to Turkey's future are widely common. The analysis of the comments of users about Syrians in online news platforms by Türk (2019) and the Facebook content analysis of Filibeli and

Ertuna (2021) about Syrians during the 2018-2019 elections period reveal the rising level of hate speech and discrimination against Syrian immigrants in Turkey. When we consider the volume of information produced and circulated intentionally to harm immigrants, it is expected to see progressive comments and posts by users in digital media tools. At this point, we come up with the importance of realizing whether the information is accurate. In order to do that, we need to distinguish the features of false information types and develop some skills to fight against information disorders.

A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF DISINFORMATION ABOUT SYRIAN IMMIGRANTS IN TURKEY

Historically, the term 'fake news' was commonly used to describe and somehow 'blame' the false information flow in the media. However, there are various types and features of false information, and the concept of "fake news" is not enough to realize this complexity. When we use "fake news" for all inaccurate information, it is possible to dismiss the points of why, how, and by whom that information produced, shared, and spread. In our digital age, most false information cannot be considered just as fake because they are often genuine and used in a context to harm some groups and target people to believe and share (Wardle, 2020). Moreover, the term "fake news" is used by politicians to discredit the media and damage the trust in journalism (Ireton & Posetti, 2018; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). The transformation of the information ecosystem in today's world due to digitalization changes the production and distribution networks of information. In order to realize and understand the diversity of false information, it is helpful to benefit from the concept of information disorders so that we are able to understand for what purpose and in which type that information is produced and how it is spread (E. Erdoğan et al., 2022). In this way, it becomes easier to realize the differences, take precautions and vary the intervention tools.

Information disorders, generalized by Claire Wardle (2020), is a term collectively used for the concepts of misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. First of all, misinformation refers to information that is false but not designed to harm, so it refers to information which is genuinely false, but the actor that spreads it is not aware of its falseness (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). The social media posts, tweets, or WhatsApp messag-

es shared in friends and family groups during the first days of the Covid-19 pandemic can be considered examples of misinformation. People have shared those contents that are not verified probably just with the intention to help their loved ones without knowing that some of them contain false information.

Secondly, however, the situation changes in the case of disinformation because it refers to content that is intentionally false and designed to cause harm. According to Wardle (2020), there are three reasons why disinformation is produced and spread: to make money; to have political influence, either foreign or domestic; or to cause trouble to get a benefit. When we tackle the inaccurate information spread about immigrants to create negative perceptions, we mostly come across examples of disinformation, such as the allegations that blame Syrians for being paid regularly by some municipalities in Turkey (Özer, 2017).

Finally, the concept of malinformation refers to truthful information but shared with the intent to cause harm (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). For example, when secret governmental documents or private email texts are shared publicly in order to create damage, that information should be referred to as malinformation. These three concepts of information disorders enable us to differentiate if the information is accurate or not and the intention behind it. In order to realize the variety of how misinformation and disinformation are produced and what types we may come across them, by referring to First Draft's categorization, we use the seven types as satire/parody, false connection, misleading content, false context, imposter content, manipulated content, fabricated content (Wardle, 2020). In order to examine Teyit's analysis of the Syrians in Turkey, we will use these seven types and make precise categorizations of disinformation.

METHODOLOGY

Since disinformation harms individuals and social cohesion directly by undermining respectful and honest dialogue and communication, it is no doubt that they have unfavourably affected the relationships between locals and immigrants. Once the disinformation about migrants springs out in social media, it is circulated too fast within and around social platforms. It reaches out too many people because there are so many people with negative beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants to scapegoat them. In this study,

we employed a qualitative data collection method in order to explore and uncover the disinformation about Syrian immigrants in Turkey. Our sample included 74 contents with the label "Syrian(s)" in the database of Teyit.org, a leading fact-checking organization in Turkey, between February 2017 and September 2022. As a verified signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) code of principles, Teyit.org commits to non-partisanships, transparency, openness, and honesty and follows several validated methods and rules, which IFCN controls, to check whether the news or information is true or false.

In this study, we discovered that while 70 claims were false, only four claims were true and ambiguous within the Teyit.org analyses. To provide a broad perspective on disinformation campaigns about immigrants, we investigated several aspects, agents, and processes of the disinformation narratives. Firstly, we classified the platforms where disinformation spreads into two types: traditional and new media, including social media platforms and online new channels. Secondly, we identified the type of actors who push the disinformation campaigns, such as politicians, journalists, newspapers, or anonymous. Thirdly, following Teyit.org analyses, we categorized disinformation about Syrians into seven types in accordance with Wardle's conceptual framework: Satire or parody, false connection, misleading content, false context, imposter content, manipulated content, and fabricated content. Finally, we reported disinformation campaigns regarding their themes in education, citizenship and rights, culture, national value, economics, and security.

UNCOVERING THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT DISINFORMATION IN TURKEY

Platforms: Where does disinformation spread?

When examining the analyses in Teyit.org, we observed that while 63 claims were spread in new media, only two news spread in traditional media, and five of them spread in both. Although traditional media are exposed to speed pressure in order to survive and increase their advertising revenues, it is seen that most of the disinformation about migrants spread on new media platforms, especially Facebook and Twitter. In the digital age, traditional media still with control and editorial process may inhibit to share of disinformation to their audiences. In contrast to traditional media, there are too many

reasons that facilitate and bring about the spread of disinformation in social media. For example, on these platforms, platforms users can post whatever they want without control or an editing process. The volume and speed of information circulated in digital media make it difficult to discern between true and false news or information.

Furthermore, filter bubbles that result from the social media algorithms that dictate what we come across with posts on online platforms accelerate the spread of disinformation. Social media platforms' algorithms and, in turn, filter bubbles frame "a unique universe of information for each of us, which fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information." (Pariser, p. 9, 2011). Through these algorithms, platforms have a lot of information and data about us, such as what we eat, what we like, and what we think. Filter bubbles set off a personal ecosystem of information where we encounter ideas like our own and hear the same voices. For this reason, social media platforms lay the groundwork for spreading disinformation about migrants, given that immigrants could be lightly scapegoated without verifying the information or news received.

Actors: Who does disinformation spread?

We mentioned above that the framework of information disorder allows us to distinguish between actors creating, producing, and distributing disinformation and sharing misinformation without knowing. As deliberately transmitting disinformation to audiences, individuals, states, or organizations might aim at making money, manipulating the public for political gains, or acquiring prestige. However, audiences or ordinary people exposed to disinformation or false news would believe and so share them or not in accordance with their beliefs, ideology, social status, etc. Within the scope of this research, we focus on the actors who intentionally create, produce, and distribute disinformation involving politicians, journalists, anonymous accounts, media organizations, and newspapers.

In new media, when we assessed the contents analyzed by Teyit.org, it was seen that most of the actors who share the disinformation are anonymous accounts on Twitter and Facebook. In particular, several radical Facebook pages and groups consistently deploy disinformation. A chance of creating an anonymous account on social media platforms ends up avoiding of responsibility of sharing disinformation and paves the way for that dis-

information to be prevalent. However, after the anonymous accounts share disinformation, the fact that media organizations refer to and post it is common practice. For example, the claim that the state gives 2.000TL in cash aid to Syrian immigrants before Ramadan was firstly posted by anonymous accounts referring to Gazete İpekyol, reporting the true story, indicating that the relief organization gives 2000TL in cash to Syrian immigrants. After that, online media organizations such as Yeniçağ Gazetesi, Yurt Gazetesi, Gerçek Kocaeli share the disinformation without checking. Similarly, after the account @derbilizm on Twitter and the account "sendegul" on Facebook raised a claim that nearly a thousand Syrian teachers were appointed as a teacher in Adana, it has appeared in newspapers and news portals such as Sözcü, KRT TV, amplifying the circulation of it within and around platforms (Uysal, 2019).

The most important evidence that we observed regarding actors is an abundance of politicians in the process of disinformation, especially on Twitter. While using social media platforms to campaign and inform the public, they could also regularly apply false information and hate speech to manipulate the public and affect their opinion on political issues. Because of their high number of followers, their posts spread fast, reaching out to many people willing to retweet or quote tweets with comments in seconds. If people receive the news or information from those whom they trust and who have the same worldview, they tend to believe them more. This puts the politicians as key actors in the disinformation ecosystem. In Turkey's anti-immigrant disinformation ecosystem, Ümit Özdağ (5), Sinan Oğan (1), İlay Aksoy (2), Yusuf Halaçoğlu (1), Mehmet Aslan (1), Ali Alemdaroğlu (1), Yıldırım Kaya (1) are prominent actors targeting immigrants through disinformation.

For instance, quoted a video on Twitter in which seen a green passport and people speaking in Arabic, Ümit Özdağ, founder and leader of the Victory Party, the newest and leading anti-immigrant party in Turkey, claimed that this passport has been only given to mayors, deputies, and investors, implying that immigrants are given it. Nevertheless, it is seen that the people from Kuwait in the video is an investor and legally has a company dealing with construction and commerce, so they were given a green passport. In another disinformation case, Ümit Özdağ claimed that Syrian immigrants could get their cars inspected free of charge, quoting the news

site "haberiniz.com.tr" on Twitter. According to Teyit.org, both claims attracted nearly 50k interactions, 10k retweets, and 33k likes (Türkan, 2022).

Similarly, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, an ex-deputy, accused the Syrian immigrant of coming into line in front of the İzmir Branch of Population and Citizenship Affairs of given citizenship, sharing the so-called photo (Korkmaz, 2019). Although in this photo, immigrants updated and renewed their address and information in Precedency of Migration Management, and even one warned and asked Halaçoğlu for that how he demonstrated any proof explaining this situation, he said that he went and saw it.

Types of Disinformation

Since the term fake news does not cover all of the false content, and generally, it is used to turn down the journalists in a pejorative manner by politicians, we need to disassemble the disinformation both to recognize and to uncover it. As we examine the contents of Teyit.org, it is seen that there are all types of disinformation except parody or satire.

Table 14.1 Types of Disinformation

Types of Disinformation	Number
Misleading Content	27
False Connection	22
False Context	7
Fabricated Content	8
Imposter Content	2
Manipulated Content	4
Parody or Satire	0
Total	70

Source: Prepared by the authors

Table 1 above shows the number of each type of disinformation about Syrian immigrants. The most common type of disinformation we encountered was misleading content, which is identifies the false information, and reframes and regenerates the narratives. Though this news or information occasionally applies to facts, they circulate as a result of deliberately creating, producing, and distributing disinformation, aiming to harm immigrants. Even if all content and information are not false, it would be seen

that facts in the content are used to blur the meaning of facts and alter it. For instance, the rumor that the Ministry of National Education will set up four schools in İzmir that only immigrants are enrolling in had been circulated on Twitter until officials made a statement (Korkmaz, 2019). Yet the Governor of İzmir tweeted that these schools are funded by European Union and then stated that a total of 440 schools will be built not only in İzmir but also in 19 provinces. It is no doubt that misleading content about immigrants is prevalent since this type of disinformation aims to harm them directly.

The second most common disinformation about immigrants is a false connection. This type of disinformation is used to cause Syrian immigrants to become the target for anything that they didn't do since it is usually referred a lousy situation and reconstituted videos or images as if they were immigrants or they did it. In this type, even if the subject of the news is not immigrants, they are blamed. For example, Ümit Özdağ shared a poster displaying that Syrians will hold a demonstration (Keskin, 2021). Yet this demonstration was enacted in 2019, and same poster was used in that case. In Özdağ's tweet, the date and time of the demonstration on the poster were changed with the new date and time to misinform people so that they are mobilized to put the blame on immigrants.

Themes of Disinformation

Disinformation has plagued the situation of immigrants and co-existence and urged anti-immigrant discourse in several ways and various aspects. In this research, we identified the disinformation themes below to find out which type of topic are prevalent. In doing so, we look at the contents more closely, including disinformation in different themes.

As the disinformation about immigrants is analyzed by themes, it is seen that the most common theme is economic claims. This theme might account for the rumors that cash aid was given to Syrian immigrants before the lockdown and that Syrian immigrants did not pay the water bill (Acanerler, 2018a). However, these types of allegations are entirely false because Syrian immigrants are provided with cash assistance within the only scope of the Emergency Social Safety Net Programme, which is funded by the European Union. Although it is obvious that the Turkish state does not directly give cash aid to Syrian immigrants, it still spreads on social media.

Table 14.2 Themes of Disinformation

Theme	Description	Number
Economic	Claims that to be created job opportunities or to aid Syrian immigrants	26
Security and Violence	Claims that Syrian immigrants' resort to violence and threat to the public and national security	15
Citizenships and Rights	Claims that Syrian immigrants enjoy more civic rights than locals and will acquire Turkish citizenship	12
Cultural Inconsistency	Claims regarding Syrian immigrants' cultural inconsistency	7
Education	Claims regarding Syrian immigrants' access to the right to education	6
National Values	Claims that Syrian immigrants attack the national values	4

Source: Prepared by the authors

Secondly, another prevalent disinformation theme is concerned with the representation of Syrian immigrants, especially those supposed to be involved in the violation. For instance, the claim that two Syrians raped and then killed a woman spread on social media in 2017 (Çavuş, 2017). This claim spread quickly and was shared in a group on Facebook, yet the photo in the post was taken in 2013, and the woman was killed by her husband. Through these unrealistic cases, people or organizations are trying to represent immigrants as prone to violence.

The claims that Syrian immigrants benefit from several rights more than locals or acquire citizenship have highlighted the sense of competition between immigrants and locals. For example, based on a photo displaying an Arabic name and surname on the signboard in the hospital, it was claimed that Syrian immigrants were considered legally priority patients in many Facebook groups and pages in 2018 (Acanerler, 2018b). However, there is no sign to prove that Syrian immigrants have priority in the hospital.

Fourthly, among the disinformation pieces examined, there is news or information that is not based on facts and puts forward that Syrian immigrants do not act in accordance with Turkey's cultural values or lifestyle. For example, after the Korkusuz Gazetesi, in its headline, shared the news with a photo displaying a Syrian immigrant smoking a hookah at sea, this quickly spread on social media platforms, although he was a Turkish citizen in the photo (Şuşar, 2019).

Another theme of rumors about immigrants is education-related claims which remark that they have some advantages in accessing education compared to locals. This type of claim might be accounted the rumors that Syrian immigrants enroll in university without exams or any circumstances (Livane Özer, 2017).

Finally, the rumors that immigrants attack national values are used to target them. In relation to this theme, we might address the rumor that Syrian immigrants allegedly burned the Turkish flag in 2019 (Furuncı, 2019). The Facebook group's post, displaying the scene of the Turkish flag burning, nearly got 20k interactions from those who shared or liked it. Nevertheless, this scene was shooted from Baghdad, Iraq, in 2015, and those who burned the flag are not Syrian.

CONCLUSION

As Syrian immigrants have fled the war and arrived in Turkey since the onset of the Syrian war, negative perceptions and attitudes about them have increased. We are moving through a time when discriminatory, hate speech, and even lynching attempts against immigrants are widespread. In this study, using Teyit.org's fact-checking analysis, we tried to scrutinize the disinformation narratives about Syrian refugees through content analysis. Based on our research, we determined that disinformation about Syrian refugees was concentrated on social media platforms and that dedicated prominent actors were comprised of anonymous accounts on social platforms and politicians. Also, we demonstrated that disinformation narratives were formed of different types and themes.

The narratives and rumors about immigrants' social position spread in media channels, the framing of the news about them by media platforms, and the negative representations that strengthen bias and prejudices directly affect the rise of negative perceptions towards them in public. Due to the lack of social contact with immigrants, our perceptions about them are pretty easily influenced by what we hear or read. Hence, it becomes easier to presume that disinformation as it is accurate. In the meantime, those misperceptions result in the spread of discriminative attitudes and hate speech towards immigrants and damage the process of social cohesion and acceptance. As shown in our analysis, as long as there are actors who benefit from the disinformation spread about immigrants and get political interest from it, the

spread will continue. However, if we become aware of this fact, it might be possible to find some ways to reinforce it.

Besides our disinformation investigation dealing with platforms, actors, types, and themes of disinformation, we need to focus on developing the methods, strategies, or mentality which would inhibit disinformation. Unfortunately, it is obvious that there is a lack of strategy or policy toward fighting disinformation about immigrants. Although we didn't discuss and focus on how to prevent disinformation in this study, based on the literature on fighting disinformation, we would mention some tips before and after spreading disinformation about immigrants.

First of all, it is essential to remember that the information we receive from friends or family or come across on social media might be false. As social media users, we are exposed to too much information, and it is common to discern which those are correct or reliable is difficult. Before sharing any news or report with our friends, family, or followers, we can do stop and think. In case we are not sure of any news or information veracity, we can follow some essential tips such as assessing the sources in the news, identifying the author who publish or write it, checking the date when information or news was released, and checking our bias and turning to fact-checkers. Furthermore, we need to boost our critical digital media-literacy skills, including an understanding the digital environment, how information circulates on the internet, and how social media platforms work. As shown in our study, since most of the disinformation about immigrants circulates on social platforms, we should develop more comprehensive approaches to using digital tools and platforms to combat disinformation.

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Is the EU a Normative Power?
Criticism of the EU-Turkey Statement

Efe Can Müderrisoğlu*, Mahsum Ökmen**

ABSTRACT

Faced with great political and economic destruction as a result of two great wars in the first half of the 20th century, Europe established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a peace project. The European Union (EU), one of the most important factors of rapid recovery, is a large economic structure with 27 members today (i.e., after Brexit). This evolution of Europe has caused the EU to be defined in different power concepts. One of these is Ian Manners' concept of "normative power". This study examines the concept of "normative power", which was considered to define the EU by Ian Manners, within the framework of neo-realist theory and in the context of EU-Turkey relations. In other words, an answer is sought to the question of whether the EU member states consider norms as a priority area in the EU-Turkey relations or whether they bring their interests to the forefront. This analysis focuses on the EU-Turkey Statement of March 18, 2016. Thus, the EU's position on these norms is explained through Syrian refugees. Based on the data used in the study, despite the negative picture that has been drawn by Turkey on norms about Syrian refugees, reaching the EU-Turkey Statement on March 18, 2016 is criticized.

Keywords: International Migration, Normative Power, Neorealism, Turkey-EU Relations, 18 March Statement

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INTRODUCTION

The power struggles that started in Europe in the 20th century spread worldwide, leading to two major wars. At the end of the Second World War, six European states, on the verge of a great collapse, turned to cooperation to prevent similar destruction from happening again. On the one hand, six states tried to maximize their power by cooperating in the coal and steel sector, which is the raw material of the war. On the other hand, they tried to increase their power by collaborating within the bipolar structure in the external context.

The European Union (*the EU*) has gained some experience from the states applying for membership. One of the most concrete examples of this issue is the Mediterranean enlargement in the 1980s. After the liberation of Greece from the junta of colonels, Spain from Franco, and Portugal from Salazar, these three countries pressured the Union to become members on normative bases such as human rights, especially democracy. As a matter of fact, during this enlargement process, the Union 'discovered' that the EU was the 'patron' of the norms, as mentioned earlier, and in 1993, conditions for being a member of the Union were established, known as the Copenhagen Criteria. The membership criteria on which these norms are based have been tried to be applied in the enlargement of Central and Eastern European countries.

In addition to all these developments, it has been frequently discussed in the literature whether the EU is a power or not and what kind of power it is. Ian Manners (2002) introduced the concept of normative power as the membership criteria started to come to the fore leading to the 2004 enlargement mentioned in the previous paragraph. According to Manners, the EU actively continues to promote ideas and norms outside the EU, despite the lack of economic and military supplies (Parker and Rosamond, 2013, p. 230).

It can be claimed that Manners' thought in question was influential in the near geography of the EU because the EU has also achieved essential successes in terms of being a normative power, especially for countries that are within the perspective of full membership. Especially in the post-Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) period, it facilitated the establishment of liberal norms in Central and Eastern European countries through the membership criteria, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the fact that these countries were criticized for the norms adopted by the Union after

they became full members of the EU (especially as seen in the examples of Poland and Hungary) led to the debate about whether the EU is a normative power even within itself. If the Union does not have an effective removal or functional penalty mechanism, in other words, if the Union membership is likened to a carrot, the normative 'power' of the Union may become dysfunctional after the states reach the carrot and there is no carrot left.

As explained above, the Union may experience problems even with the member states within the framework of the concept of normative power. On the one hand, while the EU has problems with normative issues within itself, it may also encounter some problems with candidate countries. One of the candidate countries in question is Turkey. The EU often directs many criticisms within the framework of liberal norms to Turkey, which has the oldest membership relationship in history and is still not a member. Despite this, the EU has signed a statement with Turkey as a solution to the influx of immigrants that begun with the start of the Syrian Civil War. In return for this Statement, the EU has promised to grant visa liberalization to the citizens of the Republic of Turkey, provided that certain conditions are met. In that case, can the EU-Turkey Statement on 18 March 2016 which it constantly criticizes in normative titles, in exchange for visa liberalization and its efforts to prevent the influx of immigrants with this agreement, be explained by the claim of normative power?

The history of relations between Turkey and the EU has passed for half a century. Turkey's relations with the EU, which applied to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, gained a new form by signing the Association Agreement, also known as the Ankara Agreement, in 1963. According to the agreement, three-stage integration would occur, but full integration has not yet been achieved. Turkey, which was declared a candidate country in 1999, still has not become a member state and maintains its candidacy status. This situation is also an indication of the fact that Turkey has never fully met the EU membership requirements for the Union. In addition, Turkey has been criticized on a normative basis in the reports published by the EU in recent years. Thus, the EU-Turkey Statement on March 18, 2016 led to the criticism of the Union's normative power concept.

In this study, the claim of Manners, who defines the EU as a normative power, will be questioned through the EU-Turkey Statement, which has been subjected to many normative criticisms. Based on this analysis, the

neo-realist theory will take place, and especially the emphasis of neo-realist theory on interests and the relationship between norms and interests will be emphasized. In this context, first of all, the concept of normative power will be examined through the EU, the assumptions of the neo-realist theory will be explained, and the situation of Turkey and the EU-Turkey Statement will be evaluated over the assumptions of the concept of normative power.

NEO-REALISM, EU AND NORMS

Power struggles in Europe led to the First World War, which brought great destruction, economic collapse, and political instability to the people of Europe. With the influence of societies' negative perceptions of war, the idealist view began to dominate the international discipline after the First World War. Understandably, idealism's assumptions, such as democratization, the creation of common law structures, and the rationality of individual and collective security, were readily accepted when they emerged. However, these "utopian" views put forward by the idealist approach failed to grasp the fundamental structure of the international system and its foundations based on power politics.

In the time that entered the third decade of the 20th century with a significant economic crisis, the hopes of the idealist approach began to give way to fear and anxiety. While the economic crisis caused disorder in world politics, dictators took over the administration in various countries, contrary to the idealist views. On the other hand, the ineffective and unsuccessful attitude of the League of Nations (despite its partial successes) in the face of these developments caused the hopes for a "more peaceful world" to fade. Realist theory, which emerged by criticizing the idealist view in such an environment, continued to be the dominant theory in the system until the 1980s.

Political realist theory, which takes its power from its simplicity and has a discourse that can appeal to everyone, describes the international system as a structure in which states are the main actors, and these actors interact. It is inevitable for these states, which constantly struggle for power for security, to fight each other. Realists often equate power with military power in this system, which they describe as an anarchic area. In other words, the international system for realist theory is the power struggle between states (Arı, 2004, p. 164).

However, in the process, realist theory has come into existence in many forms. For this reason, it does not seem possible to explain realist theories as a "single" theory. In this study, since a neo-realist approach will be adopted in terms of the subject, it is necessary to explain the basic assumptions of the theory in question. The first is that "the international systems are anarchic". Second, 'states are the primary international actors'. The third assumption is that "states are functionally similar". The fourth assumption is the acceptance of "states as rational and unitary actors". (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 220-221)

Considering the neo-realist approach to the EU, the emphasis on the system draws attention. The theory in question does not define the EU by looking at its internal structure; it deals with the international structure (Rosamond, 2000, p. 133). According to Adrian Hyde-Price, "Co-operation in Western Europe took place under the security umbrella provided by the USA and institutionalized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)" (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 225). In other words, neo-realists describe the EU as a product of the bipolar structure experienced during the Cold War.

Neo-realists explain the integration process through states, which they see as the main actor. As a matter of fact, according to this approach, the interstate cooperation process takes place under the control of states, which are rational actors (Pentland, 1973, p. 218). Because states have the power to have the last word about their destiny, they do not allow any steps to be taken against their interests as rational beings. This thought leads to the conclusion that the Union cannot make decisions independently of the member states. The fact that the Union still maintains an intergovernmental approach to foreign policy issues can be seen as a manifestation of this.

In addition, according to Waltz, one of the pioneers of neo-realism who analyzes the EU as an international institution, the life of any international institution is related to whether it has a strong state or not. Waltz explains this by saying, "The survival and expansion of NATO tell us much about American power and influence and little about institutions as multilateral entities" (Waltz, 2000, p. 20). Similarly, according to Waltz (2000, p. 24), "Strong states use institutions, as they interpret laws, in ways that suit them" and associated the cooperation processes between states with the decisions shaped in line with the interests of the states.

The fact that realist theories treat structures like the EU as international institutions can be successful in explaining the EU's foreign policy and security policies, but this treatment have difficulties in explaining the Union's domestic policy in particular. For example, realist theories have difficulty explaining the type of authority known as the exclusive authority of the Union, which gives the Union the right to make regulations independently of the member states. However, in this study, it is seen that the neo-realist theory is in harmony with the subject of the study, as it is analyzed whether the Union can be a normative power within the scope of EU-Turkey Statement.

The neo-realist approach, which sees states as essential, rational, and unitary actors, discusses norms within this framework. According to neo-realists, states, the main actors in the international system, make rational choices. Thus, states continue to cooperate with other actors to the extent that they maximize their benefits (Risse, 2000, p. 3). Another important concept at this point is the logic of consequence. Because according to neo-realists, actors deal with norms within the framework of this logic. As Risse underlines, in conditions of uncertainty and incomplete information, norms provide actors with roadmaps for appropriate behavior in which they can best realize their interests. Thus, states, which are the main actors, make profit and loss calculations when adopting or not adopting the said norms and decide whether to adopt the norms within the framework of their interests and implement these decisions (Risse, 2000, p. 4).

Here, especially the suggestions of the theory in question gain importance. The propositions of the neo-realist approach are security competition in a self-helping system, security and power maximization, relative gains, milieu shaping, and second-order concerns (Hyde-Price, 2006, p. 221-223).

Among these, secondary concerns have an important place in this study. Because states are not only motivated by concerns about maximizing security and power. In addition to these primary concerns, they maintain a range of ethical concerns that reflect their distinctive political values, ranging from the environment to protecting international human rights. However, these are always 'second-order' concerns because these concerns are subordinate to national security and other fundamental national interests, and states make sacrifices within the logic of power to balance core national interests or conflicts (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 46-47). This proposal of neo-realism will constitute one of the main reference points explaining the EU-Turkey Statement in this study.

EU AND NORMATIVE POWER

In addition to the neo-realist theory outlined in terms of norms and its approach to the EU in the previous section, the concept of normative power that Manners uses for the EU will be explained. First, Duchéne's civilian power concept will be compared with Manners' normative power concept because it is possible to find the origins of normative power in Duchéne. An excellent example of this is when Ian Manners (2002, p. 235-236), referring to Hedley Bull's article (1982) on the concept of civic power, states that "Bull's argument forms the starting point of my discussion of the international role of the European Union (EU) as a promoter of norms"[1]. In addition, since the situation of the Syrians in Turkey will be analyzed in the following sections, the norms that are the subject of the normative power concept will be mentioned after the civilian power – normative power comparison.

Whether the EU is a power or not, and if it is a power, which power category it can belong to has been frequently discussed in the historical process.[2] For instance, Francois Duchéne believes the European Community is

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[1] In addition, Ian Manners frequently compares civil power and normative power in his studies and tries to explain what normative power is and what it is not regarding the concept of civil power. This is another indication of the concept of civilian power at the heart of normative power debates. For some of Manners' discussions of civil power: Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", JCMS, Cilt: 40, No: 2, 2002, p. 235-258; Ian Manners, "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads", Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 2006, p. 182-199; Ian Manners, "The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35(1), 2006, p. 167-180; Ian Manners, "The normative Ethics of the European Union", International Affairs, Volume: 84, No:1, 2008, p. 65-80.

[2] Some debates for the EU and power Relations: **For civilian power:** Francois Duchene, "Europe's Role in World Peace", Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, (London: Fontana), 1972; Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", JCMS, 21(2), 1982, p. 149-170; Jan Orbie, "Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates", Cooperation and Conflict, 41(1), 2006, p. 123-128; **For normative power:** Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?", JCMS, Volume: 40, No: 2, 2002, p. 235-258; Ian Manners, "Normative power Europe reconsidered: beyond the crossroads", Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 2006, p. 182-199; Ian Manners, "The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35(1), 2006, p. 167-180; Ian Manners, "The normative Ethics of the European Union", International Affairs, Volume: 84, No:1, 2008, p. 65-80; Thomas Diez, "Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33(3), 2005, p. 613-636; **For transformative power:** Tanja A. Börzel ve Thomas Risse, "The Transformative Power of Europe: The European and the Diffusion of Ideas", KFG Working Papers, Free University Berlin, 2009; **For post-colonial power:** Nora Fisher Onar ve Kalypso Nicolaidis, "The Decentring Agenda: Europe as a post-colonial power", Cooperation and Conflict, 48(2), 2013, p. 283-303

a civilian power. These discussions have been moved to another dimension with an article by Ian Manners (2002). In this article, Manners discussed the EU as a normative power. As Thomas Diez emphasizes, Manners argues that the EU represents a new kind of power that pursues normative goals (as opposed to self-interested material gains) predominantly through normative means (as opposed to predominantly military and economic means) (Diez, 2013, p. 194).

The difference between the propositions of Duchêne and Manners relates to the Cold War. According to Diez and Manners (2007, p. 175), the EU passed from a civilian power to a normative power in the post-Cold War period. It can be argued that this claim was made by looking at the EU's policies. As a matter of fact, while Article 237, which regulates membership in the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), sought the condition of being European for membership, a number of membership criteria were determined on the basis of norms as a result of the Copenhagen Summit held in 1993. While the EU was experiencing a cooperation process based on the economy from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Maastricht, it also tried establishing itself as a political entity with the Treaty of Maastricht. It can be argued that this change has led Diez and Manners to think that the EU has moved from civilian power to normative power.

Essentially, there is a close relationship between Manners' normative conceptualization of power and Duchéne's civilian power, so the two concepts are often confused with each other. Because Manners' understanding of normative power was developed as a resurrection of the idea of civilian power. However, a normative power does not only act in its interests. Whether self-interested or not, a normative power often emphasizes its commitment to international norms. It tries to realize this emphasis not only through non-military means but also through the power of norms (Diez, 2013, p. 197). The non-military vehicles mentioned here are primarily economic.

It is difficult to assess the differences between civic and normative power. Two factors cause this difficulty. The first of these is the interpretation of civilian power. It is possible to interpret civilian power as civilizing; thus, this interpretation makes it a kind of normative power. Second, it is challenging to distinguish empirically between foreign policy driven by norms and foreign policy driven by interests. For example, there is a deep relationship between the EU's international trade and norms. Numerous stud-

ies show that the EU exports its norms with its international trade (Diez, 2013, p. 197, Özoflu, 2022).

In addition to this problem between norms and interests, there is a second problem related to the concept of normative power. This problem is related to whether the EU is effective as a normative power at home and in the international system. "Are there norms by the EU that influence the behavior of other states?" According to Diez (2013, p. 197), who asked the question, answering this question is fraught with practical difficulties.

The EU's inability to exist as a power on its own can be shown in the background of the EU's characterization as a normative or civilian power. This situation stems from the EU's lack of military power and the effect of liberalism. According to Nicolaidis and Howse (2002, p. 768), although the EU lacks military power, Europeans can act as a civilian power and spread their liberal visions through democracy and by exporting democracy through trade. Parker and Rosamond (2002) also argue in their article that the understanding of governance brought about by economic liberalism goes beyond the limits of traditional nation-state sovereignty through European-ization and globalization. However, trade data between the EU and Turkey shows the opposite of the claims of Nicolaidis and Howse.

All these criticisms aside, Manners (2002, p. 239), who conceptual-izes normative power, emphasizes that the EU's civilian or newly develop-ing military power is not unimportant. Manners underlines that the main issue with the normative power concept is simply that "in the field of in-ternational relations, much more attention should be paid to the ability of the EU to shape the concept of 'normal'". According to Manners (2002, p. 239), the EU has taken even more critical steps than many other actors in world politics in informing and stipulating its external relations with a catalog of norms approaching the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The EU was founded on the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as foreign and development policy objectives. At this point, Manners refers specifically to Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union[3]. The reason for underlining this article is that with the said article, the European Union Charter of Fundamental

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3   Other articles underlined by Manners are Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 177 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Rights has become a part of the Union's acquis. According to Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union:

> "1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions.
>
> 2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.
>
> 3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law." (Treaty on European Union, 2007, M.6, Paragraph.)

The basic principles of the normative power concept in shaping the normal are also in harmony with this article. Manners (2008, p. 67-75) lists these basic principles in the emergence of the EU as a normative power. These principles are the objectives of the Union, the general provisions of the Union's foreign actions, sustainable peace, social freedom, mutually agreed democracy, relational human rights, supranational rules of law, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance. In his early writings, Manners emphasizes that the normative basis of the EU has been five basic norms over the last 50 years through declarations, treaties, policies, and criteria. These norms are the centrality of peace[4], the idea of liberty[5], democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms (Manners, 2002, p. 244-245).

Manners argues that six fundamental factors permeate these norms. The first of these is contagion. Manners gives the South American Common

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4 Manners emphasizes the centrality of peace found in the preambles of the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Schuman Declaration, and the Treaty of Rome.

5 Manners also emphasizes that the Treaty of the European Union in 1992 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are included in the preamble.

Market Mercosur (Mercado Comun del Sur) as an example of "diffuse", which means the unintentional transfer of norms from the EU to other political actors. The second factor is informational diffusion, which means the strategic communications of the EU on new policy initiatives, which can take place in the form of statements by the EU and the Commission president or the EU presidency. The third factor is procedural diffusion[6], which includes institutionalizing the EU's relationship with third parties, such as interregional cooperation agreements, membership in an international organization, or the EU's enlargement. Transferring, another factor, occurs when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid, and/or technical assistance with third parties through primary financial means. This factor can mainly be based on the export of community norms in the relationship of "carrot and stick". The fourth factor is overt diffusion. Such diffusion occurs due to the EU's physical presence in third parties and international organizations, as in the role of commission delegations and embassies of the member states. The final factor shaping the diffusion of norms is the cultural filter, which leads to the learning, adaptation, or rejection of norms, thereby influencing the impact of international norms and political learning by third parties and international organizations (Manners, 2002, p. 244-245).

In order to analyze the EU-Turkey Statement within the framework of the above conceptual and theoretical discussions, the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey will be discussed. In this regard, the population distribution (age, gender, etc.) of Syrian refugees in Turkey will be given. Subsequently, the labor force status of refugees will be explained. Here, the participation of Syrian refugees in the labor market and their means of making a living will be examined. Finally, Turkey's legal regulations will be analyzed better to understand the position of the refugees in Turkey. This triple analysis aims to provide a better understanding of the situation of Syrian refugees. Thus, the legal and economic difficulties faced by asylum seekers in Turkey will be revealed more clearly. In the next chapter, the EU-Turkey Statement will be analyzed.

As a result, it will be claimed that the asylum seekers struggling with difficulties in Turkey are kept in Turkey within the framework of the

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6   Examples of the first three expansions by Manners are the interregional dialogue with the African Development Community since 1994, the EU's membership in the World Trade Organization, and the ongoing membership negotiations.

EU-Turkey Statement, and thus the EU moves away from the normative power concept by acting on an interest-based basis.

INTEREST-BASED NATURE OF THE EU-TURKEY STATEMENT

Anti-government demonstrations, known as the Arab Spring, which started in Arab countries in 2010, spread to Syria in 2011. As a result of the conflict that turned into civil war in a short time, many Syrians had to leave their countries and migrated to various countries, especially Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, which are on the Syrian border. Focusing on the migration process in Turkey, where an open door policy is implemented for refugees, it is reflected in the UNHCR data that after the refugees entered Turkey in a group of 252 people on April 29, 2011, the migration of asylum seekers from Syria to Turkey continued and the number of asylum seekers reached 248,666 in 2012. As can be seen in Figure 1, this number continued to increase in the following years and exceeded 3.5 million as of 2018. According to UNHCR and PMM data, 65% of Syrian refugees, whose number was 5,605,952 in September 2022, reside in Turkey. This figure is one of the most obvious indicators that Turkey is the country most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis.

Unlike Turkey, there is no open-door policy towards Syrian refugees in European countries. For this reason, refugees try to reach Europe illegally, mostly by boats. According to UNHCR's (2016) report, more than 1 million

Figure 15.1 Number of Syrian Refugees Under Temporary Protection in Turkey Over Time

Source: PMM and UNHCR

refugees, including Syrians, reached Europe by boat in 2015. In the same report, it has been determined that at least 850,000 of these people crossed the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece. At the same time, unaccompanied or separated children comprised 25 percent of those who reached Greece, Italy and Spain. Also, the death or disappearance of 3,770 people in the Mediterranean was reported. In the face of these developments, two meetings were held between Turkey and the EU between 29 November 2015 and 7 March 2016, and an agreement was reached on the "EU-Turkey Statement" on 18 March 2016. When the content of the EU-Turkey Statement is considered, it becomes clear that the European Union prioritizes interests rather than norms regarding irregular migration. The agreement's emphasis on "to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU" is one of the indicators of this approach. The mechanism developed in accordance with this purpose is based on keeping Syrian refugees in Turkey as a first step, as can be understood from the following Articles:

> *"All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey."* (Art. 1)

> *"Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect."* (Art. 3)

> *"Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced, International Summit a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme."* (Art. 4)

Furthermore, with the one-to-one formula, the expulsion of those who have reached Europe illegally has been legitimized, and the way for indirect punishment of those who attempt to enter the EU through prioritization of those who have not attempted to enter the EU before.

> *"For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States, as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented as from the same day the returns start. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly."* (Art. 2)

Even though *"Collective expulsions are prohibited"* by Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), according to the PMM (2022), as of September 29, 2022, a total of 35,262 Syrian refugees left Turkey within the scope of the one to one formula which corresponds to the expulsion of 35,262 people from the EU. To understand whether the EU takes the humanitarian conditions of the refugees into account, it is significant to describe status, rights and living conditions of the Syrian refugees in Turkey.

In the early years when Syrian refugees started to migrate to Turkey, camps were established in the provinces on the Syrian border and the number of these shelters increased in parallel with the number of refugees. As of August 23, 2013, the refugee population living in the camps reached 200,386, and the ratio of the refugee population in the camps to the total refugee population was recorded as 36% (AFAD, 2013). By May 2016, new camps were added to the camps in the provinces where they were located, and the total number of camps reached 26, while the number of refugees in these camps reached 264,865. However, since the total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey was 2,484,997 on the same date, only 11% of the refugees were accommodated in the camps (AFAD, 2016). This situation has brought the policies of closure of the camps and orientation out of the camps (Erdoğan and Çorabatır, 2019: 7). According to the PMM, as of September 29, 2022, the number of refugees in the camps decreased to 48.006 in total, and the ratio of this number to the total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey decreased to 1.3%.

When refugees are evaluated in terms of age and gender, it is striking that the majority of the population is of working age (see Table 1). This situation created a remarkable increase in labor supply in the labor market. However, this increase mainly affected the unskilled labor market due to the fact that most of the refugees do not know Turkish and they had to leave their livelihoods and assets in Syria due to the war. Many studies found that refugees accept to work for lower wages and longer working hours than natives, mainly in the textile, construction and agriculture sectors[7]. The fact that refugees are at the bottom of the wage pyramid causes all household members to work. There is evidence that Syrian females, who have to be in-

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[7] For the working conditions of Syrian refugees, see. Lordoğlu and Aslan, 2015; IGAM, 2019; Mutlu et al., 2018

cluded in the labor market despite their families' disapproval of their work, are paid even lower than Syrian males. (Yaman, 2018). In addition, Syrian children constitute another group included in the labor market. Lordoğlu and Aslan (2018) observed that in Istanbul, Mardin and Şanlıurfa, children who work 12-14 hours a day, especially in small businesses and agriculture, for very low wages, cannot attend education. Women and children constitute two important elements of migrant labor in agriculture. Findings of Dedeoğlu (2018) about Syrian workers working in the production of watermelon, citrus and various vegetables in Adana Plain is that all household members try to maximize their daily earnings by working in agriculture. It has been determined that Syrians receive the lowest wages in agricultural areas where they work when compared to Georgian and Azerbaijani immigrant groups (Dedeoğlu, 2018)

Table 15.1 Syrian Refugees by Age and Gender

Age	Male	Female	Total
0-14	781.023	732.616	1.513.639
	21%	20%	
15-24[8]	398.598	314.693	713.291
	11%	9%	
25-64	749.003	601.998	1.351.001
	21%	17%	
65+	31.784	36.563	68.347
	1%	1%	
Total	**1.960.409**	**1.685.870**	**3.646.278**
	54%	**46%**	

Source: PMM, https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638, (Date of access: 08.10.2022)

Despite the fact that the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey exceeded 1.5 million in 2014, they did not have any legal status such as refugees, asylum seekers or citizens until 13 October 2014. This is due to the misconception that the civil war in Syria will end in a short time and that the Syrians in Turkey will return to their countries, as well as the lack of legal regulation suitable for such a large migration flow. With the entry of Law on

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8 The age range of 15-24 constitutes the young population according to the classification of the United Nations.

Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) into force on April 11, 2013, the uncertainty regarding the status of Syrian refugees has been removed and asylum seekers have been included in the scope of temporary protection. Persons who can be included in the scope of temporary protection are defined in Article 91 of the LFIP as follows:

> "Temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection."

Following the entry into force of the LFIP, the Presidency of Migration Management (PMM) became operational on April 11, 2014 and took on the task of executing the works and transactions related to temporary protection. As a result of the studies carried out by the PMM, on October 13, 2014, the Temporary Protection Regulation was issued based on Article 91 of the LFIP. With this regulation, it became clear who cannot benefit from this right, the registration process of those who will be placed under temporary protection, and the services they can benefit from. On the other hand, as of January 15, 2016, based on Article 29 of the Temporary Protection Regulation, the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection, which regulates the participation of Syrian refugees in the labor market, entered into force. In this context, it has been decided that foreigners under temporary protection cannot work without a work permit, and that the person who will receive the work permit must be under temporary protection for at least 6 months. In addition, the employer of this person, not the person to be employed, must apply for leave. The prohibition of working without permission in Article 1 has been stretched for those who will work in the agriculture and livestock sector, and those who will work in this sector are deemed exempt from leave. However, in the next paragraph of the same article, it is stated that provincial and quota restrictions may be imposed for those who can work in this sector. According to Article 10 of the Regulation, at least minimum wage must be paid to someone under temporary protection. When these articles are considered together, it can be said that the work permit is a deterrent factor for employers in sectors other than agriculture and animal husbandry. Because employing refugees without permission causes administrative fines for both the employee and the employer. At the same time, since it is obligatory to pay the minimum wage,

the employer is more likely to choose a Turkish person whose adaptation in terms of language, education and culture will cause less cost.

The Regulation also makes it difficult to obtain this permit in the context of the province where the foreigner is registered and the employment quota. According to article 7 of the regulation, the foreigner must be in the province where he/she is registered in order to obtain a work permit. In addition, it is prohibited to employ foreigners more than ten percent of the number of Turkish citizens working in the workplace. If the number of employees is less than ten, only one foreigner can be employed in the relevant workplace. In order for this rule to be subject to an exception, the absence of a Turkish citizen to do the job must be documented. According to estimations of Caro (2020), while 30% of Syrians in Turkey have less than 10 employees in their workplaces, the province where 19,8% of them work is different from the province where they are registered; 19.1% meet both conditions. Therefore, 68.9% of Syrians are not eligible for a work permit. Hence, regardless of the employer's conditions, it is not possible for the majority of Syrians under temporary protection to obtain a work permit directly due to the Regulation. This rule is also reflected in the number of refugees who receive a work permit. According to the data published by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (2019), the number of Syrians who have a work permit as of 2019 is 63,789, of which 59,406 are male and 4,383 are female. When this number is considered together with the number of Syrians aged 15-64[9], which was 2,057,844 as of December 31, 2019, it is concluded that the employment rate of Syrians with a work permit is at the level of 3%. Despite the increase in the total number of Syrians in Turkey in 2020, the number of Syrians with work permits decreased to 62,369 (ÇSGB, 2020).

In short, Syrians have no choice but to work for their livelihood, and conditions, including legal framework, lead them to work informally for low wages, long working hours. Precarious living conditions and limited access to refugee rights may lead Syrians in Turkey to turn the EU but as already referred, the agreement provides legal basis to hinder the majority of them to do so. One of the mainstays in directing refugees to Turkey is the premise that Turkey is a safe country. This acceptance is controversial as well. Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive defines required principles for safe third country as:

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9   Relevant data was obtained from M. Murat Erdogan's study, *Syrians Barometer, 2019*

(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;

(b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011/95/EU;

(c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected;

(d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and

(e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

There is ample evidence that Turkey violates these principles. Many reports published by Amnesty International (2014; 2015; 2019) have reflected events such as refugees in Turkey being detained, tortured in removal centers, and sent back to the war zone. Despite these findings, the fact that the European Union considers Turkey a safe zone and directs refugees who reach Europe illegally to Turkey is another indication that it prioritizes its interests. Likewise, what was promised to Turkey in the context of the agreement supports the argument that persuading Turkish government comes before improving the humanitarian conditions of refugees. For instance, Article 6 states:

> "The EU, *in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018."* (Art. 6)

A part of this 3+3-billion-euro financial support reaches refugees as cash aid. With the Emergency Social Safety Net Programme (ESSN) initiated in this context, 230 TL per person monthly cash support is provided

via Kızılaykart to refugees living under international protection, temporary protection or humanitarian residence permit in Turkey and meeting various criteria. In addition, every 3 months, 600 TL for families consisting of 1-4 people who continue to benefit from the ESSN, 300 TL for families of 5-8 people, and 100 TL for families of 9 or more people is provided. According to TÜRK-İŞ (2022), "the minimum expenditure for food in a month for a family of four to have a healthy and balanced diet" has been calculated as 4,097.85 TL for December 2021 and 7,245.18 TL for September 2022. From this point of view, it can be said that contrary to its purpose, the ESSN program is insufficient to meet the basic needs of a vulnerable immigrant in a dignified way. Similarly, as explained in the previous sections, inadequacies in living conditions cause all household members, including children, to work which poses a declining participation in education so causing projects in this field to become inefficient.

Articles 5 and 7 present additional evidence about the EU's effort to persuade Turkish government because these articles contain features that are independent of the migration crisis and for the benefit of the Turkish government:

> *"The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met. To this end Turkey will take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to allow the Commission to make, following the required assessment of compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal by the end of April on the basis of which the European Parliament and the Council can make a final decision."* (Art. 5)

> *"The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union."* (Art. 7)

Considering abovementioned articles, it can be said that the agreement is based on keeping refugee crisis in Turkey rather than eliminating the reasons for the migration of Syrians to Europe. This has resulted in a picture in which Turkey defines refugees as a bargaining tool against the EU and EU as a mass that should be excluded from Europe at all costs.

DISCUSSION

The literature explains the EU within the framework of many different power concepts. One of them is the normative power concept conceptualized by Ian Manners. It is claimed that the EU, as a normative power, has a transformative effect based on norms, especially in countries with which it is in a membership relationship. However, the EU may experience problems on a normative basis with Poland and Hungary, which are among the important countries of the 2004 enlargement process. This situation causes the normative power concept to be questioned even within the EU.

Turkey, on the other hand, has a different position among the countries that are going through the EU membership process. In this sense, Turkey-EU relations assume a sui generis place. Turkey, which made an application in 1959, signed the Association Agreement in 1963, was declared a candidate country by the EU in 1999 and started the negotiation process with the EU in 2005. The relations between Turkey and the EU, which established the longest membership relationship in EU history, gained a new form as a result of the developments in the MENA region after 2010. Especially the migration caused by the Syrian Civil War started a new process between the parties. In this study, the EU-Turkey Reconciliation is discussed.

The situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey is explained within the framework of this analysis. First, the population distribution of Syrian refugees in Turkey was examined. According to UNHCR and PMM data, 65% of Syrians are refugees, whose number was 5,605,952 in September 2022. The main problem faced by asylum seekers is access to the labor market. Because when refugees are evaluated in terms of age and gender, it is striking that most of the population is of working age. This situation has created a remarkable increase in the labor supply in the labor market. However, this increase has hit the unskilled labor market the most, as most refugees do not speak Turkish and have had to leave their livelihoods and assets in Syria due to the war. Many studies have revealed that refugees agree to work for lower wages and longer working hours than locals, particularly in the textile, construction, and agriculture sectors. The fact that refugees are at the bottom of the wage pyramid causes the entire household to work.

Another challenge faced by asylum seekers in Turkey is their legal status. The legal uncertainty that occurred at the beginning of the migration process disappeared with the entry into force of the Law on Foreigners,

and International Protection (YUKK) on April 11, 2013, and asylum seekers were included in the scope of temporary protection. On the other hand, according to Article 29 of the Temporary Protection Regulation, the Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners under Temporary Protection, which regulates the participation of Syrian refugees in the labor market, entered into force on January 15, 2016. In this context, it has been decided that foreigners under temporary protection cannot work without a work permit. The person receiving a work permit must be under temporary protection for at least six months. However, it seems like a positive development; the work permit will increase the costs, and the province where the foreigner is registered, and the employment quota complicates the process. In addition, it is prohibited to employ foreigners, and more than ten percent of Turkish citizens work in the workplace. If the number of employees is less than ten, only one foreigner can be employed in the relevant workplace. Within the framework of all these difficulties, despite the increase in the total number of Syrians in Turkey in 2020, the number of Syrians with work permits has decreased to 62,369.

In addition to the difficulties faced by the Syrian refugees in Turkey, the fact that the EU, unlike Turkey, does not implement an open-door policy reduces the hopes of immigrants for better living conditions. That is why refugees try to reach Europe illegally, primarily by boat. As a result of this situation, immigrants are losing their lives in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Due to the tragedies, an agreement was reached between the EU and Turkey. Within the scope of the EU-Turkey Statement, it has been decided, as of 20 March 2016, all new irregular migrants who crossed from Turkey to the Greek Islands to be returned to Turkey, and for each returned Syrian, one Syrian from Turkey to be accepted to the EU. It has also been decided that Turkey should take all kinds of measures to prevent illegal migration from Turkey to the EU and cooperate with neighboring states and the EU for this purpose. In addition to the 3+3-billion-euro financial support, it has been stated that removing Turkey's visa requirements will be accelerated, provided all expectations are met. When the content of the EU-Turkey Statement is considered, it becomes clear that the European Union prioritizes interests rather than norms regarding irregular migration. Syrian refugees endure the difficulties of transitioning to Europe with a better life expectancy instead of taking part in the labor market as an informal and cheap labor force with-

out citizenship or legal refugee status in Turkey. However, the agreement is based on convincing the Turkish Government to keep the Syrians in Turkey rather than eliminating the reasons for the migration of Syrians to Europe. For example, a part of the 3+3-billion-euro financial support reaches refugees as cash aid. With the Emergency Social Safety Net Program (ESSN) initiated in this context, 230 TL per person monthly cash support is provided via Kızılaykart to refugees living under international protection, temporary protection, or humanitarian residence permit in Turkey and meeting various criteria. In addition, every three months, 600 TL for families consisting of 1-4 people who continue to benefit from the ESSN, 300 TL for families of 5-8 people, and 100 TL for families of 9 or more people provided. According to TÜRK-İŞ (2022), "the minimum expenditure for food in a month for a family of four to have a healthy and balanced diet" has been calculated as 4,097.85 TL for December 2021 and 7,245.18 TL for September 2022.

Another problematic area is the 'safe country' debate. The assumption that Turkey is a "safe country," which is one of the main pillars of the agreement, is another controversial point. Article 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive enumerates the necessary principles for a safe third country. Many reports published by Amnesty International (2014; 2015; 2019) reflect the detention of refugees in Turkey, torture in removal centers, and repatriation to the war zone. However, despite these determinations, the European Union's seeing Turkey as a safe zone and directing refugees who reach Europe illegally to Turkey indicates that it prioritizes its interests. This has created a situation in which Turkey defines refugees as a bargaining tool against the EU and the EU as a mass that must be excluded from Europe at all costs.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, within the framework of all these analyses, the EU's efforts to keep asylum-seekers in Turkey open the concept of normative power to the discussion despite the difficulties faced by asylum-seekers in Turkey. As a normative power, the EU does not use any means of pressure to improve the living conditions of asylum seekers in Turkey. Notably, the EU, unable to create any transformative effect on this issue, has closed its doors to asylum-seekers struggling for the right to life and work. On the one hand, the EU's failure to implement an open-door policy with behavior far from norms, and on the other hand, its inability to transform the candidate coun-

try Turkey on a normative basis causes the normative power of the EU to be questioned. Thus, as Mearsheimer underlines (2001: 46-47), states are not only motivated by concerns about maximizing security and power. In addition to these primary concerns, they maintain a range of ethical concerns that reflect their distinctive political values, ranging from the environment to protecting international human rights. However, these are always 'second-order' concerns because these concerns are subordinate to national security and other fundamental national interests, and states make sacrifices within the logic of power to balance core national interests or conflicts. The EU and its member states have also prioritized maximizing their security in the face of migration flows and have seen norms as second-order concerns. Within the framework of this perspective, unlike Turkey, they did not follow an open-door policy; on the contrary, they offered Turkey 3+3 billion Euros and visa liberalization, which they frequently criticized in their country reports, to keep asylum seekers in Turkey.

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Naturalization Policies of Turkiye from a Historical Perspective

Elçin İstif İnci*

ABSTRACT

This chapter discusses the evaluation of naturalization policies in Turkey over time. More specifically, it focuses on the changes in the citizenship law in the Republican era of Turkey, although there are effects and reflections of the Ottoman Empire legacy on the Republican period in Turkey's migration history and citizenship regulations. This study also explores the role of migration waves as a response to these changes. When the triggering and leading force of migration to naturalization is considered, it is indispensable that migrants become citizens in their new country gradually. Similar to migration waves, the role of having a 'Turkish origin' also plays a crucial role in the formulation of naturalization policies in Turkey. In addition to that, there exist 'exceptional cases' that allow citizenship acquisition under the condition of certain criteria. In light of the current debates about the naturalization of Syrians as Turkish citizens, this research aims to contribute and shed light on these discussions by providing a historical perspective of naturalization and migration policies in Turkey.

Keywords: Naturalization, citizenship, migration, Turkey, policy.

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INTRODUCTION

Naturalization is obtaining a citizenship different than the one at birth. More often naturalization policies of a country are shaped by historical patterns and migration waves. For migrants, citizenship means the transformation from "temporary to becoming permanent" in a country as well as a tool to strengthen social, economic and political integration (Yıldız, 2017). Yet this transition can be contested due to the three dimensions of citizenship (legal status, rights, and identity) as Bloemraad (2000) argues. These contestations towards naturalized citizens have the potential to differ from one country to another depending on migration positions and histories.

Historically and due to its geopolitical position, Turkey has been a country of both immigration and emigration as well as experiencing changes in recent years turning from a transit country to a final destination of migrants. According to MIPEX (2015), Turkey is now referred to as a main center that hosts refugees, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, migrant workers and various streams of migration. Turkey's migration, citizenship and naturalization policies have been affected by these major changes.

Considering these changes, this descriptive study aims to address how Turkey's naturalization and citizenship policies evolved over time in parallel to the migration waves. It is designed with a brief introduction of citizenship theories, followed by the historical background of citizenship and naturalization policies of Turkey in parallel with migration waves, and it will be concluded with discussion and suggestions.

CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION THEORIES

In order to understand and discuss citizenship policies, it is best to provide a quick overview of the citizenship theories and models as they provide a wider picture of the topic. The scope of citizenship has evolved since the Ancient Greek polis (cities), as a privileged status showing allegiance to a city. In nation-states, it represents equal rights granted to each member of a certain territory. According to Brubaker (1990), citizenship can be defined as a model of membership with the division into six categories which are egalitarian, sacred, nation-membership, democratic, unique, and socially consequential (p. 380). Each of them constitutes a solid feature and is complementary to each other. Similarly, Turner (1993) sees citizenship as a group of practices

involving legal, political, economic and cultural values. Followingly, a 'citizen' is then a competent member of the society practicing these set of values.

Bauböck (1999), on the other hand, describes three basic elements of citizenship. These elements consist of 'rights', 'practices', and 'membership' which are depicted in the thick-to-thin spectrum of citizenship in his study. The assumption in this spectrum is that the forms of citizenship changes their 'thickness' according to the values being held in each dimension. To illustrate, in the 'thinnest' concept of membership dimension, citizenship is presented as a legal status, whereas, in the 'thickest' concept citizenship is mostly related to cultural identity as part of nationalism. The membership dimension of citizenship has also been highlighted by other scholars as Bellamy (2008) points out the benefits of membership status similar to being a member of a golf club. Similarly, Benhabib (2002) argues citizenship as membership in 'a bounded political community' where she groups its institutions and practices into collective identity, the privileges of political membership, and social rights. While collective identity includes a common language, religion, ethnicity, common history and memory, the privileges of political membership are discussed regarding the access to public autonomy rights.

Nuhoğlu Soysal (2000) addresses the two paradoxes that underly today's citizenship as follows: the increasing divergence of rights, identities and citizenship components; and the tendency towards particularist claims in the public sphere and their legitimation of individuality through universalist discourse. According to these paradoxes, Nuhoğlu Soysal (2000) highlights the importance of "new forms of making claims, mobilizing identity and practicing citizenship" (p. 1).

Finally, Joppke (2007) explains citizenship on three pillars as well. Similar to Bauböck, Joppke's definition categorizes citizenship into 'status', 'rights', and 'identity'. In this "intrinsically state-related concept" (Joppke, 2007, p. 38), access to citizenship has been liberalized, multiculturalism and anti-discrimination have reshaped rights and identity dimensions.

Naturalization theories, on the other hand, examine the status and stages of becoming a citizen. Since citizenship involves various concepts concerning both the individual and the state, naturalization policies serve diverse sociopolitical functions. According to Orgad (2017), these functions are a means to manage 'the admission into the community and to maxi-

mize national interests regarding the identities, welfare, and justice' (p. 339). As naturalization theories do not possess a guiding theory like citizenship theories, Orgad (2017) also draws attention to the ultimate goal of naturalization by investigating within the three goals: contract, political test, and nation-building (p. 338). Among them nation-building concerns specific characteristics dealing with each country's political history. Another citizenship scholar Shachar (2017) discusses naturalization based on the challenges who is 'ought to' belong to the membership society, which is indeed one of the most difficult and sensitive decisions that political communities face.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKEY'S CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION POLICIES

In the history of Turkey, together with the reflections of the Ottoman Empire legacy, naturalization policies have shaped in parallel with the migration waves during Turkey's Republican period. The mass migration waves to Turkey are classified under ten movements as listed in **Table 16.1**.

Table 16.1 Mass migrations to Turkey

Year	Origin country
1922-1938	Greece
1923-1945	Balkans
1933-1945	Germany
1988	Iraq
1989	Bulgaria
1991	Iraq
1992-1938	Bosnia
1999	Kosovo
2001	Macedonia
2011-Present	Syria

Source: Presidency of Migration Management Turkey, 2019

It is seen that the migrations from the Balkan geography constitute the closest ties with Turkey considering the fact that the Balkans are "historically the main area of expansion of the Ottoman Empire" (Uzgel, 2002, p. 167). Since the Ottoman domination lasted for about 500 years in the region, it, therefore, affected many of the socio-cultural, ethnic, religious and

economic structures of the Balkan countries. Migrations to Turkey in the 20th and 21st centuries were also affected by this composition. With regard to these migration waves, the basic distinction in migration movements and management for Turkey is shaped as "*people of Turkish descent and culture, immigrants with a high probability of being a citizen or with an expectation in this direction, and asylum seekers (including temporary protection status) who took refuge in Turkey under the asylum procedure due to war, violence or political events; and refugees*" (Ateşok, 2018, p. 190).

Turkish citizenship has been regulated in several different forms since the establishment of the Republic by the 1924 Constitution, and later followed by the 1928 Citizenship Law, the 1934 Settlement Law, the 1964 Turkish Citizenship Law, and the 2009 Turkish Citizenship Law which is still in effect today. The Constitution of 1924, also known as *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*, defined Turkish citizenship with an emphasis on "regardless of religion and race", and regulated Turkish citizenship *jus sanguinis* through parents (father) as follows:

> "Anyone who comes from a Turkish father in Turkey or outside of Turkey, or who is born in Turkey from a foreign father residing in Turkey and resides in the country, and who formally seeks Turkish citizenship when he reaches the age of puberty, or is accepted to Turkish in accordance with the Citizenship Law, is Turkish." (1924 Constitution, article 88)

When the 1924 Constitution was enacted, there was no citizenship law yet. The first regulation was made in 1928. 1928 Turkish Citizenship Law No. 1312 regulates "acquired (*müktesep*)" citizenship in Article 5, and "exceptional (*fevkalâde verilecek*)" citizenship in Article 6. In this context, in order to become a Turkish citizen, a continuous 5-year residence requirement and the decision of the Cabinet Council were required. Exceptional citizenship, on the other hand, included the acquisition of citizenship by the decision of the Cabinet Council of the foreigners who could not fulfill the residence requirement "if they were deemed worthy of exceptional permission" (Turkish Citizenship Law of 1928). However, it was not clearly stated on which "exceptional" characteristics such citizenship acquisition would be based on. Another law on the path to regulating citizenship law was the Settlement Law of 1934. The Settlement Law No. 2510 enabled the granting of immigrant and refugee status to people who settled in Turkey as well

as those who were settled by the state (Kadirbeyoglu, 2010). As stated in Article 6 of the Law, there was a provision that "those who are taken as immigrants (*muhacir*) are directly naturalized by the decision of the Executive Board". Here, the term "immigrant" meant "settled and nomadic people of Turkish descent as well as settled people connected to Turkish culture" (Settlement Law 1934, Article 3).

Three years after the new constitution was made in 1961, regulations were amended in the citizenship law, and the Turkish Citizenship Law No. 403 came into force in 1964. According to Aybay (1982), this law aimed to bring regulations in line with the principles of the 1961 Constitution, which is the new constitution, directly or indirectly related to citizenship.

The principles mentioned here are the three principles introduced by the Institute for the Law of Nations (Institut de Droit International) at its Cambridge Meeting in 1895. These three principles are respectively "everyone should have a nationality", "everyone should have only one nationality" and "a person should have the freedom to choose nationality" (Tekinalp, 1973, p. 484). In this context, the 1964 Citizenship Act did not allow dual citizenship. For naturalization, the conditions required to have resided in Turkey for 5 years, to have behaviors confirming that she/he decided to settle in Turkey, to have good morals, to speak Turkish enough and to have enough income or profession to make a living (Turkish Citizenship Law 1964, article 6). The naturalization decision belonged to the Council of Ministers. In the "exceptional" citizenship, which was regulated in the next article, Turkish citizenship was granted to people who met certain criteria, upon the proposal of the Ministry of Interior and the decision of the Council of Ministers. Persons who meet these criteria were the adult children of those who have lost their Turkish citizenship, the adult children of those who are married to a Turkish citizen, those who settled in Turkey with the decision to marry a Turkish citizen, those whose naturalization is deemed essential by the Council of Ministers, and those who have brought industrial facilities to Turkey and those who have served or are expected to provide extraordinary service in the fields of science, technology or art (1964 Turkish Citizenship Law, article 7).

The 1960s were also the years when Turks immigrated to Western Europe, especially Germany, as part of labor migration. These migration movements, which were initially seen as a source of income, has turned into

a process that has evolved into acquiring the citizenship of the country of destination and followed the birth and settlement of the second generation in the long term. These changes drew the attention of the society and on the state level. As politicians and bureaucrats realized that migrant workers were no longer "temporary guests" in the countries they went to, regulations were made in the citizenship law in Turkey (Kadirbeyoglu, 2010, p. 4). In this context, with the changes made in 1981 and 1982, dual citizenship has been allowed, and a Turkish citizen mother could also give Turkish citizenship to her child as a practice of *jus sanguinis*. Moreover, this change has also eliminated the inequality between men and women (Anbarlı Bozatay, 2010).

In the 1980s, Turkey faced both a new constitution and a migration wave in 1982 from Afghanistan. After the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan that started in 1979, Afghan Turks living in the region took refuge in Pakistan. In 1982, some of these Afghan refugees who had Turkish-origin migrated to Turkey with the flights organized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees following the decision of the Council of Ministers. This decision was taken after the president at the time Kenan Evren's visit to a refugee camp in Pakistan where Afghans were staying. In light of these developments, a resettlement law was drawn up for Afghans of "Turkish descent". The emphasis on Turkish ancestry was based on the fact that those refugees ethnically had Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Turkmen origins (Kirişci, 2000, p. 10). With "*Law No. 2641 on the Admission and Settlement of Turkish Originated Migrants Who Sought Asylum in Pakistan from Afghanistan*", these migrants were provided with the opportunity to reside in the eastern provinces of Turkey and acquired Turkish citizenship over time.

Another similar migration movement to Turkey was the migration of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989 and Meskhetian Turks living in the former USSR geography in 1992. Due to the forced migration decision by the Bulgarian Communist Party towards the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in 1989, approximately 345.000 people of Turkish origin living in Bulgaria migrated to Turkey that year (Presidency of Migration Management Turkey, 2019). Most Bulgarian Turks who migrated to Turkey in 1989 received Turkish citizenship through (Turkish) lineage. As a result of the continuation of migration after 1989, Bulgaria ranks first among the foreign-born population

living in Turkey in 2014 with 37.6 percent (TurkStat, 2014), and 13.6 percent in 2019 (TurkStat, 2019).

In 1992, the Meskhetian Turks living in the former Soviet republics and considered cognates, who wanted to come to Turkey, were given the opportunity to immigrate within the annual number to be determined by the Council of Ministers (Law on Admission and Settlement of Meskhetian Turks to Turkey, 1992, article 1), starting with those who were in the most difficult situation.

An important migration movement that had an impact on Turkey in the 90s was that Iraqis who fled from the Iraqi army due to the Gulf War in 1991-1992. They were based on the borders of Iran and Turkey. Although Turkey initially hesitated to accept them, nearly 500,000 Iraqis crossed the border, and they were finally accepted to the refugee camps inside Turkey (Uzgel, 2002). While some of them later migrated to other countries, an important portion of them continued to live in Turkey and some received Turkish citizenship. Therefore, Iraq is followed by Bulgaria in the list of the foreign-born population in Turkey (TurkStat, 2019).

Finally, the largest mass migration Turkey started to face took place following the Syrian Civil War in 2011. The number of Syrians who migrated to Turkey increased gradually each year. Yet the official status of Syrians has been determined as "under temporary protection" due to Turkey's reservation on the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention as Turkey agrees to grant refugee status only to those who fled due to the event occurring in Europe. However, despite not having refugee status, both in the press and academic

Figure 16.1 Cumulative Number of Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey

Source: Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, 2022

discussions, Syrians in Turkey are referred to as 'Syrian refugees'. Turkey currently hosts 3.622.486 Syrians under temporary protection (Presidency of Migration Management Turkey, 2022).

The last two mass migrations to Turkey from Iraq and Syria did not cause changes in citizenship policies extensively. The Turkish Citizenship Law No. 5901, which is in effect today with its amendments, entered into force on 29 May 2009. The two most important features of this law are that both parents have equal rights in conferring Turkish citizenship to the child and that it makes citizenship conditional through marriage. The condition abandons direct citizenship acquisition via marriage, instead, it requires that the marriage should be sustaining for at least three years.

CURRENT SITUATION

Current naturalization as a Turkish citizen is regulated in Turkish Citizenship Law 2009. In articles 10 and 11 of Turkish Citizenship Law (2009), conditions to apply for naturalization as a Turkish citizen are listed such as uninterrupted five-year residence criteria without interruption and good command of Turkish. In case of marriage to a Turkish citizen, three years of continuation of marriage is required to apply for Turkish citizenship. In the language criteria, no specific level of language referring to the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) as most European countries' citizenship criteria require is addressed. Having a standardized test will potentially make the language criteria less ambiguous.

Additionally, Turkish citizenship is granted on the basis of 'exceptional cases' for persons who bring industrial facilities to Turkey or who have passed or are thought to be doing extraordinary services in scientific, technological, economic, social, sports, cultural and artistic fields and for whom a justified offer has been made by the President of Turkey (Turkish Citizenship Law 2009, article 12/1-a). Before 2018, this decision was being taken by the relevant ministries. This article is mostly used for foreign athletes who were expected to naturalize as Turkish citizens in order to play in the national teams of Turkey. Most common cases are seen in track and field, basketball and table tennis.

Exceptional citizenship based on investment is also regulated in the same article for foreigners who invest a capital worth 500.000 US Dollars or buy real estate worth at least 400.000 US Dollars. This type of citizenship

acquisition has been criticized by scholars (Utku & Sirkeci, 2020; Gölcüklü, 2020; Özbek Hadimoğlu, 2021) based on ethical concerns and labeling it as "selling citizenship" (Shachar, 2017). Most concerns addressed degrading citizenship into a commercial commodity (Utku & Sirkeci, 2020). Similar concerns are also raised about the number of people who have been naturalized as Turkish citizens recently. The latest statistics regarding the number and origin of the naturalized Turkish citizens rely on the announcement of the Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs in August 2022. According to the latest data, 363.179 people obtained Turkish citizenship (NVI, 2022). Among them, Syrians constituted the largest group by 211.908, followed by 104.976 Meskhetian Turks, 39.294 Afghans, and 7001 Uyghur Turks from the East Turkestan region of China (NVI, 2022).

The naturalization of Syrians as Turkish citizens has been contested on political and public grounds. The numbers regarding the acquisition of citizenship are irregularly announced by the Ministry of Interior as Figure 2 below shows the cumulative number of Syrians who acquired Turkish citizenship since 2018. Due to the mass migration from Syria to Turkey following the Syrian civil war, tensions arose whether the 'guest' Syrians will eventually or gradually receive Turkish citizenship in the future. Although President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a statement in 2016 addressing the

Figure 16.2 Cumulative number of Syrians who have acquired Turkish citizenship

Source: Ministry of Interior Presidency of Migration Management, 2022

opportunity of granting Turkish citizenship to Syrian migrants in Turkey ("Erdoğan'dan Türkiye'deki Suriyelilere", 2016). On the other hand, the ambiguity of the guest discourse transformed the discussion of the Syrians' temporariness in Turkey.

In addition, regarding the citizenship by investment, 7312 people became Turkish citizens between the years 2018 and 2020 (Yılmaz, 2020). Among them, applicants from Iran and Iraq were at the top of the list. Since most of these naturalizations are subjected to 'exceptional acquisition', it raises concerns that the contradictions caused by the systematic use of exceptional citizenship are against "the basic principles of liberal and civic inclusion into citizenry" (Serdar, 2022, p. 17). At this point, Shachar (2021) discusses that wealth accelerates the access to citizenship disregarding having social ties with the admitting country. Although the short-term reflections of such acquisitions are not visible yet in Turkey, the increased usage of this type of naturalization is expected to be debated.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Considering all the migration waves Turkey has faced, it is clear that the naturalization and migration policies in Turkey have shown parallelism with each other. Yet, being of Turkish origin has always been at the core of citizenship and naturalization policies. Its effect and reflections have clearly been observed in the history of citizenship laws together with the amendments. To illustrate, the latest statistics of the number of naturalized citizens in Turkey is preferred to be announced by declaring the ethnic origin (e.g., Meskhetian Turks, Uyghur Turks) rather than the name of the origin country. In a way, it is related to toning down the possible tensions that may arise from the society. Being of Turkic origin is expected to be more welcomed in naturalization, such as in the 1990s migrants from the Balkans being the most privileged among other groups (Danış & Parla, 2009).

Moreover, today, with increased migration as well as Turkey's position as the largest refugee-hosting country (UNHCR, 2020), naturalization policies of Turkey might be in the need of revision. Most importantly, it is expected to have more up-to-date statistics about the number of naturalized citizens each year. Regarding the application requirements, a practice of a citizenship test can also be considered alongside the current criteria. Kunnan

(2009) notes that citizenship tests support "civic integration, political allegiance, social cohesion and harmony" (p. 89). As most migrant-receiving countries exercise, Turkey can build its own citizenship test model (Istif Inci, 2020) with its specific characteristics.

Naturalization policies are also highly related to the integration efforts which may bring another dimension into the table. Citizenship acquisition has to some degree effects on "fastening and deepening the process of political integration" (Hainmueller et al., 2015 p. 12651). As most migrant-receiving countries have benefited from integration programs, Turkey will also potentially pursuit such programs in the near future. The current system already has integration regulations on the basis of 'harmonization' as conducted by the General Directorate of Harmonization and Communication. As naturalization brings along socio-economic benefits for migrants (Peters & Vink, 2016), integration will potentially contribute to the process.

In sum, Turkey has adjusted its naturalization policies evolving from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire over time. Although the core of the policy has been on being of Turkic origin, the latest developments have transformed the citizenship acquisition in additional forms. Overall, having a more systematized model with providing up-to-date statistics will potentially facilitate and institute an improved structure of citizenship policies in Turkey.

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Reflection of International Protection and Temporary Protection Regimes on Turkish Law

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ABSTRACT

The concept of migration, as being one of the oldest phenomena in human history, proves day by day that it will maintain its influence on human history in the future as it has been an important agenda topic in the past and present. With the 1951 Geneva Convention, the status of refugees was legally defined and the concept of immigration has been tried to be out on legal ground. Turkey, which is one of the parties to the 1951 Geneva Convention, has made a geographical reservation to the convention and with this reservation, Turkey has protected itself on the convention against the intense migration movements from the east.

In this study, the reflection of the concept of refugee, as it is defined by the 1951 Geneva Convention, to the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and to Turkish Law is emphasized and the way of how both International Protection and Temporary Protection regimes are implemented in Turkey has been mentioned. The scope of international protection and temporary protection in the Law on Foreigners and International Protection has been examined in terms of the statuses granted to individuals, the rights provided by the law to individuals within the scope of the law, the duration and the way they expire.

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In the preparation of this study, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Regarding the Status of Refugees, the European Union Temporary Protection Directive and the relevant legal regulations in Turkish Law, especially the Foreigners and International Protection Law and the Temporary Protection Regulation, national and international reports and experiences in the field were used.

Keywords: Refugees; Turkish Law; The Law on Foreigners and International Protection; Temporary protection; International Protection

INTRODUCTION

People have migrated for centuries both in the hope of a better life and due to factors such as natural disasters, wars and climate. The Anatolian lands, where the current Republic of Turkey (Turkiye) is located, has taken its place both as a destination and as a transit route on the migration route. Turkey connects the Asian and European continents by land and sea. This has caused Turkey to have an indispensable place in the history of migration.

Over 40 million people were displaced in Europe after World War II and the Cold War.(Castles & Miller, 2018, s. 147) By 2022, 89.3 million people have been forcibly displaced worldwide. While 53.2 million are internally displaced, 27.1 million are refugees and 4.6 million are asylum seekers. (UNHCR, 2022) In the temporal and spatial context, the emergence of international protection and refugee has been shaped through the humanitarian and political interests of the countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which came into force at the beginning of 1951, started its work as the most effective international institution in this field and still continues to be the most effective institution. Following the steps taken institutionally, the signing of an international convention came to the agenda and the Geneva Convention (Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees) was signed on 28 July 1951 and regulated the details and conditions of refugee, one of the international protection types.(Refugees, 1951) This convention entered into force on 22 April 1954. It is stated in the Convention that recognizing the right to asylum may impose a heavy burden on some countries and that the problems arising from the right of asylum cannot be resolved without international cooperation. The Convention recognizes the social and humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem.

Turkey signed the convention on 24 August 1951 (İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2023). The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, known as the Geneva Convention, put a time limit on the definition of the concept refugee in its original form. In the Convention, those who are outside the country of their nationality and cannot benefit from its protection because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, or every person who does not want to return is defined as a refugee. (Refugees, 1951, m.1) New York Protocol Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees, (Refugees, 1967) the phrase 'people displaced due to events occurring before 1951' in the definition of refugees was removed, and the time limitation was terminated. Turkey continued its preference to maintain the geographical border registration left to the parties in Article 1 of the Convention. Thus, Turkey limited the definition of refugee in the convention to individuals who had to leave their country due to events in Europe. It has preserved the geographical limitation that it accepted with the 1951 Convention until today. The fact that Turkey signed the Convention with geographical limitation means that refugee status will not be granted to persons coming from outside the countries of the Council of Europe.

States have their own national regulations in addition to the international conventions they are party to regarding asylum seekers. Until the EU negotiations, Turkey did not have an in-depth discussion of refugee or other international protection status, neither was it keenly aiming to create immigration law. However, this motivation was created with the EU negotiations and preparations were started with smaller steps. (Altıntop, 2022) However, the Syrian civil war that started in 2011 and the mass migration that followed accelerated these steps, and as a result, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection *(LFIP)* was published and the General Directorate of Migration Management was established. (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2022) Its current name is the Presidency of Migration Management. LFIP is the law that defines the international protection status in Turkey. Therefore, the types of international protection in Turkey are determined by law. In Turkey, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection *(LFIP)* dated 04.04.2013 and numbered 6458 was accepted and published in the Official Gazette dated 11.04.2013 and numbered 28615. (Yabancılar ve Uluslar-

arası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)The legal situation of asylum seekers in our country is regulated by the relevant law. In addition to the refugee status in Turkish Law, new statuses such as conditional refugee, secondary protection and temporary protection have been included in the legislation.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.61-63) With these new statutes, it has been tried to eliminate the deficiency created by the geographical restriction placed in the contract in terms of asylum seekers coming from outside the countries of the Council of Europe.

In this study, the legal stay of a foreigner in Turkey will be examined based on the Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458. In the first chapter, the reflection of the prohibition of refoulement on the country's law has been examined; The reflection of the subjects under the titles of legal entry and residence in Turkey, international protection and access to international protection, denial of international protection and objection, temporary protection, access to rights and services in international protection and temporary protection, administrative detention and deportation are included in the country's legislation.

NON-REFOULEMENT PRINCIPLE

The principle of non-refoulement means that a foreigner should not be sent to lands where he or she may face the potential danger of persecution.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.4) The principle of non-refoulement, regulated by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Legal Status of Refugees,(Refugees, 1951) has become a rule of customary international law that aims to protect the most fundamental rights of asylum seekers, namely life and freedom. The principle of non-refoulement, which takes its source from the 1951 Geneva Convention, is considered within the scope of many international conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights (EC, 1948), the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (UN, 1976) due to its close relationship with human rights. The provision of the principle of non-refoulement by international agreements also enabled the states to transfer this prohibition to their domestic laws. For this reason, the protection provided by the 1951 Geneva Convention is also adopted in terms of the domestic laws of the states. Turkish Foreigners Law (2013) has also addressed this prohibition brought by the 1951 Geneva Convention with the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and adopted it as a basic rule.

In article 33, subparagraph 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, (Refugees, 1951) It is said that no State party shall send back or return ("refouler") a refugee to the borders of countries where their life or freedom will be threatened due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political opinions.

The Law on Foreigners and International Protection states that 'No one under this Law shall be sent to a place where they will be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, or their life or freedom is threatened because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.4)

For foreigners who came to or crossed our borders urgently and massively after the Syrian civil war, a **Temporary Protection Regulation** (2013) was also issued within the framework of Article 91 of the Foreigners and International Protection Law No. 6458, dated 4/4/2013. In this regulation, the prohibition of refoulement is included in accordance with both the LFIP and the Geneva Conventions.

LEGAL ENTRY AND RESIDENCE IN TURKIYE

In accordance with the principle of sovereignty of the state, every country has the authority to control the people who can enter its territory. In Turkey, in the section titled Foreigners of the LFIP, it has regulated the conditions of legal entry and inadmissibility into the country under the title of 'Entry to Turkey and Visa' (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013).

In this section, besides the concept of asylum, legal forms of stay in Turkey, that is, types of residence, are explained. Entry to and exit from Turkey is made through the border gates with a valid passport or documents that replace a passport. Documentation is required.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.5) Foreigners who will not be allowed to enter Turkey will be included in the scope of inadmissible passengers.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.7) It has been stated that the passengers who are inadmissible will not be allowed to enter Turkey and will be turned away. These foreigners are kept in the areas designated for them, which we call the 'transit zone', at the border gates until their transactions are concluded. Apart from asylum; the conditions in this section, where the forms of stay and residence permits other than the reasons included in the

refugee definition are regulated, cannot be interpreted and applied in a way that prevents applying for international protection.

Among foreigners who will not be allowed to enter Turkey;

- Those who do not have a passport, passport substitute document, visa or residence or work permit, and those who have obtained these documents or permits by fraudulent means or are found to be fake,
- Those who do not have a passport or passport substitute document with a validity of at least sixty days from the end of the visa, visa exemption or residence permit period,

Those who are prohibited from entering Turkey even if they are within the scope of visa exemption,

- Those who are deemed inconvenient in terms of public order or public security,
- Those who have one of the diseases considered as a threat to public health,
- Those who are accused or convicted of the crime or crimes that are the basis for extradition, in accordance with the agreements to which the Republic of Turkey is a party,
- Those who do not have valid health insurance covering the period of stay,
- Those who do not justify their purpose of entering, passing through or staying in Turkey,
- Those who do not have sufficient and regular financial means during their stay
- Those who do not accept to pay the receivables arising from the visa violation or the previous residence permit or which must be followed up and collected in accordance with the Law No. 6183 on the Collection of Public Receivables, dated 21/7/1953 or those who do not accept to pay the debts and fines followed according to the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 dated 26/9/2004 were counted (YUKK, 2013, 7/1, 15/1).

Persons who enter Turkey and wish to stay in Turkey for a certain period of time legally must obtain a residence permit by applying to the appropriate type of residence listed in the law. Types of residence permits; short-term residence permit, family residence permit, student residence permit, long-term residence permit, humanitarian residence permit, human trafficking victim residence permit (YUKK, 2013, 30/1). According to the data dated 06.10.2022 taken from the website of the Directorate of Migration Management, 1,343,701 foreigners live in Turkey with a residence permit

.(Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2022) Istanbul is the province with the highest number of foreigners with a residence permit with 703,105 persons. After Istanbul, Antalya comes second with 168,292 people (Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2022). Currently, it is thought that a major reason for the density in Antalya is that Russian and Ukrainian nationals, who had to leave their country after the Russia-Ukraine War, prefer to live in this city. According to unofficial statements of officials, Russian and Ukrainian nationals apply for residence permits instead of applying for this status, although they carry the reasons for refugee listed in the LFIP(YUKK). It is seen that people of Afghan nationality who entered the country with and without passport after the Taliban's domination in Afghanistan, or Iranian nationals who came to Turkey from Iran after the death of Mahsa Amini, are directed to a residence permit in practice despite meeting international protection conditions. (Euronews, 2022) The residence permit is given for a period of time, unlike the statuses regulated in the law, and it gives the right to travel freely within the country. Again, people who continue their lives with a residence permit can enter and exit the country through legal means, provided that the necessary conditions are met. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.20)According to the current data published on the website of the Presidency of Migration Management; In 2022, 968,729 persons were in Turkey with short-term residence permits, 107,987 persons with student residence permits, 98,417 persons with family residence permits, and 168,568 persons with other residence permits.(Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2022)

Persons who have entered Turkey legally and wish to continue their legal stay can apply to the appropriate residence permits, which are numbered in the law, by going to the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management in each province. At this point, the acceptance or rejection of the application is within the jurisdiction of the administration. In case of rejection of the application, the means of objection are regulated in the *LFIP*.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

Turkey has a dual protection regime. The first of these is international protection and the other is temporary protection. The statuses that can be granted to the asylum seeker in Turkey within the scope of international protec-

tion are reckoned as limitations in the LFIP. Temporary Protection, on the other hand, is regulated by a separate regulation for people seeking asylum in mass as a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria. The Temporary Protection regime will be evaluated under a separate heading. In this title, types of international protection are explained and access to international protection is examined under a separate title.

In Turkey, international protection refers to refugee, conditional refugee and subsidiary protection status. Under this title, the definition of refugee in the 1951 Geneva Convention has taken place as follows due to geographical limitation and events occurring in European countries;

> "Persons who are outside the country of their citizenship and cannot benefit from the protection of this country because they fear that they will be persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a certain social group or political opinions, or to the foreigner who does not want to benefit from it due to the fear in question, or to those who are outside the country of residence and cannot return there as a result of such events, or the stateless person who does not want to return due to the fear in question is granted refugee status after the status determination procedures.(LFIP, 2013, 61)"

In Articles 62 and 63 of the Law, (2013) conditional refugee and second protection statuses are defined separately from the contract. The difference of the conditional refugee from the definition of refugee is manifested in terms of geographical limitation. Conditional refugee is defined as the status given to an asylum seeker who has a well-founded reservation that he will be persecuted for the five reasons included in the definition of refugee, due to events occurring outside of European countries.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013, m.62) Unlike the definition of refugee, the definition of conditional refugee includes events occurring outside of European countries. It has been stated that these people will be allowed to stay in Turkey until they are resettled in a third country. At this point, conditional refugee status will not give people permanent protection in Turkey. What is meant by European countries in the law is the countries that are members of the Council of Europe. In consequence of the asylum applications made in our country by the people coming from the member countries of the Council of Europe, it is possible to receive refugee status as a result of the evaluation.

Secondary protection is defined as the status given to a foreigner or stateless person who do not qualify as refugees or conditional refugees, but who, if returned to their country of origin or residence, will be sentenced to the death penalty or executed, subject to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, in situations of international or national armed conflict and who cannot benefit from or does not want to benefit from the protection of his country of origin or country of residence due to indiscriminate acts of violence or due to the fact that he will face a serious threat to himself (LFIP, 2013, 63).

According to the data of the Presidency of Migration Management (2022), 29,256 applications for international protection were received by the end of 2021. In the distribution of these applications by nationality, Afghanistan with 21,926, Iraq with 4,961 and Iran with 1,032 are the first three nationalities for which international protection applications were received.

The concept of 'asylum' in the 1951 Geneva Convention was not included in the LFIP No. 6458.

Instead, the term 'applicant for international protection' was used. An International Protection Applicant is a person who has requested international protection and whose application has not been finalized yet. Applicants; if they are still receiving protection or assistance from another United Nations body or organization other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, they are recognized by the competent authorities of their country of residence as having the rights and obligations of the citizens of that country, or if there is a serious conviction that they are guilty of the acts specified in paragraph (F) of Article 1 of the Convention, they are excluded from international protection (LFIP, 2013, 64/1). The provisions of paragraph f of Article 1 of the Convention (1951) are preserved in the LFIP. These provisions are also included in subparagraph b of paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Temporary Protection Regulation (Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, 2014) titled *'foreigners who will not be included in the scope of temporary protection'*. According to this, this protection shall not apply to a person who; has committed a crime as defined in international instruments making provisions for crimes such as crimes against peace, war crimes or crimes against humanity, has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of asylum before taking refuge in the country of asylum as a

refugee, or is seriously believed to be guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Refugees, 1951, 1/F).

Access to International Protection

International protection applications are made to the governorships in person. Provincial Directorates of Migration Management have also been authorized by the governorships for application. In the applications made in person, the applicant can also apply on behalf of the family members who come with him based on the same reason. In this case, the consent of the adult family members to apply on their behalf is sought (LFIP, 2013, 65/1,3).

In Turkey, where there are 81 provinces, there are provinces closed to international protection and temporary protection status regulated separately by regulation. İstanbul, Yalova, İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Ankara and Antalya are among the provinces with limited registration. However, according to the postdated 30.06.2022 on the website of the Presidency of Migration Management; Considering the density of foreigners in various regions of our country, 781 neighborhoods in certain provinces in our country have been closed to temporary protection registration, international protection registration, residence permit, temporary protection or international protection and residence permit changes, except for newborns and nuclear family reunification. (Presidency of Migration Management, 2023a) As of July 1, 2022, the number of closed neighborhoods has been increased to 1169. This practice, which is also called the 'dilution policy', appears as an obstacle to receiving international protection applications from people in need of protection. Even if the sensitivity rates are high or they have valid reasons such as family reunification and supporting documents, their applications are not accepted when they apply to provinces that are closed to registration. When applying for international protection to provinces other than the ones we know are closed to registration, it is stated by the applicants that these provinces are closed to registration without showing an official basis. In cases where it is obligatory to be in provinces that are closed to registration due to health needs, it can be observed that even if people have documents and health reports to prove their sensitivity, their sensitivities are ignored and international protection applications are not received, they are not identified, and thus their access to basic rights and services is prevented.(Yabancılar ve

Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) Especially in the Istanbul area, the fact that most of the applicants could not even pass the security of the provincial migration administration directorates and reach the officials of the institution is one of the problems mentioned.

Due to the housing shortage that has come to the fore in Turkey recently, people seeking international protection have difficulty in finding a house due to both economic inadequacies and discriminatory attitudes. In addition to the provinces that are closed to protection status, the increase in the neighborhoods that are closed to protection status has narrowed the area to live legally. If the applicant has a house in one of the neighborhoods, which is closed to registration despite being located in the province of registration, the residence changes of these persons are not accepted. Failure to notify the change of residence may cause the applicants to become irregular immigrants as a result of any inspection to be carried out on their residence addresses, since the applicants do not reside at the specified address. According to the data obtained from the website of the Directorate of Migration Management, Address inquiries of 3,791,198 foreigners have been conducted since the beginning of 2022. (Presidency of Migration Management, 2023b)

Appropriate application environment is not provided for individuals to apply for international protection. As mentioned above, individuals cannot apply for international protection from every province. Persons who apply for international protection but whose applications are not received from the provinces whose registration is limited due to reasons such as ensuring the population balance and preventing illegal crossing from the border provinces, are not referred to an open province with a suitable travel document issued by the governorates. People seeking asylum are expected to find a suitable province by their own means and go there. Persons who do not have an international protection application document or a valid road permit issued by the immigration administration cannot travel from one province to another by public transport. It is not possible to buy a ticket for transportation without any legal documents. Persons who do not have the necessary and valid documents and who are checked by law enforcement on the way face the risk of being taken to the refoulement center and then deported. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013; Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Kouma Kanununun Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik, 2016)

International protection applicants are not taken into administrative detention just because they have applied for international protection. Irregular migrants placed in administrative detention can also apply for international protection in administrative detention centers. However, people are often not informed about their legal rights under international protection and administrative detention in administrative detention centers.

In applications made to the Directorates of Migration Management established under the governorships, applicants must report their identity information correctly during registration. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) Applicants must submit documents and travel documents to prove their identity to the competent authorities. If there is no document regarding the identity of the applicant during registration and if no information is obtained as a result of the identification studies, the applicant's statement is taken as the basis. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) During registration; reasons for leaving the applicant's country of origin or residence, the events that they experienced after leaving their country and that caused them to apply, how they entered Turkey, road routes and vehicle information used, if he has applied for or benefited from international protection in another country before, information and documents regarding this application or protection are received (LFIP, 2013, 69/4).

In case of applying for international protection, the information that the time and place of the interview regarding determination of status will be notified during registration is included in the law. However, the density in the institutions prevents this date from being determined during registration. An individual interview is conducted with the international applicant within thirty days from the date of registration *(LFIP, 2013, 75)*. However, in practice, this thirty-day period cannot be complied with. The applicant is informed during registration about the procedures to be followed regarding his application, the rights and obligations of his application in the evaluation process, how he will fulfill his obligations and the possible consequences that may arise if he does not comply with these obligations or does not cooperate with the authorities, objection procedures and deadlines.

Upon request, interpreting services are also provided to the applicant during the personal interviews during the application, registration and interview stages *(LFIP, 2013, 70)*. Regarding the information to be made during

registration; It is heard from the applicants that the translator was not ready during the registration, the translator did not translate correctly, the documents obtained were signed without translation, therefore the necessary obligations were not complied with. The residence requirement and notification obligation, which were mentioned before, are regulated here as well. Administrative obligations have been imposed on the applicant, such as the obligation to reside in the reception and accommodation center shown to him, in a certain place or province, and to notify in the desired form and time. The applicant must register in the address registration system and is obliged to notify the governor's office (LFIP, 2013, 71).

International protection applicants receive one of the above-mentioned refugee, conditional refugee and secondary protection statuses if their applications are approved after the status determination procedures. In case of rejection of their application, the appeal procedures are regulated in the law.

Refusal of International Protection and Objection

If it is determined that the international protection criteria are not met after the examination and evaluation made after the international protection application, the international protection application is rejected. The right to appeal against a negative decision is regulated by Law on Foreigners and International Protection. If this negative decision is not appealed, the decision will become final. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)

If the applicant has renewed the same application without giving a different reason, has made the same application without giving a just reason at any stage of the application after giving consent to the application on his behalf or after the application has been rejected, without putting forward a different reason, if he has come from the first country of asylum or if he has come from a safe third country, the evaluation will be stopped. This situation, which is described as an unacceptable application, is notified to the relevant person or his legal representative or lawyer.

In cases which the applicant; declares in writing that he has withdrawn his application, fails to attend the interview three times in a row without excuse, flees without an excuse from the place where he is under administrative detention, fails to fulfill its notification obligation three times in a row, does not go to the designated place of residence or leaves the

place of residence without permission, opposes the collection of personal data, does not comply with the obligations in registration and interview, the application is deemed withdrawn and the evaluation is stopped (LFIP, 2013, 77). This issue is described as the withdrawal of the application or its being considered withdrawn. In practice, it is seen that the decisions to consider the application to be withdrawn mostly due to failure to fulfill the notification obligation without excuse, failure to go to the designated place of residence or leaving the place of residence without permission. Applicants do not reside in small cities especially for economic reasons, they want to reside in big cities where employment is higher but are closed to registration, even though it is against the law, and they resist in this regard.

International protection applications are concluded by the Directorate General within six months from the date of registration (LFIP, 2013, 78/1). If the applicant can be protected against persecution or the threat of serious harm in a certain region of the country of nationality or previous residence and the applicant is able to safely travel and settle in that part of the country, it may be decided that the applicant is not in need of international protection (LFIP, 2013 , 78/4).

In addition to the ordinary international protection application process, which will conclude within six months in its ordinary course,(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) another type of evaluation called expedited evaluation is also regulated in the law. In order for an international protection application to be subject to expedited evaluation, the applicant should not have mentioned any issues that require international protection while presenting the reasons for the application. It should mislead the authorities by using false documents or misleading information and documents or by not providing information and documents that may adversely affect the decision. Maliciously destroy or dispose of identity or travel documents in order to make it difficult to establish applicant's identity or nationality. Applicant must be under administrative detention to be deported. Applicant should only apply in order to delay or prevent the implementation of a decision that will lead to his deportation from Turkey. they must have created a danger in terms of public order and public security or must have been expelled from Turkey before for these reasons. He must have reapplied after his application was deemed withdrawn *(LFIP, 2013, 79/1)*. The interview duration, which should be done within six months in the normal

procedure, with the applicants subject to the reasons listed for accelerated evaluation, is regulated here as three days. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Kouma Kanununun Uygulanmasına İlişkin Yönetmelik, 2016)The time for the result of the interview, which will be held within three days, is specified as five days in the law. Unaccompanied children are the most important criterion in applications to be taken with accelerated evaluation. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)The international protection application of unaccompanied minors will definitely be received in the normal procedure and will not be subject to accelerated evaluation.

In the applications that were subjected to negative evaluation, the appeal court procedure was arranged. An appeal can be made to the International Protection Evaluation Commission within ten days from the notification of this decision. It is not possible to apply to the International Protection Evaluation Commission for every decision. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)Objections to the administrative detention decision, objections to the inadmissible application and expedited evaluation cannot be made to the International Protection Evaluation Commission. In these decisions, only the judicial remedies stipulated in the law can be applied. In this case, we can say that the objection to the rejection of the international protection application may be subject to an application to the International Protection Evaluation Commission.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) The objection to the inadmissible application and the expedited evaluation must be made within fifteen days from the date of notification of the relevant decisions. Except for these two types, the objection period against other administrative decisions and actions has been determined as thirty days.(Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) It is foreseen that objections to be made to the administrative court can be made by the person concerned, his legal representative or his lawyer. Court applications for inadmissible applications and decisions made as a result of accelerated evaluation must be concluded within fifteen days. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013) The court decision on this matter is final and the process for deportation begins after the final decision. The applicant is allowed to remain in the country until the appeal made to the International Protection Evaluation Commission or to the court is finalized. Submitting the application document called annotation regarding the objections to the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management, which makes the deci-

sion, also supports the person's stay in the country until the conclusion of the trial.

The situations in which the international protection status will end are listed in the law. These;

- " Benefiting from the protection of the country of which he/she is a citizen of international protection status voluntarily,
- Regaining his lost citizenship voluntarily,
- Acquiring a new citizenship and benefiting from the protection of the country of citizenship,
- To return voluntarily to the country he left or stayed away because of fear of persecution,
- To be able to benefit from the protection of the country of which he is a citizen, since the conditions that ensure the granting of status have disappeared,
- Being stateless and able to return to his/her previous country of residence as the conditions leading to his/her status have disappeared,
- Leaving Turkey voluntarily,
- Benefiting from the protection of a third country,
- Admission to a third country for humanitarian reasons or resettlement,
- Departure to a third country
- His death" (LFIP, 2013, 85/1).

Persons who have been granted international protection status may also encounter status cancellation. The status of those who cause to be granted status through the use of forged documents, cheating, deception or facts that they do not declare and those who are understood to be excluded from international protection may be revoked. (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu, 2013)

As stated at the beginning of the article, Turkey has a dual asylum system. The first of these is international protection, and application procedures, rejection of the application and termination of international protection are explained. In the Turkish asylum system, besides international protection, temporary protection is also regulated by regulation. Therefore, it is important to examine this concept in more detail in order to understand the protection regime in Turkey.

TEMPORARY PROTECTION

Due to the civil war in Syria, it has been difficult to evaluate the requests of people who came to our borders and seeking asylum in the form of international protection application procedure. Due to the thought that the process in Syria will stabilize in a short time, the temporary protection status, which is an exceptional status previously applied by the contracting states, has been added to Turkish law with a regulation.

Temporary protection can be provided to foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country they have left, and come to or cross our borders en masse in order to find emergency and temporary protection *(LFIP, 2013, 91)*. The authority to regulate the regulation, which includes the issues regarding the persons to be granted temporary protection status, has been given to the President with Article 71 of the Decree Law No. 703 dated 02.07.2018. The Ministry of Interior will be able to make a proposal to the President to end the temporary protection. Temporary protection can be terminated by presidential decree. With the termination decision, the President of the Republic may decide to stop the temporary protection completely, to allow the temporary protection to return to their country, to grant the status that they meet the conditions of temporary protection collectively, to evaluate the applications of the international protection applicants individually, or to allow the temporary protected persons to stay in Turkey under the conditions to be determined within the scope of the Law *(TPR, 2014, 11/2)*. The President of the Republic may decide to limit the temporary protection measures being implemented or to suspend them temporarily or indefinitely in case of conditions that may threaten national security, public order, public security or public health *(TPR, 2014, 15/1)*.

Temporary protection is a status that will be granted if the international protection demands of foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country they left, come to our borders en masse for emergency and temporary protection or cross our borders, cannot be evaluated individually. (Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, 2014) In addition to these procedures and principles, the issues related to the admission of these persons to Turkey, their stay in Turkey, their rights and obligations, the procedures to be taken when they leave Turkey, the measures to be taken

against mass movements and the cooperation between national and international organizations are also regulated in the legislation.

If touched on the differences between temporary protection and international protection here: international protection includes three statuses that will be given as a result of an individual evaluation. If the application is evaluated positively, the applicant receives a status. Temporary protection, on the other hand, is a status declared and recognized by the executive body as a result of mass movements for asylum. The application for temporary protection does not give the person one of the statuses listed in the law.

In the Temporary Protection Regulation, temporary accommodation centers and referral centers for foreigners who come to Turkey for temporary protection, apart from international protection applicants, exist in law and in practice. Together with the Temporary Accommodation Center, centers established for the purpose of collective accommodation and providing basic needs of foreigners within the scope of the regulation and persons deemed appropriate by the Ministry have been defined. On the other hand, referral center refers to the places where foreigners who come to our country for temporary protection are kept temporarily for registration and other procedures until they are transferred to temporary accommodation centers or if they are to stay outside of the temporary accommodation center, they are directed to their residence *(TPR, 2014, 3/1)*.

Foreigners who come to border gates or border crossing points for temporary protection without documents or with invalid documents are allowed by the governorships *(TPR, 2014, 17/2)*. Foreigners and their family members, if any, are handed over to the authorized law enforcement units as soon as possible to be taken to the nearest dispatch center by the relevant units, together with a report containing their identity information, date and place of entry into the country, and other information deemed necessary *(TPR, 2014, 17/4)*. Those who are within the scope of temporary protection within the country are directed to the nearest referral center if they apply to the governorships in person. However, if these people are identified by the competent authorities, they are taken to the nearest dispatch center accompanied by the authorized law enforcement *(TPR, 2014, 17/7)*. According to the information on the page of the Directorate of Migration Management, Turkey has hosted 256,971 Syrian foreigners in 26 temporary accommodation centers established in 10 cities due to the immigration waves result-

ing from this humanitarian crisis.(Presidency of Migration Management, 2023a) Due to the lack of peace and security in the Syrian Arab Republic, the duration of stay of Syrians under temporary protection in our country has been extended, and this has necessitated social cohesion. As a result of this requirement, people were supported to maintain their lives outside the temporary accommodation centers, and as of September 16, 2020, 59,877 Syrians under temporary protection are housed in 7 temporary accommodation centers in 5 provinces. Apart from this, there are 3,559,041 Syrians under temporary protection living outside the temporary shelter centers. (Presidency of Migration Management, 2023c)

With a new circular, it has been stated that the registration of persons who want to apply for Temporary Protection will not be taken, except for the *"Temporary Accommodation Centers"* in the provinces listed, regarding the temporary protection persons who are supported to maintain their lives outside the Temporary Shelter Centers. (Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, 2014)In this way, the temporary protection procedure will work as in the period when the mass influx started, in the form of firstly taking the people to the shelter centers and directing them to the provinces from there. People were prevented from applying directly to the provinces and from living in the province where they obtained their identity. Persons wishing to apply for Temporary Protection will be directed to the temporary accommodation centers established in the provinces of Hatay, Kilis, Osmaniye, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin and Gaziantep and registration procedures will be initiated. For this reason, as of 06.06.2022, the identity appointments given from other provinces have been canceled and the process of directing the people to the specified provinces has started. The fact that it is not clear how long people will stay in temporary accommodation centers, concerns about the fact that the applicants do not want to live in provinces other than big cities and that family unity can be ensured, creates an obstacle to temporary protection applications. Instead of obtaining the legal right to stay, people prefer to remain in the position of irregular immigrants and be placed under administrative detention due to uncertainties.

According to the data available on Mülteciler.org; As of September 22, 2022, the number of Syrians staying in temporary accommodation centers was announced as 47,988. This number is 48 thousand 399 people last month *(August 18, 2022)*, 51 thousand 435 people at the beginning of

2022, 58 thousand 752 people at the beginning of 2021, 63 thousand 247 people at the beginning of 2020, 143 thousand 558 people at the beginning of 2019 and at the beginning of 2018, it was 228 thousand 251 people. Only 1.3% of Syrians lived in camps. As of September 22, 2022, the number of Syrians living in cities was announced as 3 million 604 thousand 246 people. The number of Syrians living in cities decreased by 168 compared to the previous month. 98.7% of Syrians live in cities. (Presidency of Migration Management, 2023c)

The temporary protection identity document provides the right to stay in Turkey. This document is not considered equivalent to the residence permit or documents replacing the residence permit regulated in the Law. It does not grant the right of transition to a long-term residence permit. Temporary Protection period is not taken into account in the total residence permit. This status does not provide the holder with the right to apply for Turkish citizenship *(TPR, 2014, 25)*.

This status, which is recognized because it is not possible to operate international protection procedures due to the mass influx from Syria to our border gates as a result of the civil war in Syria, does not give confidence to those who are temporarily protected. For more than 10 years, people from Syria have been placed under temporary protection. It is not certain how long this status will continue to be valid, and it is not known what will happen to the persons under temporary protection if the status is canceled by the President's decision. This situation causes social tension within the country.

ACCESS TO RIGHTS AND SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND TEMPORARY PROTECTION

The rights and freedoms that international protection applicants and status holders and persons under temporary protection can benefit from are regulated separately in the LFIP and the Temporary Protection Regulation.

Regarding the international protection status regulated in LFIP in terms of access to education services, applicants and persons with international status and their family members will be able to benefit from primary education and secondary education services *(LFIP 2013, 89/1)*.

Educational services are regulated under a separate article in the Temporary Protection Regulation. Education activities have been given to the

control and responsibility of the Ministry of National Education inside or outside the temporary accommodation centers. In this context, the relevant identity holders will be able to benefit from the courses to be organized within the scope of pre-school education, primary education, secondary education and non-formal education. The procedures and principles regarding associate, undergraduate, graduate and doctorate education will also be determined by the Higher Education Presidency. It has been stated that those who are temporarily protected can also benefit from these training services once the specified conditions are met. (Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, 2014)

Regarding access to health care; Those who do not have any health insurance and do not have the ability to pay are subject to the provisions of the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law No. 5510, dated 31/5/2006, for a period of one year from the registration of the international protection application.(TBMM, 2006) A one-year time limit is not sought for those with special needs and those whose insurance continuation is deemed appropriate by the Ministry *(LFIP, 2013, 89/3)*. Here, the access of international protection applicants and status holders to the right to free health is limited to one year. The insurance of people whose insurance is closed and then proves to have special needs is reactivated.

Access to health services of persons benefiting from temporary protection is regulated in the regulation. Persons benefiting from temporary protection benefit from general health insurance. These people benefit from health services within the borders of the province where they reside. People living in different provinces, who do not have a valid road permit or a referral document between hospitals, can access the right to health by paying a fee in these provinces.

In order to access the labor market, an international protection applicant, conditional refugee or person under temporary protection can apply for a work permit six months after the application date. Refugee or subsidiary protection status holders can work independently or dependently from the status they receive. The identity document to be given to a refugee or a person with subsidiary protection status also acts as a work permit. This situation is also written on the identity document of the persons *(LFIP, 2013, 89/4/b)*. Identities issued for persons other than refugee and subsidiary protection status do not replace work permits. The work permits obtained by people with this identity do not give them the right to move freely within the

country. In order to travel between provinces, individuals are obliged to go to the provincial immigration administration in their province and obtain permission.

Access to social assistance and services is provided to those in need among applicants or persons with international protection status *(LFIP, 2013, 89,2)*. Those who apply for temporary protection can also benefit from the social assistance specified in the Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Law No. 3294 dated 29/5/1986, within the framework of the procedures and principles to be determined by the Social Assistance and Solidarity Encouragement Fund Board.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AND DEPORTATION

Foreigners can be deported to their country of origin, transit country or a third country with a deportation decision *(LFIP, 2013, 52)*.

Deportation decision is taken on the instructions of the General Directorate or by the governorships ex officio. The deportation decision should be notified to the foreigner, his legal representative or lawyer, about whom the deportation decision has been taken, together with the reasons. The deportation decision can be appealed to the administrative court within seven days from the notification of the decision. The person who applies to the court to appeal the decision also notifies the authority that made the deportation decision. Applications made to the court are finalized within fifteen days. The court's decision on this matter is final. Provided that the consent of the foreigner is reserved, the foreigner is not deported within the period of filing a lawsuit or, in case of a judicial remedy, until the trial is concluded. *(LFIP, 2013, 53)*. After the final deportation decision, an individual application can be made to the Constitutional Court.

Those for whom a deportation decision will be taken are listed as a limitation in Article 54 of the Supreme Court. These are:

- " Those who are directors, members, supporters of a terrorist organization or managers, members or supporters of a profit-oriented criminal organization,
- Those who use false information and fake documents in the procedures for entry to Turkey, visa and residence permits,

- Those who earn their living from illegitimate means during their stay in Turkey,
- Those that pose a threat to public order or public safety or public health,
- Those who exceed the visa or visa exemption period for more than ten days or whose visa has been cancelled,
- Those whose residence permits have been revoked,
- Those who have a residence permit and violate the residence permit period for more than ten days without an acceptable justification as of the expiry of its term,
- Those who are found to be working without a work permit,
- Those who violate or attempt to violate the provisions of legal entry or exit from Turkey,
- Those who are found to have come to Turkey despite being banned from entering Turkey,
- Those whose international protection application is rejected, excluded from international protection, whose application is considered inadmissible, whose application is withdrawn, whose application is deemed withdrawn, whose international protection status has expired or been cancelled, who do not have the right to stay in Turkey after the final decision,
- Those whose residence permit extension applications are rejected and do not leave Turkey within ten days,
- Those who are considered to be related to terrorist organizations defined by international institutions and organizations." (LFIP,2013, 54)

Those who are directors, members, supporters of a terrorist organization or managers, members or supporters of a profit-oriented criminal organization, those who pose a threat to public order or public safety or public health, those who are considered to be related to terrorist organizations defined by international institutions and organizations are included. International protection applicants or persons with international protection status can be deported at every stage of international protection proceedings. In practice, it is seen that deportation decisions are frequently made without adequate research and without providing a valid justification, on the ground that there is a threat to public order or public security.

Deportation decision cannot be taken for the foreigners listed below, even if they are among the persons listed above for whom a deportation decision can be taken.

- " Those who have serious indications that they will be subject to the death penalty, torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment in the country to which they will be deported, under the principle of non-refoulement,
- Those who are considered risky to travel due to serious health problems, age and pregnancy status,
- Those who do not have the opportunity to receive treatment in the country to which they will be deported while their treatment for their life-threatening diseases continues,
- Victims of human trafficking who benefit from the victim support process, victims of psychological, physical or sexual violence until their treatment is completed" (LFIP, 2013, 55/1)

The deportation decision for those who need a deportation decision is taken by the governorates. Of those for whom a deportation decision has been taken;

- " Those at risk of escaping and getting lost,
- Those violating the rules of entry or exit to Turkey,
- Those using fake or unfounded documents,
- Those who do not leave Turkey within the given time without an acceptable excuse,
- Those that pose a threat to public order, public safety or public health,

administrative detention decision is taken by the governorship or alternative obligations are brought to administrative detention pursuant to Article 57/A" (LFIP, 2013, 57/A)

Foreigners for whom an administrative detention decision has been taken are taken to the refoulement centers within 48 hours by the law enforcement unit that made the arrest. The administrative detention period in the refoulement center cannot exceed six months. The period of administrative detention can be extended for a maximum of six months. (Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği, 2014)The governor's office regularly evaluates whether to continue the administrative detention or not. In cases where it is not necessary to continue the administrative detention, the administrative detention is terminated immediately and alternative obligations are brought. Objections to administrative detention are made to the Criminal Judgeships of Peace. Making an objection will not end the administrative detention. The Magistrate Judge examines the objection within five days. The decision of the Magistrate Judge is final.

Persons for whom administrative detention decision has been taken are kept in places called Removal Centers. In 2022, the number of removal centers was increased to 30 and their capacity to 20,540. Provinces where removal centers are located; Adana, Ağrı, Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Balıkesir, Bursa, Çanakkale, Çankırı, Edirne, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Kütahya, Malatya, Muğla, Niğde, Şanlıurfa, Van, Iğdır, Malatya. Persons to be deported and in removal centers are taken to the border gates by law enforcement.

A deportation decision may be taken for persons who apply for international protection or stay in Turkey with a residence permit. As Syria is a safe third country, a deportation decision cannot be made for those who benefit from temporary protection, which is a special status. However, it is known that Syrian nationals, for whom a deportation decision cannot be taken, are forced into the voluntary return procedure, which is also included in the law. In the post titled <Turkey Left Europe Behind in Deportation Numbers> on the official website of the immigration administration, it is stated that 75,678 people have been deported since the beginning of the year in 2022. At the time of publication, it was stated that 17,569 foreigners from 91 different nationalities (5,259 from Pakistan, 3,888 from Afghanistan and 8,422 other nationalities) were under administrative detention in removal centers.(Presidency of Migration Management, 2022)

CONCLUSION

In this study, the dual asylum system in Turkish Law is explained within its legal framework. Within the scope of the LFIP, the definitions of refugee, conditional refugee, and secondary protection statuses that can be provided to individuals in case of access to international protection and acceptance of international protection are explained. The legal remedies that can be applied in case of access to international protection and refusal of international protection are specified. The conditions listed in the law for administrative detention and deportation decisions are mentioned, and the place and form of the prohibition of refoulement in our law are mentioned. Temporary protection status, which is another title of the dual asylum system, and the rights and services that international protection applicants and temporary protection holders can access are explained.

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In a period when the number of forcibly displaced people exceeds 100 million, conflicts and wars are not over, rights violations against migrants and refugees are expanding, anti-migration hate speeches are increasing, and security perspectives such as Fortress Europe - Fortress Anatolia are dominated, this book offers an alternative perspective on the phenomenon of migration with examples from the Eurasian region, encompassing the scholarly contributions of researchers spanning from Belarus to Pakistan, Turkiye, Iran, and Georgia.

By taking a multidisciplinary approach to the phenomenon of migration from economic, social, political and legal perspectives, the book aims to contribute to migration studies, in addition to the theoretical chapters on economics, civil society, security, nation-state policies and migration politics, the readers will find chapters related from the field such as position of Afghan immigrants in Iran and Turkiye; economic, social and cultural environment of Syrians in Turkiye; security policies of the European Union; identity crisis caused by refugees in Hungary and Germany; internal migration in Georgia; the situation of Afghan immigrants in Pakistan, and migration industry.

By presenting important theoretical and field studies on migration, which has affected and continues to affect the world from past to present, this book emerges as an indispensable wellspring of knowledge for anyone interested in migration studies.

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